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**Harvard University, 1991**

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



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Date: 27 September 1991



THE DEMOCRATIC LEFT AND THE PERSISTENCE OF  
POPULISM IN PERU: 1975 - 1990

A Thesis Presented  
by  
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to  
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## ABSTRACT

### THE DEMOCRATIC LEFT AND THE PERSISTENCE OF POPULISM IN PERU: 1975 - 1990

Cynthia Ann Sanborn

This dissertation examines the challenges to the consolidation and extension of democracy in contemporary Latin America. It does so through a case study of the efforts of the Peruvian Aprista Party (APRA), and part of the Marxist left, to forge alternative democratic left projects in Peru over the past decade and a half, in a context of transition from authoritarian to democratic rule.

This research confirms that there are tremendous structural obstacles to democratization in Latin America. Yet it also argues that political strategy and rules can reduce--or reinforce--such inherited constraints, and can also create new barriers, particularly during a period of regime transition and the initial years of a new regime. Furthermore, this study suggests that without effective structures and processes of representation, the outcome is likely to be a recurring cycle of populist politics and socioeconomic crisis. This pattern has emerged in several cases, including Argentina, Brazil and Peru.

The Peruvian case is particularly illustrative. While Peru's historical-structural development made it an unlikely case for democratization through the 1960s, this thesis points out how structural changes in the 1970s reduced some important barriers to democratization, and produced key political elements considered necessary for social democracy. These include a mass labor and popular movement, which played a key role in Peru's successful transition from military to

civilian rule. They also include the establishment of new "rules of the game" through a Constituent Assembly and electoral laws. The mass-based APRA party and the United Left front emerged as the main contenders to represent this movement politically in the 1980s. Each developed a social democratic discourse and program, and they faced little competition from the political right.

Nonetheless, this study demonstrates how other conditions hindered a social democratic outcome and, indeed, the consolidation of any democratic political structures. While labor and popular organizations played a fundamental role in the transition, they remained relatively weak. Their links with the political parties were fraught with difficulties, and a deepening economic crisis further diminished their strength. Furthermore, the parties themselves had difficulty shaping the transition process and representing their diverse constituencies. They lacked clarity about the importance of the Constituent Assembly; were unable to develop coherent strategies, organizations or pacts; and ultimately redefined themselves around electoral personalities. The result has been a "representation gap", which in turn contributes to the recurrence of populism and socioeconomic crisis.

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## CHAPTER I

### Social Democracy and Populism: Old Debates in a New Context

"It is worth asking...why and for what did the Peruvian people vote? They voted first of all to affirm democracy as peaceful coexistence, as the fundamental liberties of opinion, expression and assembly. They voted to confirm that only the people can select their leaders and sanction their errors...But (they also voted) to open the door to a more profound conception of democracy...a social democracy"

--Alan Garcia Perez, July 28, 1985

In 1985 President Alan Garcia Perez of the Peruvian Aprista Party (APRA) swept into office with an unprecedented popular mandate. Recalling the ideals of his party's legendary founder, Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, Garcia rejected the "new imperialism" of Latin America's international creditors, and promised to install in Peru a political and social democracy, a regime in which human rights would be protected and state policies would be oriented towards the needs of the poor majority. Garcia's closest electoral competitor, Alfonso Barrantes Lingan of the marxist United Left Front (IU), professed similar goals of anti-imperialism and democracy with social justice. Garcia thus urged all Peruvians to rally behind his popular leadership, and to share his dream of "an integrated Latin America, which will be the grand showplace for democracy and socialism in the coming century".<sup>1</sup>

Garcia's dramatic initial measures and the tacit consensus between Peru's two main political forces, the APRA and IU,

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<sup>1</sup> See "El Mensaje Presidencial, 28 de julio de 1985", reprinted in Mensajes de Fraternidad (Lima: Partido Aprista Peruano, 1985).

generated considerable enthusiasm in a country where democracy had thus far been accompanied by economic and social crisis. This domestic enthusiasm was reinforced by the many expressions of international support for Garcia, particularly from the United States media and intellectual community, and from such prominent Socialist International leaders as Felipe Gonzalez of Spain and Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela.<sup>2</sup> Yet this outcome also prompted questions among those familiar with the history of the APRA party. In decades of frustrated efforts to win political power, the APRA like many of its Latin American counterparts had abandoned its early anti-imperialism, assumed populist political forms, and made widely-criticized conservative pacts with dominant elites. By the 1960s the APRA lost ground to new reformist and revolutionary groups, in the 1970s its brand of politics was pronounced dead in Peru as in much of the region, and in 1979 APRA's Jefe Maximo Haya de la Torre himself passed away. How, then, did the APRA make such a comeback? And how feasible was a new social democratic reform project in the 1980s?

In fact, it did not take long for Garcia's social democratic project to degenerate into an extreme form of populism, which led in turn to greater economic collapse, exacerbated social conflict, and a substantial weakening of Peru's nascent democratic institutions. By

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<sup>2</sup> See for example Riorden Roett, "Peru: The Message from Garcia", Foreign Affairs, Winter 85/86, Volume 64, Number 2, pp. 273-286; Alan Riding, "Downcast Peru is Given a Lift By New Leader", The New York Times, September 3, 1985; and Everett G. Martin, "Peruvian President's Push on World Debt Gains Him Visibility and Public Approval", The Wall Street Journal, September 25, 1985.

the subsequent elections of 1990 the young president and his party faced widespread public opprobrium, and the United Left was also in disarray. Both were swept aside by a new popular figure, Alberto Fujimori, a man with no party base and no experience in public office. And today Peru appears to be repeating a vicious cycle of failed populism and socioeconomic crisis.

The recent Peruvian experience in fact raises difficult questions about political democracy and social change that are have been common to most of Latin America. "Social democracy", broadly understood as the pursuit of equity and social justice within the parameters of a capitalist economy and political democracy, became a predominant strategy of radicals and reformers alike in Latin America in the 1980s. Although armed struggle remained an option for some sectors of the left in Central America and the Andes, the repressive military dictatorships of the Southern Cone and the lure of electoral competition across the region pushed many former revolutionaries towards more moderate democratic politics.<sup>3</sup> At the same time, older populist leaders and parties faced new policy agendas, new social movements, and greater political competition in the 1980s, and a number of them made remarkable comebacks.<sup>4</sup> For some the pursuit of

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<sup>3</sup> See Robert Barros, "The Left and Democracy: Recent Debates in Latin America", Telos No. 68, 1986; Steve Ellner, "The Latin American Left Since Allende: Perspectives and New Directions", Latin American Research Review Vol. 24, Nos. 2, 1989; and Henry Pease Garcia et al, America Latina 80: Democracia y Movimiento Popular (Lima: DESCO, 1981).

<sup>4</sup> In 1988 Alan Riding noted that "The phenomenon of charismatic leaders who can stir the masses with messages of hope and faith is reappearing today. Although the appeal of President Alan Garcia Perez of Peru is already fading, Venezuela's former President, Carlos Andres Perez, seems set to return to power this year, and the left-leaning



social change through electoral means is simply a tactical option; for others it has become the ideal. But what are the prospects for social democratic movements in contemporary Latin America? Can particular types of political organization, alliances, or strategy overcome the tremendous structural obstacles to democratization and social justice throughout the region? And can such a movement avoid becoming a populist one, with all the weaknesses and contradictions that have plagued that political form?

The efforts of the APRA, and part of the Marxist left, to forge alternative democratic left projects in Peru over the past decade and a half, a period of transition to democracy and prolonged economic crisis, orient this study. It argues the following: First, there are major historical and structural obstacles to democratization in Peru. Second, accelerated social change and political mobilization in the 1970s created new opportunities for a broad-based democratic left movement. With the transition from military to civilian rule, the APRA and the IU became the main contenders to organize and represent such a movement. Third, a "representation gap" nevertheless made the construction of such a broad-based movement difficult, and contributed to the persistence of unstable populism as a dominant political form. More specifically, the APRA party faced serious limitations in constructing a broad democratic left organization; the IU also had difficulty grasping new opportunities; and efforts to

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populist Leonel Brizola is currently Brazil's most popular politician". Populists did well in the Ecuadoran elections of 1988 and Peronist Carlos Menem was elected President of Argentina in 1989 ("Democracy and Disappointment in Ecuador", New York Times, May 15, 1988).

forge an alliance between them proved unsuccessful. Instead, Peru in the 1980s was marked by a continued distance between the state and political party structures on one hand, and the organizations and interests of civil society on the other. This fostered a recurrence of arbitrary and personalist leadership, and of deepening social and economic crisis.

This tendency towards populism in contemporary Peru was exemplified by the Garcia phenomenon, but it began before 1985 and has remained a central feature of that country's politics. As in previous eras, this populism emerged in a context of socioeconomic stress; has been predominantly urban, multi-class and electoral; and is characterized by vertical and personalist authority relations between charismatic leaders and popular masses, above existing party and interest organizations. As in the past, populist leaders have also pursued contradictory economic policies that are intended to benefit the working classes, but that end up undermining the welfare of the poor majority. Furthermore, they share the same disdain for liberal, representative democracy as their predecessors.<sup>5</sup> At the same time, this populism has emerged in a distinct economic and political context. By the 1980s Peru's major urban trade unions were largely under Communist leadership, forcing other political contenders to seek alternative bases of support among the broader

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<sup>5</sup> On past populist regimes and leaders, see Michael L. Conniff, ed., Latin American Populism in Comparative Perspective (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982). On populist economic policies and their impact, see Jeffrey D. Sachs, "Social Conflict and Populist Policies in Latin America", National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., Working Paper No. 2897, March 1989.

urban poor and diverse middle sectors. Both Garcia's APRA and the IU vied to do this. Yet they faced a more unfavorable international system, a shrinking economy, and had far fewer resources to distribute than their predecessors. Latin American history demonstrates that when politics takes this populist form it does not bode well for the consolidation of democracy or social justice, and instead the outcomes are likely to be deeper social and economic crisis and greater political instability.<sup>6</sup> As we shall see, the Peruvian experience of the 1980s certainly confirms this pattern.

The remainder of this chapter lays out the concepts of social democracy and populism as they are used here, and discusses recent theoretical and comparative debates which are relevant to this study. In particular, it aims to draw from comparative experience the factors that have conditioned the emergence of these political forms in different contexts. The following chapter then lays out the structural dilemmas of Peru's development which form the framework for the period, actors and choices this thesis will subsequently analyze.

#### The Social Democratic Alternative

Rather than identify "social democracy" by a specific party label or international affiliation, the term is used in this study to define a broad political strategy: working within the parameters of political democracy and capitalism in order to bring about a transition to socialism. Social democrats begin as socialists,

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<sup>6</sup>. The similarities and differences between what I call populism here and its predecessors are further elaborated in the concluding chapter.

committed to such goals as the autonomous organization and empowerment of the working class, the replacement of private property by social ownership of the means of production, the elimination of economic and political inequality and all sources of exploitation, and the construction of a society based on solidarity and the satisfaction of basic human needs.<sup>1</sup> But they have also come to believe that the working classes should seek power through elections and political alliances rather than revolutionary action, and pursue a gradual transition towards these goals. Thus social democratic strategy is often conceived in stages: political democracy is pursued first, then democratic principles are extended into the social realm, and ultimately--but not necessarily--into the sphere of production.<sup>2</sup>

Social democracy has of course been most prevalent in Western Europe, and has historically had little presence in Latin America. However, a renewed interest in this political strategy was an important outcome of the recent regime transitions in this region. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, analysts concerned with the prospects for democracy in Latin America began to turn their attention from issues of economic development and social structure,

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<sup>1</sup> Marx and Engels never provided a detailed description of socialism, and it has since been defined in many ways. The replacement of private property by social control of the means of production is a common point of departure, but many socialists also stress economic and political equality, social solidarity, and human liberation as part of the socialist ideal. See Adam Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

<sup>2</sup> See Przeworski, *op cit*; and Gosta Esping-Anderson, Politics Against Markets: The Social Democratic Road to Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). A basic statement of "stage theory" of democratization is that of T.H. Marshall, Class, Citizenship and Social Development (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1964).

to political variables such as organization, leadership, pactmaking, and institution-building.<sup>9</sup> Yet the major problems plaguing most new democracies in the region have been economic and social--overwhelming external debt burdens, prolonged recession, and historical problems of poverty, racism and highly inequitable social structures. This has generated renewed conviction that democracy in the region cannot survive unless issues of social and economic justice are addressed along with political democracy. This has been reinforced in some cases by the incorporation of radical left parties into the political process, and their espousal of democratic goals and strategies.<sup>10</sup>

In this context of searching for social democratic alternatives, the comparative development of this strategy in different historical contexts can offer some insights.<sup>11</sup> Marxist working class parties across Europe became social democratic in

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<sup>9</sup> See Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., *op cit*; Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Jorge Nef, "The Trend Toward Democratization and Redemocratization in Latin America: Shadow and Substance", Latin American Research Review, Volume 23, Number 3, 1988.

<sup>10</sup> An important statement of how economic structures and political statecraft together shaped Latin America's historical development is that of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979; original Spanish version 1971). Useful recent analyses of the relationship between structure and choice in Latin American politics are found in Terry Lynn Karl, "The Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America", Comparative Politics, October 1990; and Evelyne Huber Stephens, "Capitalist Development and Democracy in South America", Kellogg Institute Working Paper #122, May 1989.

<sup>11</sup> The following discussion draws primarily from Przeworski *op cit*; Esping-Anderson, *op cit*; John Stephens, The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1979); and Ignacio Walker, Socialismo y Democracia: Chile y Europa en Perspectiva Comparativa (Santiago: CIEPLAN-Hachette, 1990).

practice in the late nineteenth century, when the struggle for political democracy itself was still a major task. As workers won the right to vote, these parties generally grasped the opportunity to participate in elections. For many this decision came in the wake of failure and suppression of mass strike and protest activity, and it began as a tentative and utilitarian choice. Leftist parties still saw themselves as class-based and revolutionary, playing not only the electoral game.<sup>12</sup>

As the twentieth century dawned, many Socialists nevertheless became increasingly optimistic about the prospect that the working class would constitute a majority, and that with universal suffrage their parties could therefore obtain an electoral mandate for socialism. Indeed, by the 1890s the proletariat in much of Europe was militant and well-organized in unions and a variety of social clubs, as well as participating in strikes and increasingly voting in elections. Early social democratic electoral results seemed to confirm these predictions. The German Social Democratic Party grew from 125,000 votes in 1871 to become the largest single party in Germany by 1890, and by 1912 it claimed 34.8 percent of the vote. In 1907 Finnish Social Democrats won a plurality in the first election under universal suffrage, while the Swedish SAP rose from just 3.5 percent in 1902 to 28.5 percent in 1911 after suffrage was extended,

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<sup>12</sup>. As Przeworski cites, these early Socialists "entered electoral politics gingerly, 'only to utilize them for propaganda purposes' and vowed 'not to enter any alliances with other parties or to accept any compromises' (Resolution of the Eisenach Congress of the German S.P.D. in 1870). Indeed, an 1898 survey showed that many Socialist International leaders felt they should never or only exceptionally participate in government (op cit, p.10).

and became the single largest party in that country by 1917. Between the 1890s and 1917 similar successes were repeated across much of Europe. "The progress seemed inexorable" Przeworski notes, "the majority and the mandate for socialism embodied therein were just a matter of years, a couple of elections".<sup>13</sup> Hence despite their radical discourse, electoral abstention was never really an option for socialist parties once they had the opportunity to participate.

As the century evolved, however, the proletariat did not become a voting majority in Europe, and class pure, electorally-based socialism no longer seemed inevitable. At the same time, political democracy became essential to many socialists even at the expense of revolutionary goals. Hence as opportunities for electoral victory came within their grasp, socialist parties quickly assumed the need to build alliances with other social classes, and to make compromises in order to attain power. These alliances varied with class structure and political opportunity, involving peasants, and/or various petty bourgeois and middle strata. To mobilize these groups socialists had to offer new kinds of benefits and reforms, and moderate their appeal. However, they generally upheld that such reforms would themselves constitute steps towards an ultimate socialist transformation.

In the aftermath of World War I and the Russian Revolution, major dividing lines were drawn between Communists and democratic

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<sup>13</sup> Op cit, p.19. Electoral data also drawn from Esping-Anderson, op cit, p. 84. Although this strategy had roots in Engels' "The Tactics of Social Democracy" (1895), the classic defense of social democracy is considered that of Edward Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism: A Criticism and an Affirmation [1899] (New York: B.W. Huebsch, 1969).

socialists, the latter stressing their reliance upon political democracy in contrast to Leninism and the authoritarian Soviet model. The impact of this split on the composition and political fate of socialist movements varied across countries. In Southern Europe much of organized labor was linked to the Communist parties, while the progress of leftist forces in general was hampered by their structural weaknesses and bitter political competition. In Northern Europe organized labor remained closely tied to the social democratic parties, and class compromise and moderation became the dominant political strategy, with greatest success in the Scandinavian countries.<sup>14</sup>

In the wake of the Depression these social democrats generally turned to Keynesian economics, and shifted to more explicit compromises with capitalist interests in the search for economic recovery with social welfare. In the wake of World War II and the experience of Fascism some of them--most notably the German SPD after its Bad Godesberg conference in 1959--shifted even further away from marxist discourse and from socialism as an economic doctrine. Although they continued to uphold the long-term vision of extending democracy into social and economic life and liberating people from the inequalities of capitalism, these "Peoples' Parties" focused

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<sup>14</sup> In Denmark Esping-Anderson notes that the arrival of the Communists only strengthened the "solid pragmatism and quest for respectability" of the social democrats. The Swedish SAP had more difficulty in choosing between revolution and reform in the 1920s, but eventually moved toward pragmatic social reformism while maintaining a discourse of socialist transformation. *Op cit*, pp. 80-84.



their daily energies on preserving parliamentary democracy, capitalist economic growth and the welfare state.<sup>15</sup>

In the post-war era, social democracy on the whole has been the most successful form of working class political organization in Western Europe and beyond, in terms of union and political power as well as material welfare. Reformism has had a broad appeal among workers as well as among the growing middle classes; even where more radical left forces have a foothold among organized labor, they remain politically smaller and weaker than their reformist counterparts. Social democrats have had a consistently strong record of respect for political democracy and civil liberties, upholding the value of democracy as a political system under socialism as well as capitalism. Once in power, they have also introduced equalized access to health care and education, and provided a minimum of material security for their populace. While far short of the socialist ideal, the welfare states they constructed have been the most egalitarian among developed nations.<sup>16</sup>

In the Sixties and Seventies many welfare states and social democratic parties were nonetheless shaken by looming fiscal constraints, rising demands from newly mobilized social groups excluded from corporatist structures (including feminists,

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<sup>15</sup> The Bad Godesberg program of 1959 recognized the market and private property rights, abandoned the exclusive focus on the working class, and declared the SPD a volkspartei or "Peoples' Party". After 1959 the party had increasing electoral success, forming a coalition government in 1969 and governing to 1983. Esping Anderson, op cit..

<sup>16</sup> On the accomplishments of Social Democracy, see Castles, op cit, p. 104; and Przeworski, op cit.

environmentalists, and a new generation of students and workers), and radical new leftist movements. This "New Left" criticized entrenched social democratic parties as well as Communist ones, charging that these had come to stress strong corporate party and state organizations at the expense of democratic ones, and economic growth over broader issues of quality of life and human liberation. They called for the democratization of state structures, a revival of grassroots forms of community and workplace-based participation, direct protest actions, and "direct democracy" to complement--or even replace--elections and parliamentary representation. They also encouraged rank-and-file challenges to trade union bureaucracies, and stressed the importance of non-class based social movements, such as the women's rights movement, neighborhood associations, and identity with Third World struggles.<sup>17</sup>

These new currents on the left brought a healthy criticism of authoritarian tendencies with party and state organizations, injected a new spirit of experimentation into changing societies, and prompted some older parties to include new issues and actors in their ranks. However, "grassroots participation" was an inadequate means for addressing some of the major policy issues of the day, particularly the salient macroeconomic problems. Furthermore, direct democracy was neither practical on a national scale nor a guarantee of popular control over higher levels of decisionmaking, and critics stressed that it could easily degenerate into a left-wing version of populism,

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<sup>17</sup> These new left currents are discussed in Esping-Anderson and Przeworski, *op cit*; and discussed in Martin Carnoy, The State and Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

with potential disregard for civil liberties and basic governance. By the 1980s this "New Left" approach was on the wane again, with most new leftists shifting to the electoral strategies and more conventional social democratic stance of the previous generation.<sup>18</sup>

The predominance of social democratic strategy on the left was further reinforced by the evolution of Eurocommunism. Communist parties in Italy, Spain and France in the 1970s began moving back towards the earlier socialist position, emphasizing the importance of democracy and representative political institutions and questioning the concept of "dictatorship of the proletariat" and a centralized vanguard party. This process of social democratization met with an initial increase in public support, beyond their existing bases in organized labor. By the 1980s, however, these Communist parties' support diminished again, as they were upstaged electorally by rejuvenated social democratic parties in Spain and France in particular.

Despite the predominance of social democratic strategy on the left, it is important to bear in mind that the historical record also demonstrates limitations to social democracy in different contexts. Only in Scandinavia have social democratic parties become hegemonic, meaning that they have won consistent pluralities, held power for decades, and been able to undertake profound, cumulative social

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<sup>18</sup> A good critique of the direct democracy focus of the New Left is found in Norberto Bobbio, "Are There Alternatives to Representative Democracy?" and "'Why Democracy?', Telos No. 35 and 36, Spring and Summer 1978, respectively.

reforms without significant resistance from dominant classes.<sup>19</sup>

Furthermore, this hegemony has been accompanied by an expanding state bureaucracy that is structurally dependent on private capital, and by corporatist forms of representation criticized above. Outside of Scandinavia, social democrats have governed less frequently, often in alliance with more conservative forces, and some have seen their reform efforts rolled back by conservative opponents.

Perhaps the most dramatic reversal for elected socialists in recent decades was that of the government of Salvador Allende in Chile in 1970-1973. Although interpretations are varied, recent studies attribute the failure of the Unidad Popular and the subsequent coup to a combination of external pressures and internal political factors; the latter including the tremendous political divisions within the Chilean left and the lack of commitment to a coherent, democratic strategy among many of the main actors.<sup>20</sup> The rocky course of French socialism has also given pause to other Europeans and Latin Americans. French socialists faced persistent tension over the twentieth century between a radical discourse and competition with the Communist Party on one hand, and a pragmatic, even opportunistic electoral practice on the other. After various divisions a new Socialist Party was formed in 1969, which gained public support under the leadership of Francois Mitterand and won power in 1981. Mitterand brought the Communists into his government

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<sup>19</sup> Castles op cit, p.104.

<sup>20</sup> See Walker, op cit, and Sergio Bitar, Transicion, socialismo y democracia: la experiencia chilena (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1979).

and attempted a broad program of nationalizations and social reforms. Yet this brought major disequilibrium to the economy, forcing austerity measures and a more neoliberal turn by 1984. When the Socialists won power again in 1988 their ambitions were greatly moderated.<sup>21</sup>

By 1983 the entire Mediterranean region had come under either Socialist majority governments or coalition governments headed by a Socialist premier. Yet after the fall of Allende and the French experience in 1981, each of them was pursuing a more moderate course. As Salvador Giner notes, the constraints set by capitalists, the state machinery and the Catholic Church on one hand, and the Communist or other non-socialist presence among organized labor on the other, are much stronger in these cases than in Northern Europe. The result has been that although radical discourse has reappeared off and on, the left has largely respected the inherited social inequalities in Southern Europe. "The left-wing opposition accepts class distinctions and economic exclusion based on the relative permanence of the inherited social inequality" Giner concludes, "as a compensation for its incorporation into the legitimate sphere of political life".<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Salvador Giner, "Political Economy, Legitimation, and the State in Southern Europe", in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

<sup>22</sup> Giner op cit, p.14.

### Comparative Lessons

In summary, the rise and fall of Communist Parties and the radical New Left--especially when combined with the demise of Communism in Eastern Europe--have reinforced the preeminence of social democratic politics, making electoralism and the gradual accumulation of reforms the main--indeed only--route for most of the European left today. A similar process of moderation and concentration on electoral politics was debated and pursued by much of the Latin American left in the 1980s, although guerilla alternatives persisted in Peru, Colombia and Central America. Yet for Latin Americans grappling with strategies for transition to democracy and social change, what can be learned from the comparative record of social democracy? What conditions are thought to be necessary for a social democratic movement to develop, and for it to thrive? What factors push a left movement in a social democratic direction, or away from it?

The first lesson to be gleaned from historical experience is that the initial decision to participate in electoral politics fundamentally conditions the shape and subsequent course of a leftist movement. In fact, abstention or merely symbolic participation has never been a viable long-term option for parties with an important working class and popular sector base. But this has also led to a universal dilemma--how to build majoritarian alliances and win political power, without abandoning the interests of the party's working class base or the fundamental socialist goals upon which it

was formed? Analysts differ markedly over whether or how this dilemma can be resolved.

On one side are those who argue that political democracy is inherently conservative and that there is an inevitable trade-off between electoralism and socialist goals. In Capitalism and Social Democracy, for example, Przeworski argues that there is a generic "logic of choices" facing socialists--in pursuit of votes, socialist leaders must necessarily abandon revolutionary forms of struggle as well as their goals of radical social change. Echoing Roberto Michels' "iron law of oligarchy", he argues that in this pursuit socialist leaders tend to produce an embourgeoisment of themselves and the movement itself, rendering it increasingly hierarchical and undemocratic.<sup>23</sup> Furthermore, the need to build a broad multi-class electoral base leads socialists to downplay divisive class conflicts, and target their appeal around issues which are shared by an increasingly large potential constituency--the poor and the middle classes, consumers, taxpayers, eventually "the nation" at large. While they may not consciously abandon workers' interests as such (or those of other oppressed groups), their message becomes an increasingly ambiguous and populist one.

This evolution towards a populist appeal, in Przeworski's view, leads to the dilution of class and other conflictive identities as forces for political organization, and undermines working class support for socialist goals--and in some cases for these parties.

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<sup>23</sup> Roberto Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy (New York: Collier Books, 1962).

Furthermore, even with the broadest of appeals many social democrats still do not win elections alone in societies that are heterogenous and conflict-ridden. When they do, he adds that they find that the welfare state depends on the generation of private capital, and that in the short-run the preservation of capitalist economic growth (and hence of class privilege) is in their partisan political interests as well as the material interests of the working class.

At the other extreme are those who argue that social democracy as defined here is not only best strategy for promoting equity and political democratization, but that social democratic movements empower the working class, and that the reforms they achieve constitute steps towards socialist transformation. Esping-Anderson, J. Stephens and Evelyne Huber Stephens fall in this category, with the latter extending this argument to contemporary Latin America and the Caribbean as well as Western Europe. Indeed, in a context of dependent capitalism Stephens and Stephens claim that "democratic socialism" is the best choice to reduce dependency, redistribute resources, enact egalitarian social policies and deepen political democratization.<sup>24</sup> And they argue that this path is feasible through the construction of strong popular alliances and mass-based ideological parties, that can negotiate compromises with economic and military elites while avoiding the populism and clientelism that have

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<sup>24</sup> The authors use the term "democratic socialism" to distinguish it from European social democracy, due to the different social and economic contexts. Yet they basically refer to the same phenomenon of reformist socialism operating in the context of electoral politics. Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephens, Democratic Socialism in Jamaica: The Political Movement and Social Transformation in Dependent Capitalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p.333.



long dominated Latin American politics. In cases where democratic socialists have suffered reversals, such as Chile and Jamaica in the 1970s, they argue that this was neither inevitable or structurally determined, but rather due to factors of political choice, timing and judgement--all factors that could be rectified in future efforts. Furthermore, in their view the Jamaica case illustrates that even when there are political reversals democratic socialists can leave lasting achievements, such as land and labor reforms, increased working class power and political awareness.<sup>25</sup>

This study falls between these two positions. It starts from the premise that socialist movements in contemporary Latin America do face serious structural obstacles to a democratic political strategy, more so than their counterparts in Western Europe. They have also felt less compelled to abandon revolutionary tactics and goals until recently, given the intransigence of dominant elites and the exclusionary nature of most of the region's political systems. However, as in other historical cases, when the opportunity to compete in fair elections has opened up, most of them face strong pressures to participate and to build the alliances and programs necessary to win a share of power. Furthermore, after the brutal dictatorships that ruled a number of Latin American countries in the last two decades, and the recent spread of civil violence and militarization in others, such as Peru and Colombia, the defense of

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<sup>25</sup> Stephens and Stephens, op cit. This was also the position of Bitar in 1979, op cit.

basic civil rights and political liberties have become much more important to all but a few extremist sectors of the left.

Although this choice reflects a sense of limited alternatives, Latin American socialists entering the 1980s also had reason to believe that the struggle for political democratization and social transformation were both feasible and compatible. Most of them had strong bases among organized labor or among the array of grassroots popular movements that emerged in the previous decade. They shared the view expressed by Stephens and Stephens, that the appropriate party organization, alliances, and compromises could counteract the negative effects that Przeworski assigns to electoralism. And while adding a dose of populism to their discourse, they felt confident that they could avoid the contradictions and crises of Latin American populism of the past.

While history shows that the decision to participate in elections has a profound impact on the shape and subsequent course of a socialist movement, it also demonstrates that social democratic party and alliance structures depend very much on the existing social and economic structure and the nature of interest organization in a given case. Social democratic alliances have been forged in a variety of contexts. In Sweden, for example, socialist working-class parties formed a "Red-Green" alliance with independent farmers' organizations in the struggle for basic political democracy; later they worked for the extension of democracy through drawing in the growing numbers of urban white-collar workers. In West Germany a very different agrarian structure made the peasantry unable to form

such an alliance with the working class, but social democrats sought power in coalitions with other forces. In Latin America, sectors of the middle class were crucial in initiating movements for democracy and socialism, in alliance with the region's relatively smaller and weaker organized labor movements. More recently, analysts have stressed the growing numbers of underemployed or "informal" urban poor as central to a democratizing alliance.<sup>25</sup>

The challenge of building successful democratic left coalitions is not just who is appealed to, but how this is done; in other words, what organizational format and operational strategies are pursued. Alliances can be formed around various forms of collective identity and interests--between parties, unions, neighborhood associations, and the like. But as Przeworski points out, in pursuit of an expanded electoral base a party also makes appeals to individuals on a non-mediated basis--as wage-earners, consumers, or simply "the people". Whether this in fact degenerates into populism, undermining class-based organization and other forms of collective identity and struggle, seems to depend on several factors--including the strength of interest organizations themselves, their relationship with political parties, the parties' strategy towards collective interest organization and, perhaps most importantly, the nature of the state and political regime in which they emerge.

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<sup>25</sup> The shifting alliances of social democracy are discussed in Esping-Andersen, op cit, Chapter 1, and Castles, op cit, pp. 14. On Latin America, see Evelyn Huber Stephens, op cit, p. 29-33; and Alejandro Portes, "Latin American Class Structures: Their Composition and Change during the Last Decades", Latin American Research Review, Vol. XX, No. 3, 1985.

The most successful social democratic movements have been in those societies in which interests in general are well-defined and organized, and the labor movement in particular is relatively strong. The "strength" of labor and other interest groups lies not only in the objective place that a group holds in the social and economic structure, but also its organizational characteristics and capacity for self-expression. A strong labor movement is generally seen as one in which there are high levels of affiliation among the working classes and penetration of union leadership and ideals to the workplace level, and at the same time centralized leadership, and one sole or dominant national labor organization. In turn, being closely linked to one strong political party can increase labor's strength.<sup>27</sup>

Although successful democratic left parties have had a broad multi-class base, organized labor has played an important role. Labor unions have important resources and organizational skills, mobilize a solid bloc of votes, and their support can be essential to economic policy-making once in power. While the unionized work force may be a minority of the working population, the defense of peoples' interests as workers and their emancipation from exploitative labor relations are fundamental goals which require the strengthening and extension of labor organization. Hence social democrats have tried to combine a strong labor movement with a multi-class party network. This has worked best where there is labor and leftist party unity, and where workers are incorporated through multiple channels--unions,

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<sup>27</sup> See Esping Anderson, op cit; and J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Movimientos obreros y sistemas politicos: un analisis conceptual y tipologico", Harvard University, draft manuscript, 1984.

cooperatives, neighborhood associations, social clubs, women's groups--which are linked to the party and union structure. As the parties' appeal extends to white collar workers, their organizations are also encouraged and linked to the party structure.

In cases of social democratic hegemony, the party and unions often developed as part of one opposition movement pressing for democracy and socialism. As democracy was won and the parties' electoral role consolidated, both party and labor leaders assumed a more moderate socialist ideology, with a focus on incremental and reformist action. Yet importantly, the parties did not abandon their attention to labor (or other allied interest groups) between elections. Rather, they maintained a focus on day-to-day organizational development among workers, both at the workplace level and through neighborhood and social networks, and they fought for collective bargaining and other concrete labor benefits. Hence workers saw it in their interests to support these broad parties, and the social pacts they forged with dominant elites.<sup>28</sup>

In contrast, when a labor movement is weak, has very divided ideological and partisan loyalties (including a strong contingent tied to a Communist or more radical left party), or where working class organizations do not form part of a larger political and social network, a social democratic movement is less likely to emerge and triumph, and the interests of workers in general may be poorly served. These outcomes have occurred in various countries of Latin Europe and Latin America. As Giner, Valenzuela and others point out,

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∴ Valenzuela, op cit.

in these cases the labor movement and competing parties formed under more authoritarian contexts, with stronger resistance from dominant elites. In some cases, radicalized union leaders have great sensitivity to base concerns, but relatively limited capacity to resolve them. The left parties, in turn, compete for base-level union support but have had little concrete benefits to offer unions as long as they are marginal to the political sphere.<sup>29</sup>

While the strength of interest organization and the nature of labor-party relations have affected the shape and success of a democratic left movement, the nature of the state and political regime per se are perhaps the primary factors that influence both working class organization and left politics. Indeed, while Stephens, Przeworski and others debate the effect of an electoral strategy on Western European socialism, they agree that the strategic choices made by socialist movements are on the whole related to the degree of openness or exclusion of the political system in which they emerge. In a comparative review of working class formation and politics in France, Germany and the United States, Ira Katznelson and Aristide Zolberg also conclude that although economic and social structure and levels of labor organization are important, the form of state and its policies were the main variables explaining diversity in these cases.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Valenzuela, op cit.

<sup>30</sup> Katznelson and Zolberg, eds., Working Class Formation: Nineteenth Century Patterns in Western Europe and the United States, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).

Generalizing from these studies, one can conclude that under an authoritarian system in which workers cannot use the existing political institutions to advance their demands, radicalization and rejectionism are likely results. When suffrage is extended and workers allowed to organize in pursuit of their interests, however, they tend to take advantage of the opening. Socialism as a movement emerged to extend this formal political equality into the very unequal social and economic realms, where there was an absence of effective competitors to defend popular interests. As working class organization and participation becomes not only legal but effective at extracting benefits from the state, however, moderate reformism has been the most frequent result.

The historical trajectory of social democracy thus poses important questions about the logic of political choice and the organizational and strategic alternatives facing democratic left movements. It also raises the question of what basic structural conditions affect these choices. Formal political democracy was the "precondition" to the emergence and success of European social democratic movements, and the extent of democratization in those cases both shaped and was shaped by the nature of the left and labor movements. But what is the relationship between the emergence of political and social democracy in contemporary Latin America? Over the past several decades scholars of Latin America have shifted their emphasis from structure to statecraft and back again, in efforts to answer these questions.

### Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Latin America

Recent analyses of democratization efforts in Latin America challenge simplistic theories that in past decades postulated a specific level of economic growth, stage of capitalist development, or type of political culture as pre-requisites to democracy. Instead, analysts have stressed the relationships between a number of factors--different patterns of dependent development, types of social structure and relations, nature of interest organizations, regime type, and role of the state--which have influenced the emergence and survival of new democracies throughout the region.<sup>31</sup>

In terms of historical-structural factors, recent analyses tend to reiterate the basic importance of agrarian structure as a factor for democratization in Latin America. The persistence of a strong landed class engaged in labor-repressive agriculture has historically been a chief obstacle to stable democracy in most countries of this region, and hence the removal of this structure would appear to be essential for stable democracy.<sup>32</sup> The colonial legacies of racism and caudillismo, the severe inequalities generated by dependent-capitalist development, and the historical reliance on military force

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<sup>31</sup> See for example Karl, op cit; E. Stephens op cit; and the review article by Scott Mainwaring, "Transitions to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical and Comparative Issues", Kellogg Institute Working Paper No. 130, November 1989.

<sup>32</sup> This is stressed by Karl, op cit; and E. Stephens, op cit. In this sense, their work reflects the influence of Barrington Moore Jr.'s Social Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).



to maintain social control, have also posed serious constraints on the emergence of political democracy in different Latin American countries.

As mentioned above, what kind of alliances can be built to challenge these constraints depends in part on the existing social class structure and nature of interest organization. There is considerable variation across Latin American countries on these counts. However, patterns of dependent development have also created some important shared conditions that are relevant to democratization. First of all, in many cases Latin American bourgeoisies have not been a driving force for political democracy. With noted exceptions such as Brazil, bourgeoisies have long tended to be linked to agrarian structures, and highly dependent on external forces and/or on state patronage. They have had fragile resource bases and limited incentives to ally with middle or lower classes. The state in modern day Latin America has played a stronger and more autonomous role in organizing national economic and political development, often in an authoritarian direction.

Organized labor movements in many Latin America countries have also not been as strong a force for democracy or socialism as they have been in European cases. Unionized labor tends to be a very small sector of most Latin American work forces; in some cases economically and organizationally weak, in others very narrowly concentrated, and in a number of cases subject to authoritarian state control or middle class party leadership. Furthermore, the relatively small core of proletarians in most Latin American

societies exist within much larger "popular sector" majorities who share conditions of poverty, exploitation and exclusion. These may include peasants and indigenous groups, recent rural-urban migrants, impoverished white collar employees, and the large urban "informal" working classes, that constitute between twenty and eighty percent of the work force across the region.<sup>33</sup>

The historical evolution of democratic and socialist parties in Latin America has not been as closely linked to the formation and evolution of organized labor movements as in many European cases. Middle class parties and leaders have often played a more crucial political role, organizing movements for the combined goals of national liberation and some form of democracy, that incorporate but are not generally led by sectors of the working class. This is the case of the mass-based, popular nationalist parties such as the APRA, discussed below. Where socialists have gained political strength (outside of certain union sectors), this has generally been due to their presence in broader popular and nationalist struggles, or to their potential for representation of interests left out of earlier populist coalitions.<sup>34</sup>

The fact that there are structural factors which present constraints on Latin American democratization, but no clear universal

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<sup>33</sup> Valenzuela, op cit; Portes, op cit.

<sup>34</sup> See Jose Arico, "La democracia y el socialismo en America Latina", in Caminos de la democracia en America Latina (Madrid: Fundacion Pablo Iglesias, 1984); and Juan Carlos Portantiero, "Lo nacional-popular y la alternativa democratica en America Latina", in Henry Pease et al, America Latina 80: Democracia y Movimiento Popular (Lima: DESCO, 1981).

prerequisites, leads us back to the issues of political institutions, organizations and strategy. What strategies, forms of organization or alliances might help overcome structural constraints in a given case? Conversely, what political actions might add additional parameters? To address these questions, one must start with a close examination of the crucial period of transition to political democracy and the initial years of a new regime.

The relationship between the dynamics of a regime transition and the type of democracy which ultimately emerges is fundamental to an understanding of the prospects for social democracy. As noted in the discussion above, democracy in Western Europe has generally been conceived of in stages: the consolidation of the rules and institutions of civil and political citizenship generally come first and social democracy, when it occurs, gradually follows. Such arguments are based on a theory of power mobilization, in which workers and their allies need both political democracy and economic security in order build effective movements for social democratization.<sup>33</sup>

In the context of contemporary Latin America, however, the nature of underdevelopment and timing of regime change affect the perceived viability of this "stages" argument. As this chapter stressed at the outset, debt burdens and economic crisis in the last decade have exacerbated persistent poverty and structural inequalities, and the issues of transition to political democracy

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<sup>33</sup> See T.H. Marshall, op cit; Esping-Anderson, op cit; J. Stephens, op cit.

and social justice have appeared together on the political agenda. Hence although greater attention has shifted towards political processes and institutions in recent years, it is not surprising that many observers of Latin American reality argue that a gradual "stage" approach is not feasible. The need for social justice remains so great that many believe that issues of equity and redistribution must be addressed simultaneously with the establishment of political rules and citizenship rights, if new democracies are expected to last.

But can basic issues of democracy and social justice be addressed at the same time, especially during the intense political uncertainty of a regime change? What becomes clear from this case study and others is that events and decisions made during the transition affect both the immediate answers to these questions and the prospects for future change. Indeed, what makes periods of regime change so critical is their problematic dual character. On one hand, new political actors and forms of representation (such as grassroots social movements, independent trade unions, and human rights organizations) emerge during regime transition, and become powerful enough to contribute to the demise of authoritarian rule. On the other hand, their very success helps to produce the convocation of elections, shifting the arena of debate in a manner which subsequently may weaken these very groups. Powerful elites and political parties take center stage at this point, and popular movements get left aside. In some cases explicit pacts or alliances have excluded the representatives of newly mobilized groups, or have removed their demands from the policy agenda. In other cases, the

rules of partisan competition or interest representation themselves make the expression of different popular sector demands difficult. The process of regime change is therefore ambiguous. While it may be a period of apertura or political opening, it may also place narrow parameters on democratization and socialization processes.<sup>36</sup>

An examination of the drafting of the formal rules and institutions of new democracies is revealing about the types of interest conflict and political negotiation which occurred around them. As historian Heraclio Bonilla has pointed out, since Independence Latin American leaders have produced approximately 200 constitutions, averaging almost ten per country. Historically, these texts have reflected the recurring convictions of liberal elites that their nations' problems could be resolved through proper rules and institutional engineering, and also the desires of conservatives (and even the most venal of dictators) to legitimize their rule through law. Yet it is clear that the actual "rules of the game" in Latin American politics are rarely those embodied in the region's many constitutions. Rather than constituting the tools to undertake the transformation of state and society, these texts at best expressed a vision of the desired outcome of such transformations.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> These processes of democratic transition are discussed in Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

<sup>37</sup> These observations are drawn from Bonilla, "Constitutionalism in Latin American History and Today", a working paper prepared for the American Council of Learned Societies Comparative Constitutionalism Project, Montevideo, November 1988.

The retreat from military rule over the last decade or so has brought a new wave of new constitutions and constituent assemblies in Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Brazil, Colombia and elsewhere. Although this reflects historically frustrated liberal hopes for government ruled by law, it also reflects transactions between a different array of political and social forces than in the past--and may have important implications for future struggles over the distribution of resources and the balance of power in society. For example, recent constitutions have added a wide array of social, economic and labor rights to the list of basic guarantees their citizens should enjoy. The Ecuadoran and Peruvian constitutions of 1979 explicitly condemn racial and gender discrimination, as does the recent Brazilian constitution. The Peruvian and Ecuadoran charters also sanction land reform, recognize the legitimacy of social and communal property ownership, and demand that their economies be organized on principles of both efficiency and social justice. Such "utopian" provisions reflect social movements and structural changes that were initiated in the 1970s, and serve as banners for the further mobilization of disadvantaged groups--women, blacks, indigenous peoples--against persistent injustices.

By the late 1980s, a growing number of political scientists had turned their attention (and faith) back to the potential of new political rules and engineering to secure these new democracies in the region. This "neo-institutional" approach has most often focused on the relative merits of presidential versus parliamentary regimes, a debate that in some cases--notably Chile and Brazil--has found

resonance in the political sphere.<sup>38</sup> In the twentieth century Latin American constitutions have tended to increase the legal authority of the Presidency, as politicians across the spectrum came to agree that a strong Executive was essential for national integration, the defense of national sovereignty, and protection of public interests against those of external economic forces or local notables. Yet the neo-institutionalists argue that traditional presidentialism in this region has instead resulted in weak and non-accountable executives aggravated political polarization and policy stalemate, and an inability of political actors to resolve crises democratically. Instead, they argue that a parliamentary or mixed system, combined with proportional representation and the strengthening of party structures, would be more democratic, allow more flexible policy-making, and be more conducive to consensus-building.

In most Latin American countries, however, such a major change in regime structure is unlikely, while overriding social, cultural and economic conditions may affect the legitimacy of any institutional changes. In analyzing the emergence of Peru's new democracy, for example, this study points out a kind of vicious cycle. In a context where the legitimacy of any regime type is low, the short-run performance of each elected government, especially its

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<sup>38</sup> Leading proponents of this approach include Juan Linz, Alfred Stepan, Arturo Valenzuela and Carlos Nino. See for example Juan J. Linz, "Democracy, Presidential or Parliamentary: Does It Make a Difference?", paper prepared for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1987; and Linz, Arend Lijphart, Arturo Valenzuela and Oscar Godoy, Hacia una Democracia Moderna: La Opcion Parlamentaria (Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Catolica de Chile, 1990).

economic policies and response to societal inequities, have had the most impact on regime survival. At the same time, the structure of Peru's democratic regimes (semi-parliamentary in the 1960s, more presidential in the 1980s) facilitated efforts to block social reform in both eras, and encouraged the widespread abuse of power and resources by ruling elites. When any regime functions this poorly, it can encourage citizens to place their confidence in individuals rather than institutions--in charismatic populist leaders who promise to override the political bureaucracy and "get things done". And this in turn reinforces the authoritarian elements of politics.

While the drafting of new rules and institutions is seen by some as the cornerstone to democratic consolidation, this study shares a classic perspective that is reiterated in the recent work of Philippe Schmitter--namely, that democracy is first of all a set of basic principles, and that the real "test" of any set of institutions is whether they in fact translate these principles into practice. Schmitter calls the guiding principle of democracy "citizenship: that is, the right to be treated by fellow human beings as equal and the obligation to respect the legitimacy of choices made by collective deliberation".<sup>33</sup> Related values include participation and competition, and government accessibility and accountability. From this perspective, democratization is the process of extending this principle to a wider range of participants and to a broader array of domains.

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<sup>33</sup> Philippe C. Schmitter, "Democratic Theory and Neocorporatist Practice", Social Research Volume 50, Number 4, Winter 1983, p. 887.



In large modern societies, effective representation of citizens' interests is essential to the democratization process. The establishment or revival of political parties and party systems is often seen by political scientists as the fundamental form of democratic representation. However, an important question in Latin America today is whether or to what extent people will in fact channel their interests and demands for change through traditional party structures. The capacity of Latin American parties to play a meaningful role in interest representation and conflict mediation has varied considerably across the region. Strong states, military intervention, and/or exclusive electoral rules have rendered some parties very weak or exclusive. Interest representation, citizen demands, and government policy responses have often flowed through interest associations and administrative agencies rather than the traditional party structures.<sup>40</sup> Furthermore, a host of new social movements and popular organizations has emerged in response to the historical lack of representation of major social sectors, generally rejecting traditional party and union structures.<sup>41</sup> And as we mentioned at the outset, so has a new generation of charismatic, populist leaders.

In sum, a movement for social democracy in Latin America today must forge political organizations and social alliances that can

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<sup>40</sup> This point is also made by Schmitter, op cit.

<sup>41</sup> See Philip Oxhorn, "Organizaciones Poblacionales, la Reconstitucion de la Sociedad Civil y la Interaccion Elite-Base", Santiago, Centro de Estudios Sociales, 1987; and Susan C. Stokes, "Politics and Latin America's Urban Poor: Reflections From a Lima Shantytown", Latin American Research Review Volume 26, No. 2, 1991.

defend recently-won democratic institutions and "spaces", and extend the democratization process to broader political, social and economic spheres. This in turn entails building new sociological and electoral majorities, through reaching "below" the organized labor movement to the large informal sector, as well as "beyond" them, to impoverished middle classes and professionals. This entails effective party organization, political rules, and the ability to forge links with a diversity of social organizations. But it is precisely in these areas that Latin America is weak. The need to understand this weakness has led to a renewed look at the multi-class, nationalist and populist politics of past decades in Latin America.

"Lo Nacional-Popular" and the Legacy of Populism in Latin America

Nationalism has been termed "the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time", its immense political power marking a sharp contrast with its philosophical poverty.<sup>42</sup> Populism is another concept that has had tremendous political force in the modern age, one that makes immediate common sense but which virtually defies theoretical definition.<sup>43</sup> In Latin America, populism has been the main form of popular sector integration into politics in this century. And twentieth century populist leaders have been instrumental in trying to identify "the nation" with "the people"

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<sup>42</sup> Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso Editions, 1983). p.15.

<sup>43</sup> This is evident in the widely-read collection by Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Geller, eds., Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1969).

across Latin America, in countries where such basic identities are still in dispute.

Populism at the most abstract level involves a discourse which is essential to all mass-based political movements: the appeal to a wide variety of social classes and groups on the basis of non-class based antagonisms which can unite them all. The term populism conjures up images of a charismatic leader with broad popularity, who staunchly defends "the common people" ("el pueblo") against an external or internal enemy (U.S. imperialism, the International Monetary Fund). This often involves identification with popular symbols or heroes which have come to represent general resistance to oppression, and the embracing of popular culture and folk traditions against the imported tastes of right or left-wing elites. This appeal to a broader public is not incompatible with appeals to workers or other specific social groups as such, and has in fact been vital to successful social democratic and revolutionary movements.<sup>44</sup>

Populism in Latin America, however, is generally associated with a specific set of leaders, movements and regimes, which flourished between the 1930s and the 1960s. They emerged in contexts of rapid urbanization, accelerated growth of urban popular sectors, and the crisis of traditional elite domination. They explicitly defined themselves in opposition to both socialism and unbridled capitalism, while espousing a definition of the "national interest" that included the substantive demands of the poor majority, and

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<sup>44</sup> Focusing on discourse, Ernesto LaClau in fact argues that socialism is "the highest form of populism". See Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory (London: Verso Editions, 1977).

excluded the interests of the landed oligarchy or foreign elites. They varied in terms of specific style, program, and alliance strategy--the prototypes are often Juan Peron in Argentina and Getulio Vargas in Brazil, but the label is also applied to the Aprista parties since the forties and the Peruvian Accion Popular party in the early sixties. What they shared was a personalist form of leadership and a populist discourse, a heterogeneous social coalition with a urban working class base and a largely middle class or bourgeois leadership, and a drive for national development which initially held the coalition together.

In power or in pursuit thereof, these populists had a very mixed record. On one hand, they advocated strong states and industrial development, encouraged strong labor movements, and fought for expanded electoral participation. They incorporated new popular sectors into national political life, and sought (but did not always achieve) a developmentalist alliance with sectors of national capital. On the other hand, many of them made conservative alliances and abandoned divisive goals such as land reform or nationalization in the pursuit of political office. Those who won power found their initial goals inhibited by limited state capacity, mass pressures for redistribution, and elite resistance. Their unstable coalitions tended to come apart and their parties weaken in the face of such pressures. By the late 1960s and 1970s populism faced external crisis and internal polarization, giving way in some cases to repressive military rule.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> This phase is discussed in Collier ed., op cit.

The history of Latin American populism since the 1930s was also the history of a fundamental schism between populist and socialist movements, which divided labor movements and weakened popular opposition to imperialism and authoritarian rule. With the exception of the revolutionary experiences of Cuba and Mexico, populists waved the banners of national independence and democratization, and yet accomplished neither. At the same time, with the exception of Chile before 1973, Communist and socialist parties were marginal to national mass politics. The passing of populism from the political scene coincided with the flourishing of the dependency school of analysis in Latin America, which had tremendous appeal on the socialist left. According to the dependencistas, populism corresponded to a phase of dependent capitalist development, marking the demise of oligarchical domination and the promotion of an early phase of import substitution. With the "deepening" of national industrial development, populism was replaced by exclusionary authoritarian rule. The foundations for any future populist alliances or "class compromises" were permanently eroded, they believed, and revolutionary socialism the only viable path for the left.<sup>46</sup>

With the return to electoral politics in recent years, however, populist leaders and appeals have resurfaced in Latin America. Furthermore, Latin American socialists themselves began to reevaluate

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<sup>46</sup> See Cardoso and Faletto, op cit; and Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics (Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, Politics of Modernization Series No. 9, 1973).

"lo nacional-popular"--the nationalism, incorporation of popular traditions, and multi-class identities that were fundamental to an earlier socialist tradition in Latin America as well as Western Europe, but that populists in this region had cultivated more successfully. In some cases, populists and socialists also began to reconsider their historically antagonistic relationships with each other.<sup>47</sup>

In this context, it is important to differentiate between characteristics that may be part of most mass movements, and populism as a specific political form. For example, while there have been similarities in economic program and class composition between populist and social democratic movements in different historical periods, there are several key factors which distinguish populism as a political form; and that prevent it from being a lasting force for democratization. These factors are summarized in Figure 1 and contrasted to social democracy. They include ideology and longer-term vision, political strategy and organizational structure, the type of authority relations established, the nature of their social alliances and particularly the unequal distribution of power and resources within the coalition--all of which affect the way that popular sectors are (or are not) incorporated.

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<sup>47</sup> See "Lo nacional-popular y la alternative democratica en America Latina", articles by Juan Carlos Portantiero and Carlos Ivan DeGregori and commentators, in Henry Pease ed., American Latina 80, op sit (215-270); and Juan Carlos Portantiero and Emilio de Ipola, "Lo Nacional Popular y los Populismos Realmente Existentes", Nueva Sociedad no. 54, mayo-junio 1981.

At the level of ideology or doctrine, both populism and social democracy are statist, reformist and electoral, and claim to promote the interests of previously marginalized social groups. But while social democracy retains socialism as an ultimate goal and the working classes as a central actor in transition to democracy and socialism, populism lacks any comparable ideological clarity. Rather, populists have demonstrated a mix of contradictory elements, usually held together by appeals to nationalism and some concept of capitalism with social justice. But populists generally do not believe in working class capacity for self-government, and focus on integration of the masses into some "national project" without fundamental social change.

Perhaps the clearest difference in theory and practice is in regard to democracy. Populism does not have the clarity about and commitment to political democracy--as a means to social change and an ultimate goal in any project--that is a hallmark of social democracy. While populism has generally been electoral and has in some cases had a democratizing impact on the political systems in which it emerged, populists have demonstrated great disregard for the basic rights, liberties and principles of democracy, or for the rules and institutions that may promote those principles. Indeed, populists of the left and right have often denounced such concepts as superficial or imported. Populist "participation" has easily degenerated into fairly undemocratic forms of mass mobilization, while concepts of

pluralism and accountability have often been absent.<sup>48</sup>

Programmatically, populists have tried to pursue a "third way" that is developmentalist and statist, promoting capitalist growth and broader distribution--but not generally redistribution--through public sector action. But populists have also focused on short-term, politically motivated policies at the expense of any longer term growth or distribution goals. They tend to promote rapidly expansionary macroeconomic policies which lead to high inflation and severe balance of payments crises. While social democrats have at times promoted similar policies, the lack of effective channels of public consultation and government accountability under populism makes such policies more likely to end in economic and political disaster.

