{"id":175,"date":"2011-09-03T01:52:02","date_gmt":"2011-09-03T01:52:02","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.up.edu.pe\/blogs\/csanborn\/Lists\/EntradasDeBlog\/ViewPost.aspx?ID=15"},"modified":"2022-10-13T06:04:46","modified_gmt":"2022-10-13T06:04:46","slug":"democracy-and-the-armed-forces-in-peru-inoperative-at-any-cost","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.up.edu.pe\/csanborn\/democracy-and-the-armed-forces-in-peru-inoperative-at-any-cost\/","title":{"rendered":"Democracy and the Armed Forces in Peru: Inoperative at Any Cost?"},"content":{"rendered":"
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[blockquote source=\u00bb\u00bb]\u00bbDespite the highly touted and real economic bonanza our country has enjoyed, very\u00a0<\/em>
\nlittle has been done to have a dissuasive Armed Forces, leaving our Nation in a\u00a0<\/em>
\ndangerous state of defenselessness.\u00a0 Unlike our neighboring countries, which during<\/em>
\nthe same period have substantially increased their defense budgets in relation to ours<\/em>\u00ab.<\/p>\n

—<\/strong>Open Letter to the Peruvian People<\/a>, 2\/9\/11, signed by 62 retired
\ngenerals, military ministers and chiefs of command.<\/div>\n

[\/blockquote]<\/p>\n

Among the challenges facing any newly elected government, is how to deal with
\nthe so-called \u201cde facto powers\u201d (poderes f\u00e1cticos<\/em>), those that did not elect you but
\ncan make life difficult if you don\u00b4t get along with them.\u00a0 In Per\u00fa these include
\npowerful national and transnational corporations, the U.S. government, the
\nCatholic Church and the Armed Forces.<\/p>\n

So far, the Humala Administration has done a pretty good job negotiating with
\ncorporate interests<\/a>, exacting higher tax commitments from the mining industry
\nwhile retaining investor confidence.\u00a0 It has not done so well at a defining a clear
\nstance vis-\u00e0-vis U.S. efforts to continue dictating drug policy, and has not yet
\nconfronted the Catholic Church<\/a> hierarchy, currently engaged in efforts to take
\nover Peru\u00b4s leading private university.<\/p>\n

Yet the relationship that most puzzles analysts today, is that between the
\ngovernment and the Armed Forces.\u00a0 This is a country ruled directly or indirectly
\nby the military for much of its post-Independence history.\u00a0 Will the election of a
\ncareer officer as president increase their institutional power? How will President
\nHumala\u2019s background influence his appointments and policy decisions?\u00a0 Do
\n22 years with the troops make him more or less sympathetic to demands from
\nthe barracks, to increase pay, upgrade acquisitions, or end the prosecution of
\nofficers for crimes against humanity committed during the 1980s and 1990s?
\nSo far there no clear answers, just speculation.<\/p>\n

What is clear is how little most civilians know, or care, about the Peruvian
\narmed forces and their relationship to national development. With a few
\nexceptions, scholars have avoided researching the contemporary military, and
\nonly a few journalists, such as Gustavo Gorriti and Ricardo Uceda, have consistently
\ncovered them.\u00a0 Among NGOs, the main focus has been pursuit of justice for civilian
\nvictims of military abuse, a necessary effort that has persisted despite complicity
\nand obstructionism from diverse powers.\u00a0 The Instituto de Defensa Legal (IDL) <\/a>
\nalso focuses on the rights of the men and women who comprise today\u00b4s troops.<\/p>\n

What is missing from this picture is a significant public debate about the role of
\nthis country\u2019s Armed Forces in the 21st century.\u00a0\u00a0 Should they be a deterrent and
\ndefensive force ?\u00a0 If so, is neighboring Chile the main threat, or are Chileans
\ntoday more interested in profit than plunder?\u00a0\u00a0 Should the Army, Navy and Air Force
\nconcentrate on internal security, fighting drug traffickers and subversives?
\nOn building and rebuilding national infrastructure, along the lines of the Army Corps
\nof Engineers?\u00a0 In a speech<\/a> this week in Cuzco, President Humala encouraged
\nyoung people to join the Army, and lauded its role as a parallel educational
\nsystem, providing useful skills to low income youth; something the public school
\nsystem is not very good at.<\/p>\n

Alas, a recent article by Ricardo Uceda<\/a> in Poder<\/em> magazine, confirms in part what
\na prominent group of retired generals and former military leaders proclaimed this
\nweek in an Open Letter<\/a> published in a leading daily: the Peruvian military is virtually
\ninoperative and unfit to play any of these roles effectively.\u00a0 Citing research by
\neconomist Juan Mendoza, military scholar Enrique Obando, and inside sources,
\nUceda details serious problems of outdated equipment and technology, low levels
\nof investment, low and unequal pay scales, a high ratio of officials to subalterns,
\nand a bankrupt pension system.<\/p>\n