Another important difference is in the way in which their social bases and political organization are structured. Trade unions linked to populist movements and regimes have received concrete benefits, at least in the short-run, and workers often became enthusiastic supporters. But working class and poor followers in general have been incorporated by populists in a vertical manner which subordinated their class interests and organizations to the interests and decisions of a small middle class or bourgeois elite. Political recruitment is centered around the popular, charismatic leader. Although the leader's

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<sup>48</sup> See Drake, op cit p. 224, for a discussion of populists' limited commitment to political democracy.



FIGURE I -- SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND POPULISM AS MODELS

	<u>Social Democracy</u>	<u>Populism</u>
<u>Ideology</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Socialism as ultimate goal</li> <li>-Democracy as means and end</li> <li>-Working class protagonism</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-"National integration"</li> <li>-Democracy not a final goal</li> <li>-"Social integration of the masses", not class-specific</li> </ul>
<u>Democracy</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Basic rights and liberties</li> <li>-Representation, consent, accountability</li> <li>-Citizenship</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Elections and distributive justice</li> <li>-Plebiscitarian, mobilization no effective accountability</li> <li>-"Lo popular"</li> </ul>
<u>Program</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Welfare state, mixed economy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Welfare state, nationalist and capitalist goals</li> <li>-expansionist, inflationary policies</li> </ul>
<u>Class Composition</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Multi-class</li> <li>-Urban and rural sectors</li> <li>-Blue and white collar workers; "new" middle sectors, petty-bourg</li> <li>-Began as working class parties, labor retains a central role</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Multi-class</li> <li>-Largely urban</li> <li>-Blue and white collar workers older middle classes, petty-bourg</li> <li>-Began as middle-class and petty bourg-led movements; labor subordinate</li> </ul>
<u>Leadership and Organizational Structure</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Strong centralized party</li> <li>-Strong, corporate interest organizations</li> <li>-Democratically-elected leadership and internal procedures, accountability mechanisms and rotation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Vertical centralized movement</li> <li>-Patron-client relations, coopted or subordinate interest organization</li> <li>-Authoritarian, charismatic and personalist leadership</li> <li>-No internal accountability, limited delegation of power</li> </ul>
<u>Legacy</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Expansion of participation (sustained)</li> <li>-Best welfare record</li> <li>-Lasting respect for human rights and democracy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Expansion of participation (short term)</li> <li>-Economic crisis, persistent poverty and inequality</li> <li>-Political crisis, democratic breakdown or decay</li> </ul>

personal authority may be reinforced through party structures and patronage, members are expected to be loyal to the leader above any mediating body and his word is above dispute. Populists made little pretense about working class autonomy or self-organization, and were in fact resistant to any interest organizations which were not under their firm control. Trade unions and other affiliated organizations were manipulated for the political interests of the party leadership, and internal democracy was rarely heard of. The leaders might convoke audiences and hold assemblies, but there were few channels of accountability between decision-makers and their social bases.<sup>49</sup>

The forces left out of this coalition were as important to the fate of populism as those incorporated. Not all union leaders were enthralled by populism, and militant clasista or class-conscious workers were frequently marginalized and sometimes explicitly repressed by populists in power. In some cases, however, the principal losers were peasants and indigenous peoples, recent generations of urban migrants, and those who were illiterate or otherwise disenfranchised (Peronism in Argentina is an exception on these counts). Populism was largely an urban and electoral phenomenon; land reform was an original goal, but in several

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<sup>49</sup> See Conniff ed., *op cit*; and Nicos Mouzelis, "On the Concept of Populist and Clientelist Modes of Incorporation in Semiperipheral Polities", Politics & Society Volume 14, Number 3, 1985, p. 329-348.

cases populists were admitted into electoral politics because of their decision not to mobilize in the countryside. In Peru, for example, populism made ample use of romanticized indigenista symbols, but the largely indigenous peasant communities did not vote and were not generally mobilized by populists. The wave of migrants filling the shantytowns around Latin American capital cities since the 1950s also presented new demands and cultural traditions that in some cases conflicted with the those of populists' original social bases or entrenched leadership. When populists incorporated these sectors, they did so in a very subordinate fashion.<sup>50</sup>

The lack of channels of accountability, the selective and clientelistic distribution of benefits, and the exclusion of the very poor all helped to undermine populists in power. The state was closely identified with the populist leader, who did little to change the ineffective political structures inherited and undertook policies which were often ill-conceived and contradictory. The unmediated ties between leadership and mass followers, furthermore, made it especially difficult for popular constituencies to influence the course of state policy, or for leaders to exact sacrifices from the populace when economic crisis demanded them. Under pressure many populists abandoned

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<sup>50</sup> See the chapters by Michael Conniff and Steve Stein in Conniff, ed., *op cit.*

popular interests and consensus-building, took sharp turns to the right in efforts to retain the support of key economic elites, and suspended social programs and benefits. This provoked widespread discontent and protest among their popular bases, a representation gap, and social conflict in the cities and the countryside. Eventually, populist leaders supported repression rather than political mediation.<sup>51</sup>

Dependency analyses argued that the conditions for populism had eroded by the late 1960s, and assumed such a political form would be structurally impossible thereafter. To the contrary, this study contends that rather than corresponding to a particular stage of development, populism might be a general and recurring response to crisis--to economic crisis and to a crisis of authority or representation--in a context of severe inequality. Indeed, there are a number of conditions which facilitate the reemergence of some form of populism--rather than social democracy--in Latin America today.<sup>52</sup>

Latin America's new democratic socialists insist that their efforts to forge new national-popular political

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<sup>51</sup> While social democratic leaders have also been forced to cut back social programs and benefits, they have attempted to do so in consultation with affected interest organizations, and without undermining respect for basic civil liberties and democratic practice.

<sup>52</sup> However, this study does reinforce the dependencistas' assessment of the weaknesses of populism in power, and notes that contemporary conditions make populism more likely than ever to fail.

alternatives are different from populism. "The task of socialism", says one proponent, "is to reclaim lo nacional-popular within itself", which includes seeking inspiration in new popular movements and in older intellectual traditions, such as the celebrated debates about nationalism and socialism between Haya de la Torre and Jose Carlos Mariategui in Peru in the 1920s.<sup>53</sup> The older populist parties, for their part, reject being characterized as such and also wave nationalism and social justice as banners. Yet this study suggests that the historical legacy of "lo nacional-popular" in Latin America can be a source of both strength and weakness for a new political movement.

The concept of lo nacional denotes a collective identity prevailing above the cleavages and conflicts in civil society, as O'Donnell has pointed out. In a democracy, the concept of citizenship refers to a legal equality among members of that nation, the basic foundation for the right to elect those who exercise power, to hold them accountable, and to have protection against arbitrary acts on the part of state institutions and leaders. "El pueblo" or "lo popular", in contrast, is an identification of the people as collective carriers of demands for substantive justice, which form the basis for the obligations of the state toward the welfare of the less favored segments of the population. In Latin America,

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<sup>53</sup> Portantiero in Pease, ed., op cit.

efforts to forge a broad, national-popular identity, undertaken most energetically by populists, have been intimately linked to such appeals. Because the historical basis for political legitimacy in Latin America has been so closely tied to lo popular, O'Donnell argues convincingly that political democracy without social justice will be unlikely to survive.<sup>54</sup>

But the other legacy of populism was a disregard for citizenship principles, pluralism, and the basic civil rights and political liberties of democracy. The experience of populism in power demonstrated the limitations of a rhetorical commitment to social justice without political mechanisms to hold leaders and state institutions accountable. And while populists disregarded these rights, the repressive regimes that followed in their wake suspended them altogether. Today such formal rights are still limited in practice by severe social inequality, and social policy performance remains a key to political legitimacy. But citizenship has gained considerably in value because of the contradictions of populism and the military dictatorships that followed. In the "struggle for the appropriation and redefinition of the meaning of democracy", as O'Donnell once termed regime transition, popular movements and parties seeking to incorporate lo popular must also wrestle with how

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<sup>54</sup> "Tensions in the Bureaucratic Authoritarian State...", op cit. p.290.

to protect the citizenship rights and accountability mechanisms that were not a part of classic populism.

### The Peruvian Case

As this chapter stated at the outset, there were unprecedented opportunities for a broad-based, democratic left movement in Peru in the 1980s. Yet when Alan Garcia came to power in 1985 with a broadly social democratic mandate, his administration turned quickly into a form of populism and eventually collapsed. This thesis argues that the roots of this outcome lie prior to 1985--in fact, the populist route has persistently reasserted itself over more social democratic alternatives in Peru. The central objective of this study is to try and explain why this is the case.

As this chapter discusses, while there may be no clear structural conditions for democracy, the lessons of European social democracy indicate that this political form has thrived under the following conditions: (1) where it has been built in stages, moving from political democracy to subsequent social and economic reforms; (2) where the democracy has clear "rules of the game" accepted by all participants; (3) where workers and other popular sectors are well organized, and (4) linked to mass-based multi-class parties; and (5) where there is a clear social democratic program by the ruling party that could gain the cooperation

of other relevant actors.

The Peruvian case is a particularly good one for examining the challenges to forging a social democratic project in contemporary Latin America. While Peru's historical-structural development made it an unlikely case for democratization through the 1960s, structural changes in the 1970s reduced some important barriers to democratization, and produced some key political elements considered necessary for social democracy. These include a mass popular movement which was based on an increased number of trade unions and new grassroots social organizations, and which played a key role in Peru's successful transition from authoritarian rule to formal political democracy. They also include the establishment of new "rules of the game" through a Constituent Assembly and electoral laws. Latin America's oldest nationalist reform party and the region's largest legal left emerged as the main contenders to represent this popular movement politically in the 1980s. Each of them developed a new social democratic discourse and program, drawing on a long tradition of indigenous socialist and nationalist thinking, and they faced little competition from the political right.

Nonetheless, other conditions hindered this outcome. First, while labor and popular organization played a fundamental role in the transition process, they remained relatively weak. Their links with the political parties



were fraught with difficulties, and the deepening economic crisis further undermined their organizational strength. Second, the parties themselves had difficulties grasping existing opportunities. They lacked clarity about the importance of the Constituent Assembly (and the left even adopted rules that ultimately hurt IU); were unable to develop coherent strategies, organizations or democratic pacts; and they ultimately redefined themselves around personalities rather than organizations or programs. This created a persistent "representation gap", between the bulk of Peruvian society and the political party system, which meant that potential forces for social democracy could not be effectively channeled.

In sum, this case underscores the way in which political choice and rules can reinforce inherited structural constraints, and also create new barriers, particularly during the extreme uncertainty that characterizes a regime change period and the initial years of a new regime. It also suggests that without effective, democratic structures and processes of political representation, the outcome is generally likely to be populism rather than social democracy.

This study is based on two years of field research in Peru between 1985 and 1987, while I was a visiting researcher in the Social Science Faculty of the Catholic University of Peru in Lima. It relies on primary and

secondary materials acquired in Peru, and extensive interviews with leaders from the APRA and IU, the military, and labor and party organization, as well as with many Peruvian scholars. Key published sources include Peru's remarkable array of daily newspapers and weekly news magazines reflecting left, right and centrist views; specialized party, labor and economics journals; and the useful Resumen Semanal and Cronologia Politica published by DESCO. I also had access to published and unpublished data on party organization and affiliation and election results, and to the then-unpublished Diary of Debates of the Constituent Assembly, as well as to secondary analyses of the 1979 Constitution and interviews with leading Assembly members.

In undertaking this research, I am aware of both the strengths and limitations of a single case study.<sup>55</sup> The combination of several conditions considered necessary for social democracy, and yet the repeatedly lost opportunities and recurrence of populism, make this case particularly relevant to the theoretical issues addressed in this chapter. Through the close examination of the structures, processes and actors in this case over a crucial period of democratic transition, this study traces out an argument that may have important implications for the viability of

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<sup>55</sup> See Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Macro Politics", in Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 7, Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds. (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1975).

constructing social democratic alternatives in other contexts. Furthermore, because there is a dearth of empirical research on this crucial period in Peru, this study fills an important gap in comparative literature on Latin American democratization. Of course, the principal limitation of this approach is that the lessons gleaned from one case study are not always generalizable to other contexts. If properly set out, however, an argument of this type may be used as a point of comparison with other cases, and it may also point out mistakes that others might avoid.

The following chapters examine in closer detail the various structural and conjunctural factors that led to the persistence of some form of populism in this case. The structural legacies of colonialism and dependent capitalist development, the cycles of economic boom and bust, and the type of state structure and social relations this development pattern produced, are outlined in Chapter II. Yet although inherited structures and economic cycles profoundly shape contemporary politics, this thesis argues that these factors alone do not fully explain the recent outcome in Peru. Rather, conjunctural political factors must also be taken into account, and these are the subject of the remaining chapters. Chapters III and IV analyze the paradoxical legacy of Peru's reformist military regime in 1968-1980, the emergence of the popular movement, and the dual, contradictory nature of the transition to democracy.

Chapter V examines the new rules and institutions of Peru's new democratic regime, which offered unprecedented opportunities for a democratic left movement but also exacerbated authoritarian and populist tendencies. Chapter VI reviews the electoral process of 1980 and the triumph of populism in that context, as well as how the new government's use--and abuse--of the new regime structure created additional obstacles to the construction of social democracy.

The nature of political party representation per se in the 1980s is the subject of Chapters VII and VIII, particularly the types of leadership, organization and popular sector incorporation that APRA and IU did--and did not--accomplish. These chapters look at how inherited structures and prior choices shaped party representation in the 1980s, as well as how the actions of party leaders perpetuated a "representation gap", that culminated in the Garcia Administration between 1985 and 1990. As Chapter IX concludes, these factors woven together--structure and process, political rules and choices--explain how cycles of populism and crisis, rather than social democracy, have persisted in this case. This chapter also discusses the extent to which these conclusions are generalizable to other contexts, suggesting points in which the Peruvian case is similar to or distinct from other Latin American countries in particular.

## CHAPTER II

### The Constraints on Democratization in Pre-1968 Peru

Peruvian history is marked by a long tradition of indigenous socialist thinking and nationalist-populist movements. Yet prior to 1968 Peru was one of Latin America's most impoverished and least democratic countries; with an entrenched oligarchy, interventionist military, and large sectors of the population excluded from citizenship. For most of its history Peru had experienced only brief periods of democratic opening, which were marked by political instability and economic crisis and terminated by military coup. It is important to review the historical and structural constraints that prevented democratization and social change in this country before 1968, in order to set the framework for the actors, choices and changes that this thesis will subsequently describe. These constraints include the impact of colonialism and of dependent capitalist development on the structure of the Peruvian state, the nature of social relations, and the forms of political opposition.<sup>1</sup>

The most persistent constraint to democratization in Peru has been its profound social and economic inequality. Peru has always been marked by geographical, ethnic, and linguistic disparities. The legacy

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<sup>1</sup> There is considerable agreement among historians of Peru on these basic structural parameters. This chapter draws on the following sources: Julio Cotler, Clases, estado y nacion en el Peru (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1978); Nueva Historia General del Peru (Lima: Mosca Azul Editores, 1980); Rosemary Thorp and Geoffrey Bertram, Peru, 1890-1977: crecimiento y politicas en una economia abierta (Lima: Mosca Azul Editores, 1985); Michael Reid, Peru: Paths to Poverty (London: Latin America Bureau, 1985); and Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, "Peru: Solidiers, Oligarchs and Indians", in Modern Latin America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984, pp. 187-221).

of the Spanish conquest reinforced and institutionalized these disparities, driving a sharp wedge between a small white ruling elite and the mass of Indians and African slaves, whose forced labor on large haciendas, in mines and workshops generated the wealth of the ruling classes. This wedge was maintained by fear, racism, and the repression of indigenous culture and traditions by both the Church and state. The problem of establishing national identity and integration in this context has remained a fundamental dilemma in Peru.

The colonial legacy also made confrontation, rather than consensus, the predominant form of political interaction in Peru. As historian Alberto Flores Galindo has shown, violence was a structural component of colonial life, not only between elites and masses but among the popular sectors.<sup>2</sup> Popular discontent under colonial rule was expressed in slave uprisings, banditry and urban riots. Periodic rebellions against white domination were also led by members of the former Indian elite, who united both Indians and mestizos (people of mixed Indian and white descent) around the symbolic goal of restoration of the Inca Empire. These rebellions were violently suppressed by the Crown.<sup>3</sup>

This inequality, racial violence and fear made a broad-based

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<sup>2</sup> Alberto Flores Galindo, Aristocracia y Plebe: Lima, 1760-1830 (Lima: Mosca Azul, 1984), pp.232-233.

<sup>3</sup> The largest of these rebellions, in 1780-1781, was led by Jose Gabriel Condorcanqui, who took the name of Tupac Amaru II. With the support of Indians, mestizos, fugitive slaves and some provincial criollos, this rebellion spread across Southern Peru. The response of colonial authorities to kill thousands of Indians, deport or kill many of their leaders, and ban the use of their Quechua language. See Reid, op cit, pp. 19-20; and Sinesio Lopez, "De imperio a nacionalidades oprimidas", in Nueva historia general del Peru, op cit, pp. 231-264.

national independence movement impossible in Peru. Indeed, the creole aristocracy feared social revolution more than subjection to the Crown, and hence Peruvian liberation had to come from outside the country.<sup>4</sup> Peru's liberators also attempted to reform the new state along liberal lines. General Jose de San Martin decreed a ban on the importation of slaves and the abolition of Indian tribute and proclaimed that all inhabitants of Peru were citizens; Simon Bolivar attempted a land reform to create a class of independent smallholders. But in this context liberalism was not viable, and when Bolivar left Peru in 1826 most of these reforms remained only on paper. Furthermore, the land reform served to undermine the communal property of Peru's indigenous communities while leaving intact the great feudal haciendas as the power base of the elite well into the twentieth century.<sup>5</sup>

The first three decades of the new Republic were marked by a vacuum of political power and a pattern of economic and political instability that would be also repeated into the twentieth century. The war left Peru's mines and plantations in ruins and left the new government heavily indebted to English creditors. The result was the accelerated expropriation of Indian lands and increasing dependence of the new state on Indian tribute. At the same time, in contrast to neighboring Chile and Argentina, post-Independence Peru lacked a

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<sup>4</sup> Peruvian independence began when an army of Argentines and Chileans under General Jose de San Martin occupied Lima in 1820, and ended when the last Spanish viceroy surrendered to General Jose Antonio Sucre on the field of Ayacucho in 1824.

<sup>5</sup> At the time of Independence the Peruvian population was 11 percent white, 57 percent indigenous peoples, 27 percent mestizo and 5 percent black and mulatto. Lopez, op cit, pp. 248-251.



governing class capable of giving firm leadership to the state. Instead, a series of military strongmen (caudillos) battled for control of the country. Between 1826 and 1865 Peru had 34 Presidents, 27 of whom were military officers. These caudillos formed shifting alliances with regional landowners and merchants who resented the dominance of the Lima aristocracy, but they left in place the underlying racial and class structure of colonial society.<sup>6</sup>

In addition to these colonial legacies of inequality and instability, Peru's post-colonial economic history was marked by a pattern of dependent capitalist development that created additional structural obstacles to democratization. This history is based on a series of export booms generated by Peru's diverse natural resources and shifting world demand. In the 1840s the economy was rescued by the rise of a lucrative export trade in the dung (guano) of the seabirds that fed on the Pacific coast. The development of capital intensive commercial agriculture in Europe created a huge market for this fertilizer, and launched a half-century of economic growth in Peru. By the 1890s guano had been replaced by sugar, cotton and mining as sources of new income. In the first decades of the twentieth century, oil and copper became the leading sectors. In the wake of the Depression cotton production and mining were revived again, while mining and new fishmeal exports provided the impetus for growth in the post World War II era.<sup>7</sup>

Yet these various booms failed to generate self-sustained growth

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<sup>6</sup> Reid, op cit., p. 21. The limits of Peru's post-colonial elite is also a major theme in Cotler's clases, estado y nacion, op cit..

<sup>7</sup> This discussion draws primarily from Thorp and Bertram, op cit..

or distribute the profits of development towards the impoverished majority. To understand this outcome, one must understand how Peru's historical relationship to the world economy and foreign investment structured the state and class system. Peru's landed elites benefitted greatly from their country's close integration into the international economy as a primary producer. Hence they were steadfast in their adherence to a liberal, primary-export model and a minimalist state. They gave generous concessions to foreign investors, and were inflexible to structural change. This remained the case well into the 1950s and early 1960s, while from the 1930s onward their counterparts in neighboring countries had expanded state capacity, launched social welfare programs, and pursued import-substitution industrialization.<sup>2</sup>

As a result, Peru remained extremely vulnerable to international price swings, and policy-makers generally focused on the international market rather than domestic demand. Furthermore, foreign capital (especially U.S. interests) gained an increasing control over the main economic resources, including mining, foreign trade, banking, export agriculture, public services, and the incipient industrial sector. Thus twentieth century Peru was characterized by a dual economy divided into a wealthy and capital-intensive "modern" export sector (mainly located on the coast) and an impoverished, labor-intensive "traditional" sector (mainly in the rural highlands), in which pre-capitalist labor relations persisted. It was also characterized by one of the most unequal

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<sup>2</sup> See Thorp and Bertram, *op cit.*, pp 209-307; and Fernando Enrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America (Berkeley and Los Angeles; University of California Press, 1978).

patterns of income distribution in Latin America.<sup>9</sup>

This development path, in turn, weakened or blocked those very political and social forces that have challenged this model in other settings--such as a strong state and national banking sector, a nationalist bourgeoisie, strong labor movements and popular opposition parties. In periods of export decline and economic crisis, opposition movements did emerge, and popular pressures for change led to brief periods of democratic opening and social reform throughout the twentieth century. However, the limited social bases of Peru's parties and the inability of reformist leaders to implement redistributive alternatives resulted in political and economic crisis, which threatened entrenched elites and ended with a swift return to a more liberal economic path and more authoritarian politics.<sup>10</sup>

#### The Emergence of Mass Politics and the Limits on Reform

By the early twentieth century this pattern of development had consolidated the economic and political power of a small group of coastal sugar and cotton growers, about fifty families collectively known as the oligarchy. At the same time, in the highlands, haciendas run along semi-feudal lines encroached on the lands of Peru's Indian communities and landowners (gamonales) exercised local power through brute force, relying on the support of the coast to undergird their position. The coastal oligarchy, in alliance with the gamonales and foreign capital, squelched all efforts at land reform and exercised veto

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<sup>9</sup> By 1972 the top ten percent of the population received 43 percent of the national income, while the lowest 40 percent saw only 7 percent of the income. See Skidmore and Smith, *op cit.*, pp. 196-200.

<sup>10</sup> See Thorp and Bertram, pp. 493-494.

power over the policies of both civilian and military governments with few interruptions until 1968.

The military continued to dominate politics in the early 1890s, but from the turn of the century until 1919 a group of civilian elites emerged to lead what historians term the "Aristocratic Republic".<sup>11</sup> This period was characterized by a series of wealthy and technocratic leaders who promoted export-led development, modernized and professionalized the Armed Forces, and began to expand national infrastructure. It was also characterized by elections from which the majority of the population was excluded, through property, literacy and/or gender restrictions. The coastal elite controlled economic policy, and powerful landowners herded their workers and peons to the polls to have themselves elected to Congress, where they held disproportionate power until 1968.<sup>12</sup>

Nevertheless, over 1900-1930 Peru's popular classes began to expand in size and influence. The capital city of Lima in particular was transformed into a modern metropolis and a "city of masses". Between 1908 and 1931 the population of Lima grew 117 percent, to a total of 376,000 inhabitants. This was due in large part to a wave of migration and expansion of the working class, with particularly high rates of growth in construction workers, market vendors, domestic servants, peddlers, and textile workers. These diverse popular sectors swelled the inner city barrios and began to participate in politics;

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<sup>11</sup> See Manuel Burga y Alberto Flores Galindo, Apogeo y crisis de la Republica Aristocrática (Lima: Ediciones Rikchay Peru No. 8, 1980)

<sup>12</sup> See Skidmore and Smith, pp. 203-205.

first through electoral clubs and street manifestations in favor of elite politicians (and through the sale of their votes), and later as members of new populist movements.<sup>13</sup>

The nascent industry in Lima and the expansion of capitalist enterprise in the mines, oilfields and sugar estates also created a new class of wage laborers that, despite its small size and social and geographic fragmentation, began to organize in trade unions and press for labor rights and improvements in living standards. In 1904 landmark strikes took place in Lima's textile mills and other factories, and the first general strike took place in Lima in 1911, in support of workers at a British-owned textile factory in Vitarte who were demanding an 8-hour day. Initially under the influence of anarcho-syndicalism, this labor movement would eventually become a key component of Peru's first mass-based political parties.<sup>14</sup>

This urban popular upsurge led to Peru's first timid experiment with populist rule in 1912 when Guillermo Billinghurst, a former mayor of Lima, was elected president with considerable popular appeal. Seeking to reconcile the interests of workers and owners, he proposed public housing, the eight-hour work day and modern labor legislation. Billinghurst's popular following was in the cities, and he did not attempt to alter the semi-feudal labor relations in the countryside. However, when he began to encourage street demonstrations in support of

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<sup>13</sup> This discussion is drawn from Steve Stein, Lima Obrera 1900-1930 (Lima: Ediciones El Virrey, 1986, Tomo I).

<sup>14</sup> See Burga and Flores Galindo, op cit; and Cynthia Sanborn, "Los obreros textiles: condiciones y contradicciones de un 'nuevo proletariado'", in Steve Stein, ed., Lima Obrera 1900-1930, op cit., Tomo III (to be published).

his policies the oligarchy closed ranks and in 1914 Billinghurst was ousted in a military coup.<sup>15</sup>

The First World War brought a sharp rise in the cost of living in Peru, exacerbated by the country's growing dependence on imported foods, and this in turn gave new impetus to the nascent labor and popular movement. Indeed, it was food riots and labor strikes that contributed to the downfall of the Aristocratic Republic. In 1918 miners, port workers and textile workers went out on strike, a movement which culminated in a three-day general strike in January 1919 in demand of lower food prices and labor reforms. This struggle merged with the efforts of university students for reform of Peru's elitist system of higher education, a movement led by Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, the future founder of the APRA party. Although the Army was called in to suppress the strikers, President Jose Pardo acceded to part of their demands, granting the eight hour work day to Lima's work force. Nonetheless, his successor, Augusto Leguia, used these disorders as a pretext to close Congress and impose an eleven-year dictatorship.<sup>16</sup>

This Oncenio initiated a new period of modernization and energetic promotion of foreign investment, and another short-lived experiment in (authoritarian) populism. Leguia set out to expand Peru's physical infrastructure, through a huge public works program financed by loans from U.S. banks. He initially sought a new political base in the expanding middle class of professionals and public employees, and courted workers by extending the eight-hour nationally and decreeing a

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<sup>15</sup> See Skidmore and Smith, op cit., p. 205.

<sup>16</sup> See Skidmore and Smith, op cit, p. 205; and Sanborn, op cit..

minimum wage. Once his power was consolidated, however, Leguia reached an accommodation with oligarchic interests, and he began to repress labor, peasant and political dissent.<sup>17</sup>

The 1920s nevertheless gave birth to new and more radical political currents, which constituted the first organized political opposition to the domination of Peru by the oligarchy and foreign capital. The emergence of these movements--the APRA and the Communist Party--was accompanied by vigorous intellectual debate about the nature of Peruvian society and the strategy for revolutionary change between two of the most influential political thinkers that Latin America has produced--Jose Carlos Mariategui and Victor Raul Haya de la Torre. Because these debates laid the intellectual foundation for virtually all subsequent movements for democratization and social change in Peru, they are worth reviewing in some detail.<sup>18</sup>

#### Haya and Mariategui: Two Visions of Change

Victor Raul Haya de la Torre (1895-1979) came from Trujillo, on Peru's sugar-growing north coast. He began his political career as a student leader in Lima during the 1919 general strike, where he and other students built close ties with the nascent labor movement. Deported by Leguia, he founded the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) in Mexico in 1924. The APRA was conceived as an anti-imperialist movement on a continental scale. Its five founding principles were: the struggle against "Yankee imperialism"; the

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<sup>17</sup> See Reid, op cit., pp. 28-29.

<sup>18</sup> The following discussion draws from Reid, op cit., pp. 30-31; Burga and Flores Galindo, op cit; pp. 169-205; and Cotler, op cit; pp. 201-226.

political unity of Latin America; the nationalization of land and industry; the internationalization of the Panama Canal; and solidarity with all oppressed peoples and classes of the world. Haya was inspired more by the Mexican revolution and the Chinese nationalists than by communism, which he rejected as alien to the specific realities of "Indoamerica" (as he called Latin America).

For Haya, Latin America's fundamental problem lay in the alliance between foreign capital and domestic feudalism. However, he argued that imperialism in Latin America was the first rather than the last stage of capitalism. In his classic early work, Antimperialism and the APRA, Haya proclaimed the need to create a nationalist, anti-imperialist revolution, based on workers and peasants and led by the middle class.<sup>9</sup> This revolutionary movement would destroy feudalism and eliminate the dominance of foreign capital by means of the formation of an anti-imperialist state, similar to that which was emerging from the Mexican revolution. This state would create a state capitalist sector which would dominate the economy, promote the development of the bourgeoisie, and bargain effectively with foreign capital in the interests of the nation.

Haya's anti-imperialist state would also protect the interests of the peasants and workers, transforming itself into a political structure through which the middle class would hold power and seek to organize other classes through corporative mechanisms. The leadership role of the middle class was one characteristic that set APRA apart from

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<sup>9</sup> See Reid, p. 30; and Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, El antimperialismo y el APRA (Lima: Ediciones Culturales Marfil, 1985; originally published in 1928).



Communist rivals. In Haya's view, it was Peru's middle sectors-- artisans, small landowners, professionals, and small capitalists--whose opportunities for development were most diminished by the growing concentration of economic power in foreign firms and a dependent bourgeoisie. "This, then, is the abused class that will lead the revolution". To this he added a nearly-messianic belief in the role of the "Great Man" (namely, himself) who "interprets, intuitively, and directs the vague and imprecise aspirations of the multitude".<sup>20</sup>

Although the APRA had ambitious goals for the liberation of Latin America, Haya always intended to create a practical instrument for action in Peru. An electrifying speaker and brilliant political organizer, he founded the Peruvian Aprista Party (known as PAP or APRA) in 1930. It drew support from the lower middle class, students and intellectuals, and urban and rural workers, primarily in the areas where capitalism was most developed. In particular, the APRA had a solid and lasting base on the north coast, winning the support of sugar workers and the local middle class that had been marginalized by the monopolization of the sugar industry.<sup>21</sup> Through his multi-class appeal, and his own charismatic leadership, Haya was able to create the most enduring political party in the history of Peru.

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<sup>20</sup> Haya de la Torre, op cit., pp 29-30. These cites are repeated in Benjamin Keen and Mark Wasserman, "Storm Over the Andes: Peru's Ambiguous Revolution", in A Short History of Latin America (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1980), p. 393.

<sup>21</sup> See Peter Klaren, Modernization, Dislocation and Aprismo: Origins of the Peruvian Aprista Party, 1870-1932 (Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1973).

Haya's contemporary, Jose Carlos Mariategui (1895-1930) was the first thinker to combine marxism with a close analysis of Latin American realities. A Lima-based journalist, he became a marxist while in Europe between 1920 and 1923. But he was also influenced by the Peruvian "indigenista" intellectual movement of the early 1920s, which supported the claims of the Indian population to land and social justice. In 1926 Mariategui launched an influential journal, Amauta, which covered both political and cultural issues. His most famous collection of writings appeared in book form as Seven Interpretive Essays on the Peruvian Reality.<sup>22</sup>

Like Haya, Mariategui based his analysis on the intimate link between imperialism and local feudalism. Unlike Haya, he did not think that autonomous capitalist development was possible in Latin America; for him socialism was the only viable form that an anti-imperialist movement could take. Hence he also disagreed with the Communist International, which held that a "national bourgeois" revolution was necessary before capitalism and, at a later stage, socialism could develop. Mariategui argued that Peru's semi-feudal landlord class would never succeed in transforming itself into a national bourgeoisie. Instead, it would be content to serve indefinitely as an intermediary for imperialism. And in his view the middle class was equally incapable of carrying out this task, because it shared with the landowners and foreign capital a strong opposition to the emergence of effective demands from the working classes themselves. This was due to the

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<sup>22</sup> Jose Carlos Mariategui, Siete ensayos de interpretacion de la realidad peruana (Lima: Empresa Editores Amauta, 1985. Original published in 1928).

pronounced ethnic and cultural differentiation between them and the largely indigenous popular masses.<sup>23</sup>

At the same time, Mariategui believed that the small size and short history of the Peruvian industrial working class meant that the establishment of a traditional Marxist-Leninist vanguard party was premature. He also viewed the participation of the Indian peasantry as central to any anti-capitalist movement, due to its collectivist traditions and its struggle with the landed class. "Socialism preaches solidarity with and the redemption of the working classes" he reasoned; "Four fifths of Peru's working classes consist of Andean Indians. Therefore, socialism means the redemption of these Indians". And redemption began with radical change in Peru's land tenure structure. Mariategui thus advocated the formation of a worker-peasant alliance, one that was constructed through grassroots mobilization and that served the anti-capitalist interests of both.

This conception of party organization was very distinct from both Haya's corporatist vision and the "purely proletarian party" favored by the Communist International. This vision was reflected in his founding of a small Peruvian Socialist Party (PSP) in 1928, and his promotion of a new broad-based, national labor federation in 1929, the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CGTP). At the same time, Mariategui was denounced for his views by the III International as being "deviationist" and "populist".<sup>24</sup> Unfortunately, he died in 1930 at the

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<sup>23</sup> This is discussed in Cotler, op cit., p. 221.

<sup>24</sup> This debate is elaborated in Alberto Flores Galindo, La agonía de Mariategui: La polémica con la Komintern (Lima: DESCO, 1982).

age of 35, without realizing this vision of a truly indigenous, mass-based socialist movement. The PSP quickly changed its name to the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP) and joined the Comintern. Nevertheless, Mariategui left behind a powerful intellectual legacy, which fifty years later was claimed by all major forces on the Peruvian left.

The Great Depression and its aftermath provided the backdrop for the national political debut of the APRA and the Communist party (PCP). Given its dependency on the U.S. economy, Peru was hit particularly hard by the crisis. In a context of mounting economic and social unrest, Leguia was overthrown in August of 1930 by Luis Sanchez Cerro--a mestizo army commander who proceeded to repress labor demonstrations while seeking popular support with food distribution programs. The manner in which the PCP and the APRA responded in this period had a major impact on subsequent political history.

The leadership of the Communist Party believed that a "revolutionary situation" was at hand in 1930; thus it provoked labor insurrection in various mines and oilfields and attempted to establish soviets and seize power by force. This strategy ended in bloody failure; the insurrections were violently put down, killing dozens of workers and leading to the dismantling of the unions involved. The PCP and CGTP were banned and their leaders arrested or driven underground. After this experience the PCP embarked on a lengthy period of clandestine struggle in which it became isolated from the broader movement for democratization and labor rights.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Reid, op cit., p. 32.

Meanwhile, the APRA made its first appearance on the political scene when new elections were called in 1931. The two main contenders were Sanchez Cerro and Haya de la Torre. The APRA's decision to participate was denounced as premature by the Communists, and the split between these two movements was exacerbated when Haya modified the APRA's revolutionary doctrine, presenting a "Minimum Program" based on an expanded state role in the economy, protection for locally-owned industry, social reforms and regulation of foreign investment. This program was still quite radical for its time, however, and Haya was seen as a threat by the oligarchy. He only narrowly lost the election. Although Apristas cried fraud, analysts of this period argue that party had yet to pull together a broad enough coalition from the various classes that constituted the electorate.<sup>26</sup>

Despite this initial setback, the APRA in 1931 was a potentially democratizing political force, one that mobilized new social forces around a bold reform agenda and aimed to expand organized political participation in Peru. Due to the isolation of the Communist Party, it was also the only popular alternative to oligarchic rule.

However, in this period Apristas committed the first of a string of errors that would place even higher barriers on subsequent political competition and struggles for social change. Unable to assume power

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<sup>26</sup> Haya apparently won over the petty bourgeoisie, middle class intellectuals, and the organized working class of Lima and the provinces (especially the north coast). Sanchez Cerro received the backing of the oligarchy, upper class intellectuals and professionals (which saw him as the lesser evil), but also the popular masses of Lima and other cities. Missing from this picture was the nation's vast peasantry, which was excluded from voting due to illiteracy and hence largely ignored by the APRA and other contenders.). See Stein, op cit..

through electoral channels, Aprista militants responded with an armed insurrection in Trujillo in July 1932, holding the city for two days and killing some 60 army officers. The Army responded by rounding up and killing more than a thousand suspected Apristas, and in apparent revenge an Aprista militant assassinated Sanchez Cerro in 1933. The Trujillo uprising and its bloody aftermath sparked a vendetta between the Army and APRA that was to last for almost half a century, fuelled by repeated incidents of terrorism by party militants and attempts to infiltrate the Army's lower ranks. This feud resulted in a military veto on the entry of APRA into formal government, and drove the party into clandestinity for over a decade. Clandestinity helped create the iron discipline and mística among party militants that would characterize the APRA in years to come. But it also reinforced the personalist leadership of Haya de la Torre, and an undemocratic party structure.<sup>27</sup>

A new opportunity for democratic opening in Peru occurred in 1945, when Dr. Jose Luis Bustamante y Rivera won the presidency at the head of a broadly based National Democratic Front that was supported by the outlawed APRA and the Communist Party.<sup>28</sup> Bustamante legalized both parties and proposed modest social reforms, and with Apristas forming a majority in Congress and holding key Cabinet posts, popular expectations for social justice and redistribution were high. However, after a

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<sup>27</sup> The evolution of APRA as an organization is analyzed in Michael P. Adams, "The Partido Aprista and the Limitations of Peruvian Democratization: A Case Study", Harvard University, Department of Government, unpublished Bachelor's thesis, March 1984.

<sup>28</sup> This period is analyzed in Gonzalo Portocarrero, De Bustamante a Odria: El Fracaso del Frente Democratico Nacional, 1945-1950 (Lima: Mosca Azul Editores, 1983).

decade of clandestinity Haya's main concern was to maintain the legality of his party, and that meant at least a tactical conciliation with dominant elites. Given this concern, and the climate surrounding World War II, Haya renounced socialism, upheld private property rights and reversed his position on U.S. imperialism, expressing greater support for foreign investment. In effect, Haya's strategic choice was to postpone demands for structural change in exchange for the opportunity to compete in a political system that was still dominated by the power of the landed oligarchy and its foreign allies.

For the APRA and its working class supporters this bargain brought important short-term gains. The party's membership increased considerably, and Apristas found positions throughout an expanding state bureaucracy. Using their control of the Ministry of Labor and Parliament, Apristas also granted official recognition to a large number of new unions and passed important new labor legislation. The new Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CTP), formed in 1944, soon fell under Aprista control and became the chief national organism for organized workers. However, Apristas did not initiate any significant agrarian reform legislation during this period, nor did they attempt other structural changes in the economy. They did not even challenge the literacy requirements for suffrage, which barred most of the peasantry from representation in the political arena.<sup>29</sup>

Haya's calculus nonetheless backfired when the country fell into another export slump. With rising inflation and food shortages, intense

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<sup>29</sup> See Piedad Pareja, Aprismo y sindicalismo en el Peru, 1943-1948 (Lima: Ediciones Rikchay Peru No. 9, 1980).

strike activity and popular mobilization ensued, and the oligarchy began to campaign for new military intervention. In 1948 General Manuel Odria staged a coup that restored openly oligarchic rule for another eight years. The CTP was dismantled and the APRA sent back into hiding; party militants were hunted down and shot, while Haya took refuge in the Colombian embassy for eight years. General Odria went on to preside over a new phase of export expansion, which allowed him to launch massive public works and a paternalistic social assistance program modeled on that of Peron in Argentina. He also initiated what Rosemary Thorp and Geoffrey Bertram have called "a remarkable twenty-year period of total integration into the international system with complete commitment to the rules of the game".<sup>30</sup>

#### The 1950s and 1960s: Structural Change and Political Frustration

Major structural changes nevertheless took place in the 1950s and 1960s that would seriously threaten the continuation of the prevailing liberal export model. First of all, foreign investment shifted more heavily into the manufacturing sector (and by 1968 manufacturing accounted for 20 percent of GDP, compared to 14 percent in 1950). This belated industrialization generated new economic groups whose interests were not always compatible with the prevailing export model, while the economic power of one key sector of the oligarchical coalition--the highlands gamonales--was seriously weakening in the face of modernization and acute land hunger among the peasantry. Although these elites continued to block land reform in the political sphere, the peasantry gradually became more organized, and a wave of peasant

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<sup>30</sup> Cited in Reid, p. 34.



mobilizations and land seizures spread across the sierra.

At the same time, rural stagnation and the expansion of urban industry generated a new wave of migration to the coast and especially Lima, which contained a quarter of Peru's population by 1970. Only a minority of these migrants found work in the formal sector of the urban economy, while the rest joined a growing mass of domestic servants, street vendors, and other "informal" occupations. Their shantytowns surrounded the city and placed increasing demands on a state that had traditionally neglected social welfare functions. The professional and middle classes also grew rapidly under the impact of urbanization and industrialization, with white collar employment doubling during the 1950s to total 15 percent of the work force.

These structural changes generated new mobilization among the rural and urban poor, and encouraged a shift towards more developmentalist, reformist thinking among broad sectors of the intelligentsia, the Catholic Church, and even among the Armed Forces.<sup>31</sup> The dominant ideology underlying this shift reflected the developmentalist theories of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (which stressed the need for planning, industrialization, land reform, and an expanded role for the state), and was quite similar to the APRA's original program. These shifts were also reflected in an emerging split among Peru's economic elites, between the traditional liberal sector and a new "nationalist-reformist" group which began to

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<sup>31</sup> This shift is discussed in Julio Cotler, "A Structural-Historical Approach to the Breakdown of Democratic Institutions: Peru", in Juan Linz, ed., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

adopt some of this developmentalist thinking. When Odria convened new elections in 1956, this shift began to be expressed in the formal political arena.<sup>32</sup>

Although the APRA was still illegal, these different elite factions knew the Aprista vote would be essential to victory in 1956. Manuel Prado, the traditional liberal candidate and a persecutor of APRA during his previous presidential term (1939-1945) offered Haya co-government, as long as the APRA continued to constitute a "loyal opposition". This meant the party would again relinquish (or postpone) its original support for structural change and moderate growing popular demands. Hoping to regain the political space and power it had lost in 1945-1948, Haya de la Torre turned his back on the new reform currents and accepted this offer.

This political alliance came to be known as the Convivencia (coexistence), and it was the beginning of a tactical alliance between APRA and the oligarchy which lasted for the next twelve years. The victorious APRA-Prado alliance did restore civil and trade union rights and allowed all opposition parties to operate freely. But in the economic sphere this government continued the policies of its predecessor, promoting foreign investment and avoiding land reform. The result was that Peru's inequitable income distribution markedly increased in this period, and the problem of agrarian structure became particularly acute.

By this stage, however, the APRA's trade-off gave impetus to new reformist and revolutionary political groups wishing to fill the party's

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<sup>32</sup> Cotler 1978, op cit..

position on the left. The Communist Party began a revival, and a nascent new revolutionary left emerged. The most important new reformist forces were Popular Action Party (AP), founded by another charismatic leader, Fernando Belaunde Terry; and the smaller Christian Democratic Party (PDC). Both were committed to nationalist development and social reform, including land reform and the revindication of Indian rights, within the framework of liberal democracy. But both were also personalist vehicles that as yet lacked the social base the APRA had constructed. In a matter of weeks the AP nevertheless managed to group an array of progressive forces around Belaunde, and won a third of the popular vote in 1956.<sup>33</sup>

In the next elections of 1962, Haya ran openly as an Aprista for the first time, and his main contenders were Belaunde and General Odria, who hastily pulled together a personalist vehicle, the Odriista National Union (UNO). Since Haya won a scant plurality of 33 percent and Belaunde 32.1, the Congress was left to choose among them. At this point Haya negotiated a deal with General Odria that--in the words of historian Frederick Pike--"shocked and disgusted even the most sophisticated and cynical of the Peruvian electorate".<sup>34</sup> In exchange for giving Odria the presidency, real power would be vested in the Aprista congressional group. But Haya's political calculus backfired once again, when the military stepped in to prevent APRA from gaining power and annulled the elections, calling a new contest for 1963.

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<sup>33</sup> Cotler 1978, op cit., pp. 188-189.

<sup>34</sup> Frederick B. Pike, The Modern History of Peru (New York and Washington: Praeger Publishers, 1969), p. 301.

Fernando Belaunde won the elections of 1963 with 36.3 percent of the vote, in alliance with the Christian Democrats and with the backing of most leftist forces and many disillusioned Apristas. This election was greeted with euphoria, as Belaunde made sweeping promises of land and industrial reforms, a restructuring of the state, and respect for democratic liberties. However, Haya had won a close 34.4 percent, and once again his party traded off an opportunity to promote social change in exchange for political power, by allying with the Odriistas in Congress to block many of Belaunde's reform initiatives.<sup>35</sup> Unable to mobilize popular support against the oligarchy and its parliamentary opposition, the Belaunde government soon adopted a more technocratic character and a focus on non-confrontational public works. Unable to get funds for these from Congress, his administration also turned to foreign loans.

The issue of land reform and peasant organization was one of the most controversial of this period. The Belaunde government introduced a modest Agrarian Reform law, which was subjected to further watering down by the Apristas in Parliament. While the law was under debate, and in anticipation thereof, a new wave of peasant land invasions spread across the central and southern Sierra. Militant peasant unions under radical political leadership also appeared, and a nascent guerilla movement arose in parts of the sierra. Remarkably, the APRA-UNO coalition, echoing the sentiments of the landed oligarchy, demanded the use of the

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<sup>35</sup> Under the 1933 Constitution, Peru's political structure allowed the legislature significant control over the Executive. The Parliament had the authority to approve all tax measures and finance programs, and there was no presidential veto on legislation. See Cotler 1978, op cit., pp 197.

armed forces to repress the peasant movement. After some vacillation the government did decide to use force, and by 1966 the peasant and guerilla movements had been brutally suppressed.<sup>36</sup>

The final years of the Belaunde government were marked by increased repression of dissent, corruption scandals, mounting economic problems and political crisis. The final straw came when Belaunde tried to settle an old controversy between Peru and the International Petroleum Company (IPC). After years of negotiation, and under strong pressure from the U.S., the government signed an accord (the Pact of Talara) that was highly favorable to the IPC. A major scandal broke out when the government, forced to publish the document, claimed to have lost the key page setting the price for what IPC must pay Peru for its crude oil. The pact was denounced by the opposition parties, the Church, the Armed Forces and the general public. With the government in disarray, the armed forces headed by General Juan Velasco Alvarado staged a bloodless coup on October 3, 1968.

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As with its civilian predecessors, the Belaunde government failed to overcome the structural constraints to Peruvian development and democratization. As outlined in this section, these included Peru's historical social and economic inequalities; its continuing dependency on exports and domination of the most productive areas of the economy by foreign capital; a land tenure system that supported the domestic

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<sup>36</sup> Details about the new revolutionary left and the guerilla experience of 1965 are found in Reid, pp. 39-40; and Ricardo Letts, La izquierda peruana; organizaciones y tendencias (Lima: Mosca Azul Editores, 1981).

oligarchy and denied both livelihood and cultural identity to Peru's large indigenous population; and an elitist political structure that denied representation to the majority of the poor.

Furthermore, although Peru had one powerful popular reform party--the APRA--that commanded roughly a third of the electorate and had strong ties to the organized labor movement, the country was unable to sustain a successful reform alternative of any sort. This was in large part due to structural factors--the continued domination of agricultural elites (who shared a fear of Indian and mass rebellion); a labor movement that was relatively small and geographically disperse; and an electorate that was structurally restricted. However, this was also due to a series of tactical choices made by APRA leaders, which erected further barriers to democracy and social reform.

First of all, APRA's early and violent confrontation with the Armed Forces created a veto against the party assuming direct power and defined the political framework within which all subsequent political events were to unfold. Then, the APRA's strategy for political survival involved trade-offs that proved costly for the party and the nation as a whole. As a study by Michael Adams concludes, the option of party leaders since at least the 1950s entailed "surrendering the party's democratizing role by pacting with those elites forming the principal structural obstacle to that role".<sup>37</sup> In other words, the party abandoned its anti-imperialist, anti-oligarchical program in exchange

for government posts and access to state resources through which to meet

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<sup>37</sup> Adams, op cit., p. 132.

the demands of its key bases.

The APRA's pactismo nonetheless led to the loss of potential support from a new generation of student and intellectual leaders, who would turn to new reformist or radical alternatives in the 1960s. This loss was exacerbated by Haya's own personal hubris and undisputed leadership within the party, factors which also led him to ally with the enemies of reform rather than with other reform alternatives. And finally, the APRA's electoral strategy per se proved an increasing liability, as it focused heavily on the middle class and the small urban labor elite rather than on mobilizing the vast indigenous peasantry sectors or the newly emerging urban poor. As the "politically relevant" masses became more diversified, the APRA's claim to represent "el pueblo" grew increasingly open to question.

In sharp contrast to previous military coups, however, the military in 1968 did not intervene to protect the status quo. Instead, General Velasco represented a growing nationalist, reformist sector that was convinced that the country's civilian leaders--especially APRA's--and its elitist democracy were incapable of forging national integration and transforming the inequitable economic and social structures. Hence the "Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces" undertook to carry out these tasks itself.

### CHAPTER III

#### The Legacies of Military Reformism and the Emergence of the Popular Movement



There is a close relationship between the structural constraints imposed upon democratization, the dynamics of a political transition, and the type of democracy which ultimately emerges, as we have seen in Chapter I. This is certainly true in the Peruvian case. While there is general agreement over the nature of the structural constraints shaping Peru's transition to democracy, there has been intense debate over the transition process itself. Some Peruvian scholars argue that the demise of authoritarian rule and the transition to democracy which occurred between 1975 and 1980 was a "popular conquest", which marked "the definitive entrance of the working class and the popular movement, and their democratic-revolutionary manifestations, on the political scene".<sup>1</sup> Others claim that the transition was a testimony to the ability of older parties to incorporate new popular demands and to the permanence of populism as "the center of national political life".<sup>2</sup> There are also those who insisted that the transition from military to civilian rule was "nothing more than a reacomodation among the dominant class", ending in yet another retreat from social justice concerns and "the systematic repression of all popular demands".<sup>3</sup>

This chapter argues that the transition process in Peru had a

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<sup>1</sup> Javier Diez Canseco, "Un pueblo que se ha echado a andar", in Peru: de la 'Revolucion' de los militares a la democracia viable, special edition of Cuadernos en Marcha, ano 1, numero 4 (Mexico, noviembre-diciembre, 1979), p.77.

<sup>2</sup> Enrique Bernales Ballesteros, Crisis politica: solucion electoral? (Lima: DESCO, 1980), p.62.

<sup>3</sup> Henry Pease Garcia, "Peru: del reformismo militar a la democracia tutelada", in Henry Pease et al, America Latina 80: Democracia y Movimiento Popular (Lima: DESCO 1981), p.440.

contradictory nature, which would subsequently affect the prospects for political and social democratization. After briefly discussing the structural framework for regime change, it demonstrates the following: On one hand, a broad alliance of labor unions, new popular organizations and leftist parties emerged under Peru's unique military regime after 1968, and formed a widespread popular movement that contributed decisively to the military's retirement from power and to the unprecedented breadth of the new political system. On the other hand, the shift from street protest to elections left popular sectors and their allies with divided political representation, weak parties, and relatively ineffective means with which to defend their interests. Furthermore, the transition to democracy coincided with another cycle of economic crisis, which further weakened popular organization and made the pursuit of social justice especially difficult. Specifically, this chapter describes the emergence of a strong popular movement, the legacy of reformist military rule for the key actors in this story--organized labor, the popular movement, and political parties--and the initial process of transition to democracy.

#### The Legacies of Military Reformism

The roots of the most significant popular movement in Peruvian history, as well as many paradoxes of Peru's future democracy, lie in the unusual nature of authoritarian rule established in 1968. The "Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces" was different from other contemporary South American military governments in terms of its ruling coalition, reform project, and approach to political participation. From its inception when General Juan Velasco Alvarado and a small group

of progressive officers led a coup in 1968, authoritarian rule was identified with a popular program: the nationalization of primary resources, land reform and industrialization. The military also tried to replace Peru's weak party system with a corporatist alternative that Velasco called "a social democracy of full participation".<sup>4</sup>

Like other military regimes, the Velasco government proved incapable of building a lasting base of support in civil society. But in contrast to the other bureaucratic authoritarian experiences of Latin America, this government actually lay the bases for a shift in the distribution of power and ideology, towards popular organization and the political left. It did this by undermining the power of traditional dominant elites, weakening the role of the APRA party as the dominant intermediary between popular sectors and the state, encouraging the growth of militant trade unionism and alternative forms of popular organization, and legitimizing demands for representation and distributive justice by previously marginalized social classes and ethnic groups.<sup>5</sup>

Perhaps most importantly, the Velasco government finally abolished the power base of the two traditionally reactionary forces in Peru, the

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<sup>4</sup> Numerous studies have analyzed the distinctive nature of the Peruvian military government. See for example Carlos Franco, coord., El Peru de Velasco (Lima: CEDEP, 1983); Abraham Lowenthal, ed., The Peruvian Experiment: Continuity and Change under a Military Regime (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); Cynthia McClintock and Abraham Lowenthal, eds., The Peruvian Experiment Revisited (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983); and Alfred Stepan, The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).