According to this report, Peru has one of the lowest per capita military expenditures in
\nthe region.\u00a0 Chile spends four times more on its armed forces; Ecuador, with less
\nthan half of Peru\u00b4s population, spends\u00a0 60% more.\u00a0 Furthermore, only 5% of
\nPeruvian military spending goes to purchase arms and equipment, and less than
\n1% to training personnel.\u00a0\u00a0 Between 2001 and 2010, according to Mendoza, 90%
\nof the military budget went to paying active personnel and pensioners, and to daily
\nexpenses such as food and transport for troops.\u00a0 Yet military wages in this country are
\nthe lowest in the region, with subalterns earning as little as US $490 per month, generals
\n$2,809 (a Bolivian general gets $6,851, his Chilean counterpart $5,072).\u00a0 The author
\nalso says that of 46,000 active service members, 10,000 are officials and 36,000 subalterns,
\nwith a 3:1 ratio in the Air Force and a striking 2:1 in the Army.\u00a0 Meanwhile, the military
\npension fund (Caja de Pensiones Militar Policia<\/em>l<\/em>) has run a deficit since 2005, costing
\ntaxpayers S\/23 million per month to meet current obligations to some 145,000 pensioners.<\/p>\n

So who is responsible for this situation?\u00a0\u00a0 The generals now lay the blame on
\noutgoing president Alan Garcia, a stance which may be politically motivated, but
\ninaccurate.\u00a0\u00a0 This dates at least to the late 1970s, when the Revolutionary Government
\nof the Armed Forces retreated from power after 12 years of running the country (into
\nthe ground, many would say).\u00a0 The ruling junta, led by General Francisco Morales
\nBermudez (1975-1980) and other signers of the recent letter, skillfully negotiated its
\nexit from government with leaders of Garc\u00edas APRA party and the center-right PPC
\n(SEE MY POST ON THIS<\/a>).\u00a0 Together they dominated a Constituent Assembly convened
\nby the Junta to delay the transition and institutionalize aspects of its statist agenda
\nand model of governance.<\/p>\n

As a result of this process, the military hierarchy not only got a new constitution
\n(replaced in 1993 by one more to Fujimori\u00b4s liking), but also tacit immunity from
\nprosecution for acts committed during their years in power, and a persistent role in
\nnational defense policy.\u00a0 Apparently, on its way out the junta also established the
\ncurrent pension scheme, one that was seriously underfinanced from the start. This
\nhas been accompanied by a costly c\u00e9dula viva<\/em> (living decree) law guaranteeing retirees
\na fully indexed pension equal to the salary of active duty counterparts.\u00a0 According to
\nUceda, another S\/250 million was lost from the Caja<\/em> due to corruption in the 1990s.<\/p>\n

Civilian control over the military is fundamental to democracy.\u00a0 Yet most civilian
\nleaders since 1980 have either abdicated to the Armed Forces or avoided their
\nconcerns.\u00a0\u00a0 President Fernando Belaunde Terry (1980-1985) made peace with
\nthe golpistas<\/em> who sent him into exile in the 1970s, and as the Shining Path
\ninsurgency appeared on the scene, he and Garcia (in 1985-1990, his first stint)
\ndelegated the military de facto<\/em> control over large expanses of national territory,
\nunder constitutional states of emergency, a situation that persisted into the 1990s.
\nIn 1992 most military leaders supported the auto-golpe<\/em> led by President Alberto
\nFujmori and his shady advisor Vladimiro Montecinos, a former Army captain and
\nCIA informer who created a huge web of political control and corruption.<\/p>\n

By the time fully civilian government was restored in 2001 the military was
\nwidely discredited, and there was little public support for increased spending on
\ndefense.\u00a0 Even with bonanza growth, the country has other development
\npriorities.\u00a0 Yet as President Humala knows, and the generals made clear,
\nthis problem will not simply go away.\u00a0\u00a0 As a leader who has personally
\nexperienced the hardships of his comrades-in-arms, will Humala do more than
\nencourage young people to join the service?\u00a0 Will he have the skill to lead a real
\nreform process, or be inclined to increase spending with nothing in return?\u00a0 And
\ncan reform be undertaken without a general amnesty or Punto Final<\/a> that would
\ntrade justice for expediency?\u00a0 What lessons can we learn from those who have studied
\nsimilar processes in other lands and times?<\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

[blockquote source=\u00bb\u00bb]\u00bbDespite the highly touted and real economic bonanza our country has enjoyed, very\u00a0 little has been done to have a dissuasive Armed Forces, leaving our Nation in a\u00a0 dangerous state of defenselessness.\u00a0 Unlike our neighboring countries, which during the same period have substantially increased their defense budgets in relation to ours\u00ab. —Open Letter to
Leer m\u00e1s…<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-175","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-politica-peruana"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.up.edu.pe\/csanborn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/175","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.up.edu.pe\/csanborn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.up.edu.pe\/csanborn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.up.edu.pe\/csanborn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.up.edu.pe\/csanborn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=175"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.up.edu.pe\/csanborn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/175\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":323,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.up.edu.pe\/csanborn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/175\/revisions\/323"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.up.edu.pe\/csanborn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=175"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.up.edu.pe\/csanborn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=175"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.up.edu.pe\/csanborn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=175"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}