<sup>5</sup> This shift in power is discussed by Evelyne H. Stephens, "The Peruvian Military Government, Labor Mobilization, and the Political Strength of the Left", Latin American Research Review No. 2, 1983.

agro-export oligarchy and the highlands landowners. It did this through the enactment of a sweeping land reform--the largest and fastest land transfer in Latin America with the exception of Cuba. All large commercial estates on the coast were expropriated and turned over to cooperatives made up of the permanent work-force. In the sierra, haciendas were turned into "Social Interest Agrarian Enterprises", under which the permanent work-force formed production cooperatives, the surrounding peasant communities received a share of the profits, and former tenant farmers were awarded ownership of the land they previously rented. In one move, the reform eliminated the oligarchy as a political force, organized previously exploited agrarian workers and encouraged mobilization among the peasantry, with such slogans as "Campesino, the patron will no longer feed off of your labor!".<sup>5</sup>

At the same time that the military government weakened the oligarchy, it also marginalized Peru's smaller bourgeois and reformist political parties through the suspension of elections. But Velasco's primary target was the APRA party, the only organization with sufficient mass support to be a challenge to the military in 1968. For decades the APRA had been the only mass reform movement in Peru, and its legendary founder Haya de la Torre was the nation's most popular political leader. It was also a vertical, clientelistic organization dominated with an iron hand by Haya and an increasingly conservative middle class bureaucracy. As noted in the previous chapter, until the 1950s the APRA dominated most universities, professional associations, and the

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<sup>5</sup> See Cynthia McClintock, Peasant Cooperatives and Political Change in Peru (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).

principal labor confederation, the Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CTP). It had a national network of party cells and could claim nearly a third of the electorate, but it was blocked from power until relinquishing its reform program in a series of conservative political pacts in the 1950s and 1960s.

The military government seriously undermined the APRA's support bases and social control capacity. The military itself was historically antagonistic towards the APRA since the Trujillo Revolution of 1932. The party's weakening was made easier because it was already discredited among reformers for entering into these pacts, and had lost some important bases of support in the 1960s. Yet it still had an impressive party apparatus, influence in most civic organizations, and control over the CTP.

Despite occasional episodes of harassment, Velasco's main strategy was to replace the APRA rather than repress it, by making the party unnecessary as a mediator between the state and civil society.<sup>7</sup> His program was aimed at carrying out the reforms Haya de la Torre had originally championed, ending CTP leadership of the labor movement, and mobilizing the formerly dispossessed sectors of society which APRA had not previously controlled--the peasantry, urban squatters, and new unions. Velasco also won over a number of younger Aprista leaders, including a leading intellectual, Carlos Delgado (a key advisor to Haya), who advised the General that marginalization would be easier and

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<sup>7</sup> The following section draws from the author's extensive interviews in 1985 and 1986 with APRA party activists, marxist left and labor leaders, and government officials of the 1970s.

more effective than repression of the party.<sup>3</sup>

The result of the Velasco project was to encourage independent popular organization and to facilitate the growth of more radical left political groups. At the same time, the emphasis the military placed on accelerated industrialization and explicit labor policies also encouraged a huge increase in the size and influence of the organized labor movement. The government pursued an integrated development strategy, in which state enterprises would coexist with a "reformed" private sector and producer cooperatives. The state invested in heavy industry and gave a variety of credits and tax incentives to private manufacturers. From 1968 to 1973 this strategy appeared to be quite successful. Peru's Gross Domestic Product grew by an annual average rate of 6.3 percent, industrial production increased by 7.1 percent per year, and foreign banks generously financed Peru's development based on

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<sup>3</sup> Aprista leaders today still express a strong sense of betrayal under this regime, as reflected in the author's interviews with veteran APRA leader and Senator Luis Alberto Sanchez on January 1, 1986, and with younger party leader Ramiro Priale Jr. on November 11, 1985;

"The coup was really directed against the Party. Nevertheless, he (Velasco) had no choice but to appeal to Aprista teachings, except without liberty, without APRA, and with a military dictatorship. For this reason some Apristas got tied up in that movement, and as we still see today, they wanted to create a type of Apro-Velashismo, saying that Velasco carried out what Haya could not".  
(Luis Alberto Sanchez)

"The presence of ex-Apristas in the regime was decisive. The Aprista party was not persecuted, but this was the worst period. The military government was more intelligent in not persecuting APRA. They knew how to treat the party, how to coopt and capture our bases, while carrying out the Aprista program. And the party was left without weight or importance. That was the hardest part."  
(Ramiro Priale, Jr.)

optimistic primary export projections. This was a boon for Peru's working classes. Employment increased in manufacturing and in related commerce and services, while government employment more than doubled. Average real wages increased by a third between 1970 and 1973.<sup>3</sup>

Velasco government officials actively sought the support of the growing modern sector labor force, and tried to co-opt rather than repress labor. Through effective use of the Ministry of Labor's considerable power over the registration of unions and the collective bargaining process, the total number of officially recognized unions doubled between 1968 to 1975, to a total of 4,330, while the number of manufacturing unions more than doubled. A General Law of Industry provided a new legal framework for labor relations in the private sector, including the introduction of "Industrial Communities" in firms with more than five workers, a mechanism for profit-sharing and workers' participation in management. A Job Stability Law in 1970 also gave workers job security after three months, making it easier organize unions.<sup>4</sup>

The growth of trade unions in the 1970s was accompanied by the reemergence of Communist leadership of the labor movement, which the government initially encouraged. The Peruvian Communist Party, which had been marginal to Peruvian politics since the 1930s, made sufficient inroads on APRA's labor support in the 1960s to form a rival organization in 1968, the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers

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<sup>3</sup> See Thorp and Bertram 1978, op cit., pp. 459-483.

<sup>4</sup> See Reid 1985, op cit, p. 46; and Alan Angell, "Peruvian Labour and the Military Government since 1968", University of London, Institute of Latin American Studies, Working Paper No.3, 1980.

(CGTP). The CGTP declared its full support for the military's nationalist Revolution in 1969, and in 1971 the government awarded it official recognition in an effort to undermine the APRA. By 1972 the CGTP was the dominant labor confederation in Peru, with 43 affiliated federations and an estimated 400,000 members, including the massive Federation of Civil Construction Workers, the wealthy Federation of Bank Employees, and the powerful Cerro de Pasco miners' union. The APRA's CTP dwindled to only a few important unions, including sugar workers, longshoremen, private clerks and textile workers.<sup>11</sup>

Undermining the oligarchy and challenging the APRA's popular hegemony, however, was not enough. The Peruvian military government tried to increase popular participation and mobilize support for its own project. Instead of creating their own revolutionary party (along the lines of the Mexican PRI), or working directly through existing parties (such as the Communist Party), the military leaders and their advisors opted for a bureaucratic alternative--the National System for Support of Social Mobilization (SINAMOS). SINAMOS was a government agency established in 1971 to organize participation through state-sponsored corporate organizations, coordinate grassroots self-help activities among the poor, and mobilize people to implement government reform policies. SINAMOS was run by generals and staffed by civilian intellectuals (including Delgado, a former Aprista, and Carlos Franco, who would later serve as an advisor to President Alan Garcia in 1985), who shared a rejection of political parties in theory and practice,

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<sup>11</sup> Angell, op cit; and Denis Sulmont, El movimiento obrero Peruano (1890-1980) (Lima: Tarea, 1981).



deeming them elitist and divisive. The agency sponsored the National Agrarian Confederation (CNA) to group cooperative members and others benefitting from land reform, the National Organization of Young Towns and Neighborhood Organizations (ONDEPJOV) to mobilize urban shantytown associations and provide them with services, and the National Confederation of Industrial Communities (CONACI), to coordinate workplace participation efforts. SINAMOS' efforts fostered an

unprecedented variety of participatory experiences for large numbers of people who had been marginal to the previous electoral system.<sup>12</sup>

The Velasco reforms were expected to eliminate class conflict and replace party competition within a consensual "Social Democracy of Full Participation" under military control. Ironically, they resulted instead in a marked increase in class consciousness and conflict. This took the form of resistance to SINAMOS from most of its target communities, and the formation of more articulate protest organizations by those who were excluded from the government effort. Furthermore, in the absence of other political arenas, unions and new popular organizations became the primary terrain of competition between different political forces in society, and different factions within the government itself.

The rise in conflict was especially notable in the industrial

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<sup>12</sup> Henry A. Dietz, "Bureaucratic Demand-Making and Clientelistic Participation in Peru", in James Malloy, ed., Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977).

sector, where employers resented government intrusion into labor relations. Industrialists were particularly alienated by job stability legislation and the Industrial Community, and some firms went to great lengths to sabotage worker participation. The number, intensity, and frequency of strikes increased considerably under Velasco, even before wage rates began to fall in 1974. The majority of strikes were defensive, in response to employer failure to meet legal obligations. But they also resulted from the growth of unions per se, as new unions tested their influence with a more sympathetic government. Despite generous economic incentives, only a few larger firms collaborated with the government and new capital investment fell sharply. Although the Industrial Community was intended to do away with the need for unions, it actually strengthened the unions' influence in the workplace.<sup>13</sup>

The land reform also produced unanticipated levels of participation and popular involvement. While it succeeded in doing away with the oligarchy, it did not eliminate rural-urban inequality or rural class conflict. Cooperative managers did not receive adequate technical assistance or producer prices from the government. And despite rhetoric to the contrary, only 39% of total agricultural land and less than a quarter of the rural population were affected by the reform. The estimated 100,000 permanent laborers who benefitted most faced new tensions from temporary laborers and surrounding communities. Excluded completely were Peru's poorest peasants, including some 5,000 indian communities with historical claims against the new cooperatives. This

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<sup>13</sup> The industrial community experience is discussed in E. Stephens 1983, op cit..

prompted a wave of land invasions in the southern sierra and the organization of these marginalized groups into the Peruvian Peasant Confederation (CCP), whose leadership identified with radical leftist parties.

#### The APRA and the Marxist Left

As the conditions for the emergence of a broad new popular movement were being established unintentionally by the Velasco government, the reactions of Peru's political parties helped to shape this movement. Most important, the APRA party's response to this challenge--a passive "wait and see"---has turned out to be one of the most important and least recognized decisions in contemporary Peruvian politics. Haya de la Torre, a modern-day caudillo whose rule over the party was undisputed, decided to stand by rather than to mobilize the party apparatus to win new popular support or compete with the marxist left to organize an opposition movement. Haya was obsessed with the survival of APRA as such, and with his own political leadership, in the face of what was clearly an unprecedented threat. He cautiously praised the military's reforms, while calling for a return to democracy and party competition. His motives may have been personal. "I think Haya wanted Velasco to recognize him, more than anything" said one young party leader, "He wasn't anti-Velasco or anti-military".<sup>14</sup> Looking back today, a party strategist also recalls Haya's behavior;

"The jefe [Haya] directed his party like a Modern Inca. He did not oppose the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces, but he didn't help it, either. His goal was to save his power and the

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<sup>14</sup> Author's interview with Mario Valcarcel Aragon, Aprista youth leader of the 1970s, November 9, 1986

party first, though others were dubious".<sup>14</sup>

Haya did republish his early tract, El Antiimperialismo y el APRA, after decades of self-censorship, in order to underscore his paternity claims to the Velasco reforms. Other than occasional public statements, however, he turned inward and focused on preparing a dedicated core of militants for an uncertain future.

This strategy ensured the APRA's institutional survival. If the party had tried to launch a frontal attack on the military, Haya and the rest of the party leadership may well have faced another period of lengthy exile. By avoiding antagonism they were generally left free to carry on internal activities. Apristas turned out every year to publicly celebrate their Jefe's birthday, and Haya used the occasion to reiterate his calls for recognition of APRA's role in originating these reforms. Thus the party's nation-wide apparatus survived and retained a core of loyal members, held together by family ties and a shared past, by the APRA's unique internal political culture and mística.

Haya's strategy in the seventies also helped plant seeds of change among younger party leaders that soon would become important. He first concentrated on working with a core of promising students, including such future leaders as Alan Garcia, Carlos Roca, Ilda Urizar and Jesus Guzman (who formed part of the APRA government after 1985). They were a small group in a university generation which turned overwhelmingly toward the marxist left for inspiration, but they also developed a vision of Aprismo that was distinct from their predecessors. As Roca and Guzman explain;

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<sup>14</sup> Author's interview with Hugo Otero Lanzarotti, May 23, 1985

"The re-edition of El Antimperialismo y el APRA produced an accelerated process of internal change, because now this was not the clandestine work read in radicalized circles within the party. Rather, by producing this new edition, the Jefe Fundador himself promoted a debate around his ideas".<sup>15</sup>

"During the 1970s...we made an evaluation and critique of the political line of the party, which at the start was our responsibility as younger members, in the face of a leadership that had become accustomed to a more bland attitude".<sup>16</sup>

While Garcia and others also went overseas to study for part of the seventies, another group of party cadres was trained daily by Haya in such forums as the Escuela de Cuadros, the Parlamento Universitario and weekend social gatherings. They were schooled in Haya's early works and

other literature, and encouraged to defend Aprismo as a progressive alternative to marxism.<sup>17</sup>

The cost of Haya's turning inward, however, was to reinforce the narrowness of the APRA's social bases and cede greater presence to the marxist left in the major institutions of civil society, including the educational system, the media, the various professional gremios, and the

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<sup>15</sup> Author's interview with Carlos Roca, October 3, 1986

<sup>16</sup> Author's interview with Jesus Guzman Gallardo, September 9, 1986

<sup>17</sup> In an interview with the author on January 16, 1986, former Aprista university student leader Manuel Garcia Torre remembered this tutelage;

"Haya taught us social sciences, literature, philosophy. And marxist texts, in confrontation with Aprismo. Then he would send us out to intervene in the polemics in the Plaza San Martin (downtown Lima) or the Parque Universitario, with all the marxist left groups. What great debates! Then we would discuss the polemics with Haya. 'Jefe, they told us such-and-such', 'they say we are reformists because we believe the middle class should lead'...And Haya responded with ways to refute them".

organized labor and popular movement. The APRA's internal life had been designed for an era when the rest of society was closed to those whom the party first embraced--the older generations of white and blue collar workers, the students and lower middle class provincianos. But Peruvian society was undergoing rapid modernization and democratization, and the old-fashioned APRA and Haya's paternalism had less appeal to newly mobilized peasants and migrants, shantytown dwellers, or the more radicalized youth of the era. The party's network of local leaders had become relatively conservative and comfortably middle class; in the seventies this was reinforced.<sup>18</sup> The party lost contact with the major popular protagonists of the seventies. With the return to democracy Aprista leaders found this a major obstacle to developing a new image and project. As APRA Senator Javier Valle Riestra and younger party militant and journalist Ricardo Ramos Tremolada explain;

"Velasco was an important influence. He stole the Aprista banners. The party had to return to its original sources, and it did. But not so much changed within the party apparatus, which remained reactionary and slow to change".<sup>19</sup>

"The APRA remained totally apart from the social movements of the seventies. It had become conservative, and was now marginal. It only formed cadres, with Alan, Carlos Roca, and others, just a clique around Haya, who were criticized from outside. It was like a school, the party mystique stayed with them, but even within the party they formed a clique apart from the mass".<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> This was evident from the author's interviews. The conservatism of local party leaders has also been noted by Liisa North, based on unpublished surveys of 152 departmental leaders in 1969 and informal follow-up in 1986.

<sup>19</sup> Author's interview with Javier Valle Riestra, January 16, 1986.

<sup>20</sup> Author's interview with Ricardo Ramos Tremolada, September 13, 1986

The APRA's "Generation of the '70s" fought bitterly with the marxist left, but this inner circle leaders also initiated new debates over strategy and tactics within the highly disciplined and vertical party. Haya and other older leaders believed that the military eventually would be forced to recognize the indispensability of elections and parties, and hence preferred to avoid antagonisms and wait for the opportunity to cultivate elite contacts. But many of the younger militants wanted instead to radicalize the party in practice as well as theory, to expand the party base and compete with the new left. Until his death in 1979 Haya's position generally won out. But this younger generation, both those who followed Haya and those who rebelled, would be crucial to future efforts at party renovation.

In sharp contrast to APRA, its historical rival, the Communist Party offered open political support for the military government and received concrete benefits in return during the early years of the Velasco government. Because it could not guarantee labor peace, however, several factions within the military government became alarmed by the strength of militant left union leadership and sought to undermine Communist control as well. In 1972 SINAMOS officials formed the Confederation of Workers of the Peruvian Revolution (CTRP), offering immediate recognition to new unions that joined this state-sponsored organization. Yet most affiliates were from small firms with notoriously anti-union owners, and thus SINAMOS found itself involved in bitter labor disputes it did not want while the Communist CGTP continued to represent most major labor organizations. A group of anti-Communist officers led by the Fisheries Minister also attempted to challenge the

CGTP, through the formation of a semi-fascist front organization--the "Peruvian Revolutionary Movement" (MLR)--based largely on the Peruvian Fishermens' Federation. The MLR took over the state-sponsored CTRP in 1974 and began to use violent tactics against leftist unions. Yet it did not enjoy full government support, and by 1975 it was thrown out of virtually every major union it tried to take over. The CGTP continued to have a success rate equal or superior to that of state-sponsored unions throughout the Velasco period.<sup>21</sup>

The reactions of the APRA and Communist Party to the military Revolution were only part of the political story of the seventies. Perhaps the most unintended consequence of the Velasco experiment was the growth of new parties to the left of the Communists--maoists, trotskyites, castroites, radicalized Catholics and other heterodox groups, commonly called "ultras" to differentiate them from the Moscow-line Communists.<sup>22</sup> This was a phenomenon that emerged in the early 1960s with guerilla activity in the Peruvian countryside, but such actions had been localized and quickly repressed. Until the early 1970s the radical left was very sectarian and limited largely to university halls. The Velasco challenge, however, sent them en masse into grassroots organizing. Although their work was clandestine, they were granted considerable political space under the military regime and they

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<sup>21</sup> This is elaborated in E. Stephens, op cit..

<sup>22</sup> The most important of these parties were the heterodox Vanguardia Revolucionaria (VR) and Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR); the maoist Communist Party of Peru--"Patria Roja" and PCP--"Bandera Roja"; and at least three small trotskyite groups (POMR, FIR, PST). See Ricardo Letts, La izquierda Peruana: organizaciones y tendencias (Lima: Mosca Azul, 1981).



were able to focus their energies on organizing among poor peasants, urban squatters, and trade unions that were alienated by both government policy and the Communists' pro-government stance.<sup>23</sup> The most prominent bases of the new left were the Peruvian Peasant Confederation (CCP), the public schoolteachers' union (SUTEP) and the largest miners' organization.<sup>24</sup>

Although the size and strength of trade unions increased dramatically under the Velasco government, and a variety of alternative forms of popular organization emerged, Peru's social structure continued to present serious obstacles to working class unity or solidaristic multi-class organization. Of an adult workforce estimated at just over four million in 1975, 39 percent was concentrated in agriculture (the majority in the underdeveloped highlands), another 38 percent in commerce and services, 15 percent in manufacturing and 1.7 percent in mining. An estimated 42 percent of the work force was classified as "subemployed", earning less than the minimum wage or forced to work less than a normal schedule, without social security or legal protection. Some 15 percent of the labor force was unionized, two-thirds of that in

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<sup>23</sup> On the "New" Left see also Alberto Flores Galindo, "Generacion de '68: ilusion y realidad", Margenes No. 1, 1987; and Los Caminos del Laberinto No. 3, 1986.

<sup>24</sup> A strike by Peru's 120,000 teachers in 1971 was met with harsh repression by the military. When the CGTP refused to support them, the teachers formed a new federation, the Unified Syndicate of Peruvian Education Workers (SUTEP), with leaders affiliated with the maoist Patria Roja party. When the Communists also refused to support striking copper miners in 1971, the powerful National Federation of Peruvian Miners and Metallurgical Workers (FNTMMP) withdrew from the CGTP and elected radical left leadership as well. In the following years the SUTEP and FNTMMP were among the strongest critics of the military government.

the public sector, and 62 percent of unionized workers were concentrated in the capital city of Lima. By the mid-1970s the members of some trade unions and agrarian cooperatives gained income and consumption levels far above that of the majority of the population. Most urban workers labored in small firms with paternalistic or abusive employers, or worked "independently", with no unions and limited legal protection. Yet urban workers as a whole were better off than the rural poor, and the gap between them was exacerbated by geographical, ethnic and linguistic barriers.<sup>22</sup>

If social structure complicated the task of building working class unity and broader social alliances, this was made even more difficult by the fragmentation of political identities. The surprisingly tolerant political climate, the ample terrain for all competitors among newly mobilized popular sectors, and the lack of serious competition from APRA meant that there was little incentive for leftists to unify around a common program or strategy. The pro-government Communists dominated the major national labor confederation, which was forced into the uncomfortable role of trying to sustain labor support for the state. In 1974, however, over 100 representatives of unions that were dissatisfied with the CGTP's representation formed the Coordinating Committee for Classist Sindical Unity (CCUSC). The radical left party leaders, for their part, turned this organization into an arena for broad (and often heated) political debate, over the nature of the regime itself and over

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<sup>22</sup> See Jorge Parodi, "Los sindicatos en la democracia vacía", in Luis Pasara and Jorge Parodi, eds., Democracia, Sociedad y Gobierno en el Perú (Lima: CEDYS, 1985).

alternative revolutionary strategies.<sup>26</sup>

This context of structural and political division makes the labor and popular organization which did emerge in the 1970s all the more impressive. Within the labor movement, there was much more industry-wide organization and more regional and national coordination than before 1968. Both the CGTP and CCUSC brought together an array of new white collar and blue collar unions. There were also steps towards greater articulation between unions and other forms of popular organization, particularly involving neighborhood and community organizations in working class barrios.<sup>27</sup> In 1973, for example, there was a wave of protests around the country against government efforts to manipulate popular organizations and the shortcomings of the reform policies. These included marches by striking miners which were supported by entire local communities, and several long and violent conflicts led by new regional defense fronts, such as that in the northern area of Chimbote in support of striking steelworkers and fishermen. In 1974 there was an increase in federation and solidarity

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<sup>26</sup> The leftist parties were divided by ideology and by the different social groups they mobilized. For example, the maoists had their main base among schoolteachers and public university students, while the more heterodox groups working among peasant unions and new manufacturing unions, and they all competed for support in the urban shantytowns. Both maoists and trotskyites wanted to make the CCUSC into a new labor confederation, each in its own image, while the rest wanted to take over the CGTP from within and remove the Communist leadership. To the ultras the Communists were tools of Soviet policy and the military. To the Communists, the ultras were "infantile adventurers" unable to recognize and defend the most revolutionary government Peru had ever had.

<sup>27</sup> An example of this can be seen in Susan C. Stokes' case study of the Independencia neighborhood of Lima, "Politics and Latin America's Urban Poor: Reflections from a Lima Shantytown", Latin American Research Review Volume 26, Number 2, 1991, pp. 75-102.

strikes over previous years, in defense of declining wages and benefits as well as in protest against government manipulation. Ironically, the chief legacy of Velasco's rule was that through a variety of participatory and protest experiences, more poor people emerged better able to defend themselves than ever before against authoritarianism--even if the channels for more permanent representation remained weak.

#### Regime Crisis and the Search for Allies

It is in this context that the demise of authoritarian rule must be understood. An authoritarian regime in crisis has several alternatives: it can alter its ruling coalition and seek new domestic allies; it can draw in its ranks and sustain itself through military force; or it can liberalize the political system. Faced with impending economic and political crisis by 1974, the military government tried all of these options. In 1975 Velasco was replaced in an internal coup. In 1976 the regime began to resemble a bureaucratic-authoritarian dictatorship, as labor protest was repressed in an attempt to restore the confidence of business and foreign creditors. But by 1977, the military announced its decision to retire from government altogether.

The Velasco government was hit hard by the combined impact of internal policy contradictions and external shocks in 1973 and 1974, which narrowed the space for reform and exacerbated social tensions. The lack of private investment had been offset by heavy state borrowing against anticipated export income. Yet in 1973 a fishing industry boom turned to bust, in 1974 world commodity prices plummeted, and an anticipated petroleum flow did not come on line in time. To make matters worse, the rise to power of a reactionary dictatorship in Chile,

Peru's southern neighbor and geopolitical enemy, led to increased concern for national security and massive defense spending. By 1974, Peru was deeply in debt and government deficits began to seriously affect the cost of living, touching off a long battle over how to distribute the burden of economic crisis.<sup>28</sup>

In the midst of this crisis, government leaders were divided over the direction and pace of policy as well as the extent to which popular participation should be permitted. Progressives in SINAMOS pressed for further socialization of property relations and popular mobilization, and some radicals urged a break with the international capitalist system. Moderates in the Finance Ministry and elsewhere wanted more orthodox austerity measures. Hardliners in the Interior Ministry saw popular mobilization and Communist "infiltration" as a security threat, and neo-fascists in the Fisheries Ministry tried to control militant unions by force. As these divisions increased, Velasco suffered a debilitating stroke. His rule thereafter was marked by increasingly erratic behavior, personalism and paranoia which alienated much of the original coup coalition.<sup>29</sup>

One incident in particular--the aftermath of a strike by the Lima police force on February 5, 1975--forced government officials, their allies and their opponents to define themselves in regard to the military's project and the channeling of popular demands. As the police

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<sup>28</sup> See Barbara Stallings, "International Capitalism and the Peruvian Military Government", in McClintock and Lowenthal, eds., The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered, op cit., pp. 163-167.

<sup>29</sup> See Liisa L. North, "Ideological Orientations of Peru's Military Rulers", in McClintock and Lowenthal eds., op cit., p. 251-270.

vanished from the streets, students linked to the APRA party and other agitators marched through the city shouting anti-government slogans. What followed was an outburst of spontaneous mass rioting and vandalism unprecedented in Peruvian history. For most of a day inner-city residents set bonfires, ransacked commercial establishments, and attacked newspapers and government institutions. "On this day the daily routine and all functioning institutions were paralyzed" said one observer. "The established order of society seemed to have disappeared". When the Army finally brought the riots under control, the official toll was 86 dead, hundreds injured, and vast material damages. The political toll on the regime was even higher.<sup>30</sup> This expression of mass discontent and cries of "Death to Velasco" badly shook Peru's military, forcing renewed debate over popular participation in the Revolution. The President publicly blamed a subversive alliance of Apristas, ultra-leftists and even the United States Central Intelligence Agency for this uprising. Privately, police lack of discipline and the slow reaction of the Army exacerbated his fears of internal destabilization. Pro-government labor and popular organizations urged progressive officers to support a mass Revolutionary Party to open channels for popular participation. The Prime Minister,

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<sup>30</sup> The cite and discussion of this incident are drawn from Aldo Panfichi, "La crisis y las multitudes: Lima, 5 de febrero de 1975", Debates en Sociologia No. 9, 1983. According to Panfichi and to the author's own interviews, there was a history of tension between Peru's Armed Forces and its underpaid, poorly-trained police. When the police aired their complaints about military privileges and abuses, Aprista university students with contacts in the police force seized the opportunity. They offered encouragement to the strikers, helped print flyers and urged other students to support their actions. When word got out that Army tanks had leveled the police barracks, these Aprista students and others held a series of protests against this repression.

General Francisco Morales Bermudez, initiated a series of public "Dialogues with the People" over national policy issues. But Velasco and his closest military advisers were unable to build more effective channels of mediation with increasingly independent labor and popular organizations. As Fisheries Minister General Javier Tantalean aptly put it, "the principal defect of the revolution was its fear of the people".<sup>31</sup>

If the events of February 1975 revealed both the extent of popular discontent and the weakness of the government, they were also important for the definition of the APRA party's political strategy. On one hand, it was clear that APRA still retained an enviable capacity to mobilize in a politically advantageous situation. Even the radical left parties were surprised by the police strike and mass response.<sup>32</sup> On the other hand, these events brought to the fore an ongoing fissure within the party over strategy and tactics. Haya de la Torre and other older leaders believed that the growing crisis would force the military to

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<sup>31</sup> This comment appears in Julio Cotler, "Democracy and National Integration in Peru", in McClintock and Lowenthal eds., op cit, p.29.

<sup>32</sup> Interviewed in by the author on January 16, 1986, former Aprista student leader Manuel Garcia Torre recalled the students' efforts;

"There was this whole mass [of strikers] that we had to lead, that we had to take advantage of, and we knew how to do so magnificently with our cadres. The Communists didn't, they saw the police as oppressors. It's the political savvy we have, we know how to use a political space when it appears. In San Marcos [the left-dominated state university] there was an assembly, with all the marxist groups and their analyses--'we have to characterize the movement correctly first' and all that. Meanwhile, we were heading out with the police. It's their lack of common sense. The APRA is better at using the conjuncture, the criollada and common sense".

recognize the indispensability of elections and parties, and they worked quietly to build contacts within the military elite. However, as noted above, some of the younger party militants wanted to radicalize the party line, oppose the military and seek more popular sector support. One party youth who was subjected to party discipline after partaking in the police strike remembers the frustration he and his cohorts felt;

"Haya led us on, always saying that 'next year there will be elections', for twelve years....And the 'golden youth' staying around him every day, singing him songs. He really wanted to dampen our spirits! Because he thought that the elections were coming, and the Armed Forces would tell him 'as long as your youth keep making trouble, nothing for you!'"<sup>33</sup>

Haya eventually prevailed; he formally disavowed any connection with the events and disbanded the APRA's university student organization. This debate would nonetheless plague the APRA in the following years.

Organized labor and other popular organizations also faced a point of decision in 1975. After some debate, a number of organizations rallied behind the regime, including the Communist CGTP, the National Agrarian Confederation and major shantytown associations. They hoped to pressure the military into continuing the reform process and expanding participation, but they also had to publicly support a government in economic crisis. Prime Minister Morales met at length with the CGTP to secure its support. When he finally presented the regime's first package of economic austerity measures in June 1975, they included moderate wage increases to placate the confederation, and the CGTP

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<sup>33</sup> Author's interview with Mario Valcarcel Aragon, November 9, 1986. Rank and file Apristas did join the strikes and protests of the 1970s, but the leadership refused to endorse them. The lack of open support for popular struggles after 1975 caused even greater discontent within APRA.



publicly supported them despite pressures from some of its most important bases. This in turn marked the most important public break between the Communists and the radical left, as the latter vociferously denounced the measures. A new magazine, Marka, emerged as the voice of left opposition to both the regime and the CGTP leadership.

This demonstration of support was inadequate to restore the authority of the Velasco government. On August 5, the Interior Ministry announced the dismissal of several newspaper editors, the sudden closure of Marka and the deportation of 29 opposition labor and political leaders, including three Apristas, all charged with various acts of subversion and threats to national security. This overreaction by military hardliners signalled to regime moderates that Velasco had finally lost control of his own Revolution. On August 29, 1975, General Morales launched a coup against Velasco which received immediate support from all branches of the Armed Forces.<sup>34</sup>

General Morales came to power with three initial goals: to unify the Armed Forces, stabilize the economy, and restore a measure of legitimate social control.<sup>35</sup> Upon taking office he announced that his rule would mark a "Second Phase" of consolidation of the military Revolution, but within one year the pursuit of military and economic stability precluded that goal. Morales purged the most progressive officers and restored military hierarchy as the principal for

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<sup>34</sup> These events are traced in Henry Pease Garcia, Los caminos del poder (Lima: DESCO, 1981), and in Pease Garcia and Alfredo Filomeno, Peru 1975: Cronologia Politica (Lima: DESCO, 1977).

<sup>35</sup> These goals were announced publicly, and reiterated in the author's interview with General Francisco Morales Bermudez on November 4, 1985.

distribution of power within the regime. This had a negative impact on popular participation and reform. His efforts to revive the economy further strained relations with popular sectors, because he favored a conservative program of greater reliance on market mechanisms, measures to restore domestic business confidence, and more active courting of foreign investment and the U.S. government.

At the same time, Morales sought new political allies by granting amnesty to old bourgeois parties and making gestures of reconciliation with the APRA, which greatly angered the still-loyal Communists. There was little hope of winning enthusiastic support from the centrist Popular Action Party (AP) or the more conservative Popular Christian Party (PPC). Former President and AP leader Fernando Belaunde Terry returned from exile in the United States and demanded an immediate return to civilian rule. Leaders of the PPC, a conservative Catholic party closely allied with sectors of the country's private business and professional elites, demanded more support for private enterprise and cuts in military spending.

In contrast, APRA leader Haya de la Torre had been waiting all along for an overture from the military government. He praised Morales for restoring order, though continuing to call for a return to democracy. Morales used the occasion of an annual military ceremony in the northern city of Trujillo honoring officers massacred by APRA militants in 1932, to call for national reconciliation. The APRA in turn mobilized its followers to fill the plazas and streets of Trujillo and cheer the new President's words. According to APRA leader Luis Alberto Sanchez, this event was prearranged. When asked by the author

about the motives for this reconciliation, General Morales' reply was the following;

"I was keeping in mind that we had to seek not only political stabilization but also the unity of all Peruvians. In Trujillo... I tossed out the first stone for construction of unification with the APRA, when I said that we had to forget historical hatreds, we had to erase all the blood spilled between the Army and the APRA, it had to end. Since 1976 there was a reconciliation, not in the sense of overt support for APRA, but in the sense of burying the past".<sup>36</sup>

Meanwhile, conditions for the popular sectors deteriorated rapidly. The decline of real wages and salaries accelerated after 1975, and plans for extension of the land reform program and urban shantytown development were scrapped. Nearly one third of Peru's urban workers went on strike in 1975. Employers demanded and received more restrictive strike legislation, as well as modification of the Job Stability Law and curtailment of the Industrial Community. Military hardliners began to denounce strikes as national security threats. States of Emergency were declared in the mining and fishing sectors, where strikes were ruled illegal and union officials detained and harassed.

This hardening of government policy, especially the imposition of a drastic set of austerity measures on June 30, 1976, proved to be the catalyst for what was called the "movimiento popular", a heterogeneous movement in opposition to the regime and a major actor in the transition process. The term is used loosely to refer to the emerging protest alliance involving the CGTP and independent or radical left-dominated

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<sup>36</sup> Author's interview with Luis Alberto Sanchez, January 31, 1986; and interview with General Morales Bermudez, November 4, 1985.

trade unions, neighborhood associations, regional defense fronts, student and teachers' organizations, and leftist parties. It began with grassroots opposition to wage cuts, price increases and the rollback of labor reforms after 1975 (and would reach a high point as an actual movement over the next three years). Within two days of the announcement of these new measures, there was a national transportation strike and protests erupted in a number of communities. In various provincial cities teachers and students led protests against price and fare increases. In Lima, industrial zones were pillaged and associations of shantytown dwellers blocked the entrances to the capital. The protests were not centrally coordinated, most came from rank-and-file workers, independent unions, and from poor housewives, family members, and students. They were, however, the first major sign of the impact of eight years of government and leftist mobilization on people's determination to defend newly-won rights.<sup>37</sup>

The government's response was that of a conventional military dictatorship--repression. A national State of Emergency was declared, with the closure of presses, suspension of basic guarantees and a special decree prohibiting all strikes and demonstrations. The State of

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<sup>37</sup> The "popular movement" and the following chain of events are discussed in Pease Garcia, *op cit*, 1981. The events of mid-1976 marked the virtual abandonment of government efforts to foster participation and redistribution, and placed immense pressure on Communist labor leaders to actively oppose government policy. Peruvian officials negotiated a \$400 million balance of payments loan with a committee of its creditors, on the condition that Peru undertake a comprehensive stabilization program and allow a bank consortia to monitor the economy. On June 30 the third and most drastic set of economic austerity measures was imposed, and response of the popular movement to these measures was swift. See Stallings, 1979; and William Bollinger, "Peru Today--The Roots of Labor Militancy", NACLA Report on the Americas, XIV, No. 6, Nov.-Dec., 1980, pp. 2-35.

Emergency lasted for one full year, to June 1977, significantly raising the costs of protest at a time when other channels of access to the government were being closed off, and when austerity was most seriously being felt. Union activists, including those from the CGTP, were jailed and harassed. Shortly thereafter, Morales announced that the term "socialism" would be dropped from official discourse, in exchange for "realism". The Revolution was definitely over.

#### The Transition to Democracy and the Popular Movement

The military's decision to pursue orthodox stabilization policies and its harsh reaction to popular protests led many observers to predict that it would take the repressive route of its more authoritarian neighbors in Argentina, Brazil and Chile.<sup>39</sup> The search for a way out of economic and political crisis, however, led not to consolidation of military rule but to a transition to political democracy--one that was negotiated with APRA from above and transformed through popular pressures from below.

The reversal of socioeconomic policy and repression of dissent definitively cost the government the support of urban and rural working classes, as well as most middle sectors. The Communist Party leadership continued to express its support for the military regime in hopes that it would reverse course, but Communists were not welcomed by the new Junta.<sup>40</sup> The CGTP also lost its privileged access to the regime and

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<sup>39</sup> See for example Julio Cotler, 1979, op cit., pp. 281-282.

<sup>40</sup> General Pedro Richter Prada, who was Interior Minister from 1976 to 1978 and Prime Minister in 1979 and 1980, was particularly concerned about Communists lurking within the military and government bureaucracy, and he came to believe the military had to leave power in order to fully eradicate this. In an interview with the author on

was increasingly unable to deliver rank-and-file compliance with such unpopular policies, especially in the face of more militant left competition. The effect of the State of Emergency on popular organization was counter-productive because, although it reduced strikes dramatically, it also led to the emergence of new human rights committees, communal kitchens and various forms of solidarity for unemployed workers and their families. These activities brought together previously isolated organizations such as the professional associations of journalists, teachers, and intellectuals; Catholic Church groups, and leftist parties. This in turn increased the credibility of the leftist parties that continued to speak out against the regime, and forced them to begin to address the problem of political unity.

While the military government alienated the majority of the population, it also failed to win over economic elites. Although Morales promised private sector capitalists he would "change the rules of the game" in their favor, they resented the state's overwhelming domination of the economy as well as their lack of input into policymaking. Producers for the domestic market found the austerity measures too harsh. Many capitalists objected to the military's heavy defense spending, and most of them did not trust the military to pursue a

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November 21, 1985, he said the following;

"There was a process of marxist infiltration which was deviating the government process, and logically this generated discontent within the Armed Forces. Basically it was the Peruvian Communist Party and the pro-Cuban sectors which were pressuring us. So we made General Morales Bermudez see that [military rule] could not go on, that the military would deteriorate a great deal, and this endangered the stability of the country".

coherent economic policy. The military was also unable to placate its foreign creditors, and in early 1977 the banks announced they would not provide further loan funds unless Peru won approval from the International Monetary Fund.<sup>41</sup>

The imposition of a State of Emergency was opposed by all of Peru's political parties and civic organizations, as well as journalists and the Catholic Church. At a time when the military was trying to regain the confidence of the United States, the Carter Administration also actively expressed its objections to human rights violations in Peru and its preference for a transition to democracy.<sup>42</sup> Finally, different groups within the military objected to spending cuts and disagreed over the use of repression. General Morales himself began to feel that the level of internal conflict was threatening the very integrity of the military establishment;

"One of the fundamental reasons for the decision to go into a democratic transition and leave the de facto government was because the military institutions had been receiving all the impact of national politics for many years, and they were being debilitated...Little by little, partisan politics were being exercised by the military institutions, which was a weakness and a rupture of what was the essence of the Armed Forces".<sup>43</sup>

By late 1976, the question facing the Junta was not whether to retreat from power but how to do so. The President named a commission

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<sup>41</sup> The best analysis of the relations between the military government and foreign creditors is Stallings 1979, 1979, op cit.

<sup>42</sup> See Julio Cotler, "Military Interventions and 'Transfer of Power to Civilians' in Peru", in Philippe C. Schmitter et al, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

<sup>43</sup> Author's interview with General Morales, op cit.

headed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, moderate General Oscar Molina Pallochía, to draft a comprehensive new government plan and seek internal consensus over a transition scenario. Above all the military wanted a gradual, controlled process, that could reestablish social control, guarantee economic stabilization, build a strong defense and secure future guarantees for the military. Military leaders disagreed, however, over how open the transition process should be and on whether or not the military should retire completely.<sup>44</sup>

The solution which emerged was to hold a Constituent Assembly, to lay a new legal foundation for the future government, and then hold general elections. A new Constitution, properly supervised, could institutionalize principles the military held dear, such as a stronger state apparatus and a fortified Executive; national control over resources, land reform, a strong and autonomous defense establishment, and secure military privileges. Furthermore, the prolonged drafting of a Constitution itself could serve as an escape valve for social discontent by providing time to negotiate an exit, while giving the older parties time to revive their apparatuses and regain support from the rapidly growing radical left. Morales put it in sporting terms;

"Why wasn't the transition carried out immediately? During the military revolution the political parties entered a sort of rest period, with no political exercise. Thus it was very dangerous to have an immediate democratic transition, because the

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<sup>44</sup> The following information is drawn primarily from the author's interviews with General Morales on November 4, 1985, and with former Cabinet Ministers General Oscar Molina Pallochía (January 22, 1986), Pedro Richter Prada (November 11, 1985) and Jorge Fernandez Maldonado (December 19, 1985), the latter being the last progressive Junta member purged in 1976. Additional information about the deliberations of Junta leaders is drawn from published interviews by Maria del Pilar Tello, in Golpe o revolucion? (Lima: Editora Universal, 1983).



parties were, as they say in soccer terms, like players who haven't warmed up, no? Players who haven't warmed up cannot enter the field, you have to warm up the body before entering. Well, that's the way politics is".<sup>45</sup>

The simultaneous narrowing of economic policy options and opening of political debate that was the essential framework for the entire transition process began formally in February of 1977. At that point government officials embarked upon eighteen months of difficult negotiations with the International Monetary Fund. At the same time the government published a proposed new government plan for 1977-1980, the Plan Tupac Amaru, and solicited comments from political parties, interest groups, and the general public. Although the plan covered everything from land reform to nuclear policy, the most hotly debated issue was the mention of a Constituent Assembly in 1978 and an elected government in 1980. There were no details in the plan about how the Assembly would be selected, who would be represented, or what the rules of the game would be. By May of 1977, some 800 organizations had commented on the new plan.<sup>46</sup>

Military leaders also initiated a special round of dialogues with the country's main political parties and interest groups.<sup>47</sup> This

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<sup>45</sup> Author's interview, 1985, op cit.

<sup>46</sup> Oficina Central de Informacion, Plan de Gobierno "Tupac Amaru", Decreto Supremo No. 020-77-PM, Lima, Peru, 1977.

<sup>47</sup> This included the APRA, AP, PPC, the Communist Party, and the tiny Christian Democratic Party, as well as the CGTP, CNA and National Industrialists' Society (SI). It also included the new Socialist Revolutionary Party (PSR), which was formed by ousted velasquista military officers and their civilian allies and counted the CNA among its support bases. At this stage the military leaders did not convene the ultra left groups. They were part of the public arena, however, as their views were widely disseminated through the media.

dialogue formally placed parties back into the political limelight, and forced all contenders for popular support to define themselves publicly on both the solution to economic crisis and the question of democracy. From the military's perspective, the primary purpose of this dialogue was not to alter the substance of the Plan Tupac Amaru (indeed, the final version was virtually the same as the original), nor to seek alternative economic policy advice. Rather, it was to find out where each of these groups stood in regards to the military's pre-established plan, and seek explicit or de facto collaboration.

The response was mixed. Essentially, the right decided to collaborate at a price, the left was divided, and the AP rejected it. Industrialists wanted the elimination of job stability and greater "labor discipline", and demanded fewer state restrictions on private investment. The PPC declared it would support a new Constitution that defended a free press, private property and the rights of employers. The AP insisted on immediate elections and abstained from further dialogues with the military. Labor unions, peasant confederations and other popular organizations were on the whole more concerned about easing the burden of austerity policies and halting the rollback of important land, labor and industrial reforms. The moderate left PC-U and PSR also wanted to preserve and deepen the reforms made under Velasco. The radical left groups, for their part, were aiming for genuine revolutionary change "from below", and rejected elections at this stage as a facade for a return to domination of Peru by domestic

and foreign capital.<sup>48</sup>

Only the APRA was enthusiastic about the plan. Hence the formal reconciliation between the APRA party and the Army which took place during this period was born of necessity as well as interest. It also proved to be one of the most significant turning points in contemporary Peruvian politics. Haya de la Torre and other party leaders had always tried to cultivate personal contacts within the military, but Velasco and his advisors had deeply despised the APRA. Things started off much better under General Morales. On a personal note, Morales' son was an APRA youth leader and the General himself harbored no particular grudges against the party. His call to bury old conflicts in 1976 was the first towards a reconciliation, which was consolidated in a series of direct encounters beginning in 1977. Meeting for the first time, leaders of the Army and APRA discovered that they understood each other and had mutual political interests. General Molina remembers the day they finally met;

"Victor Raul Haya de la Torre and his principal leaders came to lunch with my division Generals and myself. All I did was give Victor Raul a big hug, and tell him that with that embrace all the stages of misunderstanding between the Army and APRA had ended. ...And then we had a whole year of interviews. The first one was at that same lunch, we stayed until eleven o'clock that night, drinking and conversing, debating. Victor Raul and I took a special liking to each other, very special".<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> The views of industrialists and conservative parties are discussed in Francisco Durand, La decada frustrada: los industriales y el poder, 1970-1980 (Lima: DESCO, 1982). On the leftist parties, see Jorge Nieto, Izquierda y democracia en el Peru, 1975-1980 (Lima: DESCO, 1983); "El P.S.R. enjuicia el Plan Tupac Amaru", Informes No. 2, abril 1977; and "Lo que planteo el PCP al Presidente Morales Bermudez", Comision Nacional de Propaganda del P.C.P., mayo 1977.

<sup>49</sup> Author's interview 1986, op cit.

Haya de la Torre put it this way at the time;

"The relationship between the APRA party and the Army is one of long lost love. Ha, ha, ha. Like people who want to be friends and fight all the time. We have always wanted to come together, but the main task of the reactionaries, the oligarchy, the communists, was always to separate us".<sup>50</sup>

The APRA made two primary demands in this period: the restoration of civil and political liberties, and guaranteed free elections. In exchange the APRA offered a past record of electoral strength and social control, and new respect for the military establishment, as well as some important international allies and a conciliatory attitude towards the private sector. Additionally, the party had a nationalist, reformist doctrine which at this stage was quite appealing to the military. As then-Prime Minister Richter recalls:

"[the other parties] had no government plans, nothing. The APRA had more or less drafted a plan...they had fundamental principles. We knew that APRA would carry out a non-marxist, democratic left policy, which was what the country needed at the time".<sup>51</sup>

The Constituent Assembly idea was also mutually advantageous for APRA and the military. Since 1972 Haya had publicly suggested that the military incorporate its major structural reforms in a new Constitution, as a first step towards return to democracy.<sup>52</sup> The extended process of

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<sup>50</sup> Cited in Equis X, 28 september, 1977.

<sup>51</sup> Author's interview 1986, op cit.

<sup>52</sup> In an interview with the author on January 31, 1986, Luis Alberto Sanchez recalled that he had more doubts about this, but thought it was prudent to go along with the plan;

"I think that what they [the military] wanted, above all, was that once and for all what they called their 'achievements' would be respected. The agrarian reform, the petroleum question...to make them lasting. And we also wanted these things to last, though subject to necessary changes. In reality, a new Constitution was not necessary, one only had to touch up the 1933 one, but above

a Constituent Assembly would also be in APRA's interest, for the party needed time to revive its dormant electoral apparatus. The APRA's focus on recuperating popular support through elections and winning access to state power rather than through grassroots organization and protest was generally reassuring to the military.

Above all, Haya de la Torre was pragmatic. While he did complain to the military about the social costs of its austerity policies, he would not let that get in the way of a smooth working relationship.<sup>53</sup> Haya gambled all along that APRA would survive the military regime, that there would be a return to an electoral system, and that APRA would return to the center of the political arena. By 1977 his gamble appeared to be paying off. The APRA and the Armed Forces never made a formal written pact, but they developed a smooth working relationship at the elite level which persisted over most of the transition and which had important consequences for APRA's longer term development.

That popular sectors could be won over through an alliance for democracy between APRA and the military, however, was not immediately apparent. The military's gradualist transition proposal was not well received by most labor and popular organizations, or the leftist political parties. These actors were primarily concerned with lifting the State of Emergency, ending the detention and harassment of popular leaders, and alleviating the immediate burdens of economic austerity,

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all the Army wanted a new Constitution. They had this myth, and we had to give them this pleasure".

<sup>53</sup> When interviewed in 1986, General Molina stressed that Haya often questioned him over the harshness of austerity policies, but that he never tried to bargain over them.

and this plan offered none of that. Unions did not think that a government-supervised Constituent Assembly was likely to restore the rights they were defending, poor families worried about rising food prices and unemployment, and the different leftist groups debated strategies for turning immediate popular demands into a revolutionary force. Initially these actors saw the transition plan as designed to distract attention from the socioeconomic problems at hand.<sup>54</sup>

The Junta, for its part, was divided over whether to include representatives of labor, popular organizations or left parties in dialogues over the rules of the game. Hardliners insisted that this was a sign of weakness and would destabilize the country, while moderates wanted the dialogue to be as wide as possible and believed that militant opposition would be tamed through inclusion rather than exclusion. They compromised by having General Molina meet with the organizations which respected the Armed Forces and had supported the First Phase of the military regime--the CGTP and CNA, and their respective partisan allies, the Communist Party and the velasquista PSR. These organizations considered themselves revolutionary, but for their support of Velasco and willingness to negotiate with the military they were commonly viewed as the "reformist left" in comparison with the "revolutionary" or ultra left parties and interest groups.

For their part, the reformist left leaders willingly entered into discussion with the military. They believed that the country faced an external crisis, that the military was a fundamentally anti-imperialist

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<sup>54</sup> See Nieto, op cit; and Henry Pease Garcia and Alfredo Filomeno, Peru 1977: Cronologia Politica (Lima: DESCO, 1979).

force, and that this government with all its imperfections was preferable to a more conservative civilian alternative. They joined the more radical left and labor organizations in challenging the trade-off that was emerging between the government and APRA--trading the promise of elections in 1980 for acceptance of austerity policies. However, they felt that negotiation would yield more immediate concessions on substantive policy issues of important to their constituencies. The Communist labor confederation wanted restoration of job stability, other union rights, and worker participation schemes. The velasquista agrarian confederation wanted continuation of the land reform and further assistance to cooperatives. The Communist Party and the PSR also wanted to establish functional representation of workers, peasants and other popular interest groups in the drafting of the new Constitution and the new regime to follow.

The "revolutionary" left leadership had a different set of strategies and end goals. Though divided among themselves, the ultra political leaders and their allied labor and popular organizations shared strong criticism of the government's economic and social policy shifts, and denounced the Constituent Assembly and entire Plan Tupac Amaru as a smoke screen for the resurgence of bourgeois and imperialist domination of Peru's economy, and for the actual suppression of labor and peasant rights. They also viewed the military regime--and the military establishment per se--as essentially reactionary forces, and on the whole they did not believe the military would follow through on its promise of free elections in 1980. Hence they harshly criticized both APRA and Communist Party's complicity with the military, arguing that

the only way to get the government to concede on substantive demands was through protest, not negotiation.<sup>55</sup>

Yet the position of the radical left leadership at this point went beyond strategic defense of certain rights and substantive demands. They had developed essentially leninist organizations, guided by revolutionary doctrines that denounced electoral participation and other channels of "bourgeois" political democracy. Rather than seeking to deepen the Velasco reforms, or secure a form of democratic socialism, their ultimate goals involved undermining the regime and replacing it with a more "popular", revolutionary form of rule. In this framework the defense of basic rights and liberties was on the whole a utilitarian stance.

Buoyed by the broad popular reaction to the 1976 austerity measures, the radical left concentrated its efforts on the fight to reverse government policies and defend living standards, through the organization of a National Strike against the dictatorship. Such an action could not succeed, however, without participation of the more moderate CGTP and reformist parties, and without broad support among the populace. This meant that long-term goals and ideological differences had to be submerged in an effort to forge a conjunctural alliance around common goals--the defense of labor rights, restoration of political liberties, and opposition to current government policies. This task was made more difficult by the State of Emergency in place since mid-1986.

What changed the balance of power and provided the catalyst for resurgence of a broad popular movement, in the midst of elite dialogues

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<sup>55</sup> On the debates within the radical left, see Nieto, op cit.



and a State of Emergency, was the sudden tightening of economic austerity measures. In May of 1977, the Finance Minister resigned, complaining that he was unable to reduce the government deficit enough to obtain approval from the International Monetary Fund for new loans. His replacement, Walter Piazza, announced a drastic Emergency Plan on June 7 which included further increases in food and fuel prices, wage and salary cuts and more fiscal constraint in all areas. This package of measures, praised by some business sectors, was publicly condemned by virtually all other sectors of society.<sup>56</sup>

As measures such as bus fare and food price increases went into effect various forms of protest broke out around the country, even though the right to strike had been suspended. In Lima, families in the outlying shantytowns demonstrated against price hikes and the detention of neighborhood leaders. University students led violent protests in Lima and several provincial capitals, halting traffic and overturning government vehicles. The powerful Bank Employees' Federation held a ninety minute national work stoppage. Within two weeks there were departmental strikes in Cusco, Arequipa, Trujillo, and Puno, led by Defense Fronts with the participation of local CGTP unions and other civic organizations. This social protest, both spontaneous and organized, finally goaded the national leadership of the CGTP into taking a more confrontational stance. On June 30, 1977, the CGTP announced its intention to organize a National Strike. At the same time, the national federations of both teachers and miners announced

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<sup>55</sup> See Stallings 1979, op cit., and Bollinger, op cit., 24-25.

they would also hold national stoppages.<sup>57</sup>

Events moved rapidly at this point. On July 7 the new Finance Minister resigned, complaining that the rest of the Cabinet was not supporting the drastic cuts. On July 8 the Unitary Strike Command, which now consisted of the CGTP, CNA, PC and PSR, was joined by over twenty other major union and popular organizations. Only a few Maoist parties refused to go along, denouncing the strikers' aims as "bourgeois". On July 15 the Labor Minister met with organizers to urge them not to strike, but the military refused to consider the minimum demands of lifting the State of Emergency and restoring basic union rights.

The General Strike of July 19, 1977, was the first genuinely national strike in Peruvian history, and it was a huge success. According to the Industrialists' Society, 95 percent of industry was paralyzed, in most provincial towns as well as in the capital. Transportation vanished from the streets, small shops closed their doors, state employees joined the strike, and professionals of all types stayed home. In the shantytowns of Lima residents rioted and blocked the main highways into the capital. Workers marched down the streets of industrial zones, shouting and waving banners. Joining a strike under emergency conditions required courage on the part of all involved, because the Interior Ministry had warned the public that severe

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<sup>57</sup> This discussion of the General Strike of 1977 and surrounding events is drawn from the following sources; Pease Garcia and Filomeno 1977, op cit, pp. 2666-2688; Bollinger, op cit, p. 24-26; Maruja Boggio y Carlos Basombrio, 19 de julio de 1977...un día como leones (cronica y balance) (Lima: ATC-Tarea, 1982); and Confederacion General de Trabajadores Peruanos, Balance del paro nacional del 19 de julio: una expresion justa y exitosa de la clase obrera peruana (Lima: CGTP, 1977).

sanctions would be applied to all who joined this "subversive" action.<sup>58</sup>

The Strike was a turning point for the popular movement. It reflected an unprecedented degree of unity and coordination between union leadership and the rank-and-file, and between labor, other popular organizations and leftist parties. It also galvanized other sectors of the populace that were fed up with the military regime and its policies. The llamamiento or public call to strike involved defense of rights and living standards won under the previous government. This was the first time so many disparate organizations had agreed on a joint set of priorities, and the list of demands reflected the diverse set of alliances which had been constructed around this actions. There were two major unifying points--rejection of the austerity measures and criticism of the State of Emergency. Organizers charged that the government was imposing austerity through a "violent offensive against the rights and conquests of the working classes", and demands included a general wage increase, a price freeze on articles of basic necessity, enforcement of the job stability law and reposition of all workers dismissed or activists jailed for political motives, and a solution to the critical situation of the peasantry. They also insisted upon "unrestricted enforcement of democratic liberties", including the right to organize and strike.<sup>59</sup>

For the labor movement, July 19 represented a major advance in

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<sup>58</sup> Boggio y Basombrio, op cit, p. 26.

<sup>59</sup> The llamamiento of the Unitary Strike Command is reprinted in Boggio y Basombrio, op cit, pp. 20-21.

solidarity, and to this date it is remembered as the day they brought the dictatorship to its knees. As one factory worker in the district of Vitarte recalled:

"We saw how powerful the labor movement was, how it took control of the streets, and then the repression didn't matter. The police stood on the sidelines and watched, they couldn't do anything, and the people took over the streets and sidewalks for the whole length of the Avenida Central. They blocked the thoroughfares and there was a euphoria, the people shouted all they wanted to against the regime, at that point you felt an atmosphere of liberty. There were no parameters".<sup>60</sup>

For the radical left parties, Peru seemed to be on the verge of a revolutionary, mass insurrection. But for many participants, the strike was basically an opportunity to express discontent with the regime when all other channels were closed. A shantytown dweller remembered it this way:

"Well, all the slogans were anti-dictatorship, everybody said 'Down with the military!'. They all had as their main objective repudiation of the government. Also the economic measures, 'Down with cost of living'. There weren't many political slogans, I mean, in the strict sense, they were only expressions of repudiation, practically spontaneous. Even the mothers, they organized themselves and went into the streets with their pots and pans. It was really something".<sup>61</sup>

The Strike created allies of circumstance of a wide variety of social groups. The APRA party leadership did not authorize its bases to participate, but most of them did so just the same, and the party soon issued a statement supporting the goals of the strikers while urging peaceful resolution of their demands. Small shops and large businesses closed their doors, not only in fear of riots but because many owners

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<sup>60</sup> *ibid*, p. 42.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid*, p. 43.

were also fed up with the military. As former Aprista and now conservative Senator Enrique Chirinos Soto remembers, the strike was virtually unanimous:

"Everybody participated in the general strike. Myself, for example, I'm no leftist and I joined the strike, I didn't leave my house. Because with this general strike we all expressed our discontent with the military regime, and this strike served to let the military know that the people weren't behind them, it was a special unanimous response".<sup>62</sup>

The government's immediate response to the strike was repression. Troops killed some 20 people, left hundreds more injured, and detained thousands. Some 500 strike leaders were jailed and the General Secretaries of the main labor confederations faced criminal charges. Furthermore, a temporary government decree allowed employers to fire any workers involved in organizing the strike, and some 5,000 union activists lost their jobs. In the short run, many of them moved directly into the political arena and their fight for amnesty would be one of the main demands of the left as the transition to democracy proceeded.<sup>63</sup>

The military's next step, however, was to grant important concessions. Shortly after the strike the government raised the minimum wage, reversed food price increases, and restored collective bargaining rights to major unions. The State of Emergency was also lifted, and Junta leaders announced open elections for a 100-member Constituent Assembly on June 18, 1978, and for a new government in 1980. The

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<sup>62</sup> Author's interview with Enrique Chirinos Soto, November 1, 1985

<sup>63</sup> Pease Garcia and Filomeno 1977, op cit., p. 2685; and Bollinger, op cit, p. 26.

military insisted it would respect the autonomy of the Assembly, which would also draft new rules for general elections in 1980. "The strike was carried out with political intentions", said General Morales, so the government also responded politically".<sup>64</sup>

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This chapter captures the fundamental, initial phase of Peru's transition to democracy, pointing out some of the contradictory tendencies that seemed to both favor and work against the prospects for social democracy. On one hand, it demonstrates the effective elimination of the political and economic power of the oligarchy, and the emergence of a broad popular movement, which forced the government to restore civil and political liberties, make temporary concessions on austerity, and announce a concrete schedule for retirement from power. Furthermore, it points out the emergence of mass-based leftist parties, whose participation in these broad struggles would make them central participants in the transition process. Clearly, popular sector interests would be on the new political agenda, and one would expect a program which combined political democracy with concerns for immediate social justice to stand a better chance in Peru than in most of the other Latin American transitions.

On the other hand, although some important structural changes were carried out, including land reform and the strengthening of state control over Peru's resources, other structural constraints remained. These included persistent social inequality, foreign debt and dependency

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<sup>64</sup> La Prensa, August 11, 1977, cited in Pease Garcia and Filomeno 1977, op cit., p. 2712.

on exports, and cycles of economic crisis, as well as even more entrenched military power and privilege. Further, political organization in Peru remained weak and divided at this stage. Hence a major challenge would be effective political representation of this popular movement and its component interests over the subsequent course of the transition, which is the subject of the following chapter.

## CHAPTER IV

### Moving Towards Democracy -- The Elections of 1978



"Some said the military government should give priority to political objectives, to the transition, and let the new constitutional government deal with the economy. Others said that military leaders should stay in power until they got the economy straightened out. I opted for a different thesis. I said that the two objectives should march hand-in-hand, and that's how it went".

--General Francisco Morales Bermudez, 1985<sup>1</sup>

"The left, so far as it won, began to lose, by facilitating the orderly and antidemocratic retreat of the military government. The Morales regime, in contrast, by planning its own defeat, began to

--Jorge Nieto, leftist intellectual, 1983<sup>2</sup>

Peruvian military leaders offered a clear trade-off to civilian elites in 1977--they promised a gradual return to elected rule, in exchange for tolerance of unpopular economic austerity measures, the suspension of labor rights, and the rollback of social reforms. The previous chapter showed how a broad popular opposition movement challenged this trade-off, demanding that basic rights and needs be immediately respected, that current economic policies be included on the agenda of debate, and that popular sector representatives be included in the transition process. In doing this, the popular movement also challenged the "stage" notion of construction of social democracy--namely, that political democracy must be conquered first, then social and economic justice can be pursued. By convoking elections for a Constituent Assembly and easing restrictions on leftist opposition parties, the military hoped to dampen social protest and separate the economic from the political, by encouraging all participants to struggle

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<sup>1</sup> Author's interview with General Morales, November 4, 1985

<sup>2</sup> From Nieto, op cit., p. 67.

over the political foundations of a future regime rather than criticize the economic policies of the existing one.

From a comparative perspective, the military's plan seemed shrewd. Studies of transition from authoritarian rule elsewhere in Latin America and Southern Europe have concluded that although popular mobilization often plays an important role in the initial stages of political apertura, such unity and energy are generally ephemeral, as opposition to military rule gives way to serious debate over what kind of government and social policies should follow. The convocation of elections, the revival of party competition, and the negotiation of pacts and alliances have tended to demobilize grassroots organization and demands for urgent social change. Furthermore, the more successful regime transitions--meaning those which are not quickly reversed--have been conservative ones, in which the interests of powerful military and business elites are appeased and the needs of the disadvantaged are postponed.<sup>3</sup>

But Peru's "Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces" was distinct from other authoritarian experiences in Latin America, and thus the dynamics of regime change differed as well. In this case the transition to civilian rule was part of a move away from a "revolutionary" regime in crisis, one that had suspended formal political liberties but had initiated broad reforms and fostered unprecedented organization and democratization within civil society.

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<sup>3</sup> See Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

This meant that the popular movement and its leftist political allies became central participants in the democratic process, and were able to place a wide array of social demands on the political agenda. The transition process was thus marked by unusually broad and simultaneous debates over how to overcome the crisis, who would bear the burden of economic austerity, and what kind of democracy was desirable in Peru.

Peru's older right-wing parties and new economic elites believed that elections, combined with "labor discipline" and a return to more liberal, market-oriented economic policies, were the way out of crisis. But trade unions, other popular organizations, and the leftist parties all argued that while the restoration of basic human rights and political liberties was important, elections per se should not be the main priority. They were more concerned with the immediate problems of deteriorating living standards and defense of newly-won labor and land rights. Labor and the left argued for rejection of IMF austerity guidelines and greater radicalization of social policies, and saw the convocation of elections as an effort to appease economic elites.

In this context APRA leaders continued to seek a centrist role, hoping to win over popular sector support while at the same time trying to reassure military leaders that the political transition was their priority as well. The social changes of the 1970s and the breadth of participation in the transition process, however, made it more difficult for elites to control the course of events or ignore more radical demands. In the struggle over what would constitute democracy in post-Velasco Peru, the advocates of equity and profound social change had more room to maneuver than in other recent transitions, and hence one

might expect some type of social democratic project to appear and have broad appeal. At the same time, the demands for simultaneous political, social and economic change would make the evolution of such a project problematic.

As the next three chapters will illustrate, the convocation of elections and subsequent political developments led to a paradoxical outcome. In 1980, largely due to this mass popular movement, Peru had the most open elections in its history and the broadest political spectrum in the region. Yet ironically, the weaknesses of APRA, the marxist left, and all other parties produced severely divided political representation and relatively ineffective means with which to defend popular sector interests. Furthermore, the coincidence of the electoral process with prolonged economic crisis and repeated efforts to impose harsh austerity measures weakened the very bases of the popular movement and made direct pursuit of its demands even more difficult. In the end, this led to the re-election of Fernando Belaunde, an aging populist with neither an organized mass base nor a solid commitment to social change--a far cry from a first step towards social democracy.

In sum, these chapters argue that the contradictory nature of transition from military to civilian rule in Peru played a critical role in shaping the prospects for a broad-based, popular and social democratic project in the 1980s. And they focus on the political decisions and events that shaped Peru's contradictory new democracy, particularly the development of the APRA, the marxist left, and the popular movement. The events of this transition have received

surprisingly little scholarly attention; thus this chapter examines the move towards the "founding" Constituent Assembly elections in some detail, including the crucial leftist decision to participate, which is the precondition to any social democratic effort. Chapter V will examine the pivotal year of coexistence between the elected Assembly and the military dictatorship and the Constitution itself. Chapter VI covers the crisis of representation that marked the elections of 1980, and the parameters that were established for social democratic alternatives in the decade ahead.

#### Shifting Arenas and Defining Positions

Two major issues formed the backdrop for political developments between 1977 and 1980--continued economic uncertainty and increasing geopolitical tensions. Government efforts to stabilize the economy and negotiate with foreign creditors continued throughout this period. At the same time, the military became increasingly concerned about external aggression and internal security, as tensions flared with neighboring countries and the centennial of Peru's loss to Chile in the 1879 War of the Pacific drew near. Government priorities in both areas--economic policy and national security--in turn posed a serious threat to popular living standards and placed parameters on the transition process.<sup>4</sup>

The Morales Administration faced a clear policy dilemma by 1977.

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<sup>4</sup> This overview of economic and geopolitical affairs during the transition period is drawn from Rosemary Thorp, "The Evolution of Peru's Economy", and Barbara Stallings, "International Capitalism and the Peruvian Military Government", both in McClintock and Lowenthal, eds., The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983); and from Howard Handelman and Thomas G. Sanders, eds., Military Government and the Movement toward Democracy in South America (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981).

Because private creditors refused to negotiate without the intervention of the International Monetary Fund, Peru either had to renounce its heavy external debt or accept IMF demands for tougher austerity measures as a precondition for refinancing. The first alternative was strongly advocated by the radical left, but was not seriously considered by the military or other political parties. The main question for policymakers was thus how to distribute the burden of austerity. The IMF urged that the government reduce subsidies for food, fuel, and other consumer goods, lower expenditures for basic services, impose tight wage restraints, and dismiss large numbers of public sector workers. It also suggested improved tax collection and trimming of defense spending, the latter estimated to be over half of government spending in 1976. The military refused to limit its arms build-up, and was also reluctant to alter taxes or otherwise impose on upper middle class and business interests, so the alternative was to squeeze the poor and lower middle classes--suppressing wages, raising prices, and slashing the state payrolls. Although the 1977 strike forced the government to renege on IMF conditions, by the end of the year policymakers were back at the negotiating table. A new agreement was reached with on November 18, 1977, and Morales officially declared 1978 "The Year of Austerity".<sup>5</sup>

The new IMF accord was sure to provoke more social unrest, and the military was divided over how to confront its effects. Similar economic programs were imposed in Chile and other South American countries through the dismantling of trade unions, prohibition of strikes,

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<sup>5</sup> See Handelman and Sanders, op cit, p. 105. The authors also point out that there was some moderation on the part of the IMF in late 1977, due to pressures from the Carter Administration.

imprisonment of labor leaders, and general suspension of civil liberties. There were hardliners within the Peruvian military who wanted to do the same, tending to brand all labor unrest and leftist opposition as subversive.<sup>6</sup> President Morales and Prime Minister Molina, however, were committed to a transition plan. While they endorsed harsh treatment of the most militant unions, particularly mineworkers and schoolteachers, they were reluctant to place blanket restraints on political liberties. With the pressures of the IMF on one side, popular protest on the other, and internal military differences as well, government policies continued to vacillate through mid-1978.

For Morales and regime moderates, the achievement of a gradual and controlled transition plan was still seen as the best way out of this economic and social dilemma. In early discussions the military considered drafting a new Constitution itself, or appointing a Constituent Assembly to do so. After the 1977 General Strike, however, Morales decided that an elected Assembly was both necessary and desirable. First, he reasoned that at this stage the public and the opposition parties would not accept an imposed Constitution as legitimate. Second, he calculated that convoking elections would break the government's political isolation, winning at least de facto cooperation from participants and diverting public attention from the economic measures. With these elections, too, the military could oversee the reactivation of party organizations and weigh the distribution of political opinion in the country--without handing over

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<sup>6</sup> Most prominent among the hardliners were Chief of Staff General Pedro Richter, who became Prime Minister in January 1979, and the Minister of Interior General Luis Cisneros.

any real power. The extended constitutional process would allow time to undertake the austerity program, negotiate an honorable exit for the military, and promote the military's preferred successors. Furthermore, under these conditions it was assumed that the Assembly was unlikely to produce a document contrary to military interests.<sup>1</sup>

Against the resistance of hardliners, Generals Morales and Molina also insisted that the marxist left be allowed to participate in the 1978 election. Military and APRA leaders alike believed that inclusion of the left was a better strategy for undermining militant opposition than exclusion. They also saw this as a "divide and conquer" strategy, hoping to separate labor and popular organizations and other key interest groups from the leftist party elite. The regime would continue to crack down on the militant unions which formed the backbone of the popular movement, while the parties most closely allied with these unions--Communist, socialist, maoist, trotskyite, castrista, and others--would be invited to defend their positions within the electoral arena. When faced with this offer, military and APRA leaders reasoned that the marxist left would be torn apart by internal debate and inter-party competition.

The 1978 elections were therefore part of an effort by the military leaders and their civilian allies to establish order and economic stability, and they took place in a very undemocratic context. But such intentions should not obscure the fact that these would be the

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<sup>1</sup> These observations are drawn from the authors' interviews in 1985 and 1986 with Generals Morales, Molina and Richter, and from Henry Pease Garcia, Los caminos del poder: tres años en la escena política (Lima: DESCO, 1981), p. 325-326.



most open elections yet held in Peru, and they marked a fundamental turning point in the nation's politics--due to the breadth of the party spectrum, the size and class base of the electorate, and the surprising results. The formal task of the 1978 election was to elect 100 delegates who would draft a new Constitution, one that would reflect the vast changes which had taken place in Peru since 1968. The lasting impact was even broader, signaling a fundamental shift in the balance of political forces in that country.

The formal rules for participation in the 1978 election were announced in December 1977, setting the deadline for party registration in February 1978 and the election itself was set on June 4, 1978. All 100 seats were open to competition and would be distributed by proportional representation; there would be no military appointees and no quotas. Also, for the first time in Peru there would be no ideological restrictions on party competition; any group which could collect at least 40,000 signatures of eligible voters and demonstrate at least fourteen local committees could declare itself a party and present candidates. Delegates were also selected by preferential vote, meaning that the voter could choose his or her favorite candidates within a party list rather than accepting them in a preselected order. Furthermore, all parties were to be granted free and theoretically equal access to the state-controlled media. In practice, the APRA candidates received more (and more favorable) media attention, and radical leftists' television spots were censored on several occasions. Yet in comparative terms a considerable amount of open debate and criticism was

tolerated by the military during the 1978 campaign.<sup>8</sup>

The parties in turn had to appeal to a larger, younger, and more diverse electorate than in past decades. Voting was obligatory for all literates in Peru. Since the last national election in 1963, the number of eligible voters had grown from just over two million to nearly five million. In 1978 the voting age was lowered from 21 to 18, meaning that nearly 60 percent of the voters were under thirty-five and going to the polls for the first time. It must be emphasized that the continued denial of suffrage to illiterates meant that nearly 2 million of the poorest Peruvians, most of them indigenous peasants, were still disenfranchised. This was cited by the left to emphasize the still-undemocratic nature of these elections. But population growth, the extension of public education, and the multiple impacts of the Velasco era still resulted in a larger electorate of distinctly more popular origins than in the past. The public was also more politically conscious and demanding than fifteen years prior. The convocation of elections and short deadline for party registration (less than two months) did win the military a temporary reprieve from opposition pressures, as the race to activate party committees, gather signatures, and draw up lists of candidates took up the lion's share of most parties' time during this period. The concrete prospect of elections put APRA and right-wing leaders squarely on the side of cooperation with

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<sup>8</sup> Details on the 1978 campaign are drawn from Enrique Bernales, Crisis política: solución electoral? (Lima: DESCO, 1980); and Fernando Tuesta Soldevilla, "La izquierda y las elecciones de 1978", unpublished Bachiller thesis, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 1980.

the military, even though neither party was fully satisfied with current policies. And the call to elections also thrust the marxist left parties into heated debates over whether or not to participate in the contest, which distracted them for awhile from efforts to organize protest actions. One way or another the electoral race was on, and the political parties took a front seat.

The 1978 campaign was a turning point for all parties and groups that participated as well as for those that did not; each was forced to quickly define a national profile and political position. Thirteen parties or fronts registered in 1978 and twelve competed. Former President Fernando Belaunde Terry and his center-right Accion Popular (AP) party pulled out of the race early, charging that there were insufficient guarantees against military interference (Privately, AP members admitted that they feared a dismal turnout after such a long period of inactivity).<sup>9</sup> The radical maoist Patria Roja party, which had its largest base of support in the SUTEP schoolteachers' union, also opted to boycott the election, along with several smaller ultra parties. This left two frontrunners from the past (APRA and PPC), three smaller right-wing groups, and seven parties or alliances to the left of APRA. But after fifteen years of accelerated social change and no elections, none of the parties or political leaders could predict their share of public loyalty and recognition. The electoral left, right and center in Peru had still to be defined.

The right was expected to have the hardest time winning mass

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<sup>9</sup> Henry Pease Garcia and Alfredo Filomeno, Peru 1978: Cronologia Politica (Lima: DESCO, 1980), pp. 2999-3000.

support in the post-Velasco era. The power base of the old oligarchy had been significantly eroded with the Velasco reforms. The PPC, a relatively conservative Catholic and pro-business party founded in 1967, was expected to be the major force on the right of the new spectrum. Ideologically akin to the West German or Italian Christian Democratic parties, the PPC generally accepted agrarian reform and the nationalization of mineral resources, but argued for reprivatization of other industries and for greater liberty for private enterprise. The party had some advantages--its leader and main candidate was a popular former Mayor of Lima, Luis Bedoya Reyes; it could afford an expensive media campaign; and it voiced a strong commitment to civil liberties, although not to the rights of illiterates or organized workers. But it always had a much weaker social base than its international counterparts, with no allied mass-based interest organizations, no affiliated students and few leading intellectuals. Its leadership was largely drawn from the white business and professional elite of Lima and the southern city of Arequipa, and they had little common ground with Peru's new popular majority.<sup>10</sup>

The APRA was assumed to have the strongest electoral advantage among the older parties, given its historical party network and electoral experience, the support it received from the regime, and the persistent national appeal of Haya de la Torre. The APRA continued to seek the role of "stable center" throughout the transition, however much the political spectrum itself shifted. Without competition from the AP, the APRA presented itself as the only non-Communist, democratic and

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<sup>10</sup> See Handelman and Sanders, *op cit*, pp. 111-113.

nationalist successor to the military regime. The APRA's main weakness, however, was also its declining social base, particularly among the peasantry and the new generations of workers and students who rejected the dictatorship and whose sympathies lay well to the left of APRA's leadership. Although APRA was seen by the military as its best ally, even Prime Minister Molina privately urged APRA leaders to pay more attention to labor and popular organization, as well as to assume a more confrontational public stance if need be to win their support.<sup>11</sup> But Haya and most other older party leaders preferred caution and elite-level negotiation. They were confident in their ability to secure electoral victory through Haya's broad appeal and reactivation of their traditional party network. Getting to general elections without disruption was paramount, and the party's social base could later be extended from a position of state power. The small Aprista CTP therefore joined military and business leaders in denouncing strikes and protest actions organized by other unions, and party leaders criticized such actions as threats to the transition.<sup>12</sup>

Two aspects of the APRA's strategy in this period would have a particularly important impact on the party in the years ahead. On one hand, the party was in fact able to revive its internal machinery in a remarkably short period of time, due in large part to the labor of two key figures, Armando Villanueva del Campo and Alan Garcia Perez. Villanueva, a party strongman and key leader from the APRA's "second generation" (active from the 1940s onward), opted to stay out of the

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<sup>11</sup> Author's interview with General Molina, January 22, 1986

<sup>12</sup> Pease Garcia and Filomeno, op cit, p. 2987.

Assembly race himself in order to concentrate on local-level party reactivation. Garcia was a brash younger leader who had just finished several years of graduate study in Europe, and Haya appointed him Secretary of Organization in 1977. Together they recruited a team of younger militants to travel around the country, opening new local party offices, registering thousands of new members, and distributing Aprista propaganda. According to party sources, within six months this team raised the number of active party committees from 22 to 140 in Lima, and from around 20 to over 1,000 in the rest of the country.<sup>13</sup> During this period, Villanueva also cultivated closer political and financial ties with important Social Democratic allies in Latin America and Western Europe.

On the other hand, it was during this period that long-brewing conflicts within the APRA began to take on serious proportions. Party youths and some middle generation leaders believed that electoral registration was not enough, that the APRA had to regain presence among labor, peasants, students, and neighborhood associations. They believed that the best way to dispute the hegemony of the marxist left among these groups was for APRA to also take an active stance in support of general popular demands (such as easing of the austerity policies) and specific labor struggles which had broad sympathy (such as the schoolteachers' demand for better pay and official recognition of their

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<sup>13</sup> This is drawn from the author's interviews with former APRA Secretary of Organization Alberto Kitasono (March 11, 1986), who was an assistant to Garcia in 1978, and with former Secretary of Discipline Vitaliano Gallardo (March 18, 1986). These sources also claim that over 50,000 new Apristas were registered between 1977 and 1980, bring the total to an estimated 300,000 members. There are no comprehensive party statistics available to researchers.

union). This meant taking a confrontational stance towards the military, and it would require channeling more party resources towards long-term organizational goals rather than just short-term electoral competition.

It also meant greater internal democracy within the party. In this period there were also efforts to revive the Revolutionary Student Association (ARE), a radical Aprista youth group, which was officially disbanded by Haya in 1975. This desire for more active party mobilization and competition with the marxist left was expressed repeatedly in numerous interviews the author conducted with younger Aprista leaders of the 1970s. Most of the party hierarchy felt these strategies were imprudent and impractical, however, and as long as Haya reigned party militants submitted to his will or defected. Hence as the following comments reflect, the young militants of the 1970s generally look back at this period as one of lost opportunities;

"We wanted to take a more active stance in support of strikes, to compete with the marxist left, but the leadership was too concerned about what they called 'maintaining the transition'".<sup>14</sup>

"[By 1978] the only banner we had left was 'democracy'. But we exhausted our energies in the elections and we were too moderate. We lost our chance at recuperating labor support. Our biggest mistake was not supporting SUTEP".<sup>15</sup>

"'How do we reconquer the popular movement?' That was one of our greatest preoccupations, that and how to give new political direction to the CTP, or to the CGTP...Why did we stay in the APRA at all? Because it is the only party organized and prepared for revolution. Therefore, we felt the goal should be internal struggle, to change the party. That's difficult, because the

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<sup>14</sup> Author's interview with Alberto Kitasono, March 11, 1986

<sup>15</sup> Author's interview with Miguel Rosas, former leader of the Juventud Aprista, March 4, 1986

party hierarchs ignore the youth".<sup>16</sup>

In the course of the campaign, and in his own bid for party leadership, Villanueva listened to these concerns. He sought to win the sympathies of the party's younger and more impatient sectors, who began to see him as a pole around which to rally against the Old Guard. It would not take long for this effort to erupt into open conflict.

#### The Marxist Left and the Decision to Participate

Despite differences in ideology and program, the APRA and the PPC were playing by the same rules in 1978. They each wanted to move along to general elections as fast as possible, and they basically accepted the military's conditions as the price to pay for this transition. Peru's marxist left parties, on the other hand, were pursuing quite different goals when the call to elections was announced. As noted above, the "reformists" and "revolutionaries" shared one basic conviction--that immediate social and economic concerns should not be subordinated to electoral calculations. The immediate issue was defense of working class rights and living standards, and the development and strengthening of the movimiento popular. And ironically, although the popular movement deserved credit for forcing the military to define a concrete retirement schedule, the leftist parties continued to denounce the elections as being designed to distract people from austerity policies and "impede the ascent of popular forces to power".<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Author's interview with Mario Valcarcel, September 15, 1986

<sup>17</sup> "Three parties denounced yesterday that the convocation to elections for the Constituent Assembly is a maneuver orchestrated to favor right wing groups... These parties--the Partido Socialista Revolucionario, the Partido Comunista Revolucionario, and the Partido



Elections and constitutional debates were seen as a farce in a context of continued military rule and daily violation of working peoples' rights. The marxist left parties' ultimate goal was popular revolution and socialism, although they had very different visions of how this would come about.<sup>18</sup>

At the same time, the opportunity to participate in these elections caught the leftist parties off guard and posed a classical dilemma--boycott the elections and risk losing ground in an important political arena, or join the race and risk losing the momentum of popular protest? Whatever their long-range goals, the decision to participate or not had to be made very quickly and, as it turned out, had rather high stakes. In past elections marxist parties had been marginal in influence as well as marginalized from electoral competition. The big difference in 1978 was that their proliferation in the 1970s and their role in the popular movement made them a potentially formidable electoral force. For the "reformists" (PC and PSR) and for many of "revolutionaries", this justified participation, not to seek Assembly seats per se but for other tactical and propagandistic goals. These included using the free media space and campaign trail to denounce the "military-APRA pact", to defend deeper structural reforms, or to encourage the popular movement and give it national political

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Socialista de los Trabajadores--stated that this maneuver is destined to impede the ascent to power of popular forces". From Correo, 22 de noviembre de 1977. Cited in Pease Garcia and Filomeno, op cit., p.2831.

<sup>18</sup> This discussion draws from Tuesta, op cit.; Nieto, op cit; the author's review of the leftist press in this period, and the author's interviews with several reformist and radical left leaders, including Carlos Malpica of the UDP/PUM (February 19, 1986) and Enrique Bernaldes of the PSR (January 15, 1986).

expression. Believing that Peru was in a "pre-revolutionary" juncture, however, some of the more radical leftists argued that electoral activities would draw energies away from the primary task of mobilizing direct action, including the organization of another national strike against the regime.

This revolutionary vision of the ultras was not entirely without foundation, given the recent string of local and regional strikes, factory and land takeovers and a general climate of social unrest. But as it turned out, the only left party of significance at the time willing to risk a complete boycott stance was the maoist Communist Party of Peru--"Patria Roja". Patria was responding in large part to its most important support base, the long-suffering and striking schoolteachers, as well as to supporters among radical public university students and some miners' unions. Other ultra left parties deciding to enter the contest were subject to constant harassment by Patria militants and other boycotters, and consequently they took care to use their political space to air the grievances of these social groups.<sup>19</sup> For those leftists who did participate, the main point of contention was how to do so, that is, determining what strategy would take best advantage of their political potential. For maximum representation in the Assembly the best strategy would obviously be unity of all contending parties, around a single platform and set of candidates. Electoral victory was not a compelling motive in 1978, however, and the divisions among left

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<sup>19</sup> The Communist Party of Peru--"Sendero Luminoso" also rejected participation in this and all subsequent elections. At this stage, however, this was a small maoist splinter group that was marginal to left politics and had not yet adopted an armed opposition stance.

forces were too deep for unity to be easily forged. There were still irreconcilable differences between the "reformists" and "revolutionaries" over several factors, including their relationship to the military regime and the Armed Forces in general, the use of strikes as a political tool, and the relative merits of the electoral, constitutional, and street arenas.

The "reformists" (PCP, PSR, CGTP, CNA) wanted to use the campaign to defend the interests of their labor and peasant bases, particularly the stalled land, labor, and industrial reforms. They had a strong interest in winning Assembly seats because they wished to see these reforms institutionalized in the new Constitution. Although they criticized the right turn of the Morales government, they still hoped that the military could be pressured back to a revolutionary course. Furthermore, while they saw strikes as major bargaining tools, Communist labor leaders did not approve of the indiscriminate use of strikes for political purposes.

The ultras who did opt to participate (including the VR and PCR, several factions of MIR, and several Trotskyite parties) had more disruptive intentions. For them the media and campaign trail would be an opportunity to denounce the military and its dictatorial regime, and unmask the electoral process itself as an "APRA-military-bourgeois pact". Any seats won in the Assembly would provide, as VR leader Javier Diez Canseco put it, "just one more terrain of struggle and tribunal of agitation and propaganda for the revolutionary program".<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Diez Canseco 1979, op cit, p. 79.

At a minimum they hoped to "maximize the contradictions facing the government", publicizing human rights abuses, corruption, arms spending, and making the austerity measures impossible to carry out. Maximalists hoped to go even further, parlaying social unrest into an indefinite general strike which could bring down the regime from below.

The military and APRA were thus partially correct in calculating that the left would be divided over the call to elections. As the registration deadline drew near the leftist parties also fell into the most traditional of political disputes over such issues as party quotas within electoral fronts, and positions of individual candidates on party lists. Yet this accelerated debate in 1978 did not in fact conquer the left. Instead, it forced the leftist groups to take some important steps that they might not have taken otherwise. First of all, some level of unification was necessary simply to meet the requirements for party registration. Hence from over thirty small marxist organizations in November 1977, two "reformist" parties (the PC and PSR) and two "revolutionary" fronts (UDP and FOCEP) were formed. The UDP was a coalition of the VR, MIR, PCR, and other heterodox groups, with grassroots ties to the militant peasant confederation (CCP), miners' unions, and various shantytown organizations of Lima. The FOCEP was a shakier alliance in which several trotskyite parties were prominent. Its bases were concentrated in a few historically conflictive regions (Cerro de Pasco, Cuzco), but it included nationally known figures such as legendary peasant organizer Hugo Blanco, labor lawyer and former

Cerro de Pasco mayor Genaro Ledesma, and novelist Manuel Scorza.<sup>21</sup>

A second important step, related to the formation of four leftist slates, was the decision of major labor and other interest groups to yield to party representation. This in turn required tentative steps towards democratization of the left's national leadership.

Organizations such as the CGTP, the CNA, the CCP, national student federations and some professional associations were the backbone of the marxist parties, and some of them could have gathered the necessary signatures to run their own set of Assembly candidates. Instead, with the except of SUTEP they all chose to rally behind one of the four political alternatives, demanding in turn their fair share of spots on the candidate lists. While CGTP leaders were prominent among the Communist Party candidates, the student and intellectual vanguard of the other fronts faced new pressures to make room for peasant, union, and barrio leaders on their candidate rosters as well.<sup>22</sup>

Finally, the elections of 1978 initiated the left's leap from union and university spheres to the national political arena. This did not mean that concrete programs were formulated in 1978. Quite the contrary--the left's campaigns were long on denunciations of the military, imperialism and capitalism, and short on policy alternatives or Constitutional proposals. Furthermore, leftist leaders and

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<sup>21</sup> See Pease Garcia and Filomeno 1977, op cit., pp. 2856 and 2866. The debates and conflicts among the left in this period are elaborated further in Chapter VII.

<sup>22</sup> The relatively large number of labor and popular representatives among the left's Assembly candidates is discussed in Tuesta, op cit., and Oswaldo Medina Garcia, Peru 1978-1980: Analisis de un momento politico (Lima: s/f).

intellectuals in 1978 were just beginning to discuss the relationship between democracy and socialism, and had little chance to reflect on the contradictions between their defense of basic rights and liberties and their rejection of "bourgeois" representative government. As the left was swept further into political participation, this reflection would become truncated, at the same time as their utilitarian arguments became harder to sustain. Nevertheless, the 1978 election did initiate an important process of establishing identities and priorities.

#### The Constituent Assembly Elections

The Constituent Assembly elections of 1978 marked Peru's entrance into the modern media age of politics. Few candidates had national profiles in 1978, and no party could claim more than a small fraction of the electorate as active party militants. Hence one analyst aptly noted that television and other media were really the "great electors" of this race, helping create images of the aspiring new leaders that were being seen for the first time by much of the population. And with the participation of the marxist left this campaign was a spectacle without precedent for all.<sup>23</sup>

On television, radio, and in the daily press the public saw legendary Aprista leaders campaigning as pillars of the struggle for democracy in Peru, as well as fading representatives of the oligarchy that had stood in the way of that struggle for decades. They saw slick and well-financed PPC candidates who promised to "run Peru like a profitable enterprise", followed in turn by Communist trade union leaders lecturing the public on the nature of class struggle. They

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<sup>23</sup> This discussion draws from Tuesta Soldevilla, op cit, p. 60.

listened to radical young intellectuals expound a litany of complex revolutionary programs. And they watched in amazement as Trotskyite peasant organizer Hugo Blanco shouted "Down with the dictatorship" on prime time television, under the very noses of the ruling Junta, and insisting upon the armed struggle of revolutionary workers and peasants as the path for true change in Peru.<sup>24</sup>

While the APRA had a disciplined party apparatus and leaders with plenty of campaign experience, and both the APRA and the PPC had considerable financial resources to spend on this race, the leftists had a number of disadvantages in reaching the public. First of all, they were sending out at least four different and often contending messages, and with the exception of Blanco and some of Communist union leaders their deliveries were often highly intellectual and hard to fathom. The leftists had limited financial resources, and many of them were still trying to channel funds and energies into strike mobilization as well as the electoral campaign. They suffered public condemnation and some harassment from the government for these protest activities, and on occasion their television time was censored. When they did appear on television, they were visibly uncomfortable in that arena. Yet the leftists also had some important points in their favor, including young and energetic cadres, important labor ties and shantytown experience, and a message aimed at the immediate concerns of a public that was also young and increasingly discontent.

Of course, the military leadership hoped that the campaign would not only distract the left, but demobilize popular protest. It did

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid, p. 69.

contribute to the failure of efforts to launch another broad national strike in late 1977 and early 1978. But ironically, shortly before the elections government policymakers themselves gave a major boost to the popular movement and to the radical left campaign as well. It started in early 1978, when Morales reneged on earlier promises made to the CGTP regarding the rehiring of unjustly fired labor leaders, and in fact passed a new decree which further reduced job stability. Then negotiations with the IMF broke down, after government officials initially decided to postpone further economic stabilization measures until after the Assembly elections on June 4. Newly-appointed Finance Minister Javier Silva Ruete decided that austerity could not be sacrificed for elections after all, and on May 14 the campaign was interrupted to announce the harshest set of austerity measures yet introduced by the regime.<sup>25</sup>

The public response to this poorly-timed austerity package was immediate. In cities people became angry and desperate as wages were frozen, price subsidies were lifted, and the cost of basic items such as milk, cooking oil and gasoline rose 50 to 60 percent overnight. Long lines formed in the marketplaces, riots broke out in various cities, and at least 35 people were killed during these disturbances. Ongoing national strikes by schoolteachers and smaller unions were joined by the powerful Bank Employees' Federation. The radical left used its media space to protest, and the CGTP was goaded into joining the declaration

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<sup>25</sup> These policy decisions and the subsequent general strike are described in detail in Pease Garcia, op cit., pp. 287-310; Bollinger, op cit, pp. 26-29; Dinamica de las luchas populares. Informe Peru 1977-1978 (Lima: CIED, 1979); and Mayo 22 - 23, Testimonio de la CGTP (Lima: CGTP, 1978).



of a General Strike to demand reversal of the measures. Events unfolded in a familiar pattern at this point. In an effort to prevent the strike, the military once again declared a State of Emergency, halting campaign activities, closing independent presses, and suspending other liberties. Hundreds of strike organizers were detained, and over a dozen opposition figures were deported, including Blanco, Ledesma, Diez Canseco, and other prominent leftist candidates. Neither APRA nor the PPC would support the strike, especially after the National Election Council announced it was postponing the elections for two weeks. Yet they were also reluctant to criticize the protest directly when so much of their potential electorate was affected, and they cautiously urged the military to restore civil liberties and reconsider its policies.<sup>26</sup> President Morales went on television to urge the public not to strike, and promised that the measures would be modified if they did not protest. Few people believed him, however, and on May 22 and 23 most of urban Peru stayed home from work, filling the streets and highways with protest, and once again bringing the nation's economic activity to a halt.

Military hardliners wanted Morales to suspend the elections altogether in light of this unrest, but international forces stepped in at this point to give Peru some breathing room and encourage the

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<sup>26</sup> The PPC actually urged the government to reestablish some price subsidies "as a temporary measure to palliate the dramatic effects of the crisis". The APRA limited itself to encouraging the military to stay on the transition course and demanding the restoration of civil liberties, while denouncing leftist "extremists" for their role in the protests. The PPC and APRA declarations are reprinted in Pease Garcia and Filomeno 1978, op cit, pp. 3059 and 3060.

transition along. The Carter Administration expressed in very strong terms the U.S. concern for a return to democracy in Peru (as well as for economic stabilization), and interceded to help Peru win postponement until 1979 of some of its debts to private banks. The governments of Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina and Colombia helped Peru meet immediate payments with a short-term joint loan of some 60 million dollars. Negotiations for a new IMF Standby agreement reopened, the State of Emergency was lifted, and the electoral campaign resumed, albeit with several leftist candidates still in exile and greater censorship of the final left campaigns.

The results of the June 18 Constituent Assembly election demonstrated that despite the vast changes of the 1970s, the APRA retained its ability to remain at the center of Peru's political spectrum. It won 37 of the 100 Assembly seats, picking up at least a third of the popular vote in most of the nation and not just in its historical strongholds. To no one's surprise, Haya de la Torre was the single largest vote-getter in Peru. The PPC followed with 25 seats, a number most observers considered inflated by a large share of votes that would have gone to the more centrist but non-Aprista AP.<sup>27</sup>

Yet the 1978 results also marked a significant shift leftward in the entire political spectrum. All combined, the four leftist slates won a startling 30 percent of the popular vote and 28 Assembly seat, far more than the candidates themselves had anticipated. Furthermore, 18 percent of that went to the revolutionary left, apparently led by the

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<sup>27</sup> The election results are drawn from Bernales, op cit, pp. 55-74.

tremendous personal appeal of Hugo Blanco. Blanco was the third highest individual votegetter nationwide and his candidacy gave the FOCEP twelve of the leftists' Assembly seats. The military had chosen a solid ally in the APRA, but its efforts to undermine the left and the popular movement backfired in 1978. If one includes Peru's small and progressive Christian Democratic party and a tiny regional party (FNTC), parties to the left of APRA won hold 34 of the 100 Assembly seats, enough to wield significant influence over the new Constitution and the political system to follow.

Because this was the first election in fifteen years, with 60 percent of the electorate voting for the first time and without at least one major contender (the AP), this outcome was considered by analysts to be very tentative. The leftist vote was widely perceived as a protest vote against the regime's policies, with the radicals' intransigent opposition and Blanco's blunt message in particular expressing the sentiments of a broad share of the public. Leftist leaders' role in the general strike and their subsequent exile before the election also helped to turn relative unknowns into national heroes.<sup>28</sup>

Yet in hindsight, this election marked some lasting changes in

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<sup>28</sup> In pondering Blanco's victory over the other left candidates, particularly in Lima's poor shantytowns, historian Alberto Flores Galindo made this assessment;

"With his first television appearance in Lima his image was seen with greater clarity. In clear and simple language (that frightened more than one intellectual and not a few leftist politicians) he said what the poor people of Comas, Villa El Salvador or Tupac Amaru wanted to hear: that in this country revolution was possible, that they did not always have to be exploited. And he explained how a revolution could be made...by turning everything upside down" (Cited in Tuesta, op cit., p. 123).

Peruvian politics. First, the old oligarchical right was clearly a force of the past, and the modern PPC had taken its place. Older right-wing parties won just four seats in the Assembly, and they would be eliminated from subsequent elections altogether. Second, this election also represented the largest vote for any marxist left in Latin America except the Chilean Unidad Popular. From 1978 onward the marxist left parties continued to be major contenders in the electoral process. While they struggled over how to use their new political space, none of the major leftist parties opted for a boycott position again. While specific leaders and alliances would change, this contest defined the basic left and right poles of Peru's electoral system in the decade ahead; only the center remained undefined.

## **CHAPTER V**

### **Establishing the Rules of the Game: The Constituent Assembly and the Constitution of 1979**

The historian Jorge Basadre described Peru before 1968 in terms of a tremendous abyss between pais legal and the pais real--a nation in which a small dominant oligarchy ruled and the large mass of society was excluded from participation and power.<sup>1</sup> In this context the laws and institutions of Constitutional government had little legitimacy, and when a social reformer was elected to power the structure of political authority and pattern of elite pactmaking helped to block basic reform efforts. The military "Revolution" eliminated the oligarchy as a political force, however, and tried to diminish the tremendous distance between state and society in Peru. Although the military regime did not eliminate inequality or institutionalize an alternative model of political participation, it did lay some important bases for the construction of a new democracy in Peru.

In his opening speech as President of the Constituent Assembly, APRA leader Victor Raul Haya de la Torre was the first to recognize the changes of the seventies, and he called for a new Constitution that would consolidate and extend them. "The people have gained control of their own destinies" he said, "Peru does not want to turn backwards". While previous Constitutions had been poorly adapted to Peruvian reality, he argued that this Assembly was a sovereign body that would reflect a broad national consensus and "crystalize, in precise principles and modern institutions, those ideals of democracy and social justice, of bread with liberty, that were the guiding banner for various

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<sup>1</sup> Cited in Alberto Flores Galindo, Tiempo de plagas (Lima, El Caballo Rojo Ediciones, 1988), p. 23.

generations in our country". At the same time, it would lay new and more viable foundations for Peru's future development.<sup>2</sup>

A Constituent Assembly is nevertheless a process of negotiation among representatives of different and often conflicting interests, the results of which can have serious implications for the future distribution of power and resources. How does such a body reach consensus over what principles and goals to formalize, and what should be left open to competition? What specific institutions and rules best embody those principles and make them viable in practice? Can a particular constitutional structure help strengthen and extend democratization and social justice? Conversely, are there certain rules and institutions that pose greater obstacles to these goals? Or are such formal legal systems entirely dependent on the social context in which they are instituted?

This chapter examines such questions in the Peruvian case. Operating under a military dictatorship, the Constituent Assembly was not entirely a sovereign body. But meeting regularly between July 28, 1978 and July 12, 1979, it played two important and related roles: it provided a new arena of elite political debate, and negotiated the formal rules and foundations for a new political and economic order. This chapter reviews the debates and negotiations of the Assembly, the impact of the Assembly experience on the main actors involved, and the new rules and institutions that were established. It argues that the

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<sup>2</sup> This speech is reproduced in the official record of the Constituent Assembly debates, Diario de Debates de la Asamblea Constituyente, Plenario General (Lima: Republica Peruana, 1978-1979), Tomo I, 28 de julio, 1978, "Sesion de Instalacion", pp. 32-37.

main actors in this period had different goals and interests to pursue, but the priorities of each of them lay outside of the Constitution itself. This fact would significantly shape the future prospects for social democracy in several ways.

First of all, the two major political forces with most potential to represent a democratic left alternative--the APRA and the marxist left--would be seriously debilitated and divided as a result of their strategic choices in this period, paving the way for the populist victory of Belaunde in 1980. The APRA, obsessed with maintaining a smooth political transition, persisted in pacting with dominant elites and turning its back on popular demands. The marxist left, drawn into the formal political arena for the first time, did not take the constitutional process seriously and yet also failed to constitute an alternative channel for defending popular sector interests in this period. Furthermore, by acting on predominantly extra-constitutional incentives, they both missed some key opportunities to shape the rules and representative structures of the new regime in order to encourage a social democratic outcome later on, and in some cases they contributed to the incorporation of new obstacles.

The Constitution of 1979 was the result of an unprecedented degree of interest articulation, and it reflects the new reality of the country in important ways. But rather than being the product of a successful pact or consensus, this chapter argues that it reflects the conflicts, short-sightedness and electoralism that marked the political context in which it was drafted. The result is a document that is quite progressive in its aspirations, and as such it has served as an



important framework for subsequent struggles for democratization and justice. Yet these aspirations have been undermined by other elements that are frankly undemocratic, and elements that tend to favor populism over social democracy. These include a highly centralized and powerful Executive and a weak Parliament, electoral rules that tend to divide rather than unite potential allies, and limited channels of effective popular sector representation or leadership accountability. They also include the persistence of military power and privilege.

In the 1980s the principle institutional foundations of the new regime became neither solid nor legitimate. As a result, the citizenry tended to place its confidence in men rather than in rules and institutions, reinforcing the authoritarian and populist elements of Peruvian politics.

#### The Constituent Assembly: A New "Convivencia"

July 28, 1978, was an unprecedented day in Peruvian political history. While a military dictator gave the annual Independence Day address from the Presidential Palace, Haya de la Torre convened the nation's first Constituent Assembly since 1931. The eighty-four year old Haya, elected Assembly President with the support of the PPC, was holding his first public office in over half a century of political activity. Amidst cheers and jeers from the spectators, Haya swore in delegates representing a diverse array of generations, social classes, and political tendencies, from veterans of 1931 to Communist trade unionists and student leaders. For the first time politicians of the

left, right, and center had roughly equal representation in an elected body, and each bloc expected to profit from participation on its own terms.

Of course, the military dictatorship had its own objectives in allowing the Assembly to take place. For the Junta leaders, the election had confirmed that APRA was the frontrunner and as such the regime's best ally in the transition process, but the unexpected size of the leftist bloc also prompted the military to keep close tabs on the Assembly and increase efforts to neutralize militant opposition. Shortly after the election, Prime Minister Molina met with the winning parties to discuss the relationship between the military government and the elected body. He insisted the Assembly was expected to "consagrate the principles of the Revolution" and to respect the institutional interests of the Armed Forces. What was more important to the military than the actual content of the Constitution, however, was the political behavior of the representatives. A political amnesty was declared to allow exiled candidates to return to Peru, and all representatives were granted parliamentary immunity. They were instructed to concentrate only on drafting the future laws, however, and refrain from criticizing current government policies, engaging in protest activities, or otherwise interfering with military affairs. As long as these conditions were met, military leaders promised that the Assembly could operate without direct interference. As an added incentive, military leaders dangled the prospect of moving up the general election date if

the Assembly process went smoothly and quickly.<sup>3</sup>

While the military insisted that the Assembly focus only on a future Constitution, the leftist representatives aimed to use the arena in exactly the opposite manner--to denounce current policies and impede the government's transition plan. They refused to negotiate privately with the military, preferring to carry their constituents' demands to the media and the Assembly floor. Eschewing the traditional oaths to God and country, they took their seats "in the name of the working class, the socialist revolution, and the blood shed" in recent labor disputes. The principal demand of the entire left bloc was an unconditional labor amnesty to compliment the political amnesty, with the restoration of jobs to workers fired for past strike activity and the repeal of decrees restricting labor rights.. In addition, a number of specific labor conflicts were literally pressing at the Assembly doors, especially strikes by schoolteachers and by copper miners and their families who marched from the remote highlands to Lima, and protests by public employees against pending mass layoffs. The left

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<sup>3</sup> These observations are drawn from the author's interviews 1 with General Molina (January 22, 1986) and several Assembly leaders from the left, PPC and APRA, and are corroborated in published comments by participants in Henry Pease Garcia and Alfredo Filomeno, Peru 1978: Cronologia politica (Lima: DESCO, 1980), especially p. 3164, 3138, 3181 and 3205. On August 2, 1978, General Molina proposed a multi-party commission of government and party leaders to maintain steady communication about the Assembly's progress. This was rejected by all parties, but the APRA readily accepted regular "informal" dialogues with military leaders.

vowed to carry these disputes into the congressional chambers.<sup>4</sup>

The APRA and the PPC were both torn between these poles, not wanting to alienate the military, but not wanting to appear insensitive to these immediate public concerns either. Haya was the first to recognize and respond to the challenge presented by the marxist left. In his opening speech he praised their decision to participate in democratic politics, and he promised the Assembly would not turn its back on urgent popular demands. To the chagrin of anti-Communists in his own party as well as the PPC, Haya extended a warm reception to old Communist adversaries and engaged in spirited but good-natured banter with younger radicals.<sup>5</sup>

Haya's conciliatory manner nevertheless did not prevent the APRA from maintaining its tacit alliance with the military throughout the transition process. While Haya rejected any formal relationship between the Assembly and the dictatorship, APRA leaders and government officials held regular weekly lunch meetings and other social gatherings, to discuss the progress of the Assembly and current policy issues. While

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<sup>4</sup> See Diario de Debates, "Sesion de Instalacion", op cit., 18 de julio de 1978, pp. 12-15; and 28 de julio de 1978. Striking copper miners and protesting public employees had been met at the Assembly door with police brutality as the swearing-in ceremony got under way.

<sup>5</sup> Diario de Debates op cit, p. 36. Interviewed by the author on January 31, 1986, Luis Alberto Sanchez recalls Haya's relations with the other delegates;

"Since the day of the installation of the preparatory commissions, Haya began to talk directly with the leaders of the different (leftist) groups. To one of them, who lacked a dress shirt, tie or even jacket, he said 'Don't think that revolution consists in not dressing like everyone else... '. To another one, he recalled family ties. And to another he said 'Don't tell me about marxist-leninism, that's an old lesson now. What really matters is whether or not the Peruvian people benefit'".

Haya expressed his sincere concern over increased food prices, press censorship or labor conflicts, Prime Minister Molina recalls that these issues were clearly secondary to APRA and rarely superceded the party's overriding concern--getting to general elections, which they expected to win, as quickly as possible.<sup>6</sup> What therefore developed was what one APRA leader called "a harmonious concertation" (military leaders call it "a high level of confidence"), in which APRA representatives expected the military to respect basic political liberties and stick to its transition schedule, and party leaders in turn would respect the main concerns and interests of the military, on the Assembly floor as well as in closed committees.<sup>7</sup>

Given the distribution of votes in the Assembly, of course, the APRA would need support from its right in order to block initiatives from the left. The PPC had in fact prepared a draft proposal for a new Constitution, one that reflected that party's overriding interest in reducing the role of the state in the economy, reinforcing the rights of private property, and limiting the rights of workers and peasants.<sup>8</sup> These positions were in direct conflict with the APRA's historical doctrine, which stressed welfare state provisions, trade union rights, and corporatist representation for the working classes. The overriding

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6 Author's interview with General Molina, op cit.

<sup>7</sup> These observations are drawn from the author's interviews with General Molina, General Richter (November 21, 1985), and with former APRA leader Andrew Townsend Ezcurra on February 3, 1986.

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<sup>8</sup> This is drawn from the Diario de Debates and from the author's interviews with PPC leaders Roberto Ramirez del Villar and Ernesto Alayza Grundy, both on February 20, 1986.

concern of the APRA hierarchy, however, was negotiating its way to an electoral victory, and the party produced no draft constitutional project at all. Instead, most Aprista Assembly members were willing to concede to the PPC on substantive grounds in exchange for shaping electoral rules to APRA's advantage, or for other procedural victories. For its part, the PPC also placed priority on the transition process, and was willing to concede points to APRA when necessary to hasten the process along.<sup>9</sup>

The stage was therefore set for a working alliance between the APRA and the PPC to put aside their principles and join forces against the marxist left. This alliance was not entirely successful, as the leftist parties in fact won considerable space to air their views on the Assembly floor, and on occasion they pressured the APRA and PPC into taking a stand on current issues. Furthermore, the PPC was more willing than the APRA to criticize the government, and even side with the left, when the military did not hold to its side of the bargain. But the general pattern was nevertheless an APRA-PPC majority which worked to keep the Assembly running along smoothly and make direct military interference unnecessary.

#### The Nature of the Game

The first task of the Assembly was to approve a set of rules for its own internal functioning. This endeavor took almost two months to complete, as the leftist bloc guided the other members into longwinded and spirited debates over the fundamental nature of the Assembly itself

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<sup>9</sup> This was confirmed in the author's interviews with PPC leader Alayza, and with APRA leader Carlos Roca on March 10, 1986.

rather than just the rules. While frustrating to most APRA and PPC leaders, this phase was actually encouraged by Haya de la Torre and it served a variety of important functions. It served as a socialization period, for elites who had been sworn enemies for decades and for those younger members who had never participated in a legislative arena. It was a first opportunity for many to meet face to face and challenge each other in an open arena. Furthermore, the basic dividing lines and patterns of behavior that would characterize the rest of the year were established in these opening debates.

The basic debate revolved around defining the political role of the Assembly and its relationship to the society around it. The APRA-PPC majority proposed a sweeping declaration that the Assembly was "free, autonomous, and sovereign", its primary goal being approval of a new Constitution, although it should also "adopt the decisions of national interest that it deems necessary". The left bloc argued that this was an empty statement and did not go far enough in defense of rights which the military was violating daily, particularly labor rights. The left bloc proposed an alternative motion demanding the Assembly declare a labor amnesty to accompany the recent political amnesty.<sup>10</sup>

In fact, most of the left tacitly acknowledged the authority of

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<sup>10</sup> Diario de Debates, Tomo I, p. 37-38. In the author's interview with former APRA leader Townsend, he admitted that the majority motion was just symbolic and that they knew they really could not challenge the military.

the military government; the labor amnesty motion was a demand that the Assembly summon the courage to address the immediate concerns of its constituents. Yet the leftist strategy was hampered from the start by persistent conflicts among the various parties. First they disagreed over whether to participate in dialogues with the military, though they finally agreed not to do so. Then, although they opposed Haya's nomination as Assembly President, they were unable to agree on a single candidate to oppose him. Now, after the entire bloc had agreed on the labor amnesty motion, Hugo Blanco and other members of FOCEP presented a different proposal--that the Assembly, as a fully sovereign body, should declare the military dictatorship defunct and assume governing powers. Dubbed the "Red Motion" by the press, this was not a serious measure but rather an obstructionist tactic, designed to embarrass the majority and "unmask" the true nature of the Assembly as "a tool of the dictatorship".<sup>11</sup> Although the rest of the left did not support this, it underscored a dilemma which would plague them all--how to defend their role as spokespeople for popular interests, in an arena that they alleged was illegitimate. The fact that they were often unable to negotiate with a single voice made this all the more difficult.

The APRA and PPC were nevertheless embarrassed by the left's efforts to force them into an unpopular position, and they finally voted to postpone a definition of the general role of the Assembly until rules of procedure were established. The Assembly thus turned to the issues of representation and participation in debates, the drafting of the Constitution itself, and the means for dealing with public complaints

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<sup>11</sup> See Diario de Debates, op cit, p. 39.



that spilled onto the floor. Yet the leftists continued to turn each procedural point into another debate over principles. While most APRA and PPC leaders argued for expediency, the leftists argued for democracy--meaning the maximum possible degree of participation, confrontation, and publicity.

The APRA-PPC majority eventually approved its own limited definition of the Assembly's role, but the left was able to extract some concessions on internal procedures. Leftists questioned the representative nature of the Assembly and proposed that outside interest groups should have the right to initiate motions and intervene in debates. The majority voted that only elected representatives could intervene formally, but conceded that anyone could present petitions to the Assembly or its component commissions. The left then argued that all 100 members should have the right to debate as individuals, rather than limiting speaking time to one voice per party. Apristas argued that this reflected the left's profound lack of unity or discipline, but the result was a compromise that in fact gave the left an advantage. Each of the representatives would formally be allowed to speak up to forty minutes on a given proposal, but a majority could vote to cut this off after one member from each party had spoken. Since the left consisted of numerous parties, they still ended up with more time to air their views than the APRA or PPC.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> See Handelman and Sanders, op cit, p.123, and Diario de Debates, Tomo I, op cit, pp. 39. The rules debate covers pp. 41-535. On party representation, see pp. 125-129, and 241-264. See also Luis Alberto Sanchez, Politica sin Caretas (Lima: Okura Editores, 1984, pp. 55-56).

APRA representative Alan Garcia was a leading opponent of interest group participation, arguing that the political parties were

The reason the left sought maximum speaking time, of course, was to use that time for criticizing the military, its policies and abuses. In this regard the left won symbolic victories. Neither the APRA nor the PPC wanted to confront the military openly, but they acknowledged the need to appease public discontent, and the PPC also wanted to make some guarded criticisms of economic policy. The first response was to form special commissions charged with investigating military crimes and corruption, human rights violations, and the causes of the economic crisis. This gave the appearance that something was being done, while in fact these commissions published no reports, made no direct challenges to the military government, and posed no threat to the military's "honorable" retirement from power.<sup>13</sup>

The format selected for the actual constitutional proceedings also allowed space for the public airing of ongoing social conflicts, but in

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sufficiently representative of the major interests in society (Diario de Debates pp. 125 and 128-129). Javier Diez Canseco of the UDP led the fight against this position, arguing that the Assembly was extremely limited as an arena for representing popular interests (ibid, p. 129). The bitter exchanges between these two young politicians during the Assembly marked an adversarial relation that would persist in the eighties.

On October 1978, Sanchez publicly criticized "oratorical abuse" by the left. From August 10 to August 15 alone he noted that FOCEP, with 12 members, intervened 49 times in the debate. The UDP, with four members, spoke 19 times, the PSR spoke 18 times, and the FNTC made 12 long interventions. On the other hand, the APRA, with 37 members, spoke only 11 times and the PPC only 9. Sanchez 1984, op cit, p. 55.

<sup>13</sup> See Enrique Bernales and Marcial Rubio, "Balance de la Asamblea Constituyente", Cuadernos en Marcha Año 1, No. 4, noviembre-diciembre, 1979. A partial exception was a report by leftist representatives of the Investigative Commission on Human Rights and Illicit Enrichment, which was published after 1980 and ignored by the new civilian regime. See Javier Diez Canseco, Hugo Blanco and Miguel Echeandia, Dictadura y derechos humanos en el Peru (lo que no dijo Accion Popular) (Lima: Perugraph Editores, 1981).

a manner which posed no serious threat to the transition plan or the military's priorities. Given the anticipated obstructionism by leftist representatives, the majority voted in September 1978 for a two-track strategy to move the Assembly forward. In essence, the task of drafting the document was divided up into commissions, and then channeled through a twenty-five man Principal Commission. This Commission, comprised of the more experienced legislators from each party, would work behind closed doors to prepare a draft or anteproyecto to present to the Assembly in full. It took seven months for this draft to be produced, and in the meantime the full Assembly (Plenary) met publicly once a week. In these sessions representatives heard occasional commission reports, voted on motions unrelated to the Constitution, and above all indulged in political speeches and ideological disputes, particularly between APRA and the marxist left.<sup>14</sup>

This division of labor between private and public sessions allowed APRA and PPC to pursue expediency while indulging the widespread demand for what Haya termed "el derecho al desfleme y el zapateo" ("the right to stomp and boast"). The left in particular made ample use of its floor space to present motions in support of ongoing strikes and protests, but with this split format it could not threaten to hold up the Constitutional process. Furthermore, motions that were highly critical of the government or the Armed Forces were either voted down by

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<sup>14</sup> A chronology of the proceedings is found in Luis Alberto Sanchez's prologue to the Actas de la Comision Principal de la Asamblea Constituyente (Lima: Republica Peruana, 1979, Tomo I).

the majority, replaced by milder pronouncements, or not admitted to debate at all.<sup>15</sup>

The entire Assembly did come together a few times in defense of its jurisdiction and of general civil liberties. When several leftist delegates were detained by security forces for actively supporting a miners' strike both parties defended their immunity, and the detainees were quickly released. And when the military imposed another State of Emergency and suspension of independent presses in early 1979, the PPC joined the left in active protest of these measures. In these cases the APRA and PPC both strongly rejected the left's actions, but felt that parliamentary immunity and civil liberties (excluding labor rights) were an essential sign of the regime's commitment to the transition plan.<sup>16</sup>

Although the Assembly did initially serve as a forum of sorts on major issues of the day, its effectiveness for reaching the masses was limited from the start by scant attention from the government-controlled media and by general public indifference. In early 1979 a series of external and internal events combined to place even greater limitations on the Assembly's public role and on efforts to consolidate the popular movement from this arena. Furthermore, from April 1979 onward the

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<sup>15</sup> Haya's quote is repeated in Sanchez 1984, op cit, p. 91. In the preamble to the Acts of the Principal Commission, Sanchez claims it was understood that "representatives had the right to vote their conscience in the [closed] Principal Commission, while giving their party line in the [open] Plenary". The record shows that UDP representative and veteran politician Carlos Malpica was the only member of the marxist bloc who participated regularly in the Principal Commission debates. He was occasionally joined by Communist Party delegates or by Ledesma of FOCEP, but in general Malpica relied on the DC and FNTC to back proposals against the majority.

<sup>16</sup> Henry Pease Garcia and Alfredo Filomeno, Peru 1979: Cronologia politica (Lima: DESCO, 1980), p. 3414.

majority turned its attention to the final Constitution, and to maneuvering for the upcoming general elections. The Assembly rules were then altered to cut short the Assembly's forum role.<sup>17</sup>

The key change in the political climate of late 1978 and especially 1979 was increased tension between Peru and Chile, shifting the military's attention to traditional national security concerns. Already in late 1978, concerns about possible aggression from General Pinochet's Chile began to take hold of military leaders.<sup>18</sup> This perceived external threat had important short and long-term ramifications for domestic politics. Above all, it made the military more intolerant of criticism and social protest. Moderate Prime Minister Molina was replaced in January 1979 by former Interior Minister General Pedro Richter, an anti-communist hardliner with ties to leaders of Argentina's military dictatorship. In 1979 the government began to brand more opposition activity as subversion. Strikes by copper miners in particular were dealt with harshly, and the Code of Military Justice was altered to permit the military trial of civilians accused of insulting the Armed Forces.

These increased tensions also forced all parties in the Assembly to define themselves clearly on national security issues. General Richter met privately with APRA leaders to convey the military's

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<sup>17</sup> These turning points are detailed in Handelman and Sanders, *op cit*, pp. 126-127.

<sup>18</sup> Foreign press sources predicted that ongoing conflict between Chile and Argentina over the Beagle Canal could spill over into Peru. See Pease Garcia and Filomeno, 1979, *op cit*. These heightened security concerns were reiterated in the author's interviews with General Richter and with APRA leader Townsend.

concerns about Chile, and urge greater patriotism on the part of political elites. The "loyal opposition" stance of APRA and of the PPC was reinforced in this period, as they joined in criticizing strike activity as unpatriotic and called secret sessions whenever security issues came to the Assembly floor.<sup>19</sup>

For the left parties, these events exacerbated one of their major points of division. The Communist Party and the PSR expressed respect for the Armed Forces and the nation's traditional border concerns, and were cautious about actions that might be interpreted as unpatriotic. The radical groups, on the other hand, pursued an overtly provocative anti-military position. They denounced the tensions as manufactured by two insecure dictatorships to cover their domestic weaknesses, while at the same time they fanned flames of protest against Pinochet. Furthermore, during this period the UDP repeatedly insisted that Peru's military leaders were criminals who should be tried for human rights abuses and corruption when they left office, and some FOCEP representatives argued that the Peruvian military was a "fascist" institution that should be replaced by armed popular militias. While anti-military sentiments that were shared by a growing share of the population, the left's provocative behavior and direct challenges to the Armed Forces created a deep and lasting distrust within military ranks.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> These concerns are apparent in the Diario de Debates and in the national media, as reported in Pease Garcia and Filomeno 1979, op cit.

<sup>20</sup> Diario de Debates Tomo III, October 24, 1978 to December 12, 1978, and Tomo VII, May 9, 1979 to June 4, 1979, especially pp. 482-490; Pease Garcia and Filomeno 1979, op cit, pp. 3348-3352. These points of division were reiterated in the author's interviews with military

In addition to the geopolitical tensions, the Peruvian economy took a new turn in 1979. The government announced that 1979 was to be the "Year of Recovery", due largely to increases in world prices for Peru's mineral exports. But at the same time, a new accord with the IMF required new adjustments that continued to bear heavily on the working classes and provoked public despair. The CGTP and radical unions called another General Strike in January to protest this accord, and once again the military responded by imposing a State of Emergency, suspending independent presses, and threatening to hold up the transition process. This, however, time the general strike failed. The reasons for this are multiple and are explored more fully below. The point to be emphasized here was that failure was a decisive blow for the popular movement, for the left's mobilization strategy, and for their combined efforts to reverse government policy. The following year did bring some economic recovery, but labor and popular sectors would be largely excluded.<sup>21</sup>

The tenor and pace of the Constituent Assembly began to change markedly after January 1979. The suspension of the independent presses remained in force until March, effectively silencing critical coverage of the proceedings. Most of the leftist delegates were absent during this period, in a boycott to protest this censorship. Even when this was lifted, leftist attendance remained spotty in 1979, as the representatives grew disenchanted with an arena over which they

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leaders; with then-UDP representative Carlos Malpica on February 19, 1986; and with PSR representative Enrique Bernales on January 15, 1986.

<sup>21</sup> See Bollinger, *op cit*, pp. 29-30; and Pease Garcia and Filomeno 1979, *op cit*, pp. III-IX and 3334-3347.

exercised increasingly less control. Meanwhile, in February the APRA met with Prime Minister Richter in a new round of bargaining over the transition. The APRA was reassured that elections would still be carried out, and the party in turn promised to change the Assembly rules in order to limit extra-constitutional debate for the remainder of the sessions.<sup>22</sup>

There was a major change in the APRA-military relationship in this period, however, which altered the panorama for all involved. In March of 1979 Haya de la Torre fell gravely ill from cancer and would never fully recuperate. APRA's lifelong Jefe Maximo had refused to name a successor while he was well enough to do so. Vice President Luis Alberto Sanchez took his place as Assembly President, but it was clear to all observers that a succession crisis was on APRA's horizon. The military became concerned about the APRA's direction without Haya at the helm, and began to look for additional allies. This change coincided with the PPC's desire to start backing away from its constitutional alliance with APRA, in order to stake out a more independent position for the upcoming elections.

Thus by the time the Assembly turned its attention to the approval of a new Constitution, the public had limited access to or interest in the proceedings, the APRA and PPC were preoccupied with preparing for the 1980 electoral contest, the APRA was also facing a succession battle, and the left had virtually pulled out of the Assembly altogether. The final Constitution, which was hastily approved by the

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<sup>22</sup> This is cited in Pease Garcia and Filomeno 1979, op cit, p. 3385, and was corroborated in the author's interviews with General Richter and with Aprista leaders.



APRA-PPC majority, did not represent a real consensus, but instead reflects the prevailing political climate surrounding the final debates.

#### The Constitution of 1979

As mentioned at the outset, each party or bloc within the Assembly, as well as the military, had economic, social and political principles it hoped to inject into the Constitution. Yet each of these was making strategic choices based on predominantly extra-constitutional concerns, and the outcome reflects this fact.

The military announced that the constitutional process was to "institutionalize the structural transformations" undertaken under its rule. What this meant in practice was a general concern that the Constitution provide for a stronger state and Executive branch, protect the Agrarian Reform, and give priority to national defense, understood as the control of national resources as well as the traditional defense of borders. But the military was also intent on assuring a "withdrawal with honor" and without accountability after twelve years of rule, and wanted the Constitution to guarantee the continued autonomy and privileges of the Armed Forces.<sup>23</sup>

The more moderate leftist parties and gremios (PC, PSR, CGTP and CNA) also wanted to institutionalize the Velasco reforms and the larger, more modern state the military had begun to erect. In their view, this meant a Constitution that would recognize and guarantee the variety of new urban and rural property structures initiated by Velasco, as well as expanded labor rights and corporate forms of representation. They also

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<sup>23</sup> See Decreto Ley 21949, October 4, 1977, "Convocation of Elections for a Constituent Assembly", reproduced in Pease Garcia and Filomenc 1977, op cit, p. 2778.

hoped to use the Assembly to press for labor amnesty and a reversal of economic austerity policies. The radical left (UDP, FOCEP), on the other hand, wanted to "maximize the contradictions confronting the government" by encouraging labor protests and creating the conditions for a revolution from below. Some of them also fought for constitutional clauses that could broaden popular participation, grant new rights, redistribute resources, and otherwise empower the working classes. Because so many of them condemned the entire constitutional process as a farce, however, they focused more on gaining speaking time rather than votes on specific constitutional provisions. While a leftist discourse was thus quite prominent in the Assembly, the marxist parties were often unable to agree on tactics and priorities, hampering their ability to influence the final Constitution.

The right wing of the Assembly clearly wished to do away with the Revolution and its structural legacies altogether, to return to a more open market economy and a restricted political democracy. The PPC drafted a full Constitutional project embodying these ideals, and because it had several skilled lawyers in its bloc and a strategic alliance with the APRA, it was able to wield important influence over parts of the constitutional text. But it was also willing to yield to APRA on substance when necessary to move the transition process along. The APRA, for its part, had a historical doctrine that was much closer to the military's ideal and to historical social democracy, supporting a strong welfare state, economic nationalism, labor rights and forms of interest group representation. Yet APRA did not produce a Constitutional project at all in 1978-1979. The Aprista leadership was

more concerned with winning power than defending principles, and their influence on the Constitution reflects short-term electoral appetites more than historical doctrine. They fought hardest to craft a set of rules that would facilitate their victory in 1980 and the concentration of power they expected to win, conceding to PPC on other principles when necessary to this end. When Apristas did defend their doctrine in this arena, it was often through symbolic efforts to incorporate key party slogans rather than substance.

The Constituent Assembly met for one year, but the actual document was debated by the full Assembly membership for only the last four months of that time. Much of the final text followed the anteproyecto or draft project prepared by the 25 member Principal Commission, and a disproportionate amount of that was worked out between just a few men, including Roberto Ramirez de Villar of the PPC, Enrique Chirinos Soto of the APRA, Carlos Malpica of the UDP, and Hector Cornejo Chavez of the tiny Christian Democratic Party (the latter a skilled lawmaker and debater). Malpica was the only consistent member of the left opposition in the Commission, though the PC and PSR representatives made some important contributions. Most APRA members were unprepared for these substantive and legal debates, while the leftist representatives were frequently absent from the Commission meetings altogether.<sup>24</sup>

By the time the Assembly turned its attention to approval of a new

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<sup>24</sup> That these men had a disproportionate influence on the draft project, in their committees as well as in the Principal Commission, was apparent from the author's interviews with each of them and with Assembly Vice President Sanchez. This is also evident in a reading of the Actas de las Sesiones de la Comision Principal de Constitucion de la Asamblea Constituyente, Tomo I and II, 1979.

Constitution, the public had limited access to or interest in the proceedings, and none of the participating blocs gave priority to the content of the document either. Roughly half the final text was quickly approved by a majority of the participating members, most often an APRA-PPC majority, and another sizeable share was approved unanimously by those in attendance. The radical left was often not in attendance, and refused to sign the final document. Yet although the final text was a product of haste and opportunism, the Constitution of 1979 and the discussions that went into it did produce some new parameters for the structures of power and representation in the 1980s.

The Preamble of the Constitution of 1979 summarizes the highest ideals of the 100 representatives convened. "We believe in the primacy of man" it states, "and that all men, equal in dignity, have rights of universal validity, prior to and above the State". It declares that work is the right and duty of all men and the basis of national welfare, and that justice is the primary value of life in community. It also upholds the creation of a society "without exploiters or exploited" and free of all forms of discrimination, a society in which underdevelopment will be eliminated and all will share in the nation's wealth. And the Preamble emphasizes the protection of Peru's cultural diversity and its natural resource base.<sup>25</sup>

Analyses of this Constitution nevertheless vary widely in their interpretations. Military leaders from the period claim that it did indeed institutionalize the principles of the Revolutionary Government,

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<sup>25</sup> Cites from Constitucion Politica del Peru (Lima: Empresa Editora "Cancer", 1984), pp. 3-4.

while opponents from the left and right say it was a clear rejection of that regime. While at the time the right believed it was too statist, the leftist representatives denounced it as "an anti-democratic and reactionary Constitution" that "does not encompass the will of the Peruvian people".<sup>26</sup> Two constitutional experts concluded at the time that this Constitution was "conservative, liberal, and last-minute (transnochada)" and did not represent a qualitative advance over the previous Constitution of 1933.<sup>27</sup> A more recent assessment, however, calls it "a significant effort by distinct actors to affirm a modern political system for the country".<sup>28</sup>

The Constitution of 1979 in fact defies efforts at generalization. It does not institutionalize all of Velasco's reform initiatives, many of which were reversed by the military before the Assembly was formed. But it does reflect many of the economic, social and political changes that took place in Peru in the preceding decades. As a product of pragmatic pre-electoral negotiation, however, it is an ambiguous document with something for everyone, and it leaves a great deal open to interpretation by the incoming government.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Diario de Debates, Tomo VIII, Sesión de Clausura, p. 639-640.

<sup>27</sup> Bernalles and Rubio 1979, op cit, p. 11-12.

<sup>28</sup> Henry Pease et al, "Democratización y modernización del Estado: el caso peruano", in Hacia un nuevo orden estatal en América Latina?, Vol. 2 (Buenos Aires: CLACSO ed., 1988), p. 112.

<sup>29</sup> The following discussion of the 1979 Constitution draws from the text itself, the Diario de Debates, interviews with Assembly members of all parties, and three secondary analyses: Marcial Rubio and Enrique Bernalles, Constitución y Sociedad Política (Lima: Mesa Redonda, 1985); Enrique Chirinos Soto, La Nueva Constitución al Alcance de Todos (Lima: AFA Editores, 1984); and Carlos Malpica, "El APRA y la Asamblea Constituyente", in Valderrama et al, op cit, pp. 231-240.

The new Constitution contains some important elements that are favorable to social democracy. In the economic sphere, it recognizes the coexistence of public and private enterprise and draws the very rough outlines of a modern welfare state. While validating capitalism and private property, it also defends the need for state enterprises, central planning and land reform. And in the political sphere, it establishes a semi-Presidentialist regime and a classic representative democracy with an expanded base of citizenship and party participation, and an unprecedented array of civil, political, and social rights, including a strong emphasis on the rights of labor.

Nevertheless, there are a number of conflicting elements in this new charter. While it advocates greater democratization of regional and local politics, it also centralizes considerable power and authority in the Executive, particularly in the economic realm. And while it provides for an unprecedented array of rights and liberties, including the right of insurrection against an illegitimate regime, it also allows the Executive to usurp many of the most fundamental citizenship guarantees when deemed necessary and to delegate even basic political responsibilities to the Armed Forces. These and other contradictions were the product of efforts to correct past defects in the political system, as well as trade-offs between the parties represented in the Assembly, and concessions made to the military still in power. The following section elaborates some of the most important elements in the Constitution for Peruvian democracy--and the prospects for social democracy--in the years ahead.

## Human Rights and Social Justice

"The human being is the supreme end of society and the state" declares the first article of the new Constitution.<sup>30</sup> In a strong reaction to a decade of military rule and a history of authoritarianism, the Assembly dedicated the first seven chapters to the rights and welfare of Peruvian citizens. There is a classic bill of rights--to life, liberty, property and all civil and political freedoms. The Assembly also abolished the death penalty for any crime except treason in time of war, and incorporated the right of appeal to international human rights tribunals as well as the right to insurgency against an illegitimate regime.<sup>31</sup>

In an important embrace of the legacy of the Velasco era, this Constitution also augments these civil and political liberties with an unprecedented array of social and economic rights and guarantees. These include particular stress on the rights of the family, of women, and of organized workers. "The State will give preference to the basic needs of the individual and his family, in the area of food, housing, and recreation" says Article 18. They enjoy the right to a home and a job, to a fair wage, health care and social security, and access to education and culture. Women have equal rights to men, while special protection is given to working mothers. Under this charter, it is the role of the

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<sup>30</sup> Constitucion politica... Title I, Chapter I, Article I, p. 5. The Constitution of 1979 is divided into eight "Titles" (The Rights and Duties of the Person, the State and Nation, Economic Regime, Structure of the State, Constitutional Guarantees, Constitutional Reform, Final Dispositions, and Transitory Dispositions). The titles are divided into chapters, and these into articles.

<sup>31</sup> Title I, Chapters 1-8, pp. 5-18; Titles V and VII, pp. 56-57

state to guarantee job stability, fair wages and working conditions, and to defend the rights of both private and public sectors workers to form free unions, negotiate collectively, and go on strike.<sup>32</sup>

This is obviously a utopian list of rights that is impossible to fully guarantee in a poor and underdeveloped country like Peru. But "in the area of human rights, nobody dared say 'no' to anything!" said Assembly member Ernesto Alayza Grundy of the PPC.<sup>33</sup> Indeed, with exceptions in the areas of labor rights and political participation, Assembly members across the spectrum agreed to this expansive list of guarantees. This was a reflection of the political climate of the times, the discourse of social justice legitimated by Velasco, and the pressures exerted by the popular movement and the leftist parties, which created a climate favorable to this progressive set of rights and principles. At the same time, the actual drafting of many of these articles involved relatively limited input by leftist representatives.

The leftists did join with Apristas to confront PPC resistance to the granting of labor rights, as well as to defend the general extension of political participation, as discussed below. The Constitution includes a broad set of considerations for workers, ranging from the unrestricted right to form unions and strike (in both the public and private sectors), to the recognition of worker participation in shareholding and industrial decisionmaking. This set of provisions reflects the fact that by 1978, the citizenship and political importance of the working classes were embraced as fundamental principles by the

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<sup>32</sup> Title I, Chapter III, p. 10; and Chapters III-V.

<sup>33</sup> Author's interview with Alayza, February 2, 1986



majority of elected representatives--only sectors of the PPC explicitly opposed expanding the rights of workers. Most of the labor sections of the Constitution were drafted by Apristas, but they were supported and enriched by the moderate left PC and PSR. In debates, the leftists generally argued for more maximalist versions of the same clauses, not for significantly different rules.<sup>34</sup>

While the new charter underscores the central role of the state in recognizing unions and mediating in labor disputes, the majority of Assembly members were emphatically against the inclusion of corporatist mechanisms of representation. Thus the right to form more than one union in a workplace or industry and to form rival federations and confederations was guaranteed, and no official state unions or direct state subsidies for unions were allowed. A majority vote for union pluralism reflected left and right-wing rejection of efforts by APRA in the past and by the military after 1968 to impose political hegemony and state controls over the labor movement. It also reflected the fact that although the CGTP was the dominant confederation in Peru, it was not undisputed. The radical left parties still hoped to challenge the reformist CGTP leadership. And now that the APRA's CTP was in the minority, that party also became an advocate of union pluralism.

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<sup>34</sup> Title I, Chapter 5, p. 13-16. For example, the Communists and the radical leftists joined to argue in favor of giving workers' an immediate and unrestricted right to job stability, while the APRA proposed a trial period and clear conditions for dismissal of workers. This debate is found in Actas de la Comision Principal, April 1979; and Diario de Debates Tomo VI, p. 2, and is assessed in Chirinos Soto, op cit., p. 71.

Yet there are key aspects of this Constitution that hinder the ability to defend this set of rights and principles, or facilitate interest representation and social justice more generally. First of all, while the APRA and the marxist left managed to agree on principles regarding many of these rights, the details and mechanisms for putting these principles into practice and ensuring compliance would be subject to the authority of the new Parliament after 1980. Labor rights, for example, were to be codified in a new Labor Code designed and approved by the incoming Parliament. Peru never had a comprehensive code before 1968, and as it turned out the legislatures elected in 1980 and in 1985 would never agree on one.

Futhermore, the flip side to the widespread rejection of authoritarian state corporatism contained in this document, was that although the ideal of "concertation" of interests is referred to in the Constitution, no concrete provisions were made for interest representation in key policymaking arenas. The state would play a major role in setting economic policy and resolving class conflicts, but it was nowhere required to be directly accountable to any body of citizens between elections. There were no provisions for convening organized labor or peasants, employees or employers. Nor were any formal channels of representation provided for these groups other than through the elected legislature.

#### The State and Economic Regime

"Peru is a democratic and social Republic, independent and sovereign, and based on labor" declares Title II of the Constitution. Not only must the state defend national sovereignty and human rights,

but it must also eliminate all forms of exploitation and "promote the general welfare based on justice and on the integral and equilibrated development of the country".<sup>35</sup> The expansion and modernization of the Peruvian state, which lagged well behind other Latin American states before 1968, was one of the chief legacies of the Velasco era. The extent to which the new Constitution should try to institutionalize, expand, or limit the state--particularly in the economic realm--was one of the more conflictive issues on the Assembly floor. The fact that this was often a purely symbolic or ideological discussion did not make it any less heated.

The few existing analyses of the 1979 Constitution tend to reiterate the marxist left view that it enshrines a "classic liberal capitalist proposal".<sup>36</sup> Yet this is not in fact the case. On one hand, it marks the acceptance in principle of some of the basic state and economic reforms initiated under Velasco. On the other hand, it is clearly disappointing to those who hoped to expand socialization of property structures beyond the military's agenda. Instead, the new blueprint for Peru's economic regime represents a clear political transaction between the liberal project of the PPC and the ambitions of the APRA, with the marxist left largely on the sidelines.

The economic regime outlined in this Constitution is developmentalist and social democratic in spirit. It stresses that state enterprises are crucial for promoting national development, providing public services and protecting national resources. A number

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<sup>35</sup> Title II, Chapter I, Articles 79 and 80.

<sup>36</sup> Bernales and Rubio 1979, op cit, p. 13.

of productive activities are reserved for the state alone or in large share. At the same time, it guarantees economic pluralism, saying that "the national economy is sustained by the democratic coexistence of diverse forms of property and enterprise", including state and private companies, cooperatives, and self-managed enterprises.<sup>37</sup> Under this charter the state should nevertheless play a central role in overall economic planning, regulation of private enterprise, and distribution of resources. "Private initiative is free" it says (and private property inviolable), but "It is to be exercised within a 'social economy of the market'". And free commerce should also be "exercised within the limits future law determines for social interest and national development". Monopolies and oligopolies are prohibited, and foreign investment should be carefully regulated and supervised by the state in line with national development interests.<sup>38</sup>

In regard to land tenure and the peasantry, the 1979 Constitution is notably more advanced than its predecessor, recognizing explicitly that "agrarian reform is an instrument of rural structural transformation and integral promotion of the peasant". It recognizes the right to private ownership of land in individual or cooperative form, by cooperatives or indigenous communities, but only in harmony with the public good. Abandoned lands fall to the state to redistribute to landless peasants. Latifundios are prohibited and cooperative

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<sup>37</sup> Title III, Chapter I, Article 112, p.22.

<sup>38</sup> Title III, Chapter I, Article 115, p. 23; Article 117; *ibid*, Chapter IV, Articles 133 and 137, pp. 25-26.

agriculture is to be encouraged.<sup>39</sup> Yet the Peruvian Peasant Confederation (CCP) and other pro-peasant organizations and parties harshly criticized these new chapters, because they were seen as a setback in contrast to Velasco's initial legislation. In particular, the CCP argued that it did not set clear enough limits on private individual ownership, leaving the door open for future reprivatization of land. And although the more radical parties and the CCP protested the top-down nature of Velasco's participatory mechanisms, none of Peru's agrarian groups were satisfied with the lack of any channels of peasant or small farmer participation in future agrarian policymaking efforts.<sup>40</sup>

This economic regime represents what one Aprista called a "necessary transaction" between the APRA and the PPC, since the leftists largely refused to participate.<sup>41</sup> The marxists made clear from the start their fundamental ideological objections to partaking in this discussion. The first day that the Economic Commission convened to draft this section, for example, FOCEP representative Ricardo Napuri made an impassioned speech in denunciation of capitalism, then left the room and never returned.<sup>42</sup> On the Assembly floor the rest of the left also expressed a "basic and almost total discrepancy" with references to

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<sup>39</sup> Title III, Chapter VII, pp. 28-30.

<sup>40</sup> See Saturnino Acostupa and Ezequiel Urviola, El debate agrario en la Constituyente: APRA-PPC de espaldas al campesinado (Lima: CCP, 1979).

<sup>41</sup> In the Diario de Debates, Tomo V, p. 486; Aprista Luis Rodriguez Vildosola publicly termed this a "necessary transaction".

<sup>42</sup> This observation was made in the author's interviews with two members of the Commission, Ernesto Alayza and Carlos Malpica.

private property, the market, and foreign capital. They showed little interest in debating the specifics of these articles, and then cited the new economic regime as one of their main reasons for not signing the Constitution. Carlos Malpica of the UDP was an exception. He had experience in economic research and did intervene in some of these debates, goading the Apristas on such issues as the regulation of foreign investment and enterprise, and the delineation of the state's right to expropriate "in the social interest".<sup>43</sup>

In the Economic Commission and again in the Principal Commission, the PPC representatives tried to defend a liberal capitalist economic regime. While they accepted in principle the existing land reform, "the market economy was their desideratum", as one Aprista negotiator put it.<sup>44</sup> They worked to include explicit recognition of the market and to lay bases for future reprivatization of land and industry. The APRA did not speak with such a clear voice--while many Apristas defended some form of state capitalism, others (including Alan Garcia) also favored giving greater room to private capital and market forces.<sup>45</sup> The APRA bloc nevertheless did band together to try and incorporate their own "desideratum"--the party's historical banner of a "National Economic Congress" (CEN). As originally conceived, the CEN was a functional body with representatives from labor, capital, the armed

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<sup>43</sup> Diario de Debates, Tomo VIII, June 5, 1979 to July 13, 1979, especially pp. 640-667, and author's interviews.

<sup>44</sup> Author's interview with Andres Townsend, op cit.

<sup>45</sup> Alan Garcia's main speech on economic matters is found in Diario de Debates Tomo VIII, pp. 106-114.

forces and other interest groups, that was to have binding influence on state economic policy and planning.<sup>46</sup>

The PPC realized that it was outvoted over the role of the state in Peru's new Constitution. Yet it was also clear that APRA's positions were more negotiable than those of the Marxist left. Hence the pepeticistas in the Principal Commission were willing to go along with the APRA on sections that they could not pass on their own. The PPC offered to accept such provisions as state planning, multiple forms of property, and a very watered-down version of the CEN--one that would serve as merely a consultative mechanism but would have no binding influence on policy. In turn, the PPC insisted on the articles recognizing private property and initiative, exercised within "the social economy of the market"--the latter was a key tenet of international Christian Democracy that was of as much symbolic value to the PPC as the CEN was to APRA. The PPC also demanded the elimination of state control over the media and the return of all newspapers to their pre-1968 owners.<sup>47</sup>

Apristas in the Principal Commission accepted this compromise, defending it as a realistic outcome in face of the left's intransigence. Yet the APRA's Economic Congress did not in fact survive in any form. In the Plenary session the full APRA bloc rejected the PPC's position on the media, and the PPC in turn withdrew its support for the CEN. APRA

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<sup>46</sup> Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, Obras Completas (Lima: Libreria Editorial Juan Mejia Baca, 1977), pp. 308-314; and Valderrama, et al, op cit, pp. 47-48.

<sup>47</sup> This debate is found in the Actas de la Comision Principal in January and May, 1979.

leaders then tried to bargain with the reformist left over this specific issue. But the PSR and PC accused the APRA of already bargaining away the potential power of such an organism in the draft version. The radical left, for its part, denounced the entire idea as "corporate-fascist".<sup>48</sup> At the same time, both the right and radical left were against the state control of the media, but no final Constitutional provision was made, leaving this decision to the incoming government.

The sections of the 1979 Constitution regarding a new economic regime, as with those regarding human rights and social justice, represent significant advances in contrast to Peru's prior constitution. They contain a variety of articles that legitimize popular aspirations, and that would become very important banners for social and political struggles in the 1980s. Yet the common factor in these sections is that the mechanisms for putting these principles into practice, or for guaranteeing their continued existence, were largely left to be defined by the incoming government. For this reason, the new structure of state authority and of political representation would in fact be the most crucial sections of this new regime.

#### The Structure of Political Authority

In the political realm, the new Constitution of 1979 provides for a fairly conventional representative democracy. It establishes a considerably more democratic regime than that outlined in the previous Constitution of 1933. Yet it was clearly disappointing for the leftist parties, and for all those who had experienced the innovative

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<sup>48</sup> Diario de Debates, Tomo VII, pp. 134-200, and Malpica op cit, p. 13. Malpica says that the military also pressured against APRA acceptance of reprivatization of the media.



participatory experiments and popular forms of expression of the 1970s. Hence the left bloc took limited interest in debates over the details of electoral competition, parliamentary authority and the like. In the 1980s, however, the details which were--or were not--worked out here would take on increasing importance for precisely those parties who most rejected them at this stage.

The new regime has been classified as "semi-Presidential" and as "attenuated presidential".<sup>49</sup> It provides for a two-chambered Legislature, an Executive, and an independent Judiciary. The President and both chambers are elected together every five years through universal suffrage, and the legislature by proportional representation. Parties are the principal form of representation in this system, and elections the main channel of citizen participation. The presidential character of the regime is attenuated in that the Chamber of Deputies can interpellate and censure government ministers, yet at the same time the Executive branch is still given considerably more power and resources than the Legislative.

Two fundamental and long overdue changes in the Peruvian political system were finally introduced in 1979 through the combined votes of the marxist left and the APRA--the extension of suffrage to illiterates, and the elimination of ideological restrictions on political parties. By 1968 suffrage had become obligatory for literates over the age of 21. It remained obligatory in the 1979 Constitution, but now the right and duty to vote was formally extended to all Peruvians over 18 years of

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<sup>49</sup> Bernales and Rubio 1985, op cit, p. 350; Chirinos Soto, op cit, p. 407.

age, increasing the electorate by an estimated 150 percent over the last election in 1963.<sup>50</sup> The bulk of the newly enfranchised would come from the poorest and most historically marginalized sectors of the population, from the indigenous population and the rural poor, recent urban migrants, poor women and youths. These were sectors of society long ignored by the APRA and other parties, and their political loyalties were largely undefined. Only the PPC openly opposed this change, using both technical and blatantly racist arguments to oppose changes that would likely reduce its share of the electorate.<sup>51</sup>

The 1933 Constitution had placed restrictions on parties with "international affiliations", which had been used to prevent both the APRA and the Communist Party from direct participation for many years. This was put to rest in 1979, as the new system eliminated all such restrictions, and allowed any group of citizens to form a party as long as they attained a minimum number of registered members, which since 1978 has been 40,000 signatures of registered voters and at least 14 national committees. Proportional representation and preferential voting further expanded the spectrum of participation and choice. At the same time, preferential treatment from the state for any party was

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<sup>50</sup> Title I, Chapter VII, Of Political Rights.

<sup>51</sup> In the Diario de Debates, Tomo VII, p. 165, PPC representative Ciohaldo Salazar argued that the illiterate's brain was deficient and too easily subject to political manipulation. Other PPC members argued that it would be too difficult to register illiterates for 1980, that they should receive five years of "political education" first, and that they should vote only indirectly for representation in the Senate. Interviewed by the author in 1986, PPC leader Roberto Ramirez del Villar still argued that granting immediate illiterate suffrage was "a grave error".

explicitly prohibited, although all parties were granted access to state-controlled media during election campaigns. While the elimination of restrictions on parties reflects an effort to correct past injustices, the majority's recognition of political parties as the maximum expression of democratic pluralism and as "the fundamental instrument of political participation for the citizenry" was an explicit rejection of Velasco's "No-Party Thesis" and of the military's efforts to substitute corporate organization for parties.<sup>52</sup>

Outside of the newly-expanded arena of national party competition, the new Constitution provides for two other mechanisms of potential democratization: popularly elected municipal governments, and regionalization of authority. Although the 1933 Constitution also contained these in principle, municipal governments had been appointed for most of Peru's history and regional government had never been attempted. Under this new system, municipal elections would be held shortly after general elections, while the new legislature would work out a timetable for new regional governments. Municipal governments would remain dependent on the central government for resources, but they would have greater say in how resources are distributed at the local level, and they would ideally represent the demands of local residents in dealing with higher authorities. Furthermore, municipal authorities would be subject to renewal every three years, making these the only

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<sup>52</sup> Title I, Chapter VII, Article 68. In the Principal Commission the PPC did in fact press for restrictions on those parties that advocate "the violent overthrow of the state", and a few Apristas were ready to accept this. In the Plenary sessions, however, the left reminded Apristas that such restrictions had historically been used against their party more than any other. Diario de Debates, Tomo VI, pp. 186-225.

staggered elections in Peru and as such an important barometer of broader political sentiments.<sup>53</sup> The 1979 Constitution therefore represents a commitment on the part of the majority of the Assembly to expand the arenas of future party competition and representation. But at the same time, and in explicit rejection of Velasco's "direct democracy" and participation schemes, the majority rejected forms of citizen participation other than parties and elections. It also did not incorporate any mechanisms of government accountability between elections, not even staggered legislative contests. The moderate PSR did propose such items as the right to hold referendums and plebiscites, and recall public officials, but these were soundly rejected by the APRA and the PPC.<sup>54</sup>

In fact, the 1979 Constitution contains fundamentally contradictory tendencies between democratization and authoritarianism, which would set the framework for political action in the 1980s and which would prove conducive to populist political outcomes. While the features outlined above are steps towards the democratization of politics, the Assembly also explicitly tried to lay the foundations for a stronger state than that outlined in 1933. In doing so, the new Constitution provides for highly centralized Executive with extensive control over the main policy decisions that affect peoples' lives, and limited accountability. It also provides the means by which the

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<sup>53</sup> Title IV, Chapter XII, pp. 49-51.

<sup>54</sup> This debate is reviewed in Chirinos Soto, *op cit*, pp. 428-430; and Bernalles and Rubio 1985, *op cit*, p. 624.

Executive can usurp the basic functions of the national legislature and of municipal and regional officials.

Although Latin American political traditions vary, most modern constitutions in the region grant considerable powers to the Executive, ostensibly to rule in the name of the people ("el pueblo"), above and against special interests. Often backed by electoral laws favoring parliamentary majorities, and enjoying lengthy fixed periods of rule, Latin American presidents have come to personify their nations and set sweeping policy agendas, overruling reluctant local elites. Some analysts argue, however, that this structure encourages the arbitrary use and abuse of authority, more rather than less instability, and may even hasten military intervention.<sup>55</sup>

In the Peruvian case, however, the excessively parliamentary aspects of the 1933 Constitution were widely blamed for the blockage of the Belaunde government's democratic reform efforts in the 1960s and hence for the military coup of 1968.<sup>56</sup> The infamous parliamentary pact between the APRA and oligarchical interests, which was instrumental in

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<sup>55</sup> See for example Juan J. Linz, Arend Lijphart, Arturo Escobar, Valenzuela and Oscar Godoy, Hacia una democracia moderna: la opcion parlamentaria (Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Catolica de Chile, 1990).

<sup>56</sup> When asked about this by the author in 1986, PPC leader Ernesto Alayza argued that "a parliamentary government is absurd among us Peruvians, since it is precisely the excess of legislative powers over the government which has been our downfall for the last forty years". On the other hand, political analyst Luis Pasara argued during this period that regime type was not the fundamental problem with Peru's past democracies, but rather the more basic structure of power underlying it, and he harshly criticized "the hypothesis that 'if only we had a clearly presidentialist, or parliamentary constitution, Peruvian history would have been distinct'". See "Parlamentarismo vs. Presidencialismo", in Pasara, Garcia Belaunde, Quispe, Urrutia, et al, La Constituyente: Para Que? (Lima: Retama Editorial, 1978), p. 30.

blocking land reform and other measures, was still fresh in the minds of many Assembly members. In fact, one of the few things that generated broad consensus across party lines was the need to strengthen the Executive branch of government, particularly in the realm of economic and social policy. Only sectors of the radical left were opposed to this.<sup>57</sup>

For the right and the moderate left, a stronger Executive was more an issue of principle than of immediate political interest. While there were PPC members who wanted to cut state powers in the economic realm, most of them believed that a strong central authority was necessary to maintain public order, an important complement to their liberal economic goals. Ironically, the PSR and PC believed in the principle of strong Executive authority for the opposite reasons--as the most effective way for those in power to defend national interests against imperialism, and to undertake radical social change. The leftists couched their arguments in terms of efficiency, arguing that the real distribution of power in society would remain the same no matter how the political institutions were structured.<sup>58</sup> Flying in the face of face of APRA's historically parliamentary doctrine, Alan Garcia also argued that a strong state and President were necessary to promote national

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<sup>57</sup> In Bernaldes and Rubio 1985, op cit, p. 336, the authors stress that "There was full consensus over this issue among all the groups represented in the Constituent Assembly, because this was an issue called for by reality itself, and...because modern Constitutions have accepted delegation [of authority to the Executive] as an institution stemming from the development of the contemporary state".

<sup>58</sup> The radical left proposed instead a "direct democracy" based on large-scale popular assemblies. Diario de Debates, Tomo VII, p. 247; and Pasara, op cit, p. 30.

development. But the driving force behind APRA's stance was immediate political benefit. After a lifetime in opposition, the party fully expected to win the 1980 elections. In order to best assume their "historic responsibilities", party leaders argued that central authority had to be strengthened as much as possible.<sup>59</sup>

The puzzling question is why the PPC and the left did not join forces to place greater restraints on Executive authority, since the expectation of an APRA victory--or at least plurality--was widespread. As it turns out, the PPC opted to focus on the battle over electoral rules for getting into power, because although it could not expect an electoral majority, it did hope to share in a governing coalition. The moderate left did try to include greater measures of accountability of the Executive branch once in power. But as noted at the outset, for the most part the leftist parties were not yet behaving as serious electoral competitors, and hence not acting as though this issue could have an important impact on them. Both the right and left did vote for proportional representation in Congress. Yet all sides appeared to operate on the assumption that a system heavily favoring the winning party was preferable, and parliamentary alternatives were not given serious debate. The debates centered around how to increase the power of the Executive, not democratize decisionmaking.

The Assembly essentially aimed to strengthen the Executive branch through increasing the powers of the President himself. The President was named Chief of State, "spokesman for the Nation", and Commander in

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<sup>59</sup> See the arguments made by Garcia and Chirinos Soto, Diario de Debates Tomo VII, pp. 190-192; and Chirinos Soto, op cit, pp. 397-411.

Chief of the Armed Forces. Cabinet Ministers were to be appointed by the President, with a delegated Prime Minister serving as little more than the President's executive secretary. The Executive would have the power to convoke legislative sessions, to establish the order of legislation debated by Congress, and to observe laws emanating from that body. Above all, the Executive would prepare all national budgets and initiate most aspects of national planning and economic and financial policy.<sup>60</sup>

Theoretically, the new Constitution charges the Legislature with approval of national budgets and with general accountability for the Executive, including the right to question and censure ministers. But the Legislature cannot initiate economic policy nor create new expenditures. Furthermore, the major change from the 1933 system was the ability to delegate even these legislative powers to the President. Article 188 allows a congressional majority to abdicate its lawmaking and accountability faculties to the President for a specified period. This gives the Executive exclusive power to initiate, approve and promulgate legislative decrees, in one issue area or many. This additional power was anticipated primarily for use in the economic policy realm, although it is not limited to that. In addition to these stipulations, the fact that the President and both houses of Congress are elected simultaneously and for the same period of time means that a popular President is likely to sweep in a Congressional majority, making

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<sup>60</sup> Title IV, The Structure of the State, especially Chapters II, IV, V, VI, VII.



the legislative body more prone to abdicating its responsibilities and less likely to censure the Executive.

The potential for authoritarianism in the new regime is increased by the influence retained by the Armed Forces, although this was due only in part to the new Constitution itself. Indeed, after twelve years of military rule the Assembly made an effort to place formal limitations on the Armed Forces' autonomy and interference into civilian life. In contrast to previous Peruvian constitutions, and to practices across Latin America, the Constitution of 1979 ceased to describe the Armed Forces as the "safeguard of the Constitution", which they had used in the past to justify intervention. The new Constitution declares that the military is not a deliberating power, excludes it from the right of petition, and reinforces military subordination to the President, as "the Supreme Chief of the Armed Forces and Police". Furthermore, it grants citizens the "right to insurgency" against a military coup, as well as declaring that any debts contracted by a usurping government would not have to be honored, two anti-coup clauses that were unique in Latin America.<sup>61</sup>

Yet although the Armed Forces are formally subject to Executive control, the Constitution does allow the military to retain its existing structure of three separate branches, and Cabinet ministers can be drawn from the Armed Forces themselves to have oversight over these branches.

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<sup>61</sup> The clauses are contained in Articles 82, 235, 273, 278, and 282. See Luis Pasara, "La 'Libanizacion en democracia'", in Luis Pasara and Jorge Parodi, eds., Democracia, sociedad y gobierno en el Peru (Lima: CEDYS, 1988), p. 38; and Philip Mauceri, "The Military, Insurgency and Democratic Power: Peru, 1980-1988", Columbia University Papers on Latin America No. 11, 1989, pp. 12-13.

This includes control over defense budgets, salaries, promotions and internal procedures. With an acquiescent Executive, such clauses could permit the military an important degree of lasting power (and this proved to be the case in the 1980s). Furthermore, no attempt was made by the Assembly to hold the military accountable for its actions while in power, nor to incorporate specific mechanisms for strengthening civilian oversight after 1980, and the military retained considerable immunity from the civilian justice system.

As the Commander in Chief the President would theoretically have the power of military oversight. Yet in an affront to its initial commitment to human rights and democracy, the Constitution of 1979 allows the President to suspend most constitutional guarantees and abdicate his own authority to the Armed Forces, whenever he and his Cabinet see fit. At the behest of military leaders, two "regimes of exception" were incorporated into the state structure which were unusual in Peruvian constitutional history; the State of Emergency and State of Siege.<sup>62</sup> The State of Siege was to be declared only in the case of invasion or external or civil war ("or the imminent danger thereof"), for up to forty-five days at a time, subject to extension with congressional approval. The State of Emergency was more ambiguous, and could be imposed "in the case of disturbance of the peace or internal order, catastrophe, or grave circumstances which affects the life of the Nation". This involved the suspension of guarantees of personal liberty and security, the sanctity of the home, and the freedom of reunion and

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<sup>62</sup> According to Bernales and Rubio 1985, op cit, p. 15, these clauses are unusual in Peruvian constitutional history.

transit. This regime could be imposed for sixty days at a time, in all or a part of the nation, and perpetually renewed with only a Cabinet decree. In both of these cases, the President would agree to hand the Armed Forces full responsibility for internal order, and the military would not be subject to civilian courts for actions under these regimes.

These issues of civil-military relations were negotiated largely between the APRA and the military leadership, outside of the Assembly, and were later re-negotiated between the military and the newly-elected civilian leadership in 1980.<sup>63</sup> In addition to being a leading Aprista spokesman for a strong state and Presidency, Alan Garcia was a member of the Defense Commission and a staunch defender of Peru's Armed Forces. After fifty years of experience, he argued, the military had learned to respect the APRA and democracy in general. In his view, this new military could be trusted to uphold the Constitution and make a major contribution to national development.<sup>64</sup>

The radical leftists were the only ones to openly challenge the structure and degree of military authority. They tended to do so, however, with provocative and extremist proposals that guaranteed their rejection by the rest of the Assembly. These proposals ranged from granting soldiers the right to unionize, strike, and elect their

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<sup>63</sup> From existing records and interviews with participants it is clear that in the Defense Commission and the Principal Commission both the PPC and the leftists had strong positions on these issues, while the Apristas tended to wait for a word from the Joint Chiefs of Staff before casting their vote. This was stressed in the author's interviews with PPC leaders Ramirez del Villar and Alayza and UDP leader Malpica. It also emerges in the Diario de Debates Tomo VII, pp. 460-497 and Tomo VIII, p. 39.

<sup>64</sup> See Diario de Debates Tomo VII, p. 477.

superior officers; to the replacement of the professional military by armed militia of workers and peasants. Only Malpica of UDP and some Communists made constructive proposals for increasing civilian control over the military. They argued against allowing military officers to hold Cabinet positions, for example, and also proposed a single Defense Ministry under civilian control. Military leaders raised strong objections to these proposals in private meetings with acting Assembly President Sanchez, however, and they were rejected before leaving the Principal Commission. The military also vetoed leftist efforts to include the investigation of outgoing government officials for human rights abuses or corruption.<sup>65</sup>

#### The Electoral Rules of the Game

By the end of the Constituent Assembly both the APRA and the PPC were primarily concerned with lining up to compete in the 1980 elections. This made the negotiations over electoral rules the most heated and extensive of all, generating conflict between PPC and APRA in a way that substantive issues of state and society generally did not. This issue was not resolved until the very end of the Assembly period.

In the debate over electoral rules, all parties were operating under three assumptions: (1) that the APRA would place first in the 1980 election, but might fail to win a full majority; (2) that the left could fare at least as well in 1980 as in 1978; and (3) that the right could not win in a first round, but could be a crucial coalition partner or second-round choice. Hence the APRA was working to secure its own

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<sup>65</sup> For the proposals and lively debates about civil-military relations, see Diario de Debates Tomo VII, pp. 471-482.

victory, and the PPC wanted to hamper this outcome, but both the APRA and PPC wanted to block the left. Given this scenario, the APRA argued that the President should be declared a winner with a simple plurality, or with a minimum of 33 percent of the vote. The PPC representatives wanted a simple majority, 50 percent plus one, or a second-round runoff election. They argued that a strong Executive needed majority rule, and calculated that this would give them important negotiating power by blocking an easy APRA victory. They also wanted to institute preferential voting, allowing the voter to choose candidates from within party lists in his or her preferred order, while the APRA opposed this as a threat to party discipline.<sup>66</sup>

The leftist parties did not initially take interest in what they saw as a superficial debate. Yet an impasse between APRA and PPC over presidential election rules led each to seek negotiations with the left, in effect giving the marxist bloc the potential to decide this matter. The leftists faced a trade-off: if they supported lowering the barrier for Presidential victory to a simple plurality they could facilitate an APRA government, which was likely to wage a strong challenge against the left's labor and popular bases. If they blocked an APRA victory by supporting the PPC position, however, they would make their own future electoral prospects more difficult. Trotskyite Hugo Blanco, whose high personal vote count in 1978 gave him the most compelling reason to join this debate, argued strongly that the left should not sacrifice the possibility of a 33 percent turnout of its own. The Communist Party, in

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<sup>66</sup> These positions were reiterated in the authors interviews with Assembly members from the left, right and APRA.

contrast, steadfastly defended a second-round runoff system, obsessed with the goal of keeping APRA out of power in 1980. Most of the left bloc shared this short-run concern.

The left's divisiveness ultimately undermined its opportunity to have an impact on this issue. Several leftist leaders felt they should bargain with the PPC and APRA for more concessions before taking a final stand. Off the Assembly floor, Armando Villanueva offered them a tempting bargain for supporting the APRA proposal, including provisions for labor participation in government and support for the left's labor amnesty proposal. But while FOCEP leader Genaro Ledesma bargained with APRA, the Communist Party did the same with PPC, and still others steadfastly rejected any hint of an accord with either of these "bourgeois" parties. By the time the issue was presented for a floor vote, the entire left bloc opted to retire from the Assembly rather than indulge in an embarrassing public battle.

Because the leftist parties could not reach agreement, the APRA and PPC were forced to reach a compromise. The APRA in effect conceded to the PPC proposal for a full majority, second-round system, with preferential voting--but only after 1980. A special set of transitory dispositions established that in 1980 the President would be elected with just 36 percent of the vote, or the election would fall to Congress, and that voting would follow the order of party lists. The system would revert to the PPC proposal in 1985. In other words, the PPC sacrificed its ambitions in 1980 in order to retain bargaining power in the future, while the APRA got what it wanted most--the best possible conditions to win in 1980.

In this debate as in most of the Assembly, the leftists were too divided and short-sighted to seek longer-term benefits in this negotiation, and in the course of events they helped raise the barriers to a democratic left victory in the 1980s. In another important example, the left bloc supported a clause which allowed candidates for President to run simultaneously for a parliamentary seat. Because the left was divided into several parties and fronts, the clause would allow each left leader or party a shot at public office even when their presidential candidates were likely to fail. Yet the effect of this clause was to encourage the proliferation of separate candidates and charismatic leaders, and over time it would exacerbate divisions with the left. Remarkably, the Aprista representative who helped to draft this clause said that it was consciously designed to have this effect.<sup>67</sup>

Finally, as the Assembly came to a close the entire left bloc let itself be manipulated by the most radical members, rejecting any responsibility for the Constitution in exchange for one last propaganda effort. When the final votes were being called Trotskyite Blanco presented a long list of "reconsiderations", which amounted to a list of all the radical left positions that had been defeated along the way. Because this was simply a propaganda measure, the APRA-PPC majority refused to admit Blanco's motion to a vote. The most radical leftists then convinced the entire left bloc to march out in solidarity. Although they returned for the final roll call, entering motion after motion in a last-ditch effort to publicize ongoing strikes, they all

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<sup>67</sup> Author's interview with Enrique Chirinos Soto, November 1, 1985.

refused to sign the final document.

The leftists gave several arguments for not signing the Constitution of 1979. According to Ricardo Napuri of FOCEP, his group never intended to support it;

"We said from the start that we would not follow military orders to draft a Constitution...In accord with this position, we have voted always en contra, be it against the initial Reglament or the commissions formed. And consequent with our position, we affirm that we vote against this Constitution, not only because it is part of the will of 'de facto' rulers, but because it has been drafted ideologically and politically in a framework of subordination to imperialism, to the native bourgeoisie and to the bourgeois state".<sup>68</sup>

Power, according to FOCEP, was constructed not through laws but through the immediate actions of the popular movement. For its part, Jorge del Prado stressed the Communist Party's objections to the new Economic Regime, which was less socialistic than the original intentions of General Velasco or his Communist allies. Furthermore, the PC and its labor allies hoped to draw attention to the undemocratic and anti-labor context in which the document was drafted. Carlos Malpica of the UDP, who made important contributions to the Constitution, agreed that final document was not what the marxist left wanted and declared that "I did not sign it, because all members of the left agreed not to do so".<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> Diario de Debates, Tomo XIII, p. 642

<sup>69</sup> Ibid, p. 633. Interviewed by the author in 1986, Malpica admitted that the left's performance in the Assembly was poor and called it a farce;

"Of the twenty or more delegates from the left, only a handful of us had any idea what this was all about. The rest had no clue, and they spent all their time fighting for labor revindications, for minor things. For example, the day the death penalty was debated there were almost no leftists in the Assembly, because that day two university students were detained and everyone was out trying to save them"... "The tragedy of the left", he concluded, "was that some 70% of the people who



And a final leftist declaration concluded that the Constitution of 1979 "does not encompass the fundamental aspirations of the Peruvian people".<sup>70</sup>

The Constitution was thus ratified by the APRA and PPC on July 12, 1979, and sent to General Morales to be put into effect. Yet despite the military's general satisfaction with the new Constitution, Morales objected to four of the transitory dispositions, charging that they overstepped the boundaries of the Assembly. The Assembly refused to alter the document, and Morales in turn refused to put the Constitution into operation, leaving it in suspension until the inauguration of the incoming civilian President. He also refused to move up the general election date, although the APRA believed this had been promised in exchange for a prompt and smooth completion of the Assembly process.

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This outcome proved to be another a defeat for the APRA and its historical strategy of elite negotiation and pactmaking. Haya de la Torre lived just long enough to put his signature on this historic document, literally closing one chapter of Peruvian political history, and laying the foundations for another. It would be up to the new government elected in 1980, however, to put the Constitution into effect. This was also a defeat for the marxist left, which was unable to use the Assembly effectively as an arena to mobilize popular protest and reverse the tide of government policies. Both APRA and the marxist

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arrived [in the Assembly] were there by chance, and they had no idea what to do, completely lost. If we had been more coherent, there would have been a different Constitution".

<sup>70</sup> Diario de Debates, Tomo XIII, p. 629.

left emerged debilitated and discredited from the Assembly process, which would hurt their chances for an electoral victory in 1980. Furthermore, because neither was focusing on the Constitutional process per se, they missed important opportunities to structure the rules and institutions of the new regime to work in their favor--or in favor of a social democratic outcome--in the years ahead.

## CHAPTER VI

### The 1980 Elections, the Triumph of Populism, and the Establishment of New Parameters

It was the popular movement and its expression of collective demands for social justice that inaugurated Peru's transition towards democratic rule, swept the leftist parties into the Constituent Assembly and prompted APRA to promise to address popular demands. The left in turn intended to use this arena and subsequent elections to consolidate the popular movement and give it a voice in national political affairs, and the APRA also hoped to extend its historical electoral appeal to new popular sectors. Yet these strategies failed to turn the popular movement into an organized and effective force in the 1980 elections. Instead, victory went to Fernando Belaunde Terry, an aging populist with neither an organized mass base nor a concrete program. And as with most previous populist attempts in Peru, Belaunde's promises quickly gave way to an exclusionary style of political rule, highly unpopular economic policies, and economic and social crisis.

How was it possible, after twelve years of profound structural change and popular sector mobilization, for Peru to return to the same type of leadership--indeed, the same leader--that it had in 1968? And given the breadth of the new democracy, how could Belaunde impose policies that were rejected by virtually all sectors of society? This chapter attempts to address these questions, through a brief analysis of the limitations of the popular movement, the elections of 1980, and the ways in which political elites used--and abused--the new regime foundations over 1980-1985.

The chapter argues that weakening of the popular movement and the reemergence of populism was due in part to the structural impact of

economic crisis and the conjunctural impact of government policies. The "stage" approach to social democratization was difficult here, given the urgent socioeconomic needs of the poor and the left's determination to defend them politically. But this weakening was also due to the strategic choices and errors of the left parties and the APRA, and their inability to represent popular interests effectively in the evolving political transition. By adhering to old rules of elite negotiation in a new political context, the APRA lost its short-term momentum and popular support. And although they initially rejected the rules of the formal political game, the left parties were affected by them over the course of the transition--while their ability to take advantage of them was limited by persistent internal divisions.

This chapter also argues that the regime structure established in the 1979 Constitution reinforced an inherited authoritarianism, by allowing the Belaunde administration to circumvent public debate about relevant policy issues, restrict participation, and violate the basic citizenship rights enshrined in the same document. At the same time, this chapter (and the following ones) note the persistent weakness of the institutions designed to resist such outcomes, namely, the parliament and judiciary, organized labor and popular sectors, and the opposition parties.

#### The Limits of the Popular Movement, 1978-1980

The structural bases of the popular movement were always quite heterogeneous and relatively weak. The unionized urban proletariat, for example, constituted a tiny minority in relation to the larger universe of urban and rural poor in Peru. Yet the driving force for the popular

movement was the effort to build power through alliances, between the strongest blue and white collar unions, peasant organizations, student and professional associations, the community organizations of the poor, and leftist parties. Such alliances were based on a set of common concerns which converged between 1976 and 1978, such as the reversal of austerity policy and the protection of basic human rights.

Between 1978 and 1980, however, government policies dealt some heavy blows to this movement. In this period the military government abandoned all pretense of promoting social justice. A modest economic recovery in 1979 was produced by increases in world prices for Peru's copper and other natural resources, yet this recovery was characterized by severely unequal distribution of the benefits. By 1980 Peru had one of the most inequitable rates of income distribution in the world. Nearly 60 percent of the work force was under or unemployed, and wages for those still working continued to fall behind the cost of living, most acutely in the public sector.<sup>1</sup>

The impact on poor families was tragic. By 1979 the average workers' wage in Lima could purchase just 75 percent of a minimum "market basket" for a family of four, and those earning the legal minimum wage could only pay for 35 percent. Caloric intake dropped 22 percent between 1972 and 1979, to only 62 percent of the minimum recommended. Typhoid and other diseases increased, and infant mortality rates in Peru were the second highest in the Western Hemisphere. In

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<sup>1</sup> Average real wages for an urban worker in 1978 had fallen back to 1970 levels, and in 1979 the deterioration was 20% more. By the end of 1979 the real income of government employees had fallen to less than half their 1973 levels. This is drawn from Handelman and Sanders, op cit, pp. 134-135; and Bollinger, op cit, p. 30.

July of 1979 the newspaper Expreso reported that food prices were so far beyond the reach of the urban poor that malnutrition among children in Lima's shantytowns was estimated at 65 percent. With serious declines in attention to the agricultural sector, the health and welfare situation of the rural poor was also dire.<sup>2</sup>

How did the various parties represented in the Assembly respond to this difficult situation? The APRA, which received the single largest share of the popular vote in 1978, opted to pursue its historical "survival strategy" in this period, essentially trading away the immediate defense of labor and popular sector interests in exchange for a tactical alliance with the military and the PPC. The left, for its part, made ample use of its floor space to present motions in support of ongoing strikes and protests, arguing that political democracy and social justice had to be pursued simultaneously. But from the start the military warned that such disputes constituted a threat to the transition to democracy, and the APRA-PPC majority made clear its intentions to keep such protests outside of the Assembly. In voting against these motions, Apristas argued that the best way to defend the interests of the working class was through drafting a good Constitution and electing a new government as soon as possible.<sup>3</sup>

The disillusionment of many workers with the position of the APRA-PPC majority, and with the lack of an alternative forum for resolving

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<sup>2</sup> Bollinger, op cit, p. 30.

<sup>3</sup> This position is demonstrated in the Assembly debates between leftist labor representatives and Aprista union leaders Julio Cruzado and Luis Negreiros. In Negreiro's view, "the Constitution is the best route to solving the problems of the working classes". Diario de Debates, Tomo I, pp. 290-340.

labor disputes, is illustrated in the case of the copper miners.<sup>4</sup> In August of 1978 miners from the central sierra (Centromin) went on strike for long-awaited salary increases and the rehiring of 400 workers illegally fired for previous strike activity. The impoverished miners and their families, of largely peasant origin, marched on foot to Lima just as the Assembly was getting under way, receiving a considerable amount of sympathy from urban unions and the general public. The miners had representation within the left bloc of the Assembly, and they pressed that body for a declaration of support for their cause.<sup>5</sup> Haya de la Torre responded by proposing a multi-party commission to discuss the issue. As days went by and no response came from this commission, the miners accused APRA of opportunism and again called for a protest on the Assembly floor. Haya asked the Assembly to postpone the issue while he arranged a meeting between union representatives and the Minister of Labor, claiming that General Morales had personally promised him that there would be a rapid resolution of the miners' demands. Instead, on September 6, 1978, the military violently dislodged the miners from their temporary shelters and forced them on trains back to their camps without a settlement. Over the next year the miners' demands would continue to be severely repressed and branded as subversive, charges that APRA and PPC leaders were unwilling to refute.

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<sup>4</sup> The following discussion draws from Diario de Debates, Tomo I, pp. 248-249, 307-310, 343-346, 416-418; and Tomo II, pp. 152-153; and from Pease Garcia and Filomeno 1978, op cit, pp. 3193-3195.

<sup>5</sup> The left Assembly bloc included the Secretary General and legal adviser of the national mineworkers' federation (FNTMMP), Victor Cuadros and Ricardo Diaz Chavez respectively, as well as Centromin leader Juan Cornejo Gomez, Cuajone mine leader Hernan Cuentas, and long-time Cerro de Pasco politician Genaro Ledesma.



Hence as the political transition evolved, the major bases of the popular movement were being undermined. The organized labor movement was the backbone of the protest efforts and the most powerful instrument of leftist political strategy. But the steady impact of the crisis, the decreasing returns from strikes, and the firing of some 1,500 experienced labor leaders were taking a toll on union members. At the same time, the ranks of non-unionized and under-paid urban and rural poor increased considerably.

At the same time, the relationship between the leftist parties and the bases of the popular movement, which had resulted in mutual benefit during most of the military regime, became increasingly problematic. As the crisis evolved, the left parties continued to prioritize strike activity as the key to pressure the dictatorship, but they had less concrete help to offer non-unionized workers and their families or to the poorest sectors of the peasantry. Although the radical left did try to mobilize shantytown dwellers, this was often focused on channeling the urban poor into supporting the struggles of the major unions, or engaging in "sindical" forms of action themselves. Yet the increasing numbers of unemployed workers and their families had basic survival needs that required other forms of action, such as community kitchens, neighborhood defense associations, and underground employment generation, which the left supported but which were not a priority at this stage of the game.

Even in the union sphere, the left's support was a mixed blessing. The Communist Party remained the main labor party; it dominated the leadership of the CGTP and defended the concrete material interests of

its bases. The radical left, however, denounced this as economicism and reformism, and spent considerable time trying to undermine the CGTP and mobilize other unions into more "revolutionary" action. The divisiveness of the left parties was extremely debilitating for labor, as union leadership was treated as territory to be "captured" or carved up in partisan battles. And the confrontational tactics encouraged by the left were proving less effective in this period.<sup>5</sup>

While these factors were accumulating, the radical left continued to stress the mobilization of general strikes as the preferred tactic to consolidate the popular movement and undermine the military regime. It took several other strategic failures before the parties decided to postpone this tactic in favor of electoral politics. One of the most dramatic was the General Strike of January 1979, the failure of which had a particularly demoralizing impact on the popular movement and the political left.<sup>6</sup> The reasons for this failure are multiple, the first being the government's more effective wielding of the carrot and stick. Under the direction of military hardliners troops occupied Lima before the strike began. Selective repression was applied to the lower ranks of strike organizers before the paro, and from past experience participants had learned that the troops were indeed authorized to kill. At the same time, the government announced a small wage increase for workers just before the strike date, and after five years of crisis such a measure began to carry weight. A second factor was the behavior of

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<sup>5</sup> See Carmen Rosa Balbi and Jorge Parodi, "Los limites de la izquierda: el caso sindical", La Revista No. 4, julio 1981, pp. 3-9.

<sup>6</sup> This draws from Pease Garcia and Filomeno 1979, op cit., p. 3345-3346.

APRA. While in the past the party had taken a cautious stance towards such protests, refusing to participate formally but acknowledging the popularity of the demands, this time APRA invested considerable energy and resources in undermining the strike. A small but influential group of Aprista sympathizers among the busdrivers' union kept transportation systems working, a key to any general work stoppage. Party leaders spoke out loudly against the action, telling the public it would keep the military in power.

Yet government and APRA actions are not enough to explain the inability of broad popular sectors to have their interests represented in the political sphere. A share of the responsibility lies with the left party leadership. From the start this action was organized as an exclusively left-labor affair, and did not reach out to the larger community nearly as well as in the past. Furthermore, although nominally working for the same goal, the strike leadership was divided along party lines, the Communist Party-led CGTP versus an ultra-dominated Unified Strike Command, and their in-fighting alienated many potential participants. The decision to hold the strike also responded more to partisan concerns than to the sentiments of the working class at this conjuncture. Strikes were yielding decreasing returns by 1978, and the average worker was exhausted by them. Finally, with the Constituent Assembly halfway through and general elections in sight, a major work stoppage seemed to many an unnecessary sacrifice.

The January strike failure was followed by the failure of other strikes by public employees, factory workers and miners, and a dramatic defeat of a seven-month strike by the nation's schoolteachers. Military

repression was the key factor in breaking these actions, but the divisions among leftist leaders and advisors worked to the disadvantage of these strikers as well.<sup>3</sup> After these defeats most party leaders and union officials finally came to the conclusion that efforts to affect radical change through mass protest had become self-defeating. With no other viable alternative, they also turned their sights to the 1980 elections.

#### The General Elections of 1980

"The elections are important because finally those desgraciados will go back to their barracks, after doing so much damage to the country... Prices go up every day because of those guys, it's not right to make us live like this. That's why it's better to have elections, because we couldn't be worse off with anyone else".

--Resident of the El Agustino shantytown, 1980

"This business about elections, I think its a fraud like always. The left and the right, they're all the same. They go around promising everything--jobs, houses, health, everything. And afterwards, when they are in government, they don't remember anything they said... For this country to be put right, we need a total change and not just elections".

--Resident of Carmen de la Legua, 1980<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> The teachers were striking because the government refused to honor an economic agreement made the year before, and refused to recognize the militant SUTEP as their legitimate union. As the schools remained closed and the strikers grew more desperate, broad sectors of society joined in solidarity with the teachers' plight. The Catholic Church offered to mediate, private schoolteachers and university employees walked out in solidarity, and prominent intellectuals and left party leaders launched a hunger strike on behalf of the teachers. Yet the military refused to budge and the teachers were forced to lift the strike and return to work.

<sup>3</sup> These testimonies are from el voto perdido? Critica y autocritica de la izquierda en la campana electoral de 1980 (Lima: CIED, 1980).

By late 1979 there was relatively little fear that the elections would not go through as scheduled. The military leadership was ready to leave power, and sufficiently in control of the process not to have second thoughts. Organized labor had been debilitated, social protest in general had been reduced to manageable levels, and all major political forces had decided to enter the electoral game. The formal rules had been established and the basic parameters of power seemed fairly clear. But one important issue remained; effective political representation for the millions of new citizens who had been marginalized from Peru's past experiments with democratic rule.

The popular movement had made the leftist parties a political force. Now the left parties bore responsibility for representing the interests of their different constituents in that movement in the national arena. After the failure of the above-mentioned strikes, electoral participation was seriously questioned by only the small maoist group PCP-"Sendero Luminoso", which had marginal influence at the time. While the decision to participate was still a reluctant one, the majority of leftist groups saw this as a last opportunity to have influence on the transition and, as Hugo Blanco put it, "to win more democratic margins in which to accumulate forces".<sup>10</sup>

Some leftist leaders also called for frank criticism of their parties' performance in the Assembly, and most of them acknowledged that a greater effort at political unity was necessary if they wanted to play the electoral game seriously in 1980. Important efforts were made to

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<sup>10</sup> Blanco is cited in Cesar Hildebrandt, Cambio de palabras (Lima: Mosca Azul, 1981), pp. 257-258.

forge one or at most two main leftist electoral alliances. Yet in practice, the major obstacle to translating popular demands into an effective democratic left political force in 1980 was the persistent sectarianism, distrust and political vacillation of a handful of rival leftist leaders.<sup>11</sup>

The first barrier to a single leftist front remained the persistent division between the "reformist" and "revolutionary" camps, even though their strategies were converging in practice. While the PC and PSR joined fairly quickly into a United Left (UI) front in January 1980, the radical left parties banded together in the "Revolutionary Left Alliance" (ARI).<sup>12</sup> Things were further complicated as the two individual leaders with greatest presumed electoral clout, General Ledesma of FOCEP and Hugo Blanco (now with his own trotskyite party), began to negotiate for special consideration. Ledesma joined the UI and Blanco the ARI, but in both cases they quickly fell into disputes with their new allies over the most traditional of issues--presidential candidacies and shares of parliamentary lists--and Ledesma soon broke off to form his own group.

Leftist sympathizers were crushed when the parties had split into three separate slates. But the worst was yet to come, as the ARI self-

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<sup>11</sup> This is reflected in an interview with UDP leader Alfonso Barrantes Langan in 1979, reproduced in Barrantes: sus propias palabras (Lima: Mosca Azul Ed., 1985). The following discussion draws on the author's interviews with then-UDP leaders Carlos Malpica (February 19, 1986) and Javier Diez Canseco (May 28, 1985), PSR leader Enrique Bernalles (January 15, 1986); from el voto perdido? op cit; and Fernando Rospigliosi, "Por que se rompio la izquierda?", La Revista no. 2, julio 1980.

<sup>12</sup> "Declaracion politica para la constitucion de la ARI", Marka January 31, 1980, pp. 22-23.

destructured in February 1980 and three more separate leftist campaigns were launched. In this case, too, candidacies were the main point of contention, although there was a haze of doctrinal considerations as well. This fragmentation went beyond anything the left's opponents could have hoped for. Five different leftist campaigns shouted competing revolutionary and socialist slogans. While the most prominent individuals could expect a shot at a parliamentary seat, this division rendered the left marginal as a national political alternative.<sup>13</sup>

This outcome demoralized many cadres and posed a true crisis of representation for the thousands of leftist sympathizers--largely working class or lower middle class men and women--that had developed over the seventies. The leftist leadership had succumbed to the electoralism and hunger for parliamentary seats which they had so bitterly derided in their opponents. One must add the sectarianism that was nurtured through years of underground political practice, the international dependencies of several key left groups, and the persistent importance of being "politically correct" over winning.

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<sup>13</sup> The maoists sided against Blanco in the struggle over who should receive the most electoral slots. When no accord was reached, the maoist UNIR front split to run its own campaign. Blanco insisted that the rest of ARI accept his electoral formula and program, as well as an all-trotskyite presidential ticket. The UDP argued that its candidate, Alfonso Barrantes, should hold the presidential slot. Blanco rejected this and opted to run on his own plank, Barrantes resigned from the election, and the ARI was dissolved just one month after its formation. See Henry Pease Garcia and Alfredo Filomeno, Peru 1980: Cronologia politica (Lima: DESCO, 1982), pp. 3784-3790; 3835-3839; 3852-3854; Rospigliosi, op cit; "Tres anos perdidos" and "La explosion de ARI", Marka, 28 febrero, 1980, pp. 4-8; "Una derrota historica", Amauta 27 febrero, 1980; and Carlos Ivan Degregori, "Las limitaciones de las dirigencias", Marka 6 marzo, 1980, pp. 7-8.

Finally, the fact that a few caudillos could impose this division when the vast majority of their potential constituents demanded unity, demonstrated the tremendous lack of internal democracy and channels of accountability within the left.

The division of the left gave the APRA a better chance at the electoral victory the party had prepared for over decades. But all of the APRA's patience and pragmatic alliances came to a halt on August 5, 1979, when Haya de la Torre died. Haya's death was not unexpected, as he was 84 years old and had been gravely ill for some time. But he had been the party's sole leader and eternal presidential candidate, who determined the party line and reconciled internal differences. The Jefe Maximo did not name a successor and the party was not prepared to deal with his passing.<sup>14</sup> The APRA's crisis began as a simple struggle for party leadership and the Presidential nomination, between party stalwart Armando Villanueva and prominent Assembly member Andres Townsend. Their conflict inevitably took on broader dimensions, however, initiating a long overdue battle over the party's identity, doctrine, social bases, and political future. Villanueva had cultivated the support of the party's more progressive youth, while Townsend had the backing of the Old Guard. Villanueva and his followers ("Armandistas") identified with Haya's early works, cultivated close ties with the Socialist International, and favored a radicalized program that could win over the popular sectors that had gravitated towards the Marxist left. Townsend

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<sup>14</sup> The following discussion draws on the author's interviews with numerous APRA leaders, including Luis Alberto Sanchez, Andres Townsend, Ramiro Priale, Carlos Roca, and Javier Valle Riestra; and Raul Gonzalez, "1978-1981. APRA: Cronica de un conflicto", Debate No. 7, marzo 1981.



and his followers ("Andresistas"), on the other hand, adopted a strong anti-communist and pro-U.S. stance, and proposed a more liberal platform designed to bring in the independent sectors of the middle class and business elites. Villanueva also discussed collaboration with the "responsible left", meaning the PC and PSR, while Townsend and his camp emphatically rejected such a possibility.

The APRA's internal power dispute came to a temporary halt in October 1979, when a party convention elected Villanueva as its Presidential candidate and gave Townsend the Vice Presidential slot. By staying out of the Constituent Assembly and spending his time mobilizing party bases, Villanueva had clearly won the sympathies of much of APRA's rank-and-file. By 1979 his supporters were largely in control of the party machinery, with the help of Secretary of Organization Alan Garcia. Yet APRA bases also wanted party unity, and they hoped that putting Townsend on the slate would contribute to this.

The disastrous conduct of the APRA's 1980 campaign demonstrated how little was actually resolved within APRA by choosing a Presidential slate. The two candidates continued to argue publicly over the direction of the campaign, with Townsend making a moderate appeal to the non-Aprista majority and Villanueva taking an approach that was more radical and at the same time more sectarian. The campaign lurched to the left and right, towards business and labor, but was fairly unconvincing to both. Villanueva made special overtures to moderate leftists, but at the same time Aprista goon squads (known as bufalos) engaged in heavy-handed efforts to try and capture union and shantytown leadership closely linked to these left parties. This in fact persuaded

many leftist sympathizers to vote for Fernando Belaunde of the AP, in order to block an Aprista victory. The APRA campaign slogan, "Armando tiene la fuerza!" ("Armando has the force!") reinforced general fears that an Aprista government would be a violent and sectarian one. And worst of all, APRA's close and public relationship with the military proved a definite liability by 1980.

The weaknesses and fragmentation of Peru's two leading mass-based political alternatives left a void in 1980 that the conservative PPC with its narrow class and racial base was not equipped to fill. What the exhausted public seemed to want was a new government that promised consensus rather than conflict, one concerned about social justice and the needs of the poor majority, but not tainted by alliance with the military nor torn asunder by political infighting. In one of the real ironies of recent Peruvian politics, the only alternative for many Peruvians was the same President who had been ousted by the Velasco Revolution twelve years before--Fernando Belaunde.

By 1980 Belaunde had no specific ideology or program to offer. Instead, he mounted a successful campaign based on a combination of populism and national reconciliation. "Peru as a Doctrine" was his platform, and "Work and Let Work" his favorite motto. Appealing beyond his small and essentially clientelistic party, he toured the length of the country evoking the grandeur of Peru and her great potential for development. He promised something for every sector of society--new housing and "one million new jobs" for the urban poor, credit and technical assistance to peasants, official recognition to the public

schoolteachers's union, the labor amnesty desired by laid-off unionists, and a stable investment climate to potential investors.<sup>15</sup>

At this point Belaunde presented a milder version of his charismatic 1960s persona. But he was able to capitalize on the symbolic value of being Peru's last elected president, maintaining a permanent distance from the military, and refusing to get involved in the Constituent Assembly process. In the popular media he was referred to as a genuine caballero, a father figure and the ideal man to reunite the nation after twelve years of accelerated crisis and change.

By early 1980 it was clear that Belaunde's message was appealing and that he was closing in on the APRA's early lead. The size of his victory, however, came as a surprise even to the candidate himself. Belaunde and his AP party won 42 percent of the popular vote, well ahead of Villanueva and well above the 36 percent limit that APRA itself had negotiated for in the Constituent Assembly as the minimum for victory in 1980. The APRA's 27 percent was significantly below its historical average, and the PPC finished a distant third with 11 percent of the vote. The assorted leftist parties won most of the remaining votes, 15 percent if counted together, but in 1980 they were definitely not together. The AP also won a clean majority in the Chamber of Deputies, and was just a few seats short of a majority in the Senate.

Hence despite the vast social changes of the 1970s, despite the APRA's revived party apparatus and the left's roots in labor and popular organizations, the Peruvian electorate in 1980 opted for an aging

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<sup>15</sup> Handelman and Sanders, op cit, pp. 132-135.

populist with neither a mass-based party nor solid program. The results represented widespread repudiation of the Morales regime, and the political vacuum punishment left by the discrediting of the other parties. Left and right sympathizers admitted to voting for Belaunde as the "lesser evil" against APRA. Ousted as an incompetent by Velasco in 1968, Belaunde's return was greeted more with relief than euphoria. But this election would also have a lasting impact on the nature of Peru's new democracy, and both APRA and the marxist left shared responsibility for this outcome.

#### Crisis and Parameters: Peru in the 1980s

In 1980 Belaunde inherited a very different country from the one he had left behind in 1968. On one hand there were serious structural problems which the military had left unresolved, including a heavy external debt burden and continued dependency on traditional mineral exports, persistent poverty and new levels of class conflict, and an Armed Forces with lasting power and autonomy. On the other hand, there were important factors which favored the construction of democracy and the pursuit of social justice, including land reform, a larger and more modern state, a more organized civil society, and a progressive new Constitution. And Belaunde himself brought important resources to this task, as a charismatic popular leader with an undisputed electoral triumph and a virtual Parliamentary majority.

In 1980 Belaunde promised to tackle the major social and economic problems left by the military. He swore to give top priority to health, education and welfare, and to uphold the Constitution and the democratic process. To underscore his commitment to civil liberties, he restored

expropriated newspapers to their former owners and granted a broad political amnesty. To demonstrate his concern for the working classes, he promised fair wage standards, labor amnesty to those who had been arbitrarily fired, a massive public employment program, and a national "Glass of Milk" campaign for the children of poor families.<sup>16</sup>

It did not take long for the public to discover, however, that Belaunde's populism was largely rhetorical. As the following section points out, this government in fact pursued unpopular economic policies which directly contradicted Belaunde's campaign promises, placing the interests of foreign creditors and economic elites before those of its mass constituency and exacerbating Peru's poverty, inequality, state corruption and external debt. By 1983 Peru was again facing serious economic and social crisis. Furthermore, as this section also points out, the decisions and policies of this administration, and its utilization of the new constitutional structure, reinforced the exclusionary tendencies of Peruvian politics and placed additional parameters on subsequent efforts at social democratization.

#### The State and the Structure of Political Authority

Belaunde's election was basically an individual victory, and did not represent the triumph of a specific party doctrine or the emergence to power of a mass-based organization. The AP itself was a weak and clientelistic party with a disparate middle and upper-middle class membership and few bases among the organized working classes. Its leaders had diverse policy interests, with a notable breach between the

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<sup>16</sup> Belaunde's initial post-election statements are reprinted in Pease Garcia and Filomeno 1980, op cit, pp. 3962-3962.

so-called "tecnicos" who had an internationalized and technocratic approach to governing, and the "politicos" or "populistas"--the local politicians who comprised most of AP's congressional bloque, answered to local constituencies, and pressured for a more populist distribution of government resources and favors. These two sectors were held together by clientelism and by Belaunde's own political skills.<sup>17</sup>

Belaunde moved quickly to consolidate the power of the Executive branch. He started by forging a governing alliance with the small PPC. In exchange for control over the Ministries of Industry and of Justice, the PPC offered its few Senate seats to give Belaunde a full majority in both houses of Parliament, and hence a maximum concentration of authority "to ensure...the opportune approbation of laws and measures the government judges necessary".<sup>18</sup> But Belaunde and the other populistas did not have a concrete government plan or strong policy agenda, and for the most part this authority was not concentrated for the President's own use. Rather, it would be used in pursuit of macroeconomic policy goals initiated by the tecnicos. It would also be used to reinforce the autonomy and power of the Armed Forces.

The tecnicos were led by Prime Minister and Minister of Economy Manuel Ulloa. For the first two and a half years, Ulloa and a small team of advisors known collectively as the "Dynamo" group attempted to impose a fairly orthodox economic liberalization program.<sup>19</sup> Their

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<sup>17</sup> These two blocs are discussed in Adams 1984, op cit, p. 96

<sup>18</sup> Pease Garcia and Filomeno 1980, op cit, pp. 3993-3999.

<sup>19</sup> The following discussion of Belaunde Administration policies draws primarily from Michael Reid, Peru: Paths to Poverty (London: Latin America Bureau, 1985), pp. 81-105; and Carol Wise, "Democratization,

strategy, which coincided with the prescriptions of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, involved the reprivatization of state enterprises, the elimination of most subsidies, drastic reduction of tariffs protecting local industry, and the reduction of the state's role in pricing, marketing, and the financial system. It also involved promotion of traditional mineral and agricultural exports, with advantageous terms to foreign investors. They also hoped to further weaken Peru's organized labor force, through new anti-strike legislation and further rollback of job stability and collective bargaining rights.

These policies contradicted Belaunde's populist and developmentalist campaign promises, and were widely rejected by labor and popular organizations, opposition parties (APRA and the left), and the general public, as well as large sectors of national industry and many members of AP itself. It was in the effort to impose this program, therefore, that the concentration of Executive authority was put into force. The alliance with PPC gave the government a full parliamentary majority. Yet instead of using this clout within the congressional arena, the majority promptly voted to grant the Executive extraordinary legislative faculties to enact wide-ranging decrees without further oversight. Although this was stipulated in the new Constitution, it was meant to be a short-term emergency measure, but by the end of the first year the Executive had promulgated 217 legislative decrees. Most of these involved economic policy measures, but some of them were also

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Crisis and the APRA's Modernization Project in Peru", in Barbara Stallings and Robert Kaufman, eds., Debt and Democracy in Latin America (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989).

designed to allow the Executive to make up its own laws of organization and functioning.

Despite their declared intentions of rolling back the statism of the military regime, this group did not in fact reform the state bureaucracy and public enterprise sector, nor did they undertake serious reform of Peru's ineffective tax structure. Instead, the new government followed the traditional pattern of using the public administration as a way to reward party loyalists, which reinforced elite privilege and state inefficiency. State enterprises remained sources of political patronage, and official corruption actually increased under the new civilian government. This mismanagement led analysts to argue that the Peruvian state was in fact becoming weaker despite of (or due to) its expanding size and responsibilities.

In addition to reinforcing an authoritarian structure of political authority, the new government helped retain the autonomy and privileges of the Armed Forces. Although the Constitution placed formal limitations on the autonomy and political role of the military, during the 1980s military leaders made it clear they did not respect these restrictions and still saw themselves playing a "tutelary" role. General Morales publicly referred to the regime change as "a transition of government, not of power", and in later interviews he continued to refer to the military as the maximum expression of national interest. Upon being removed from his post in 1985, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs declared that "the Armed Forces are not subordinate to any power, and they never should be", and another high official told the media that "while the President is Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, these



forces have another level of decisions...and this does not entail subordination to civilian power".<sup>20</sup>

Belaunde was quick to accommodate the military's desire to retain de facto autonomy and political power, by abdicating his constitutional authority in such important areas such as military promotions, the budgetary process, and the protection of human rights. After consultation with military authorities he agreed to respect the existing command structure, and maintained in power the three military Ministers who were in charge of the Army, Navy and Air Force in 1980. In the area of promotions the Executive and majority-controlled Senate approved the military's own proposals with little question. A similar process occurred with military budgets; each branch sent its proposal to the Finance Ministry, where they were trimmed somewhat but much less so than other sectors. At no point would military budgets be debated in the 1980s--not in the Finance Ministry, not in Congress, not in the media. Yet between 20 and 25 percent of the national budget was destined for military spending, and arms purchases constituted between 25 and 30 percent of Peru's total external debt in 1980-1985. Finally, as discussed below, Belaunde delegated to the Armed Forces complete responsibility for maintaining public order, including labor and popular protest as well as a budding insurgency, and he defended their impunity despite unprecedented human rights abuses and growing international

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<sup>20</sup> These quotes are cited in Luis Pasara, "Peru: La democracia reciente", unpublished paper, March 1986, pp. 38 and 39.

criticism.<sup>21</sup>

While the consolidation of a powerful Executive Branch and Armed Forces was actively sought by Belaunde Administration, Peru's other major public institutions contributed to this tendency through their own weakness and inefficacy. The Parliament rapidly assumed a reactive role vis-a-vis the Executive, one which the media and critics began to call a "parlamento genuflecto". While the roots of this disequilibrium were written into the semi-presidentialist Constitution itself, this was reinforced by Belaunde's parliamentary majority and the early refusal by most congressmen to exercise the legislative and accountability powers they had. At the end of the first year the Parliament approved few laws, contributed little in the way of public debate over issues of national importance, and rarely generated consensus. This early abdication set off a pattern of inefficacy and inattention to the modernization of this institution, which would make it much harder to reassert parliamentary authority later in the 1980s, even though growing numbers of opposition politicians (and some from the governing party as well) wanted to do so. With the exception of traditional clientelistic ties to individual politicians, the attitude of the general public rapidly became one of cynicism or indifference.

This in turn reinforced the widespread view that one needed greater

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<sup>21</sup> Defense figures in Pasara, op cit., pp. 39-40. In 1984, an Americas Watch report on human rights abuses in Peru was aptly titled Abdicating Democratic Authority.

Executive powers to get things done.<sup>22</sup>

The Peruvian judicial system was historically characterized by political manipulation and acute underfinancing, and these patterns continued in the 1980s. The administration of justice was painfully slow and fraught with corruption, with the courts backlogged by years. As cases of terrorism and human rights abuses began to mount in the latter part of the Belaunde Administration, the courts could not begin to cope.<sup>23</sup>

While the weakening of these government institutions under the Belaunde administration was due in large part to the behavior the AP-PPC majority, the opposition parties were also responsible. As the following chapter details, the APRA and the marxist left parties were mired in internal problems until 1983 and hence had limited concern for the consolidation of the new democracy. Ironically, when the opposition parties did revive themselves, they found their Parliamentary arena had become marginal to political decision-making. The main arena of opposition thus became the press, which remained remarkably free and lively during the 1980s, but which had limited impact on the government policy.

#### Economic Policies and Social Impact

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<sup>22</sup> Polls of Peruvian elites by Debate magazine in 1984 and 1985 showed that the Parliament was considered among the five worst functioning institutions in the country. See Pasara, op cit, pp. 27-29; and Enrique Bernales, El Parlamento por Dentro (Lima: DESCO, 1984).

<sup>23</sup> See Americas Watch 1984, op cit., p. 19.

The liberal economic strategy of the tecnicos was only partially implemented, due in large part to pressures from the populist wing of AP itself. The privatization drive was stalled as most of the state enterprises and banks were filled with directors and managers close to the ruling party, who tended to operate for their own benefit rather than in the interests of productivity. Heavy public expenditures also continued, for large construction projects and other public works that yielded clientelistic benefits. A major \$11 billion public investment program was undertaken to support export-led growth, a plan endorsed by the World Bank on the basis of favorable commodity price projections. Military spending also rose to nearly 25 percent of the national budget by 1984.<sup>24</sup>

Because policymakers were reluctant to increase taxes on the private sector, this public spending was financed through the contraction of new foreign loans and by printing money. The mineral price boom in 1979 enabled Peru to obtain another round of external borrowing, and total foreign debt grew from US \$9.6 billion in 1980 to over \$13 billion by 1983. At the same time, by 1983 Peru's moderate export-led growth spurt abruptly gave way to what even Ulloa called "the worst economic crisis of the century".<sup>25</sup> A variety of factors combined to bring this about. The Dynamo policies had reinforced Peru's traditional dependence on international raw materials markets, and in late 1982 world prices fell to their lowest level since the 1930s. Commercial bank loans also dried up throughout Latin America after 1982,

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<sup>24</sup> See Wise, op cit, p. 168; and Americas Watch op cit, p. 16.

<sup>25</sup> Cited in Reid, op cit, p. 88

while the region as a whole was dedicating a growing proportion of export earnings to debt service; by 1983 Peru's debt service payments constituted 65 percent of the country's export earnings. Because of the chosen economic policies and the concessions to clientelistic pressures, the impact of these factors was disproportionately severe in Peru. Overall production fell by 12 percent in 1983 and was stagnant by 1984 production. By the end of Belaunde's term inflation was at an annual rate of nearly 150 percent, far worse than under the military, and real wages had declined by about 40 percent between 1980 and 1985. Finally, natural disasters added to the country's woes: the El Nino current brought flooding to the North coast, while drought hit the south. Agricultural output fell and food scarcity increased prices further.

The economic team initially responded to Peru's balance of payments problems by turning back to the IMF. In exchange for a three-year, \$960 million agreement the team agreed to continued liberalization of the economy and to a familiar set of austerity measures. By this point, however, such measures were protested not only by organized labor and other popular sectors, but by important sectors of national business and the AP party as well. Faced with such pressure, Ulloa resigned in December of 1982 and was replaced by men who were even more aligned with Peru's creditors--the new Minister of Economy and Finance, Carlos Rodriguez Pastor was until then a director of Wells Fargo Bank, and Prime Minister Fernando Schwalb had previously worked for the IMF. They tried to turn economic policy ever more towards an inflexible monetarism and greater slashing of demand. Yet despite efforts to prioritize its creditors, Peru still could not pay its debts. The agreement with the

Fund was rescinded in October 1983, Rodriguez Pastor stepped down under pressure in 1984, and policymaking lurched along chaotically until the general elections of 1985. And while increasingly widespread resistance to these policies was not well-heeded by government policymakers, this would result in a nationalist and populist realignment over 1983-1985.

However inconsistent, the new economic policies had a rapid and negative impact on Peru's overall economic structure and on the welfare of the poor majority. Both initial growth and subsequent severe recession were felt very unequally across Peru's economy. The chief beneficiaries were foreign and local finance capital and a new economic elite in the banks, finance corporations and insurance companies, as well as the military. The fortunes of nationally owned manufacturing industry, on the other hand, declined dramatically after 1980, and agriculture remained stagnant. By 1984, the manufacturing industry was operating at only 40% of capacity, with textiles, vehicle assembly, steel and leather goods particularly damaged. In industries such as shoes and garments, a large share of production was diverted to homeworkers in the so-called "informal economy", increasing industrial unemployment and reducing tax revenues.<sup>26</sup>

While causing severe damage to the overall economic structure, these policies also exacerbated historical social class and regional inequalities. The cycle of economic downturn under way since the mid-1970s intensified after 1982 and by 1984 real income per capita had fallen to the level of 1964. Furthermore, there was a dramatically widening inequality in the distribution of income. While all but a

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<sup>26</sup> See Reid, *op cit*, p. 85.

small elite got poorer in the early 1980s, impoverishment was concentrated in the highlands and in the urban shantytowns along the coast. By 1983 Peru's record on poverty, inequality, health care and general welfare was among the worst in the hemisphere.

Although Belaunde had announced that agricultural development and the improvement of living standards for the peasantry were to be his priorities, rural stagnation and dependence on imported foods continued under his watch. Public investment was heavily biased towards the more modern Pacific coast, neglecting the impoverished highlands. Still, by 1985 per capita agricultural production and food consumption fell to levels of the mid-sixties. The government also began to reverse the agrarian reform process, halting land redistribution, reducing the legal protection of cooperatives, and lifting restrictions on the buying and selling of land. This encouraged the return of larger landowners in some areas and aggravated rural social conflict. The people of the southern Sierra remained the most impoverished in the country. These policies reinforced severe discontent among the peasantry and forced many impoverished serranos forced to migrate to the nation's overburdened cities.<sup>21</sup>

Peru's organized labor movement was also affected by the new government's policies, through a dramatic decline in real wages, further erosion of job stability and benefits, and increasing un- and under-employment. While wages for unionized workers made a modest recovery in the first two years of the Belaunde Administration, this was eroded by a 20% drop in real wages in 1983. By 1984 average wages for blue collar

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<sup>21</sup> Americas Watch op cit, p. 15, and Reid, op cit, pp. 100-102.

workers were just two-fifths of their 1973 peak, and white collar salary levels fell even more sharply. Furthermore, those whose salaries were determined by formal collective bargaining were still relatively better protected than the growing mass of under-employed, non-unionized "informal" workers, and by 1984 one-fifth of Peru's 700,000 industrial workers had joined the ranks of the latter. By mid-1984 62 percent of the work force was underemployed, meaning that the average worker did not work enough hours or earn enough money to survive and feed his or her family.<sup>23</sup>

#### Popular Protest and Government Response

The economic and social policies of the Belaunde administration violated the letter and spirit of the new Constitution in regard to the basic social and economic rights of the population and the priorities of national development. They also contributed to an even more pronounced structural differentiation of the poor and working classes that comprised the popular movement of the late 1970s. Over 1980-1985 Peru's organized workers, peasants and residents of poor urban neighborhoods continued to mobilize in defense of their interests, joined by the dramatic growth of public sector unions which were legalized after 1980. They made important steps towards unification, participated in peaceful negotiations, held strikes and protest marches, and engaged in increasingly desperate measures such as factory takeovers and hunger strikes. The contradiction between the democratic ideals of the new Constitution and the markedly undemocratic outcome, however, are best

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<sup>23</sup> See Peru in Peril, Washington Office on Latin America, 1987, p. 17.



illustrated by the government's increasing intolerance towards these actions.

The labor and popular mobilizations of the late 1970s had demanded political democratization and fair wages and salaries, job stability, collective bargaining rights, and an end to austerity policies that disproportionately affected the poor. With the restoration of civilian government, workers wanted and expected the state to do its constitutional job, despite the ideological radicalism of the largely Communist trade union leadership. With the state exercising its basic functions of conflict mediation, defense of constitutional guarantees, and the establishment of wage and benefit guidelines, unions hoped to recuperate their rights and lost earning capacity.<sup>29</sup>

Belaunde's initial Cabinet did not have a uniform stance towards these expectations. While the economic team was hostile to labor interests, the first Minister of Labor, Alfonso Grados Bertorini, was a respected independent with social democratic tendencies. When the economic team's first "paquetazo" of austerity measures set off a General Strike on January 15, 1981, the Labor Minister responded with an offer to dialogue with labor, and the formation of a National Tripartite Commission. This Commission consisted of representatives from the major trade unions (the Communist CGTP, the Aprista CTP and two smaller labor federations), important private sector gremios, and Labor Ministry officials. Its initial mandate was to review cases of reposition of workers unjustly fired by the military regime. Importantly, Grados also

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<sup>29</sup> These observations draw from Jorge Parodi, "Los sindicatos en la democracia vacía", in Luis Pasara and Jorge Parodi, eds., Democracia, sociedad y gobierno en el Perú (Lima: CEDYS, 1988), pp. 79-124.

promised that the Commission would be consulted about economic policymaking. Under these conditions the CGTP readily agreed to participate in the Commission, even though the radical left parties and many individual union leaders criticized it as a means to distract attention from economic policies rather than to influence them. Some also faulted the Commission for its limited representativity, since less than one worker in eight was represented by the four confederations involved.<sup>30</sup>

The life span of the Tripartite Commission proved to be short and unsuccessful, largely because its mission--tripartite consensus building--was totally at odds with that of the insular economic policy team. Although collective bargaining and other rights were formally restored, they were not fully reestablished in practice. Instead, the economic team maintained a policy of unilateral ceilings on wage and salary increases, and ministerial resolution of labor claims were adjusted to these pre-established levels. Although this strategy was neither legal nor consensual, it became a core part of anti-inflation efforts. Furthermore, pressure from private employers prevented the Commission from fulfilling its minimal mandate; only 135 workers were reinstated out of some 1,500 cases recommended. Under increasing heat from its rank-and-file, the CGTP pulled out of the Commission in November of 1981, and the Aprista CTP shortly followed suit. Labor

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<sup>30</sup> See Alfonso Grados Bertorini, Concertacion social: alternative o imperativo? (Lima: Intercampus, 1981); and Alfredo Torres Guzman, La Comision Nacional Tripartita: Una experiencia de concertacion social (Lima: Ministerio de Trabajo y Promocion Social, 1982).

Minister Grados himself resigned shortly thereafter, charging publicly that the sacrifices of austerity were not being distributed fairly.

The Tripartite Commission was the first serious effort to promote constructive dialogue and consensus-building among labor, capital and the state in a country with a history of conflictive class relations. It was also the new government's only attempt to explicitly extend the channels of democratic participation to the working classes. In the wake of its demise, it was inevitable that the labor movement returned to confrontational tactics for drawing attention to the plight of workers and unions. Sectoral strikes and protests brought some modest results for Peru's most important labor federations until 1982, in that they detained the fall of real wages in these sectors. But these actions did not yield benefits for the bulk of the labor force, and they became insufficient even for the strongest after 1982, due to the severity of the recession and the desperate state of enterprises themselves.

As the new government's economic policies became popularly identified as the cause of rapidly declining living standards, however, the unions were able to garner wider public support. Between 1981 and 1984 there were six general strikes in demand of a general reversal of economic policy as well as specific labor concerns. Three of these were relatively successful in terms of mass participation and political attention. A one-day paro in March of 1983 was particularly broad, with the CGTP, independent left unions, and even the Aprista CTP joining together. The first national Agrarian Strike in Peru was also held that year, and there was considerable protest activity undertaken by multi-

class regional defense fronts. Another nation-wide strike in March of 1984 was the most widespread since that against the dictatorship in 1977.<sup>31</sup>

In the early 1980s the labor and popular movement also became more unified than it had been in the previous decade. The Communist party underwent a degree of self-criticism, which led to the opening of CGTP membership to important unions with non-Communist leadership, including the radical schoolteacher's union, SUTEP. Although the PCP retained a majority, five leaders from other leftist current were elected to the CGTP's National Council in 1982, and during the next three years other important independent unions would rejoin the CGTP, including the militant Peruvian Peasant Confederation (CCP) and the newly-combined mine and steelworkers' federation. This opening to the left made CGTP leadership of the labor movement virtually undisputed. At the same time, from 1982 onwards reform sectors of the Aprista labor movement joined the CGTP in opposition to government policies, representing over 95% of Peru's organized workers. In 1982 all of Peru's major labor organizations presented a common list of demands to Belaunde, which government policymakers largely ignored.<sup>32</sup>

Labor and popular sector mobilization did win some important political victories under Belaunde. Ulloa's economic team was unable to eliminate job stability provisions altogether (an explicit objective),

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<sup>31</sup> Parodi 1988, op cit., and Francisco Eguren, "Democracia y sociedad rural", in Pasara and Parodi, op cit., pp. 125-150.

<sup>32</sup> This draws from William Bollinger, "Organized Labor in Peru: A Historical Overview", InterAmerican Research Center, Occasional Papers Series No. 10, 1987, p. 17-19.

or pass censored anti-strike legislation. And Ulloa's successor, Rodriguez Pastor, was removed in the wake of a groundswell of protests in 1984. But although the protests demonstrated that the component parts of the popular movement remained combative, these demonstrations won few material concessions for urban workers, peasants, or neglected regions of Peru, and they did not turn the general tide of macroeconomic policy. Furthermore, after 1981 the government response to these actions was similar to that of the previous regime; they were declared illegal and treated with increasing harshness. After the 1983 and 1984 general strikes, in fact, Belaunde called such actions "subversive" and declared a full State of Emergency, and the violence used against strikers ended in numerous deaths and injuries and thousands of arrests.

Given these mixed results, important sectors of the labor and popular movement turned to the political arena for added support, primarily in the form of the United Left front (IU), an alliance of Peru's major leftist parties that formed in 1981. After 1983, many other poor and middle class Peruvians put their faith in the renewed leadership and message of the APRA party. The potential and limitations of this party leadership in the defense of popular demands are discussed further in the following chapters. At the same time, a minority of Peruvians were frustrated enough by the existing economic and political system to put their faith in armed insurgency.

A detailed analysis of Peru's recent experience with the "Shining Path" guerilla movement is beyond the scope of this chapter.<sup>33</sup> But

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<sup>33</sup> See Carlos Ivan Degregori, "Sendero Luminoso: Los hondos y mortales desencuentros", in Eduardo Ballon, ed., Movimientos sociales y crisis: el caso peruano (Lima: DESCO, 1986); and Gustavo Gorriti

two factors are important to note as having a major impact on the subsequent prospects for democratization: the government's militaristic response to an initially small insurgent group, and the reaction of other institutions and sources of leadership in Peruvian society to the growing violence.

"Abdicating Democratic Authority", the title of a 1984 report by the human rights organization Americas Watch, is the most apt description of the government's response. A repressive new Anti-Terrorist Law was passed by Executive decree and a constitutional State of Emergency was declared in five provinces of the highlands where guerilla activity had begun to grow, with special police forces dispatched to the region. In December 1982 Belaunde granted control of an expanding Emergency Zone to a military administration, and in 1984 civilian authority in these areas of conflict was fully ceded to the Armed Forces Central Command--by 1985, thirteen of Peru's provinces were under military authority. The military's counterinsurgency strategy involved the kinds of severe human rights abuses against the poor, particularly the indigenous peasantry, that have been practiced by security forces in Central America.<sup>34</sup>

This swift delegation of power to the Armed Forces, combined with

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Ellenbogen, Sendero: Historia de la guerra milenaria en el Peru, Volume I (Lima: Editorial APOYO, 1990).

<sup>34</sup> In the wake of the military's occupation of Ayacucho and surrounding provinces over 6,000 people had been killed and another 1,300 disappeared by 1985. Arbitrary detention, routine torture, disappearances and extrajudicial killings were all part of the military's operations, as was the forced organization of local populations into "civil defense" leagues fronting for the military, troops, which caused severe disruption of peasant communities.

the relative autonomy the military enjoyed coming into the new regime, placed real barriers on Peru's new democracy. While such provisions were designed as national security measures, states of emergency and military action were also used in response to strikes by Peru's schoolteachers, public employees and others. In addition to linking labor activity to "subversion", the government launched negative publicity campaigns against the liberal media, academic institutions, the Catholic Church and the nascent human rights movement that emerged in this period, accusing each of complicity with terrorism when they spoke out against human rights abuses. Such campaigns, combined with the fear of military veto and deep-seated racism against the indigenous and rural population, would cause considerable caution among the nation's civic and political elite.

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Fernando Belaunde triumphed as a personalist, populist figure in 1980, in a context of rising socioeconomic demands and a vacuum of political leadership. As with past populist experiments in Peru, this one resulted in economic collapse and political instability. But unlike past eras, widespread dissatisfaction with this government generated a growing consensus over the need to defend democracy, increase government accountability and pursue social justice, sentiments that seemed to favor the reemergence of a more nationalist and social democratic alternative. At the same time, through outlining old and new structural constraints, and the use (and abuse) of political rules and institutions, this chapter points out that the parameters within which such an alternative could maneuver were narrow indeed.

## CHAPTER VII

### The APRA, The United Left, and the Emergence of a Democratic Left Consensus



The victory of Fernando Belaunde in 1980 was the first indication that the combination of economic crisis, a new democracy and weak political representation could lead to the reemergence of populism in post-Velasco Peru. At the same time, Belaunde's initially popular appeal quickly gave way to distinctly unpopular policies. Instead of forging a broad multi-class alliance, the AP government allied with the political right and external financial interests, and undertook measures that exacerbated Peru's poverty and severe inequalities. Instead of incorporating popular sectors and democratizing the policy-making process, his government continued a pattern of highly concentrated power and authoritarian decision-making, systematically ignoring the demands of organized social groups and the majority of citizens for policy change. By 1983 these policies led Peru into the worst recession since the 1930s and exacerbated political violence.

Yet the rapid decline of the Belaunde Administration did not bring the new democracy to a close, as was the case in previous crisis periods. Instead, it created new opportunities and hopes for a broad social democratic opposition movement, one that both the APRA and the marxist left vied to represent. This chapter examines the processes of internal debate and renovation that occurred within the APRA and the marxist left in the wake of their 1980 electoral defeats, tracing their definition of new leadership, programs and political strategies. While the APRA party and a newly-formed United Left Front (IU) had real differences on these counts, by 1983 they also demonstrated some important common trends. These include a clear shift towards electoral

priorities, the adoption of nationalist and social democratic policy goals, and a shift away from narrowly class-based identities in favor of broader social appeals. By 1983 each had also generated extremely popular and charismatic leaders who articulated these new appeals, and voiced the growing popular opposition to the Belaunde government. These trends in turn led to growing interest in an "historical alliance" between these two forces, to build a viable political and social democracy.

#### The United Left Front

While the APRA was preoccupied with internal conflicts, the marxist left parties surprised everyone in late 1980 by forming a single front and taking the lead in opposition to the Belaunde government. After their dramatic rise and fall between 1978 and 1980, the major leftist parties and allied labor and popular organizations believed they had a stake in electoral participation. They also realized that the only way to win elections was through unity, and the convocation of municipal elections in November of 1980 made this an urgent task. The United Left Front (IU) was born just before this date, as an electoral alliance of three parties and three fronts presided over by a popular independent, Alfonso Barrantes. With a broad base of grassroots support and a unitary platform, the IU won a significant number of municipal government posts and became Peru's second largest electoral force.

The way in which the marxist left was incorporated into Peru's new democracy would fundamentally mark its subsequent development and the nature of the democracy itself. The formation of a plural leftist front in Peru and its entrance into democratic politics was not the

culmination of an extended process of repression and exile, intellectual transformation or party reorganization--as it had been in neighboring Chile. Instead, this was a rapid and pragmatic response to the prospect of electoral success and was seen as only the beginning of a more protracted process of accumulation of hegemony within society. Important internal critiques and political maturation did occur with the formation of IU. Yet the left's accelerated political experience and early success also cut short processes of reflection and change that would be fundamental to the longer-term building of an alternative, democratic socialist project.

In the late 1970s leftist intellectuals were beginning to debate the need for a Peruvian form of socialism, one that would take into account the kind of organization, alliances and strategy that were best suited for their heterogeneous and fragmented context. This discussion grew out of dissatisfaction with the various international models that had dominated left party politics since the 1930s, and was influenced by trends in international marxist thought, particularly the revival of Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony, but the original thought of early Peruvian socialist Jose Carlos Mariategui was the fundamental guidepost. Key concepts in Mariategui's work that were revived in the late seventies included his argument for an alliance between workers and peasants, his defense of a united left front, and his emphasis on grassroots organization--working from the "bottom up"--rather than on the conquest of state power. Furthermore, although opposition to APRA was an integral part of being on the marxist left, some marxist intellectuals also began to take a fresh look at the early work of Haya

de la Torre. In particular, they contrasted Haya's anti-imperialism and statism, and his emphasis on strong multi-class party organization and the conquest of state power, with Mariategui's views.<sup>1</sup> Although an incipient and largely intellectual debate, the dissemination of these views was facilitated by the close linkages that were developed in this period between intellectuals and labor and popular organizations. This was magnified by the flourishing new left media that emerged during the transition process and culminated in the establishment in 1980 of the widely-read daily El Diario de Marka.<sup>2</sup>

Because this renewed search for a distinctly Peruvian form of socialism coincided with the regime change, one might have expected it to focus on how to integrate socialism and political democracy. There was considerable leftist discourse about democracy during the electoral campaigns of 1977 and 1980, most of it centered around differentiating between still-vague notions of radical, participatory or class-based democracy, and the formal or "bourgeois" variety being inaugurated in Peru. As noted in previous chapters, leftist participation in the latter was justified on purely utilitarian grounds. However, the May

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<sup>1</sup> These debates within the left are reflected in Carlos Ivan DeGregori, "Reflexiones sobre el movimiento popular y la forja de un proyecto nacional-popular en el Peru", in Henry Pease Garcia et al, America Latina 80: Democracia y movimiento popular (Lima: DESCO, 1981), pp. 241-270; "La izquierda en torno a Mariategui", Tarea No. 1, junio 1980, pp. 56-60; Alberto Flores Galindo, "La nueva izquierda: sin faros ni mapas", El Caballo Rojo No. 100, 11 de abril, 1982; and "Especial: Los militantes anos '70", los caminos del laberinto No. 3, abril 1986, pp. 41-87.

<sup>2</sup> The importance of the new leftist media is discussed in Fernando Tuesta Soldevilla, Elecciones municipales: cifras y escenario politico (Lima: DESCO, 1983), p. 47. In addition to El Diario, discussions within the left were aired in the weekly magazines Marka and Amauta.

1980 election debacle postponed the discussion of socialism and democracy, as attention turned towards immediate efforts to understand and learn from the left's electoral defeat. This was quickly followed by the need to develop a new strategy for the November 1980 municipal elections and for opposition to the Belaunde government.

The leftist parties' effort to understand their own self-destruction in the general election was itself an extremely useful process, because it revealed considerable agreement among those involved regarding their strengths and weaknesses. There was a general recognition of the importance of labor and popular sector organizations and their basic social demands, and of the left's comparative advantages for representing these in the political sphere in the 1980s. At the same time, the election debacle reflected a breach between party leaders and their potential constituencies, as well as between leftist discourse and evolving political practice.<sup>3</sup>

First of all, closing the profound ethnic, social and cultural gaps between political elites and the mass population was discussed as a priority, given the historical significance of ethnic and class hostility in Peru.<sup>4</sup> As with other parties, leftist political leaders

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<sup>3</sup> The following section draws from interviews and debates among party and popular sector leaders aired in Marka and Amauta in 1980, and from the following sources; el voto perdido? critica y autocritica de la izquierda en la campana electoral de 1980 (Lima: CIED, 1980); Fernando Rospigliosi, "Por que se rompio la izquierda?", La Revista No. 2, julio 1980; Luis Pasara, "Del fracaso a la subversion en la izquierda", Amauta 13 marzo, 1980; "Adonde va Izquierda Unida?", QueHacer No. 10, marzo-abril, 1981; and "La izquierda en cuestion: entrevista", La Revista No. 6, octubre 1981.

<sup>4</sup> See Carlos Ivan DeGregori, "Las limitaciones de las dirigencias", Marka, 6 de marzo de 1980, p. 7-8; and debates about party-popular sector relations in Marka, 6 de mayo de 1980, pp. 22-25, and 12 de mayo

tended to be of middle and upper class origin, intellectuals and professionals from the urban coastal areas (culturally "criollos"), and more often white or mestizo. The majority of Peruvians were poor and working class, non-white, with more immediate roots in rural society and the indigenous cultures of the nation's provinces--"serranos" and "cholos". The leftist parties claimed to defend the interests of Peru's most oppressed classes, and there were leaders from the major trade unions and peasant organizations within their ranks. Yet insufficient attention had been paid to building more fully representative leadership or to extending the left's appeal through more popular discourse and political style.<sup>5</sup> This was important for electoral reasons, as the continued popularity of individuals such as peasant organizer Hugo Blanco and labor lawyer Alfonso Barrantes demonstrated. It was also essential for more systematic inclusion of popular sectors in a longer-term project.

These problems of representation and incorporation were reinforced by hierarchical party structures and divisive leadership behavior. All of the major left parties were guilty to some degree of being overly sectarian, competing against each other rather than against common opponents from other parties and scaring away sympathizers with their multiple structures and dogma. Eduardo Figari, First Vice President of the maoist UNIR front, described the situation this way;

"The left did not have adequate channels of interaction

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de 1980, pp. 22-25.

<sup>5</sup> In el voto perdido?, op cit, pp. 54 and 58, this is mentioned by popular sector interviewees as one of the major factors contributing to voter rejection of the left in 1980, in addition to leftist divisions.

within itself. We had practically constructed ourselves like isolated chapels or fiefdoms; there was no point of contact among parties, no communication, no traditions...of working together. Each one worked permanently in function of its own perspectives".<sup>6</sup>

The leftist parties were also criticized for excessive dependence on international models for strategic and programmatic inspiration, and for their reliance on individual personalities rather than collective leadership in practice. The relationship between parties and mass organizations was criticized as overly utilitarian, with party competition to "capture" union and popular leaders being more important than providing concrete technical assistance to the latter and building sustained influence among the rank and file. Party leaders themselves were portrayed as petty caudillos, with great distance between their verbal radicalism and traditional political practice. This comment by political analyst Luis Pasara reflects an emerging critique of traditional political styles on the left;

"We have discovered that candidates abound on the left... We have an excessive number of criollo Lenins, suddenly multiplied in the heat of the electoral process.... We have foolishly combined a religious faith in the conquest of power by apocalyptic means, with a voracious appetite for assuring immediate positions of power for each little group of illuminati".<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Cited in el voto perdido?, op cit, p. 70.

<sup>7</sup> Pasara, op cit., p.7; Critiques of leftist behavior among trade unions and popular organizations are summarized in Parodi and Balbi, op cit. In an interview in QueHacer No. 10, op cit, these sentiments were reiterated by Javier Diez Canseco, then leader of Vanguardia Revolucionaria party;

"It is without doubt that in this country the entire vanguard of workers, poor peasants and revolutionary intellectuals are not well organized within the leftist parties. On the other hand, these parties also retain hegemonic and sectarian vices. Some companeros feel they are the Lord's chosen, and the problem is that there are many chosen".

In this context, there was also concern that the parties not become overly electoralist and abandon grassroots organization and labor activities. The decision to compete in elections had shifted partisan turf battles to a new terrain and, as discussed in Chapter V, Peru's new electoral laws gave individual leaders incentive for divisionism at the expense of the whole. After a decade or more of fighting for quotas of power among the leadership of unions, cooperatives, or in university circles, party leaders began competing for positions on parliamentary lists and shares of electoral propaganda. Importantly, their initial foray into electoral competition had also reinforced the central role of individual personalities over mass organizations, while demonstrating the dangers of letting one popular candidate (like Hugo Blanco in 1980) call the shots and undermine collective efforts.<sup>8</sup>

It was not surprising that parties which were formed in opposition to a military regime adopted Leninist modes of organization, with undisputed leaders and organizational hierarchy. What was remarkable was the recognition and critique of such tendencies so soon after they had erupted in a bitter public struggle, and while they were still so

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<sup>8</sup> Such observations are made in Marka 6 de mayo, op cit., and QueHacer No. 10, op sit. Carlos Tapia of MIR summarized this concern;

"When the transition happened...a deviation of gremial character was transformed, without correcting itself, into a deviation of openly electoralist character. Both correspond to the very spontaneous attitude of the left parties. The electoralist deviation explains the rupture of unity for the elections of May 1980; struggles over parliamentary seats, personal profiles, appearances on television, etcetera" (QueHacer 10, p. 81).



predominant. Of course, this was tempered by the fact that leaders from one party were more prone to condemn these vices in others than to engage in self-criticism. But it was also notable that in 1980 the parties' ideological differences were already being discussed as secondary to more classic political vices--the predominance of narrow interests, lust for power, interest group "territoriality" and excessive personal ambition.

The most important outcome of these early debates was a general consensus that political unification was the most important step the left had to take. Indeed, in the wake of the general elections the question was not whether they should try again to ally, but how to do so. Several party leaders stated that the electoral defeat facilitated this process, by reducing them all to losers and hence bringing them back to the bargaining table as equals.<sup>9</sup> In their first post-electoral meeting the major "revolutionary" and "reformist" leaders decided to form a coordinating organism, and in subsequent reunions they began to discuss points of substantive agreement. These included a commitment "to struggle for the democratization of society" through promotion of the popular movement, and support for common protest actions. They also agreed to oppose any pact with the government party and to launch joint Parliamentary opposition.<sup>10</sup>

The call to municipal elections in November of 1980 further accelerated left unity, and at the same time compressed longer-term internal debates. The left parties still had

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<sup>9</sup> These comments were made by Guillermo Herrera of the Communist Party and Alfredo Filomeno of the PSR in QueHacer No. 10, op cit, p. 80.

<sup>10</sup> These meetings are detailed in Henry Pease Garcia and Alfredo Filomeno, Peru 1980: Cronologia politica (Lima: DESCO, 1982), pp.3972, 3976, 3982, 3989 and 4003.

considerable grassroots support in various provinces and in the poor shantytowns of Lima. If they could forge a common platform and single set of candidates, they had a chance of recuperating voter confidence and hence gaining another shot at power. An editorial Marka on July 17, 1980, urged the left to respond to this opportunity;

"It seems that no left organization has fully realized the importance and proximity of these municipal elections. The consensus is to participate. But to do so under the same conditions of dispersion of last May would be double suicide, meaning that nothing had been learned from our defeat. Furthermore, the nature of these elections presents unprecedented problems for the left. The goal now is not to get into Parliament and use it as a tribune for political agitation (a correct but insufficient thesis). Now what is at stake is the possibility of being government and not opposition, even though we are talking about elementary levels of political power".<sup>11</sup>

#### The Formation of the United Left Front

On September 13, 1980, after a series of negotiations, representatives of three leftist parties and three fronts signed the founding declaration of the United Left Front (IU), a formal political alliance comprised of these core groups and open to affiliation by independents who adhered to the objectives and goals of the front.<sup>12</sup> In order to avoid partisan battles, the leadership of IU would consist of an

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<sup>11</sup> Marka No. 164, July 17, 1980, p. 5.

<sup>12</sup> The founding members were the Moscow-line Peruvian Communist Party (PCP-U); the Revolutionary Communist Party (PCR), founded by radicalized Catholics and former student leaders; the velasquista Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR); the heterogenous FOCEP front; the UDP, which was comprised of three radical "New Left" factions (the MIR-Unificado with Carlos Tapia, Vanguardia Revolucionaria with Javier Diez Canseco, and part of the splinter PSR-ML); and the UNIR front, of which the main base was the maoist Patria Roja. See "Declaracion Fundacional de Izquierda Unida", in El Diario de Marka, 14/8/80; and "Presencia de Izquierda Unida", in Enrique Bernales, Socialismo y Nacion (Lima: Mesa Redonda Editores, 1987).

independent president, Alfonso Barrantes, and a National Directive Committee (CDN) with representatives from each party or front. The core founders represented the major currents of leftist thinking in Peru, including Moscow-line communists, maoists, castroites and other heterodox "New Left" groups, velasquistas and radicalized Catholics. Together they also represented important bases of support among major labor and peasant organizations, including the powerful miners' and teachers' unions and the Peruvian Peasant Confederation (CCP), as well as among the shantytown organizations of Lima, student organizations, a share of the press and prominent intellectuals.

Who did not join IU? Ironically, just one year after Hugo Blanco led the rest of the left in refusing to sign the new Constitution, the founders of IU agreed to exclude Blanco and all three of Peru's trotskyite parties, as well as any others "who question the democratic legality put in march with the new Constitution and the 1980 general elections".<sup>13</sup> Several other radical groups also remained outside IU, rejecting the "revisionism" of the front and clinging to the ideal of armed struggle.<sup>14</sup>

From the start, the founders of IU did not want the front to be merely a transitory electoral phenomenon, but rather a lasting political

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<sup>13</sup> Bernales, op cit, p. 128. The Trotskyites also rejected the idea of joining IU at this point.

<sup>14</sup> The small radical groups that stayed outside of IU included the maoist Communist Party of Peru--"Sendero Luminoso"; MIR-IV Etapa; Puka Llacta, a dissident fraction of Patria Roja; and part of the PSR-ML, a dissident fraction of PSR, which later became the basis for the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA), which began urban guerilla actions in 1983. In 1980 the abstention of these groups was of little notice. But "Sendero Luminoso" would soon become a major actor on the political scene, its terrorist actions weakening the still-fragile democracy and placing parameters on all the rest.

and social project. "We could say that Izquierda Unida had the original sin of having arisen on the occasion of an electoral process" said IU President Barrantes;

"But nevertheless, all the organizations agree that IU should transcend its electoral origin, with the objective of becoming the instrument capable of organizing the popular sectors of the countryside and the city to contribute to the revolutionary process in Peru".<sup>13</sup>

At the same time, they did not see this alliance evolving into one political party. It was imperative to maintain the identity of and a quota of representation for each founding party, they argued, and to "recognize the plurality of contributions of the organizations that form it and of the independents who adhere to it". Thus the founders essentially agreed to develop a common program and governance structure for the IU, and they agreed to disagree--or rather, to not define themselves--on issues over which there was discord.

The leftist leadership also hoped to make IU a multi-class mass front rather than just an alliance of party elites. The first goal would be to incorporate directly into the front (rather than into competing party structures) broad new sectors of society that were politically independent but might identify with socialist and democratic goals, although the mechanisms for doing this were not specified at the outset. And while each party was free to pursue its own vision of a vanguard class, they agreed in principle on the need for IU to organize a broader popular movement and to forge a multi-class bloc of exploited groups and

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<sup>13</sup> Cited in QueHacer No. 10, op cit, p. 71.

represent these politically.<sup>16</sup>

For most of the founders, however, the IU was envisioned not only as a mass front but also a revolutionary one. Despite their turn to electoral strategy, in 1980 all of Peru's leftist parties still saw themselves as struggling ultimately for radical structural change, for the destruction of the "bourgeois state" and a genuine transition to socialism. At the same time, it was as yet impossible for them to agree on any explicit ideology or long-term strategy. Hence they incorporated into the IU a very general ideal of socialism inspired in the message of Mariategui. This socialism would be open and heterodoxical, anti-imperialist and non-aligned. It would also prioritize the democratization of civil society before the conquest of state power, working to build a grassroots movement of workers, peasants and progressive middle sectors, rather than an authoritarian and vanguardist party apparatus.

In terms of strategy, the founding of the front involved explicit acceptance of political democracy on one level: "to use the political space offered by democracy to consolidate the organization of a leftist alternative and advance in the construction of socialism".<sup>17</sup> They recognized that the new regime included an important set of rights that had been "conquered by the people through popular mobilization and formalized by the Constitution". But they continued to believe that the

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<sup>16</sup> Leftist intellectual Carlos Ivan DeGregori noted that "the concept of a bloc of national-popular forces reflects more exactly what has been emerging in recent years. And besides, in accordance with the development of class struggle in this country, (this concept) gives the impoverished non-proletarian and urban middle sectors a fuller place in the popular camp". In Pease, et al, America Latina 80, op cit, p. 250.

<sup>17</sup> Bernalles, op cit, p. 138.

institutions of liberal democracy should be transcended by forms of collective grassroots participation, and that the first step towards socialism in Peru was the construction of "a popular government based on direct democracy and the genuine organizations of the people".<sup>12</sup>

The specific nature of this alternative ideal and how to attain it were issues left open for further discussion, including the relationship between democracy and the use of revolutionary violence. None of the parties joining IU had abandoned its belief in the legitimacy of armed struggle in principle, even while they did not feel that this was appropriate for the current context. But with the emergence of a nascent armed insurgency and the government's harsh response, there was clearly potential for conflict among the IU member organizations. On one hand, the founding of IU already involved a decision to forgo arms, and the national leadership was anxious to differentiate the front from extremist groups in the public eye as well as that of the military. Yet there was considerable confusion on the left about how to characterize and relate to Sendero Luminoso, and about how much to criticize the military for human rights abuses. Rather than threaten the left's nascent unity, this issue was postponed. Indeed, in 1980 the insurgency was marginal to the

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<sup>12</sup> Cite in Marka, 2 de octubre de 1980. When asked if he were disposed to defend Peru's new democracy Barrantes gave this reply;

"Of course, to the extent that this representative democracy is better than military dictatorship. This does not mean that this democracy satisfies me, or the interests of the working class. But this is better. By affirming democratic liberties we can strengthen the organization of the oppressed and prepare a leap forward...what we want is to gain a space that permits us to raise the consciousness of the exploited class and strengthen their unity. (QueHacer No. 10, p. 34).

political scene, while the very existence of the IU was a milestone in the history of Peru's fragmented and conflictive left. As PSR leader Enrique Bernales put it, IU was "not something finished, but rather a project to create".<sup>19</sup>

#### The 1980 Municipal Elections

Of course, in the short run the IU was primarily an electoral front, and had to turn quickly from these lofty ideals to the immediate campaign for municipal elections in November of 1980. In the past, municipal governments in Peru were rarely elected, had little autonomous power or resources, and were quite distant from the lives of the poor majority. However, by 1980 urbanization, the expansion of the electorate and the transfer of new authority to the local level made these governments potentially important actors in the democratization process. In 1980 Peru had 152 provincial municipalities in 26 Departments. Some 76 percent of the electorate was classified as urban, and 67 percent of voters concentrated along the Pacific coast. The Department of Lima was by far the largest, with 30 percent of the nation's total population and some 40 percent of the electorate, and it was divided into 39 districts with mayors and city councils of their own.<sup>20</sup>

The governing Popular Action party (AP) was expected to lead these elections, coming so soon after Belaunde's presidential victory and with the resources of the state at its disposal. The APRA was also expected to have a good showing in the northern provinces, due to its historical presence there, although the party was suffering serious internal

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<sup>19</sup> Bernales, op cit, p. 132.

<sup>20</sup> This section draws on Tuesta Soldevilla 1983, op cit.

conflict. Although battered by its 1980 defeat, the left also hoped to recuperate popular support.

Alfonso Barrantes was the IU's consensus candidate for the Mayorship of Lima, and the left ran candidates in 114 other departments, with the parties mobilizing their rank and file to campaign for common lists in all but a few areas. The left used this campaign in part as a forum to oppose the central government, and El Diario de Marka played a key role in denouncing the emerging national policy priorities. But IU also put forth a 10-point municipal program that stressed greater autonomy and democratization of municipal government, increased rents, devolution of basic services to local control, and municipal oversight of the public service companies operating at the local level. Barrantes' own campaign was moderate in tone, tending to avoid radical left discourse in favor of more concrete discussion of municipal issues and the needs of the urban poor.<sup>21</sup>

The election results gave an overall victory to AP, both nationally and in Lima, with 35.86 percent of the national vote. However, IU came in a surprising second place both nationally and in Lima, with 23.90 percent of the total vote, still below the combined left total of 30 percent in the Constituent Assembly elections but up from the 13 percent total left vote in the general elections of 1980. Leftists won in Peru's second city of Arequipa and five other departmental capitals; won five of Lima's 38

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<sup>21</sup> The IU municipal program is reproduced in Tuesta, op cit, pp. 47-48. See also Marka 13 de noviembre de 1980, and two interviews with Alfonso Barrantes: "Todo el poder para los municipios", Equis X, septiembre 1980, pp. 24-27, and "La espera del candidato", El Caballo Rojo, 30 noviembre 1980, pp. 4-5, reproduced in Barrantes en sus propios palabras (Lima: Mosca Azul Editores, 1985).



district mayorships; and won eleven of the 40 city council seats in Lima and many nationwide. The APRA placed third with 22.69 percent of the vote, reflecting a continued decline from 1980, while the rightist PPC and various independents made up the rest.<sup>22</sup>

Geographically, the IU's main source of strength was in Lima, where it drew 46 percent of its total votes, and in Peru's southern provinces. Socially, the left's support came overwhelmingly from the urban and rural poor and working classes, from both organized labor and the larger mass of informal workers, the residents of the shantytowns and ghettos of Lima and provincial capitals. Indeed, the results seemed to confirm upper class fears of a "red belt" emerging around the capital, as IU won in five of the city's most impoverished outlying districts and placed second in four others.

This election had a strong impact on the nascent IU. It reinforced the left's commitment to an electoral strategy, and to approaching elections with a greater concern for program and governance. It also confirmed that unity was important to victory and that by working together the marxist left could have nationwide appeal. Furthermore, it strengthened the left's claim to represent the poor and working classes, since IU's major victories were concentrated in the country's poorest districts and regions, while APRA did better among middle sectors and the rightist PPC led in Lima's upper class enclaves. And finally, the results suggested that the marxist left was leading the opposition, since analysts

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<sup>22</sup> Tuesta 1983, op cit.. In Lima, the left won in the poor districts of Comas, Ate, San Martin, El Agustino and Carabayllo, and placed second in Independencia, Villa Maria del Triunfo, San Juan de Lurigancho and San Juan de Miraflores. In each of the latter, the IU's loss was due in part to competition from other leftist lists.

believed the IU benefitted from the decline in AP's share of the vote since May 1980.

On the other hand, the election also demonstrated that party dominance remained important beneath the electoral alliance, that charismatic individuals were also fundamental to the left's appeal, and that the left's social base was still relatively narrow and tentative. While the votes for Belaunde' loosely-organized AP remained multi-class and national in scope, there was an overrepresentation of Lima (46 percent of the left's votes) and a few provincial areas in the IU's support. The results also suggested that the IU was still primarily the sum of its larger parts. Despite efforts to attract a groundswell of new independent voters, the IU basically won in areas where one or another of its component parties was strong (e.g. UNIR in Arequipa and Moquegua, FOCEP in Cerro de Pasco and Tumbes, UDP in Ayacucho and Piura, and the various shantytowns of Lima), and it did not do well where there was no pre-existing party strength, such as in the Aprista-dominated "solid North".<sup>23</sup>

Where the left did gain new voters, analysts underscored the charismatic appeal of individual leaders. In Lima, Barrantes was widely respected as a committed labor lawyer of modest means and provincial origins. In Arequipa, the new IU Mayor Villalobos was a popular local doctor, and in Vitarte IU Mayor Franklin Acosta had led a local Parents' Association that supported the schoolteacher's struggles for better pay and conditions. These results brought home the importance of promoting more leaders with close ties to the community, to offset the abundance of

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<sup>23</sup> Tuesta 1983, op cit, pp.111-145.

middle class intellectuals in national party leadership. However, some analysts cautioned against allowing a focus on individual charisma and image to overshadow the need for IU to build a more organic organization and strategy between elections.<sup>24</sup>

Finally, the overall total of just 23.9 percent of the electorate demonstrated that the majority of Peruvians were still skeptical about the left's unity and message. Analysts stressed that in 1980 the majority of Peruvian citizens did not identify with any political party; elections served to measure the public temperature and reaction to current policies rather than fixed positions. Hence the left had a long way to go to develop a solid base of support for its political organizations and socialist goals.

In the wake of these elections the IU made several strategic shifts. First, the leadership of Barrantes was considerably strengthened after he placed second in the Lima election, and he began to exercise greater authority as the IU's public voice. While his position as IU's President was initially owed to the votes of the different left parties, his proven electoral appeal allowed him to take distance from the parties and call for greater organization of IU as an alternative project. Second, although labor and popular protest remained an important opposition tool, and leftist parliamentarians continued to represent voices of opposition in the national media, municipal government and neighborhood organization took on new importance as a "political space" for leftist organization and democratization.

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<sup>24</sup> See Marka, 27 de noviembre de 1980; and Barrantes interview in "La espera del candidato", in Barrantes 1985, op cit, p. 37.

### The Renovation of the APRA

While the IU surged forward, the APRA remained mired in internal crisis between 1980 and 1982. The party's self-proclaimed left wing retained control of the party apparatus after the 1980 general election debacle, yet this victory only caused greater polarization, as a more conservative rival faction broke away and formed an "Aprista Base Movement" that fought bitterly and publicly with the official party. The APRA's third place finish in the 1980 municipal elections further demoralized party members and revived longstanding conflicts. To many it appeared that the APRA, built on quintessentially personalist authority relations, could not survive the loss of its founder and Jefe Maximo, Haya de la Torre, and hold its heterogeneous bases together. Apristas of all tendencies began to express similar fears--that the party was not equipped for democracy, that it had lost a clear political space, and that it lacked capable leaders.<sup>25</sup>

Yet the death of Haya and the battle that followed proved in fact to be necessary steps towards internal renovation and revival of Peru's oldest party. By mid-1981 a new consensus current began to emerge, encompassing members of the Old Guard, important provincial bases, and the younger generation of leaders that had developed in the seventies. Their main point of agreement was simple: the APRA had to restore internal unity

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<sup>25</sup> This concern about the party's future was stressed in the author's interview with APRA leader Carlos Roca on March 10, 1986. The following section draws on the author's interviews with numerous APRA party leaders, including Senators Andres Townsend, Luis Alberto Sanchez, Ramiro Priale, and Javier Valle Riestra; labor leaders Julio Cruzado, Luis Negreiros, Victor Salas, and Begnino Chirinos; Secretary of Organization Alberto Kitasono, Secretary of Discipline Vitaliano Gallardo, and former Secretary of Discipline Alfredo Tello.

above all else, and improve its public image. Only then could it address more substantive concerns and regain political centrality. Alan Garcia Perez emerged as the candidate to translate these sentiments into a new internal coalition and fill APRA's leadership void. In late 1982 Garcia was elected APRA Secretary General, and from there he went on to launch a successful campaign to revamp APRA's image as a nationalist, popular and social democratic alternative.

As noted previously, longstanding internal differences within APRA began to stir even before Haya's death in 1979, and they were a key factor in APRA's 1980 electoral defeat. These differences began as a classic power struggle between two second-generation rivals to succeed Haya, Armando Villanueva and Andres Townsend. Yet the conflict soon began to take on the character of a broader struggle over what ideology, program, alliance strategy and political space APRA should forge in the 1980s. These were important issues that had rarely been discussed openly under Haya's rule, and they were crucial for the party's longer-term development. Their mixing with this succession struggle, however, threatened to tear the party apart.

The battle over succession was also a clash between two distinct styles of leadership and political practice. On one hand, Villanueva was the consummate machine politician, who had stayed out of the Constituent Assembly in favor of overseeing the revival of the party apparatus, and in the course of visiting party bases nationwide he consolidated his own support among provincial leaders and the rank and file. Townsend, on the other hand, was an experienced parliamentarian with international prestige who was a smooth public speaker but had little taste for the day-to-day

battles of party organization. Villanueva represented an emphasis on party-building, on strengthening APRA's social bases and consolidating its sense of Aprista identity and discipline. Townsend emphasized electoral priorities, and favored reaching out to independent voters and policy experts with a more pluralist appeal. As one analyst noted, these two faces of APRA had historically complimented each other when Haya was at the helm, but with his death the dispute between the two was virtually inevitable.<sup>26</sup>

The battle lines began to be drawn during APRA's XII Party Congress on July 6, 1979, where with Haya ill the main topic of debate was APRA's future leadership structure. Villanueva and his followers favored a single General Secretary, while Townsend and his supporters a collective secretariat; the latter position was also supported by party patriarchs Luis Alberto Sanchez and Ramiro Priale. Haya had nominated a young Villanueva supporter, Luis Alva Castro, to preside over the organization of the event, and the correlation of forces in the Congress favored Villanueva's position by a long shot. However, Townsend threatened to leave the party if this happened, and with the 1980 elections on the horizon the party Congress opted to postpone the decision and elect a temporary collective leadership.

Although questions of national leadership structure dominated this congress, there were also substantive accords which reflected important concerns of the more than 1,000 delegates from APRA bases around the country, accords that would be reiterated by the bases throughout the

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<sup>26</sup> Raul Gonzalez, "1978-1981, APRA: Cronica de un conflicto", Debate No. 7, Marzo 1981, pp. 39-49.

1980s. First of all, these accords called for the democratization of the party and leadership selection process at all levels, and for reinforcement of the party's multi-class nature. Recognizing that the party's social base was becoming increasingly middle class and urban, delegates recommended that all party organisms (and any future APRA government) have greater representation of workers and peasants. They also expressed support for current popular demands and labor struggles, and demanded a total change of leadership and line in the Aprista-affiliated Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CTP)--urging it to shed its AFL-CIO affiliation and conciliatory relations with business in favor of more militant unionism. With special concern for the party's limited base among the peasantry, delegates recommended that all Apristas be obliged to do literacy work in the countryside. And they urged the Secretary of Organization to draft a pilot plan for approaching non-Aprista popular organizations.<sup>27</sup>

In terms of doctrine, the APRA delegates rejected both "totalitarian communism" and the "reactionary right", urging instead greater adherence to APRA's unique mix of nationalism, anti-imperialism and social democracy (including an emphasis on a welfare state and corporatist representation). On the international front, they voted to reaffirm APRA's rejection of imperialism of all forms, but with stronger criticism of United States policy in Latin America. On the regional level, they called on their leadership to convene a "Congress of Democratic Left Parties of Latin America", to increase relations with like-minded parties, and to study the

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<sup>27</sup> These accords listed in Partido Aprista Peruano: XII Congreso Nacional, 10 de julio de 1979; and "Principales acuerdos de cita aprista", Correo July 10, 1979.

possibility of APRA's becoming a full member of the Socialist International rather than simply an observer.

All of these issues were put aside, however, when Haya died in August of 1979 and the leadership issue had to be resolved. In a subsequent party convention Villanueva was easily nominated APRA's candidate, but the bases also urged Townsend to run as first Vice President.<sup>28</sup> As the two struggled openly for control of the party, ideological and political differences were delineated along the way, encouraged rather than suppressed by the heat of the electoral campaign. Villanueva convened Socialist International advisors, defended central economic planning and corporate interest representation, praised Peru's participation in the Non-Aligned Movement, and urged the formation of a unified labor movement. At the same time, Townsend took a strong anti-Communist position, denounced the Non-Aligned Movement for including Cuba, and joined a group of non-Aprista intellectuals and businessmen in late 1979 to form the Institute for Liberty and Democracy, supported by conservative West German and U.S. interests and dedicated to promoting the virtues of the free market and eliminating "totalitarian marxism" from Peru's schools and universities.<sup>29</sup>

While seeking to define APRA in contemporary terms, the two leaders grasped different pieces of Haya's work and political practice to

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<sup>28</sup> Gonzalez 1981, op cit., p. 42; In "Las bases elegiran candidatos del APRA", La Prensa 17 de septiembre de 1979. Organizers estimated 802 delegates from the provinces [heavily representing the Northern provinces], and 234 from the greater Lima area, plus additional functional delegates.

<sup>29</sup> See Pease Garcia and Filomeno 1979, op cit., pp. 8115 and 8199.



legitimize their positions. Villanueva called for a "return to the early sources", specifically to Anti-Imperialism and APRA, to support the leftist and revolutionary character of Aprismo. Townsend drew on Haya's more moderate later writings, his anti-communism and his elite political alliances, to justify a neo-liberal path. This led in turn to differences in their views of the marxist left competition. While Villanueva proposed dialogue and strategic cooperation with other "responsible left" parties, Townsend insisted that there was no responsible party to the left of APRA, and that any alliances should be made with parties to APRA's right.<sup>30</sup>

Villanueva's aggressive campaign and the APRA's public infighting turned off a majority of Peruvian voters, and caused Villanueva to lose a considerable share of the ground he had gained within the party since 1978. After the election Townsend went on the offensive, increasing his denunciation of Villanueva and the CEN for incoherent policies and "marxist infiltration", and calling for the election of new party leadership. For this he had the support of senior leader Luis Alberto Sanchez, and a new Congress was called for August 1980.<sup>31</sup>

Rather than back down in the face of defeat, Villanueva tried to shift the debate even more towards the realm of ideological and political definition. He criticized Townsend's conservatism and argued that his candidacy had served to "keep the APRA in its true line", which was democratic left. He continued to defend APRA's relation with the Socialist International and encourage joint opposition to the Belaunde

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<sup>30</sup> Gonzalez, op sit, pl 48; and Adams 1984, op cit. pp. 87-95. This differentiation was reiterated by Townsend in an interview with author on November 29, 1985.

<sup>31</sup> Pease Garcia and Filomeno 1980, op cit, p. 3965.

government with the marxist left. At the same time, he stressed APRA's originality as a truly Latin American form of democratic socialism.<sup>32</sup> In this effort to force an ideological showdown, Villanueva had strong support from openly left-leaning younger leaders like Secretary of International Relations Carlos Roca and Hilda Urizar. Other younger leaders, including Secretary of Organization Alan Garcia and Secretary of Sindical Affairs Wilber Bendezu, also shared his desire to purge the party of its more conservative elements.<sup>33</sup>

A preview to this showdown came during the IX Congress of the Aprista labor confederation, the CTP, on June 26, 1980. Here the central issue was also leadership, but accompanied by a battle over political line and international affiliations. Longtime CTP leader Julio Cruzado, a close ally of Townsend's, retained control over the Confederation and reiterated its conciliatory stance towards business and its close ties with the AFL-CIO. An opposition challenge led by Luis Negreiros, a younger and more militant longshoremen's leader and supporter of Villanueva, was stalled when he and his followers were refused admission

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<sup>32</sup> "Entrevista a Villanueva: la lena del arbol caido?", Amauta, julio de 1980. In Marka 27 de noviembre de 1980, p. 31, Villanueva said "For Europeans who use the term socialism, Aprismo is a 'Latin American socialism'. We could say that Social Democracy is a 'European Aprismo'".

<sup>33</sup> Urizar expresses these views in an interview in Marka, 20 de noviembre de 1980, and in "Roca: Este irreversible proceso de asuncion", Marka 6 de junio de 1980, Roca expressed high hopes for a new party congress;

"The Congress will serve to analyze all that has occurred since July of 1979, and to determine the direction the party will follow. It will be a Congress of unity around the leftist and revolutionary principles that Haya de la Torre left to us. One of its objectives will be the consolidation of the democratic left position that we maintained in the electoral campaign".

to the Congress. In response, Negreiros and a dozen Aprista unions formed a "Frente de Defensa Sindical de la CTP", which publicly charged the Aprista leadership with corruption and urged the party's Sindical Bureau to censure the CTP leadership. The negative publicity around these events was damaging for APRA as a whole, reinforcing the CTP's loss of prestige and lack of important union bases.<sup>34</sup>

The next major showdown was the XIII APRA Party Congress, on August 1-3, 1980 in the northern city of Trujillo. With over 1,000 delegates and observers Villanueva's forces prevailed again, and the delegates voted to institute a single Secretary General. This time Townsend charged fraud and walked out, together with Sanchez, Priale and some forty other delegates. Shortly thereafter, a declaration signed by the dissident leaders and 149 other party members publicly condemned irregularities in the Congress as well as the fact that APRA had not undertaken any serious self-criticism of its 1980 election failure, and they demanded a new Congress to take up these issues.<sup>35</sup>

Villanueva had won the short-term battle over leadership structure,

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<sup>34</sup> The damage done by this conflict was admitted by both sides in the author's interviews with Julio Cruzado on June 30, 1983; with Luis Negreiros on August 27, 1983 and June 29, 1985, and with another dissident APRA labor leader, Begnino Chirinos, on November 3, 1986. See also

"Congreso de la CTP: la hora de la cachiporra", Marka 26 de junio de 1980;

"Dos grupos capitalistas dividen la CTP y al PAP" and "Cruzado de fantasmas", Marka 10 de julio de 1980. In "Luis Negreiros entrevista: Hay discrepancias fundamentales con Cruzado", Amauta No. 263, 10 de julio, 1980. Negreiros also spoke out in favor of coordinating opposition to Belaunde with the CGTP and with the marxist left in Parliament.

<sup>35</sup> See "Declaracion de Trujillo, La Prensa 24 de agosto de 1980, and Gonzalez 1981, op cit., p. 44.

but at a high cost to party unity. The walkout of two of APRA's most venerable Old Guard leaders made it impossible for him to take the new post personally, and he proposed instead another veteran leader, Fernando Leon de Vivero, who was easily elected. But the Congress had been consumed by this battle and little else was resolved; the event closed with a general resolution to end sectarian and divisive behavior. Sanchez and Priale were wooed back to the party a month later, in preparation for the municipal elections and exchange for an agreement to hold a new National Convention to address their unresolved concerns. But Townsend and a smaller group remained outside, demanding full party reorganization.

The APRA's internal troubles had a negative impact on its external behavior between 1980 and 1982. When the dust settled on the November 1980 municipal elections, the party's credibility hit a record low. In January 1981 Townsend and his group were formally expelled from the party after efforts at reconciliation proved fruitless, yet this created more havoc as Townsend's new "Hayista Base Movement" (MBH) competed vociferously with the official APRA.<sup>36</sup> This divisiveness was especially unfortunate as the demand for effective opposition to the new government's unpopular policies began to grow.

The APRA's internal crisis also contributed to the Parliament's inability to resist the Belaunde administration's unpopular economic measures. Unlike the inexperienced marxist left, the APRA had a lifetime of parliamentary opposition and understood the artful exercise of

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<sup>36</sup> See 42 preguntas y 42 respuestas sobre el movimiento de bases apristas (Lima: Comando de Accion de la Bases, 1981).

constitutional authority better than anyone. But for the first two years of the new democracy there were two APRAs in Parliament--one in the Chamber of Deputies (where Villanueva supporters predominated) and another in the Senate (where Townsend was based), and they appeared to spend more time fighting each other than playing an effective opposition role.<sup>37</sup>

The APRA's infighting strained its relationship with the military and the private sector, and also reinforced its distance from the organized labor and popular movement. The persistence of the widely-distrusted Cruzado bloc at the head of the CTP prevented any reform of the Aprista confederation. And while younger party strategists had hoped to extend APRA's grassroots base among the new urban poor, preoccupation with internal party conflicts left them unable to pay attention to this.

Indeed, party development as a whole was stymied during this period. Modernization of the party apparatus, including such basic things as an updated census of party militants, was indefinitely postponed, as were demands for internal democratization, improved channels of representation for provincial bases, and greater mobility for younger generations. To the disgruntlement of many younger members, conservatives and corrupt older figures remained within the official party machinery despite the Townsend split. Between 1980 and 1982, however, the registration of new party militants was virtually stagnant.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> See Enrique Bernalles, "No se siente al APRA en el Parlamento", QueHacer No. 8, Nov-Dec 1980. An exception was Senator Javier Valle Riestra, who was an early defender of human rights in the Parliament in this period.

<sup>38</sup> According to the author's interviews with then-Secretary of Organization Alberto Kitasono on March 11, 1986, and with longtime Secretary of Discipline Alfredo Tello on February 7, 1986, party membership surged in 1977-1980, but during the internal crisis of 1980-

For most Apristas party unity and mística had always been their most important values, above any doctrinal or strategic turn. But this unity had been dependent on Haya's leadership and ability to mediate between conflicting interests. Haya's leadership, in turn, was prolonged by the lack of a substantial "intermediary generation" between the aging founders and second generation leaders (like Villanueva and Townsend, now in their sixties), and the generation that came of age politically in the 1970s. Due to the party's conservative pacts in the 1950s and 1960s, the most talented and progressive leaders of those decades were drawn into Accion Popular, the small Christian Democratic Party, or the nascent radical left. Those who did enter APRA were often driven more by anti-communism or sheer clientelism. Unfortunately, with Haya gone this left a fairly narrow and lackluster group to oversee the transition to a new era.<sup>39</sup>

Peru itself had also changed considerably since the era when, as historian Pablo Macera put it, every small town in Peru had "a police station, a church, and an APRA locale".<sup>40</sup> In past decades the APRA had been more than just a party, it had filled a variety of social needs ranging from education and health care, to employment and entertainment. But in the 1980s the APRA was no longer the only institution of its kind.

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1982 it stagnated and registration of new party members was temporarily closed. This is also asserted in Jose Barba Caballero, APRA: Presente y Futuro. Analisis de la derrota electoral, drama interno y proyecciones del Aprismo (Lima: Editorial Cultural Popular, 1981).

<sup>39</sup> This is drawn from numerous interviews with APRA leaders, and from Jose Maria Salcedo, "APRA: Entre el caos y las definiciones", QueHacer Number 11, julio 1981, pp. 36-41, and "Apristas que fueron y apristas que son: polemicas opiniones sobre una crisis de identidad", *ibid*, pp. 52-60.

<sup>40</sup> Reprinted in Salcedo, *op cit.*, p. 34.

Post-Velasco Peru had a far wider range of schools and universities, movie houses and television, neighborhood associations, trade unions, women's clubs and feminist organizations. And now there was serious marxist left competition, with new levels of unity and popular appeal.

Interviews with rank and file Apristas in this period reveal a tremendous sense of frustration with the party's lack of charismatic leadership, political space or public credibility. They were deeply hurt by the loss of Aprista solidarity, angry that they had lost so much ground to IU, and ashamed of the party's negative and corrupt image. Some even speculated that the party could not go on without its Jefe Maximo.<sup>41</sup>

The rest of Peru's political actors were also vitally interested in APRA's crisis. Outside observers seemed to agree that the party could not stay where it was, but were uncertain as to which way it would turn. Most analysts predicted that Townsend's small splinter group would gravitate towards the right of the spectrum to ally with the other "bourgeois liberal forces", which it eventually did in 1984. But while some speculated that Villanueva and the official APRA would become a more modernized social democratic party, others stressed that the presence of IU would make this difficult, and predicted instead the party's gradual demise.

The marxist left gave considerable attention to this issue. It is noteworthy that Marka magazine, a principal forum for leftist debate and consensus-building in the early 1980s, ran a special issue on "What to do about the APRA?" in August 1980. The editors recommended that IU welcome

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<sup>41</sup> In addition to the author's interviews, this is reiterated in the interviews in QueHacer Number 11, julio de 1981, op cit., and "Y que dicen las bases Apristas?", Amauta, 3 de junio de 1980.

and encourage APRA's efforts to become a modern democratic left party;

"In a pragmatic party like the APRA...ideological differences can be reduced to the distance between a possible 'modern Peruvian social democracy' and a viscerally anti-communist and opportunistically liberal tradition. Nothing more. But also nothing less... Because a social democratic APRA is, without doubt, a positive evolution... A social democratic APRA could play a role that neither Belaunde nor Bedoya can, while an APRA with Townsend could not".<sup>42</sup>

### The APRA's Road to Recovery

While the rest of Peru debated APRA's future, it seemed as though the party itself was incapable of internal reflection and change. Yet the initial steps towards renovation came more quickly than most observers predicted. Once Villanueva and his allies felt securely in control of the party apparatus, the controversial leader left Peru for an extended tour of Western Europe. His proclaimed motive was to bolster APRA's flagging international image, particularly among social democratic allies. But he also distanced himself in order to allow other party leaders and bases to undertake a more open process of self-criticism and to seek consensus about the party's future direction.<sup>43</sup>

What points of consensus could draw Apristas back together? First, most party militants agreed on the need to

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<sup>42</sup> The editors add that "It is naive to think that APRA will disappear with this crisis, or that the IU alone is in ascent...There is a clear space in the Peruvian political map for social democracy. A purified APRA has conditions to fill this space that those who previously tried to do so did not possess...". "Quehacer frente al APRA?", Marka, 14 de agosto de 1980, pp. 10-11.

<sup>43</sup> This point is made in Adams 1984, op cit, p. 101.



restore unity and avoid further expulsions. As one young leader put it, the Townsend-Villanueva split placed excessive stress on ideology and on Haya's different texts, "when everyone knows that the most gigantic work of Haya de la Torre was his party"--a party that had survived for decades due to its unity and fraternity.<sup>44</sup> This was why Townsend's decision to break ranks disillusioned many Apristas, even many who shared his criticisms of party leadership. Rather than choosing sides, most Apristas wanted to reunite around common goals.

Another point of agreement was the need to change APRA's public image, in order to expand its ranks and appeal to the vast non-Aprista majority. This had been one of Townsend's main arguments--that APRA make a less sectarian and more inclusive appeal--but this had become mixed up with his personal power bid and controversial neo-liberal affiliations. Other internal evaluations of APRA's 1980 electoral defeat nevertheless concluded the same. While Villanueva's "revolutionary" rhetoric had been designed to compete with the marxist left, the party's aggressively sectarian tactics at the grassroots alienated popular sectors. There was also growing agreement that a new image involved greater leadership turnover, and many party bases admitted that APRA would be better off if Villanueva and his more controversial allies were also replaced. This coincided with the longstanding

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<sup>44</sup> Barba Caballero, *op cit.*, p. 25.

demands of party bases for democratization of the leadership selection process, and lent new force to the demands of younger Aprista generations for greater access to positions of leadership.

As for definition of a political line, the APRA was essentially a pragmatic and electorally-oriented party, and many militants were frightened by the renewed ideological conflict that the Villanueva-Townsend battle had generated. They were also tired of losing elections. It was clear that APRA had to rethink its political space in this new context, but many felt that less stress should be placed on internal definition of Aprismo and more on assessing what the voting public wanted to hear. APRA leaders assumed that with the rapid decline of the AP-PPC government Peruvians would seek a more left-of-center alternative. For some this meant the party should return to a moderate populist position, like that of Haya in 1978 and Belaunde of 1980, while others argued for a more explicitly social democratic model. But this was not a burning debate; the immediate concern was on restoration of unity and credible leadership, and postponing more substantive issues until these were resolved.

The first public sign of a movement for renovation within APRA was the release of a "Political Declaration" in the national press on June 5, 1981, signed by nearly 400 local and sectoral party leaders and militants of various generations. The signers defended APRA's anti-imperialist and

democratic left identity, in the face of competition from the right and left, and openly questioned the effectiveness of the current national leadership. They argued that the APRA Parliamentary Cell (CPA) lacked initiative, and had lost authority by taking sides in the fractional Villanueva-Townsend struggle. The CEN was not playing its leadership role well for the same reason, they charged, being dominated by Villanueva loyalists intent on hanging on to power at any cost. And they charged that the heavy overlap between CEN and parliamentary posts meant that the national leadership was not adequately fulfilling its duties to either the party or the nation.<sup>45</sup>

In short, this declaration argued that "the moment has arrived to demand democratically the change of men in leadership" and to this end the signers made several proposals. First, they called for a new party convention, to elect new leaders and unify the "Aprista family". They also proposed measures to ensure internal democratization and adequate representation of party bases in that convention, including the establishment of a "one Aprista one vote" rule (instead of giving certain leaders extra weight), and preferential voting for individuals rather than pre-established lists. They demanded ideological and strategic clarification by the new leaders, in line with traditional

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<sup>45</sup> "Partido Aprista Peruano. Declaracion Politica", La Prensa, 5 de junio de 1981.

Aprista doctrine. At the same time, they wanted an end to punishment and expulsion of party dissidents. These measures, they concluded, would be the "best homage to our Big Brother, Chief and Guide, companero Victor Raul Haya de la Torre" and reaffirm his slogan that "united we can do anything, divided we are nothing".<sup>46</sup>

This declaration was quickly dubbed the "Third Tendency" by the media. Leading news magazine also dubbed it "alanismo", because young Alan Garcia was emerging as a leading force behind this movement, which combined the concerns of the Old Guard with diverse forces interested in reconciliation. This current did not find much echo within the CEN, and their demands were not met in the short-run. But with this declaration Apristas and outsiders alike realized that there was potential for change from within the party bases.

At first glance, Alan Garcia did not seem the most likely candidate to translate these sentiments into a new political coalition. As Secretary of Organization since 1977 he had been a close ally of Villanueva, playing a central role in the latter's electoral campaign and in the subsequent battle to control the party machinery. In addition to his key role in this conflict, his behavior as a junior Congressman was seen by older Aprista leaders as hot-headed and politically green. At the age of 33 Garcia seemed too young

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<sup>46</sup> *ibid.*

to assume a leadership role in a hierarchical party that had two other generations of leaders waiting in line.<sup>47</sup>

Nevertheless, Garcia and a group of allies engineered a successful campaign against the very party machinery he had helped to revive, and in October 1982 he was elected Secretary General in the most democratic elections in APRA's history. Garcia combined impeccable Aprista credentials with youth and energy, a significant period of study abroad and openness to progressive new ideas that emerged in the seventies. His rapid rise to power filled the APRA's leadership void and generated excitement among Apristas of all generations and tendencies. It also sparked the enthusiasm of many non-Apristas, and helped to dispel the party's image of gerontocracy and vertical rule.

Garcia's decision to turn against the party leadership was based on a combination of personal ambition, electoralism, and a close reading of the concerns of party bases. This decision would prove to be fundamental for the prospects for social democracy as well as the persistence of populism in the 1980s. Through his frequent contact with the party bases Garcia sensed the desires for unity and stronger leadership, and also a reversal of electoral fortunes. He came to realize that Villanueva was unable to deliver this, and that the APRA in its present state could not win the next general election

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<sup>47</sup> See Raul Gonzalez, "La division del APRA: escenas recientes de un drama prolongado", QueHacer No. 11, julio de 1981, pp. 44-45.

in 1985. In this context he decided that the party needed a Belaunde-style leader, someone who had broad and non-controversial appeal beyond the APRA ranks. When none of the older leaders seemed to offer this, Garcia began seriously planning for 1985 himself.<sup>48</sup>

Garcia began his campaign with a series of personal and political steps well before the next party congress of October 1982. These included renovation of his own figure and oratorical skills with the help of political consultants, and the publication of a book (El futuro diferente) that outlined his views of Aprismo as a moderate social democratic-type and nationalist doctrine, and suggested general policy alternatives. He also undertook a dramatic, high profile opposition to the government's economic policies, which culminated in a televised interpellation of Prime Minister Ulloa in Parliament in 1982. The APRA as a whole gained some credit for initiating a multi-party agreement to call for this formal interpellation, and Garcia made a dramatic critique of the Prime Minister, which included leaping from his seat and physically grabbing the microphone from Ulloa in mid-sentence. Older Aprista leaders were displeased with these antics, but the younger generations loved the performance and these

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<sup>48</sup> These observations are based on the author's interviews and the work of journalist Raul Gonzalez, who followed Garcia's emergence since the late seventies. In 1983 Gonzalez remarked that "what motivates [Garcia's] political activity is getting into the Government Palace; it doesn't matter with whom or under what flag". "Los secretos del Senor Garcia", QueHacer No. 21, febrero de 1983.

actions quickly captured the attention of the national media.<sup>49</sup>

In order to position the APRA for a comeback in 1985, however, Garcia had to consolidate power within the party, and this was not something one man could do alone. Garcia's success thus depended heavily on building coalitions and making compromises with a variety of other leaders and sectors who shared an interest in renovation but who had their own agendas and ambitions as well. A key ally in this task was another young Aprista Congressman, Luis Alva Castro, who as head of the party's new Government Planning Commission (CONAPLAN) had begun to form a team of young Apristas and independent technocrats to elaborate pluralist policy alternatives.<sup>50</sup> Another important figure was Jorge Torres Vallejo, Mayor of Trujillo and a powerful leader who represented the demands of the party's provincial bases. Torres Vallejo had been instrumental in organizing regional protests against government policies, working together with marxist left and independent forces, and as a result his popularity extended well beyond APRA. Garcia and Torres Vallejo publicly denounced the corruption of some party leaders, which in turn attracted the attention of Old Guard leader Sanchez.

Yet even with these allies and a rising public image,

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<sup>49</sup> Gonzalez 1983, op cit.

<sup>50</sup> See El APRA Responde (Lima: Partido Aprista Peruano, Comision Nacional de Plan de Gobierno, 25 de enero de 1982).

taking over leadership of APRA seemed difficult for Garcia in 1982. First of all, there was an "official" candidate for the post of Secretary General, Senator Carlos Enrique Melgar, who entered the contest with considerable advantages. A prominent member of the intermediary generation of leadership, Melgar had the support of most of the CEN, the APRA Parliamentary Cell, outgoing Secretary General Leon de Vivero and presumably Villanueva. He was also backed by the APRA's "left wing", which included Senator Javier Valle Riestra and Garcia contemporaries Carlos Roca and Luis Negreiros. In addition to Melgar, Torres Vallejo was interested in the top post himself and had the experience and mass base to compete for it. For most party leaders, Garcia's pretensions were simply premature; as Valle Riestra put it, "you cannot pass directly from cadet to general".<sup>51</sup>

Nevertheless, as one journalist aptly put it, "all of them had forgotten the great electors: the delegates, the bases". They had overlooked the tremendous ascendancy Alan Garcia had among rank and file Apristas who saw him as a way out of the party's current stagnation and negative public image. They had also underestimated the last-minute ability of Garcia and Alva Castro to negotiate with potential rivals and convince them to defer to his candidacy as the only way to defeat Melgar. In this party congress new electoral rules

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<sup>51</sup> Author's interview with Valle Riestra, January 16, 1986. See also "La balanza del PAP" (Interview with Guillermo Larco Cox), Caretas No. 717, septiembre 1982, pp. 24-27.



gave each delegate one vote; and on October 12, 1982, in the most democratic internal elections in APRA's history, 55% of the delegates chose 33-year old Garcia as their new supreme leader.<sup>52</sup>

An initial indication of Garcia's support was given when he took the congress floor to make a fiery speech condemning General Secretary Leon de Vivero's alleged connections to a convicted drug trafficker, which was met with thunderous and appreciative applause from the delegates. His victory was then secured through a series of compromises which guaranteed party unity and a quota of continuity. Torres Vallejo was persuaded to exchange the estimated 200 provincial votes he could deliver for an important position in the CEN. And Sanchez was made head of a new Political Commission that would have executive functions and thus serve as a "power behind the throne" of young Garcia.

A total of twenty-six elected posts had to be filled along with the General Secretariat, and these were distributed in a way to maximize balance between conflicting groups. Various posts went to Melgar's original supporters, and a few went to individuals who had flirted with Townsend, while former dissident leader (and Velasco advisor) Luis Felipe de las Casas was wooed back with the post of Secretary of Organization as well as a seat on the Political Commission.

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<sup>52</sup> Details on this Congress are drawn from Gonzalez 1983, op cit; Cesar Hildebrandt in Expreso October 13, 1982; "El pastel del Congreso" and "Ojo con Alan Garcia", Caretas No. 719, October 1982. pp. 23-32.

Alva Castro was retained as the head of CONAPLAN. The remaining members of the Political Commission represented virtually all tendencies in APRA, with the notable exception of those who were seen as directly dependent on Villanueva. Although the Old Guard was represented, the new leadership was markedly younger than in past years, with the majority from the sixties or seventies generation.

In addition to leadership selection, new substantive accords were ratified in 1982, which reiterated rank and file sentiments that had been expressed since at least 1979. On one hand, they stressed the need for continued internal democracy and accountability, for more labor and popular sector representation within the party ranks, renovation of APRA's ineffective labor, neighborhood and youth organizations, and the expulsion of controversial union leader Julio Cruzado. On the other hand, a proposal for APRA's full integration into the Socialist International was rejected in favor of retaining Haya's longstanding position that the APRA was a unique political force and as such should remain simply an observer in the SI. But delegates did urge the new party leaders to reaffirm APRA's anti-imperialist, "democratic left" doctrine.<sup>53</sup>

As in the case of IU, the achievement of short-term unity and

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<sup>53</sup> See "Acuerdos del XIV Congreso Nacional Ordinario del Partido, 7-9 octubre, 1982", in Organizacion Aprista, Secretaria de Organizacion del Partido Aprista Peruano, 1984.

resolution of APRA's leadership problem took precedence over working through more divisive substantive issues. After this congress, further action on the internal front would be postponed in favor of supporting Garcia's campaign to revive the party's external image. Garcia was a young man with great ambition and pragmatism, who had the charisma other leaders lacked and who firmly believed that APRA could win a majority in Peru. "Alan is perspective" said one Aprista congressman, "Alan is possible triumph". His optimism, in turn, generated new excitement among the rank and file, who were tired of losing to the left and right, and willing to let the new General Secretary define a winning party line. Interviews with APRA militants at the time reflect this spirit;

"The APRA has to stop looking to the past. Haya's thought is our guide, but we have to stop fighting over which of his books is better. Alan makes new proposals...concrete ones, not fancy things in the air. That's why his election is so good"

"'With Alan we are going to win' say many Apristas. 'With Alan the APRA has changed. We all have to work together for victory. The frustrations within the party are forgotten. We are not going to forget our martyrs, but if they were alive today they would surely want to see us in power. For this we need an efficient party with executive men'.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Aprista militants interviewed in Gonzalez 1983, op cit.. The author also made the following observations;

"Garcia has not given APRA 'the promised land' that Haya spoke of, but rather the hope of winning; of triumph. And if Haya said that his ambition was not to reach the Presidential Palace, because anyone can reach the Palace, that what Apristas should want is to reach the conscience of the people... Garcia now tells Apristas that the objective of APRA is to reach the Palace, to win power, to cease being the sect that meets every February like the Senor de los Milagros in October... Thus the party understands

Once Garcia's internal leadership was established, he shifted his attention to convincing the non-Aprista public that he represented the best alternative to Belaunde. With the help of professional advisors, Garcia launched a modern public relations campaign of unprecedented magnitude in Peru. This involved reinforcing his opposition profile, making speeches in Congress against the International Monetary Fund and sweeping denunciations in the media of the government's economic policies. His name went out on a series of colorful, widely disseminated "Message to the Nation" pamphlets which also criticized the current policies. He personally joined labor marches and made rousing speeches around the country, encouraging the public to protest inequitable policies.<sup>55</sup>

The next step was to present the APRA to independent voters as an open and progressive alternative to both the radical left and the right. The old war cry of "only the APRA can save Peru" was replaced by a pluralist new message, "the APRA extends its hand to you", and a white dove of peace was added to the party symbol of a five-pointed red star. "We are trying seriously to change public opinion about us" Garcia

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that it has to change, because it is going to win...(47).

<sup>55</sup> The planning and detail that went into this campaign were conformed in the author's interviews with Garcia public relations advisor Hugo Otero on May 21 and May 23, 1985; former military officer and APRA campaign advisor Cesar Garrido Lecca on November 11, 1985; pollster Manuel Torrado on July 16, 1986, and other party leaders.

said in an interview, "(to change the view) that we are a closed and sectarian party".<sup>56</sup> To the general public, Garcia quickly became just "Alan", whose youthful good looks appeared on billboards and bumper stickers, in leaflets and on television. "We sold him like Coca Cola" said one party fundraiser, "and that's what the people like".<sup>57</sup>

In addition to mass appeals, Garcia cultivated individuals and select groups with power and influence that would be vital to APRA's new future. He made contacts with key journalists and progressive intellectuals, sharing "confidential" insights, asking them to comment on his book, and impressing them with his candid criticisms of APRA's past errors.<sup>58</sup> He also made rounds among major businessmen, asking them for policy advice and emphasizing his respect for private initiative. He cultivated independent professionals and had them join the APRA's Government Planning Commission (CONAPLAN). He travelled to Europe to make contact with

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<sup>56</sup> Interviewed in QueHacer No. 24, septiembre 1983.

<sup>57</sup> Cited in author's interview with Cesar Garrido Lecca, November 11, 1986. Garcia's impact was noticed early on by the editors of the newsweekly Caretas, who wrote in 1982 that "the youthful and renovating charisma of Alan Garcia--so effective in a country of youths like ours--generated unexpected enthusiasm... For the Apristas themselves it was a miraculous renovation. For many independents--and even militants of other democratic parties--it was also a moral renewal". The writers observed that even the marxist left was enthusiastic, seeing Garcia's emergence as a victory for the APRA's left wing. Caretas No. 719, octubre 1982, p. 17.

<sup>58</sup> From the author's interviews with journalist Raul Gonzalez, February 5, 1986; and intellectuals Carlos Franco, May 21, 1985; Julio Cotler, May 13, 1985; and Guillermo Rochabrun, May 30, 1985.

leading social democrats like Francois Mitterand of France and Felipe Gonzalez of Spain, whose own prestige reflected well on APRA. And he took special care to bolster APRA's relationship with the Armed Forces, meeting with active and retired officials, expressing concern for military interests and assuring them that the military played a prominent role in APRA's vision of national development.<sup>59</sup> Garcia already had his eye on the 1985 Presidential election, and his strategy seemed to be working. Within six months of the party convention he led national popularity polls, and the APRA's party membership also began to swell.<sup>60</sup>

While Garcia engineered a remarkable renovation of APRA's image and rhetoric by 1983, there were several important issues that had not been addressed. These included the definition of the party's concrete program, its relationship to IU, and its relationship with labor and popular organizations. Garcia's strong opposition stance suggested the radicalism of the early Haya, but his overtures to a variety of powerful interests revealed a more moderate line. Aprista youth, trade unionists and progressive party leaders had thrown their support behind Garcia, but they all

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<sup>59</sup> Interviews with Cesar Garrido Lecca and Raul Gonzalez, op cit.

<sup>60</sup> According to the author's interviews with then Secretary of Organization Alberto Kitasono and Garcia strategist Hugo Otero in 1986, party membership stagnated during the period of intense conflict in 1981-1982, but from 1983 on there was a sharp rise in registration and the formation of local party committees, with the largest increase in Lima. Based on an unpublished membership survey, party sources claim over 35,000 joined in 1983 and over 150,000 by 1985.

wanted greater clarity on these issues.

As it turned out, however, the APRA's new coalition was being built in a populist fashion around Garcia, not the party, and he was ambiguous about defining a specific program or organizational structure. Many younger Apristas shared youth leader Walter Espiritu's hopes that "the election of Alan means the reselling of the Aprista party in the style of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party", and Garcia did cultivate a moderate social democratic image. Yet although Alva Castro and the CONAPLAN team were apparently hard at work developing position papers on major policy issues, none of these reached the public arena. Instead, Garcia stuck to criticism of Belaunde and general statements about the need for greater attention to social justice, economic independence and popular participation.<sup>61</sup>

In regards to organized labor in particular, Garcia did depart from Aprista practice of the seventies, expressing support for the protests and strikes led by the CGTP, the SUTEP, and other non-Aprista union organizations. Yet he adopted a strategy distinct from Aprista progressives (who wanted to recapture labor terrain) and from comparative social democratic practice--a strategy conditioned by purely electoral criteria. Garcia and his advisors conceded that the major labor and peasant unions would ally with the IU, and he

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<sup>61</sup> Walter Espiritu is cited in Adams 1984, op sit, p. 37.

promised to respect their autonomy regardless.<sup>62</sup> But they also reasoned that organized urban and rural workers were a small fraction of the electorate, while there were many less organized, less politicized sectors of society that no party had yet incorporated--including new professional and middle class sectors, and new generations of rural and urban migrant poor, many of whom labored in the growing informal economy. Garcia stressed this in 1983;

"Just as sindicalism is expressed in a reduced percentage of Peruvian workers--who are at the same time a minority in this country--in the political parties one does not find a majority of Peruvians. Most of our compatriots are marginal to the parties, and not because they are apolitical, because they are motivated and well-oriented people...but because they have not been channeled or organized".<sup>63</sup>

The Garcia strategy towards popular sectors emerged from this calculus. On one hand, he would make subtle references to the "elitist" nature of organized labor, without denying labor accomplishments outright. On the other, he would make a strong effort to appeal both "below" and beyond this sector, making heavy use of the media and a populist discourse that

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<sup>62</sup> This strategy was reiterated in the author's interviews with Otero, Kitasono and other party strategists. In a speech to the Conferencia Nacional de Trabajadores (CONADET), a forum organized by the CGTP, Garcia responded to criticism of APRA's past labor record by emphasizing the party's anti-imperialist stance, especially on the debt issue, and promising support for job stability and other union concerns. He also argued that "the APRA party is not totalitarian, it is not going to destroy non-Aprista unions...let all unionists choose the colors they want!". From "El APRA respetara a sindicatos y buscara entendimiento con la CGTP", La Republica, 1 de marzo de 1985, p.3.

<sup>63</sup> Cited in "Alan Garcia: Pensando en el '83", QueHacer No. 24, septiembre 1983.



avoided class distinctions, using instead a variety of moving individual images--a young street vendor, a nursing mother, a hardworking Andean peasant, and a struggling student--to relay an Garcia's vision of el pueblo. As it happens, sectors of the marxist left were also beginning to seek a broader and more populist appeal, particularly as they shifted their focus to the municipal arena. But Garcia wagered that IU's ability to reach a multi-class audience would be hampered by its close relationship with the organized unions.

#### The Municipal Elections of 1983: New Definitions and Challenges

By 1983 the Peruvian economy was in serious recession. As the government's policies became increasingly identified by the public as the cause of the crisis in living standards, strikes and protests became more frequent, and both the parliamentary opposition and the organized labor movement moved back into the offensive. Indeed, with the breakdown of the Tripartite Commission and the government's increasingly authoritarian response to unrest, it seemed as though protest and violence were the only means by which the state and civil society could influence each other.

As the November 1983 municipal election campaign began to dominate the scene, however, the contest became a new outlet for opposition to the government. Both APRA and IU wanted to turn this event into a plebiscite on the government's policies, and each was in a position to benefit

electorally from the widespread discontent. For both APRA and IU these elections would also be a testing ground for their newfound unity and leadership, and for the political strategies they would carry into the 1985 general elections.<sup>64</sup>

For APRA the 1983 elections were a trial run for the moderate social democratic image that Garcia hoped would draw in independent voters and carry him to victory in 1985. In terms of national media attention as well as political influence, the mayorship of Lima was the most important race after the presidency. As APRA's candidate Garcia nominated Alfredo Barnechea, a wealthy young television journalist who had only recently joined the party but was close to Garcia and well known to the public. Cool and cosmopolitan in style, moderate in his presentations, Barnechea was the antithesis of the old-time Aprista politicians as well as the passionate young leftists. The primary goal at this point was to woo Lima's middle classes, who Garcia assumed would be reluctant to elect a marxist mayor or an old time Aprista. Barnechea put it this way;

"My candidacy played the role we wanted it to... Our message was fairly centrist, diluted, a message that would permit many non-Aprista peruvians to reunite with the APRA, which was our main objective. If the party always won only the Aprista vote we would never get to power, so this aspect of the campaign was accentuated

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<sup>64</sup> The following section draws on Fernando Tuesta Soldevilla, El nuevo rostro electoral: los municipales de 83 (Lima: DESCO, 1985).

and was then developed in Garcia's own campaign.<sup>65</sup>

This strategy produced some tensions within APRA, among both radicals and traditionalists. Armando Villanueva, returning from his lengthy European visit, criticized it as an excessively elitist candidacy and tacitly refused to support the Lima candidate, arguing that Barnechea would alienate the city's vast popular sectors and throw votes to IU. Torres Vallejo, a key ally in Garcia's rise to power, also threatened to resign as APRA's Sub-Secretary General in discrepancy with the new line. Yet APRA's early rise to the top of the polls was enough to quiet most of the doubters.

In these elections the United Left would also be testing a relatively moderate new program and the more pragmatic electoral approach favored by IU President Barrantes. The 1980 municipal elections had been the first step in this direction. Partly out of conviction and partly in an effort to differentiate themselves from the Shining Path, IU actions since 1980 had focused increasingly on the institutional arenas of democracy--especially municipal governments and Parliament--and on the national media. As expected, the IU's strategic shift was also not made without internal tensions. The more radical parties feared that IU was abandoning grassroots protest action and losing opportunities to extend its popular base, at a point when Peru was undergoing a new

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<sup>65</sup> From the author's interview with then-Congressman Alfredo Barnechea on March 12, 1986.

wave of societal radicalization. Prominent independents within the front also complained that this strategic shift had stalled the institutionalization of IU, limiting its ability to incorporate more potential sympathizers who were not party militants. The independents demanded that IU define clearer organizational norms, including the establishment of local IU committees and the democratic election of IU leadership.<sup>56</sup>

These tensions led to the convocation of IU's second national leadership conference in March of 1983, which produced its first General Program and a new Government Platform for 1983. Though ambiguous enough to achieve consensus among all six major forces, the General Program did confirm a moderate turn for the left front. The general objectives of IU were to be the struggle for establishment of a "democratic, popular, sovereign and independent state", which would open the way to socialism. The ultimate goal remained the "destruction of the liberal state of bourgeois domination" and its substitution by a popular, democratic state led by workers and peasants. But this now appeared as a dialectical process with an indefinite time frame. Furthermore, the parties agreed that this struggle would be a political one, with democracy as both a primary goal and condition for transition to socialism. In the meantime, the IU's government platform for 1983 focused on the current

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<sup>56</sup> See Henry Pease Garcia, "IU: una larga crisis con salidas posibles", QueHacer No. #20, diciembre 1982.

policy context rather than long-term revolutionary goals, and was infused with nationalist and democratic tenets, welfare state provisions and a respect for human rights that drew straight from the 1979 Constitution. Indeed, the IU platform in 1983 and thereafter was not far from that of Alan Garcia and APRA.<sup>ii</sup>

The immediacy of the electoral process nevertheless led to the postponement of longer-term plans for IU's organic development, in favor of the urgent need to select candidates and run campaigns. As the President of IU, Barrantes had initially insisted that he should not be a candidate, in order to give opportunities to younger leaders. Because IU still lacked a structure of its own, the National Directorate (CDN) initially proposed election of candidates and slates by a series of conventions. However, infighting among the different parties over preferential slots on the municipal lists created an impasse that raised bitter memories of 1980. Hence in Lima the CDN opted for the only consensual solution--to nominate Barrantes after all--a decision from which only the radical UDP abstained. Once this was decided the other pre-candidates withdrew their names and Barrantes was selected by acclamation. Barrantes' hand was greatly strengthened by this outcome. This was also a positive step for the

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<sup>ii</sup> Quotes and IU program in Bernales 1987, p cit., pp. 149-151. See also Tuesta 1985, op cit., pp. 58-60. The following discussion is also based on the author's interviews with PSR leader Enrique Bernales on January 15, 1986; independent IU leader Henry Pease Garcia on February 17, 1986, and UDP leader Carlos Malpica on February 19, 1986.

independents, as one of the conditions he demanded in exchange for his candidacy was to put a share of independents on the municipal lists, including prominent academics, professionals and some popular sector leaders.

It was clear early on that APRA and IU were the leading forces in the 1983 elections. The governing party and its PPC allies would have a difficult time winning in a context of widespread discontent, despite the fact that the AP ran former labor Minister Alfonso Grados as the candidate in Lima. In Lima Barrantes ran a pluralist campaign around the slogan of "una Lima para todos"--"a Lima for everyone"--which summarized IU's general proposal to democratize municipal government and the provision of local services, and played down its marxist and clasista heritage. Leftist party militants mobilized their supporters throughout the city's working class slums and shantytowns. In contrast to his competitors, Barrantes appealed to the urban poor as a humble man of the people, a modest labor lawyer who, like many of them, had migrated from the provinces and struggled to gain an education. In televised debates his sharp wit and down-to-earth demeanor were attractive to those who were otherwise skeptical about the contentious leftist parties.<sup>68</sup>

The APRA's national campaign was also a marked contrast to previous elections. Gone were the traditional marches, hymns and party symbols; in their place Garcia and the

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<sup>68</sup> See Tuesta 1985, op cit, p. 88.

municipal candidates campaigned together projecting youthfulness, moderation and pluralism. Although old time party leaders kept a lower profile in this race, at the local and provincial level the campaign was carried through by local party committees with militants who were well versed in electoral mobilization. In the Lima race, however, Barnechea proved to be a lukewarm campaigner whose telegenic appearance could not cover for a an obvious discomfort with campaigning and with relating to the poor electorate. His costly and aristocratic wedding in the midst of the campaign was also seen by most observers as bad taste in the midst of economic crisis.<sup>59</sup>

When the results were in, the APRA had won the largest share of the overall vote with 33 percent nationwide, but it was followed closely by IU with 28.8 percent of the vote. The AP dropped to 17 percent and the PPC trailed at 13.8 percent. The APRA's victory was truly national, winning not only traditional northern strongholds but also important new cities in the South. With this election the old and conflictive APRA appeared to have been put to rest, and the new pluralism of Garcia vindicated. Party militants were disappointed with Barnachea's lackluster performance in Lima, and nervous about IU's close finish overall. Yet even in Lima APRA's results were remarkable in historical terms, as the party placed second with the largest share of votes it had ever received in

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<sup>59</sup> Tuesta 1985, op cit., pp. 80-83.

the capital.

Perhaps the most stunning outcome of the 1983 election, however, was the IU's victory in Lima, where at 34 percent of the vote Barrantes became the first socialist mayor of a major Latin America city. For IU militants and sympathizers alike this victory generated unprecedented euphoria. Since Lima claimed a third of the total electorate and had the greatest concentration of political, social and cultural power in the nation, the IU celebrated this victory as though it were national. Gone was the aristocratic Lima of old; the victory of a modest provinciano was "the political manifestation of a new social reality, of the new fact of a more provincial, more cholo and overflowing city".<sup>70</sup> As Mayor of Lima, Barrantes would be supported by leftist mayors in 21 of the capital's 41 districts, including a clean sweep of the city's populous shantytowns as well as most of the older inner city working class and lower middle class neighborhoods. Some 51 percent of the IU's total votes came in Lima, followed by the highland city of Cusco and other Southern provinces. Outside of Lima the IU again won in regions where individual parties had a long trajectory of political work, or where there was a history of social rebellion.

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The elections of 1983 had a political impact that went well beyond their municipal nature. To all except Belaunde

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<sup>70</sup> Tuesta 1985, op sit, p. 100.



they were seen as a plebiscite demanding a change in course of government policy, and they marked a growing national consensus in favor of a more democratic and left-of-center alternative. They also made it clear that APRA and the IU were the main contenders to replace Belaunde in 1985, and demonstrated that IU's popular support was more on par with APRA than Garcia had initially calculated. Within APRA and IU, the results strengthened the hands of two charismatic leaders, Garcia and Barrantes, against those of internal rivals and critics. And this major taste of victory also prompted modifications on both sides that effectively made the two forces more similar in terms of program (nationalist and generally social democratic) and political style.

For the IU, the 1983 results reinforced the commitment of the majority of member parties to a democratic socialist path. The assumption of responsibility for municipal governance also encouraged a shift towards the search for concrete policy alternatives rather than engaging only in opposition. At the same time, the elections strengthened Barrantes' position considerably vis the various parties that comprised IU. As the highly popular Mayor of Lima, he would have his own base of power, and he could use this to overcome internal left resistance to his strategic decisions or to the demands of new constituencies.

For the APRA, the Barnechea's disappointing performance in Lima and IU's close finish overall prompted Garcia to make

readjustments in his campaign. He shifted to a more emphatically populist appeal and a more radicalized discourse, working to steal the left's thunder and broaden APRA's reach among the poor.

## CHAPTER VIII

### The Limits to a Democratic Left Convergence and the Persistence of Populism

In 1983 Peru had seemed headed for the worst crisis in the nation's history. The economy was nearing collapse, labor strife continued, and there was escalating political violence, while the Belaunde government turned a deaf ear to public protest, equating it with the subversion of democracy. Yet 1983 proved to be an important turning point for Peru's new democracy. Far from subverting the regime, the democratic left opposition breathed new life into it, with the triumph of APRA and IU in the municipal elections and the emergence of two popular and charismatic leaders--Garcia and Barrantes--as the main contenders to replace Belaunde in 1985.

Widely regarded as a plebiscite, the elections reflected a growing consensus among opposition politicians, interest group leaders, the media and the general public, in favor of major policy reversals as well as preservation of democracy. This included a call for economic policies that were more nationalist and more equitable, for national dialogue (concertacion) among contending interests, and for unity against both militarization at home and creditors abroad. From 1983 onward the leadership of APRA and IU vied to articulate these concerns, through new municipal governments, parliamentary opposition, the media, and expressed support for labor and popular protests.

Given the severity of the crisis as well as the growing consensus about change, prominent intellectual and political figures also began to call for a Democratic Front or "historic alliance" that would unite the APRA and IU and incorporate a wider array of social and political forces. If forged immediately, before the next round of electoral

competition took over, proponents felt such an alliance could help strengthen popular organization and curb the excesses of the Belaunde government and the Armed Forces, as well as confront the dramatic challenges of national reconciliation and democratization that no one party could tackle alone. The basic arithmetic of the 1985 general election, in which analysts predicted that neither APRA nor IU was likely to win an absolute majority in the first round, reinforced this position.

But could APRA and IU work together to reverse the regime's policies? And could either one, or a combination of the two, offer a viable democratic left political alternative for 1985? The previous chapter described how each of them made real strides over the early eighties towards greater internal unity, new leadership and more pluralist political appeals. Although they maintained important ideological and political differences, by 1983 the APRA and IU leadership already demonstrated many common trends. These included a clear shift towards electoral priorities, the adoption of similar nationalist and social democratic tenets (as one prominent IU economist put it, "seventy to ninety percent of our solutions to the nation's

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In Socialismo y Participacion No. 22, diciembre 1983, political analyst and former Velasco advisor Carlos Franco argued that "if we get to 1985 without changes in the economic policy, with a growing guerilla movement, with social pressure in the streets, with an increase in terrorism and repression...the electoral act here will have no more importance than it has today in Central America, and thus it will not legitimate anybody". In his view the only viable solution was an APRA-IU front that could lead a "profound national revolution". See also "Interviu de la Semana: Carlos Franco", Equis X 17 de septiembre de 1984. In La Republica 15 de agosto de 1982, prominent historian Pablo Macera also called for a new "Frente Democratico" with APRA, IU, and all centrist and left forces.

problems are the same")<sup>1</sup>, and the generation of extraordinarily popular individual leaders who articulated these new appeals. Having evolved this far in a similar direction, it was not surprising that an alliance between the two was seen by some as the logical next step.

Yet the IU proved to have serious limitations for translating its new unitary discourse into practice, the APRA also had difficulty grasping the opportunity to construct a broader and more democratic political organization, and efforts to forge an alliance between them proved unsuccessful. This chapter examines the factors blocking an APRA-IU alliance, arguing that the logic of electoral competition reinforced the historical antagonism between APRA and the marxist left, even while it influenced a convergence in their discourse and programs. It then takes a closer look at the underlying weaknesses within the IU and APRA, and the problematic decisions made by each in this crucial period of democratic transition and consolidation. These include a primary focus on short-run electoral victories, and dependence on personalist leaders over organization-building; a consequent persistence of weak party organization and limited ability to make collective decisions; and the inability of either party or front to become an effective channel of participation for the mass of urban and rural popular sectors that both claimed to represent. In sum, the way in which political unity was constructed in the short run postponed, and ironically reinforced, underlying tensions on each side.

#### The APRA-IU Relationship: Convergence and Competition

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<sup>1</sup> The IU economist is Javier Iguínez, interviewed by the author on November 20, 1986.

The relationship between the APRA and IU during the 1980s was a complex one. On one hand, there were deep historical antagonisms between them that militated against a positive relationship. On the other hand, the new political and social context of the 1980s, new leadership on each side, and increasingly convergent programmatic goals provided objective grounds for reconciliation and collaboration. Although their ultimate decision was to continue along separate and competitive paths in the 1980s, this was not a forgone or structurally determined outcome. And because their inability to cooperate represents a lost opportunity for greater consolidation and extension of Peru's fragile democracy, it is instructive to briefly review the decision points along the way.

The APRA's relationship to the marxist left was one of several points of conflict in the struggle for the internal leadership and political identity of APRA in the wake of Haya's death. While Villanueva proposed to shift APRA towards a more democratic left position and to seek reconciliation with like-minded sectors of the marxist left, Townsend maintained a visceral anti-Communism, rejected any relationship with the left, and even warned against possible "Allende-nization" within the APRA. Although Villanueva's generally social democratic stance eventually won out, party bases also urged the leadership to avoid making any alliances until APRA's own identity was better defined.

The appropriate stance to take vis-a-vis the APRA during this period was also a point of contention among the leftist parties. The radical left gloated over the APRA's apparent demise, and argued that IU

should concentrate on taking advantage of this to woo away Aprista bases. But others did not believe the APRA would fade so easily, and instead they discussed whether or not to make overtures to Villanueva and other progressive Apristas. As noted in the previous chapter, the editors of Marka recommended that the left welcome and encourage steps by APRA to build a modern social democratic party in Peru, given the positive role played by International Social Democracy in movements against dictatorship elsewhere in Latin America. At the same time, they urged leftists to concentrate on forging a united, revolutionary alternative, and avoid following the APRA's "siren song". This position essentially prevailed over 1980-1982.<sup>3</sup>

On both sides there was thus a general decision to avoid establishing a relationship until their separate identities were better defined--a new leader and image for APRA, and a united IU. Yet while these internal processes were under way both sides found increasing coincidences in external political arenas. In Parliament, APRA and left congressmen joined to interpellate cabinet ministers over issues of administration of justice, the national budget and foreign investment, even signing a joint declaration "In Defense of our National Petroleum". They also jointly opposed a restrictive new strike law proposed by the Belaunde Administration, which ultimately failed to pass. At the municipal level, they joined forces in the First Annual Mayor's Congress in early 1982 to question the AP majority and protest the impact of economic measures, and in the northern provinces the Aprista Mayor of Trujillo Torres Vallejo joined frequently with leftist leaders in

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<sup>3</sup> "Que Hacer frente al APRA?", Marka 8.14.80, p. 10-11.



regional strikes and other actions in protest of the economic policies and centralization. In the labor sphere, the CGTP and the Aprista CTP joined forces to present a pliego unitario to the government in January 1982, demanding policy reversals and wage increases. And the top leadership of both parties rejected Finance Minister Ulloa's call for a "national accord against inflation", demanding instead serious policy changes by the government.<sup>4</sup> In recognition of this practical coincidence, Peru's most widely-read newspaper La Republica undertook a concerted campaign in favor of APRA-left unity. This campaign took on a much wider appeal once Garcia was elected Secretary General of APRA. Barrantes welcomed Garcia's election, stating that "the acrimony between APRA and the other political organizations of the left is being smoothed out, and some coming together between us is evident".<sup>5</sup> Aprista progressives, including Roca, Torres Vallejo and labor leader Negreiros pressed Garcia to seek a closer relationship with IU and with the CGTP. Independents and other prominent leftists also called for a historical "reencounter" between these two forces, and some even urged them to form a "Democratic (or Popular) Front" for the 1985 elections.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> See "APRA e IU abandonan Congreso", La Republica, 1 de enero de 1982; "Primeras respuestas a Ulloa", La Republica, 11 de enero de 1982, p. 3; "Declaracion: 'el petroleo para los peruanos'", La Republica, 13 de febrero de 1982, p.3; and "Paro regional en el Norte", La Republica, 7 de abril de 1982, p. 7.

<sup>5</sup> Barrantes interviewed in El Observador, 13 de noviembre de 1982.

<sup>6</sup> See "Un peligroso vacio politico", La Republica, 27 de noviembre de 1981, p. 4; and "Una democracia para 1985", La Republica, 7 de abril de 1982, p. 10. In 1982 UDP leader Edmundo Murrugarra stated that Peru needed "the unity of all democratic and patriotic forces, to demand a radical change in economic policy and the cabinet itself". While many leftists feared any relationship with APRA, he argued that showed a lack

The leadership of IU took the first major step in June of 1983, calling for a national "Civic Convergence" in defense of democracy and inviting Garcia to sign a joint public declaration in defense of human rights and democratic liberties. Although this was a broad and consensual statement, there was some resistance on both sides; conservative Apristas argued that it would make APRA appear like "the tail end of marxism" just as they were trying to win over independent middle classes and the business sector, while the radical left UDP and FOCEP were still very distrustful of APRA's political intentions. But there were strong forces on both sides who favored such a common action, so it would up to Garcia to make the final decision.

Garcia's decision was negative. While he agreed that there were coincidences between them, he stated that the common defense of democracy did not imply the formation of any Popular Front or the signing of any joint statements. He even declined to meet with IU leaders, saying that the APRA's Political Committee was opposed and that the party was too busy preparing for the upcoming municipal elections of November 1983. Garcia's concern was less ideological than practical--he wanted to consolidate the

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of confidence in themselves and in the working class. See "'Solo un Frente Politico salvara al Pais': Edmundo Murrugarra", La Republica, 16 de abril de 1982, p.9.

Aprista Torres Vallejo argued that an alliance between APRA and IU was necessary for 1985. In his view APRA had just two options, to go with the right or the left, and the logical path was with the left. "With the government of 1985 we should construct a socialist and democratic nation, as Victor Raul Haya de la Torre and Jose Carlos Mariategui both dreamed of", he said in La Republica, 17 de enero de 1983. Interviewed by the author on March 10, 1986, Carlos Roca says that in 1983 he renewed his early demand to construct a Popular Front with the left, "to carry the oppressed classes to power in 1985".

profile and electoral strength of his party, and was willing to postpone substantive concerns to that end. This attitude nevertheless strengthened those within IU who suspected that APRA lacked a serious commitment to human rights or social justice. From here on they argued that APRA should make the next move.<sup>2</sup>

After APRA and IU both emerged as victors in the 1983 elections, proponents of an alliance between them argued that this made it all the more necessary in order to forge a democratic left majority in 1985. And some modest gestures were made in this direction. For example, Villanueva held a victory dinner for Barrantes and an array of APRA and IU leaders, Barrantes stated that "the left is no longer afraid of dialogue and coincidences", and Garcia told Barrantes publicly that he hoped 1985 would be "a year of coincidences between APRA and IU, on broad democratic and nationalist goals". Yet in fact, over the next year both sides strengthened their resolve to compete for the same political space and seek separate victories in 1985.<sup>3</sup>

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31 Garcia stated that "We are not interested in losing our electoral identity, and neither is the left. But we do realize that in opposition efforts there are permanent coincidences, and we think these should be deepened". "Juntos pero no revueltos: Alan", El Diario, 28 de junio de 1983, p.7. In Expreso, 20 de junio de 1983, pp. 405, IU's Javier Diez Canseco said that this demonstrated APRA's lack of seriousness about these issues, and added that in any case it was the leftist bases who should decide about this relationship and not the leadership. The Communist Party claimed that Garcia's stance was a triumph for APRA's anti-communist sectors; FOCEP argued that there should be no future efforts to cooperate with APRA; and UNIR's Rolando Brena said that it was up to APRA to take any future initiative.

<sup>2</sup> "Villanueva: El APRA, la historia y tres horas con Fidel", QueHacer No. 27, febrero 1984, pp. 57-61. After his election Barrantes said that all discussion of an APRA-IU pact was misguided, and pointed out that "by reviving the old anticommunist banners, Senor Garcia has provoked unnecessary distancing. Nevertheless, in spite of these

In the case of IU, Barrantes' strategy in Lima had included a conscious effort to woo the APRA's popular and lower middle class bases as well as independent voters. Playing on rank-and-file Apristas' dissatisfaction with their party's elitist candidate and campaign, Barrantes portrayed himself as the true standard-bearer of APRA's historical commitment to grassroots organization and the urban working classes.<sup>3</sup> With his modest provinciano demeanor and plain talk Barrantes did prove appealing to Apristas as well as independents. Hence the IU made no secret of its desire to compete for the same constituencies nationwide, rather than respect any Aprista "terrain". Meanwhile, Garcia's rejection of a pre-election meeting with IU was used by the radical left parties in their jockeying for position within the front. For example, UDP leader Carlos Malpica accused more moderate IU leaders of pro-aprismo and "social democratic deviation", adding the following;

"This starts from the dubious assumption that APRA is social democracy, and thus we have to pact with them and erase overnight the fifty years of political, ideological and programmatic antagonism... (But) the APRA is the same as always, with leaders who sometimes lean to the left, sometimes to the right, according to

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attitudes, we will continue to have coincidences at the congressional and municipal levels". "Dar posada al peregrino aunque sea cajamarquino", Caretas, 29 de noviembre de 1983, pp. 29.

<sup>3</sup> During the 1983 campaign Barrantes commented that "while it is true that the APRA is a popular party, we have the right to consider that those combative Aprista masses are reluctant to give their support to those who just join the party for the electoral process...I have evidence that of the 400,000 or so votes that I received in 1980, for example, no less than 50,000 came from the Aprista masses" (Barrantes 1985, op cit., p.123). After the election, he proclaimed that "the APRA always had a monopoly on mass convocations; but since (the election) this capacity for convening masses is held only by IU" (ibid, p. 169). In the author's interview with APRA leader Carlos Roca on March 10, 1986, he underscored his fellow Apristas' frustration with Barrantes' success, saying the IU leader was "more Aprista than the APRA".

what serves the general interests of the party".<sup>10</sup>

On the APRA side, Garcia had to reassess the party's appeal to popular sectors in the wake of Barrantes' victory, and his decision was also to fight harder to win over the same uncommitted majority, as well as to reassure his own bases' commitment to an APRA victory in 1985. He would do this by adopting the IU's more radicalized discourse, but at the same time putting greater distance between APRA and the leftist parties. Garcia continued to play on the fears of the independent middle classes, the military and dominant economic elites, encouraging them to support APRA as a hedge against a marxist victory. He calculated that the IU was in an impossible position; with Sendero on one side and the military on the other, it had to pursue a moderate democratic left line not too different from APRA's. But he knew the radical sectors of IU were uncomfortable with Barrantes' moderation and might be less convincing to the public. The APRA would keep its distance and present itself as the "responsible" alternative."

Thus although greater cooperation between APRA and IU in the 1980s was widely seen as a way to reverse unpopular government policies and

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<sup>10</sup> "Malpica va al grano. Es un error creer que hay tendencias de izquierda en el APRA", El Diario de Marka, 11 de marzo de 1984, p.7.

<sup>11</sup> Garcia interview in Caretas No. 753, 18 de julio de 1983, p. 11. Interviews with APRA militants suggest that even the progressives were generally satisfied with this approach. As one of them put it;

"We had come to see the left as a natural ally and this enthused many, but it dismayed many more, within and outside APRA...because APRA should win the middle sectors, and if we got too close to the left we lose them. Alan Garcia understood this, that we had to maintain our distance from them" (cited by Gonzalez 1983, op cit, p. 44).

strengthen Peruvian democracy, a number of factors prevented this from happening. The most important was still the weight of history. The APRA's past trajectory was one of controversial pacts with dominant elites, trading off popular sector interests in vain attempts to win political power. The radical "New Left" had been born in reaction to this perceived betrayal, and after decades in which Aprismo and anti-Aprismo defined Peruvian politics they were reluctant to trust Garcia's progressive new image. The APRA's anti-communist Old Guard was equally reluctant to trust the left's evolution into a democratic force. Furthermore, those past alliances were so widely repudiated in Peru that any attempts at civilized dialogue or tactical cooperation between different political forces tended to raise deep-seated fears of "pactismo", equated with the selling out of ones' basic principles.

The second factor was that APRA was indeed still pursuing a strategy of winning over dominant elites--in this case the Armed Forces and the business community. In the 1980s this was not done through formal political pacts, but through convincing them that APRA would respect their main concerns; respect for the military establishment and internal security, and respect for the role of private property and initiative. Hence while a moderate social democratic program was acceptable, the APRA wanted to stake out the "center" of Peru's shifting political spectrum, avoiding any relationship with IU that would suggest further radicalization of its program or mobilization of popular sectors.

Finally, both of these factors were exacerbated by the demands of electoral competition. Because each side thought that it could in fact win a first or second-round electoral victory in 1985, and because each of

them prioritized this path, they saw any pre-electoral relationship as a threat to their potential votes. Indeed, as the 1985 campaign got under way the relationship between APRA and IU grew increasingly bitter. Presiding over a multi-party city council, Barrantes accused the Apristas of deliberate obstructionism and electioneering, including refusal to approve the budget and support for a municipal workers' strike against Barrantes. Aprista and marxist militants also traded barbs in the media, and clashed in efforts to win votes in new shantytown areas.

#### IU: The Paradoxes of Success

Participation in municipal elections had thrust the IU into the national spotlight well before the front was consolidated. Among the member parties and their respective leaders there was still no real agreement on IU's doctrine, strategy, or permanent structure, its relationship with popular sectors, or its positions on key issues such as economic policy and the counterinsurgency policy. Some of the individual parties were uncomfortable with the mantle of "loyal opposition" that the front was playing with increasing success, and there had been little reflection on how to shift from an electoral pact to a mass organization in this context. All of this had to be worked out quickly, or put aside, as the left assumed responsibility for municipal governments and a small parliamentary block, for delivering tangible benefits to new constituencies and competing in successive elections.

The United Left nevertheless held together and matured considerably over the 1980s. As IU Senator Malpica put it, the IU was "a marriage of interests, not of love"--any party tempted to leave the alliance knew that

it would be punished at the polls.<sup>12</sup> By 1983 IU had developed a broadly democratic socialist platform, a popular leader with national appeal, and a multi-class constituency that extended well beyond the original ranks of party and union militants. It was the largest legal left in the hemisphere, and a serious contender to replace the Belaunde government in 1985.

Yet the achievement of unity did not erase serious contradictions inherited from the past, or resolve the underlying challenges to a socialist movement that are posed by transition to democracy. In fact, the way in which unity was maintained had postponed, and ironically exacerbated, internal tensions that IU had begun with. These included a persistent tension between the autonomy of the parties and the unity of the front; the problems of leadership selection; the relationship between IU and the major labor and popular organizations; the problems of putting IU's programmatic goals into practice; and the balance between electoralism and efforts to build a more "organic" democratic socialist organization. Although the attainment of short-term political success involved a conscious decision to postpone such issues, a high price was paid for this by the end of the decade, as the IU found itself unable to develop into the kind of broad-based democratic left organization that could effectively link the demands of Peru's vast popular sectors with the formal political sphere and bring about profound policy change.

The most obvious handicap that the IU inherited from past decades was the longstanding ideological and political conflict among its founding members. The specific doctrinal disputes between pro-Soviet Communists,

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<sup>12</sup> "Mañica va al grano...", El Diario 3 de marzo de 1984, op cit.



maoists, velasquistas and others had diminished considerably in the 1980s, with the decision to participate together in the electoral process. However, the underlying tensions did not vanish so quickly, and in particular the division between the so-called "reformist" and "radical" groups from the 1970s persisted beneath the surface. Their dividing lines now revolved around such issues as the kind of democracy desired (e.g., the reformists favored strengthening the institutions of representative democracy, while the radicals advocated alternative structures of popular power and "democracy from below"), and the way the left should participate in democratic politics (e.g., the relative merits of pursuing access to government office, versus mobilizing grassroots opposition). They also disputed the type of alliances to form (particularly the relationship with APRA), and the position to take vis-a-vis the armed insurgents and the military's counterinsurgency policy. While the national public face of IU became increasingly represented by the moderate Barrantes, the radicals represented the left's largest mass-based parties and hence their demands could not be ignored.

The ideological and political differences between the left forces were not, however, the main obstacles to the consolidation of IU. Rather, it was the party structures and political culture these differences engendered that posed the greatest problems, and that persisted even when the original sources of conflict had disappeared. Most of the party leaders did not enter IU in a unitary spirit, but rather for pragmatic electoral ends. While supporting IU in elections, they fully expected to preserve their existing bases and continue their longer term competition for power and hegemony within the front and without. The struggle for IU

leadership posts and quotas of parliamentarians, mayors, city councilmen and the like became of great importance for these partisan ends. At the same time, the six component parties and groups were determined to retain for themselves privileged relations with the labor and popular organizations whose leadership they had previously "captured" and guarded jealously.<sup>2</sup>

In addition to inter-party rivalries, the inherited political culture of the leftist leadership was antithetical to genuine fraternity or compromise. Many left party leaders combined the worst historical traits of Peruvian politics--clientelism, caudillismo, ambition for power, territoriality--with the intolerance and vanguardism of a lifetime of leninist politics. For the radical parties, the internal struggle against "reformism" had always been considered fundamental to progress, and it was through polemical defense of one's own tendency against others that hegemony was conquered--this is symbolized in their slogan "el consenso se impone" ("consensus is imposed"). And for those who had been in control of their own parties, it was difficult to cede real authority to a collective leadership.

These obstacles were all recognized when the IU was founded, of course, but party bases had hoped that the front itself would help to overcome them. Instead, the structure of the front actually formalized and reinforced them. The initial pact gave the founding parties and their existing leaders formal equality of representation in the National Directorate (CDN), regardless of the size of their bases. It also

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<sup>2</sup> See Fernando Rospigliosi, Juventud obrera y partidos de izquierda (Lima: IEP, 1988); and Bernalles 1987, Socialismo y Nación op cit., p. 170.

established decision-making for the front by consensus alone, while granting each party autonomy to define its own program and strategy outside of the electoral arena. In the short run this structure was seen as the necessary price to pay for unity. But over the long run it froze in place an artificial balance of power and privilege at the top, creating persistent tensions among the member parties, between these and the increasing ranks of independents interested in IU, and between the leadership in general and its actual and potential bases. During elections the parties rallied around a set of candidates and a general program. Yet between elections, each party, sub-group or leader concentrated on developing its/his own profile and bases, rather than working to organize IU or implementing the common program.

The longer-term cost of this structure was organizational and programmatic stalemate, the lack of a clear collective public identity, and an increasing distance between the party leadership and IU's broad popular constituency. This had two general results. First, it favored a much greater concentration of power and representation in the IU's charismatic president, Barrantes, than was ever anticipated by the founders of the front. At the same time, it generated discontent among rank-and-file leftists and sympathizers, encouraging defection towards APRA by some and towards the armed movements by others.

The debate over party autonomy surfaced shortly after the 1980 municipal elections, when the IU convened regional meetings to bring together its elected officials around common goals. Strengthened by his electoral turnout and that of other independent leftists, Barrantes made it clear that he thought the weight of the parties was a drag on IU's

development. In his view the party leaders lacked the ability "to feel the heartbeat of the masses", which he had developed through years of practical experience. From here on Barrantes and his allies would advocate the evolution of IU into one large party with its own local, regional, and national organization--one that would replace its founding groups altogether.<sup>4</sup>

The parties had various reasons to resist this proposal. First, they were reluctant to cede their hard-won social bases to a new organization whose goals, beyond winning elections, were still ill-defined. Unless real unity could be achieved on issues of substance and longer-term strategy (a process that would be very difficult given the nature of the front), they preferred to maintain their autonomy. For example, although the CGTP was an important source of support for IU, the Communist Party was reluctant to give up its formal dominance of the leadership of this major trade union organization. And the UDP and UNIR, which were the largest and also the most radical groups within the front, also preferred to maintain their identity and partisan links to Peru's major peasant confederation, mineworkers and teachers' unions. Their attacks on the artificial equality of IU's leadership were seen as a threat by all other parties and by Barrantes. Yet it was the smaller parties that had the most to fear from turning IU into one big organization, since the direct election of IU leadership by the rank-and-file, rather than by party quotas, might have left them without a seat at

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<sup>4</sup> "Los frutos de la unidad", Equis X, 12 de diciembre de 1980, p. 23; and "Ni ilusiones reformistas ni renuncia a los principios", El Diario, 28 de junio de 1981, p. 10, both reprinted in Barrantes 1985, op cit, pages 47 and 65, respectively.

the table.

While the parties deserved much of the blame for the organizational stagnation of IU, Barrantes also bore his share of responsibility. From the outset his presidency of IU was less a factor of positive consensus than of a stalemate among rival leaders; he was the only one they could all agree on. But instead of working to smooth conflicts and build stronger alliances with the other leaders, he formalized a conflictive relationship, by airing his grievances in the mass media, forming his own team of personal advisors rather than drawing on the parties, and stressing personal loyalty over party representation in the selection of his staff.

After winning the 1983 Municipal elections, Barrantes' claim to represent the popular will gained greater weight within IU as well as outside, and his margin of autonomy vis-a-vis the parties increased. Yet this high visibility and individual power contributed little to development of the front itself. On the contrary, it opened up a new dividing line. On one side were those who promoted Barrantes' leadership, out of personal loyalty or because he was the left's only "exportable" national candidate (barrantistas). On the other were those who were frustrated and opposed to this, either out of personal rivalry or out of genuine concern that his personalist and populist leadership was an obstacle to the left's organizational development.

Due primarily to these internal tensions, the program of IU remained undefined until 1983 and the structure of the front was also just a tacit pact until 1984. After considerable complaints from IU leaders about the lack of a concrete program, and rising competition from Alan Garcia and

APRA, the second national leadership conference of IU (the II Ampliado Nacional) was finally held in March of 1983, to define and publish a General Program for IU. As noted in the previous chapter, they produced a very broad statement that essentially outlined a nationalist and democratic socialist vision for Peru.<sup>15</sup>

It was not until a III Ampliado Nacional in April of 1984, however, that organic norms for the organization of IU itself were drafted, defining who could be militants of IU as well as the territorial organization of the front itself. Here the delegates specifically called for the transition from a collection of parties to a mass front of socialist orientation, opening membership to people without party affiliation who adhered to the general IU program and strategy. They also reached a consensus that Barrantes would be the IU's presidential candidate for 1985. But the 120 delegates (10 of them independents and the rest party leaders) did not devise internal mechanisms for electing other internal IU leaders or political candidates. Instead, they postponed this for a later event, agreeing only to consider universal

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<sup>15</sup> The 1983 program declared IU's main objective to be the struggle for the establishment of a "Democratic, Popular, Sovereign and Independent State that opens the way to Socialism". It also declared that IU would pursue socialism and the democratization of society through political struggle, not through violent means. The state under IU would not be exclusively class-based, but based on an alliance of urban and rural classes and "the unity of the people". The IU would seek to restructure production under state guidance, make agricultural development the base for national industry, encourage individual and collective initiative through decentralized planning, and encourage pluralism in the forms of property ownership, with nationalization and state control of only the most important multinational or monopolistic sectors. The IU would also promote the democratization of society, defend equality of rights between men and women, and promote full employment, universal social security, and adequate health, education and welfare for all Peruvians. Reprinted in Bernalles 1987, op cit, p. 150.

direct election by militants for candidates to the House of Representatives (Diputados).<sup>13</sup>

In 1984 the IU leadership reiterated that IU's main objective was to gain power--la toma de poder--essentially through electoral means, in order to establish a transitional Democratic Popular State. At the same time they affirmed that "the accumulation of social forces" was also crucial, turning IU into a mass-based, multi-class organization that could incorporate the diversity of oppressed social groups and "democratic, patriotic and progressive sectors". Hence delegates underscored the importance of combining electoral competition with support for labor and regional strike action, and for grassroots popular movements.<sup>14</sup>

By 1985 the IU had control over a number of municipal governments, a small but highly visible Parliamentary group, influence in the media as well as the organized labor and popular movement, and a fairly moderate Government Plan that expressed widely-held democratic and nationalist sentiments. Yet in terms of organizational development and practical programmatic achievements, little had actually been advanced. The small National Directive Committee (CDN) remained the front's only real deliberative body, and this continued to be comprised primarily of the General Secretaries of the founding parties, with Barrantes nominally presiding. Furthermore, the CDN continued to make decisions on the basis of consensus, which meant that on controversial issues there were few concrete accords at all. In practice, little territorial organization of IU was carried out, and where there were IU "Base Committees" formed these

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<sup>13</sup> This debate is cited in Resumen Semanal, 27 de abril de 1984.

<sup>14</sup> Bernalles 1987, op cit, p. 151-153.

tended to be dominated under the surface by individual parties. Despite public sympathies for the left, there were no effective channels for affiliating new members directly to IU, rather than through the separate parties, whose political autonomy continued. The IU had no newspaper of its own, few locales, no youth organizations or sectoral associations. In practice, it remained a coordinating body of parties which convened for short-term objectives, primarily elections and press releases, while between elections the parties pursued their own agendas.

Barrantes remained the strongest advocate of a gradualist democratic left strategy. In his view, the drafting of electoral programs, participation in elections and management of local government would force the left to propose concrete solutions to everyday problems, move closer to the popular sectors they claimed to represent, and reduce their seventies image of petulance and dogmatism. As the IU's electoral fortunes improved an increasing number left leaders came to share this approach. Yet there remained a real contradiction between the IU's moderate programs and leftist practice.

First of all, the official positions of IU contrasted sharply with the persistently radical discourse of the more militant party leaders (particularly the UDP and the maoist Patria Roja) and allied labor and popular organizations (such as the CCP, FNTMMP, and SUTEP). While IU as such shifted towards a moderate democratic left stance, these groups decided to join forces in 1983 to challenge this position. Worried about competition for the left's social bases from Sendero Luminoso and the urban guerilla group MRTA, as well as from APRA, their aim was to alter the balance of power within the front, challenge Barrantes' leadership,



encourage greater focus on grassroots mobilization, and impose more radical programmatic goals. In 1983 they formed a new "Coordinadora Mariateguista", named after the father of Peruvian socialism, and in 1984 they formed a new party, the Partido Unificado Mariateguista (PUM). The PUM was a result of the paralysis of IU, and ironically it adopted Barrantes's original solution for this, which was to turn IU into one large organization with internally elected leadership (in which PUM's larger mass base was likely to result in greater influence). Yet the rest of the parties and Barrantes were sufficiently threatened by the PUM to resist efforts at altering the internal decision-making structure. For its part, the PUM was still a fragile coalition with its own problems of leadership and internal democracy, and was not willing to leave IU and risk either electoral or military defeat. Hence it remained in the position of supporting IU, while attempting to fortify its parallel organization and defend often contradictory policy positions.<sup>12</sup>

Radicals and reformists alike also found it difficult to translate the IU's general programmatic statements into the development and implementation of concrete policy alternatives. Their lack of governance

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<sup>12</sup> Vanguardia Revolucionaria leader Javier Diez Canseco proclaimed that this process "would radically alter the political map of the left", and was part of a general strategy to conquer power ("Proceso de unificación izquierdista", El Observador, 3 de mayo de 1983).

On May 28, 1984, the "First National Convention of Mariateguista Unity" was held. The new leaders of the PUM--Santaigo Pedraglio of PCR, Diez Canseco of VR and Carlos Tapia of MIR--announced that PUM would be "a new organization, within IU, qualitatively superior, as an instrument to realize the historical socialist project in this country" (El Diario, 28 de mayo de 1984, p. 6). Barrantes responded that he strongly disagreed with this strategy, and also insisted that "mariateguismo" was the patrimony of all of the left and the Peruvian people, not just these parties (El Observador, 28 de mayo de 1984, p. 14).

experience was exacerbated by the fact that while there was agreement on IU's opposition stance vis the current government, it was hard for the left leadership to agree on concrete alternatives on the major, controversial issues of the day--such as economic policy, counterinsurgency and the protection of human rights.

The left's newly elected officials were therefore left largely to their own devices and to the resources of their respective parties in trying to draft legislation, and plan and implement programs to meet the immediate demands of their jobs. At the municipal level there were some very positive experiences, with leftist mayors and city council members initiating long-overdue reforms and encouraging grassroots participation in local government. Yet interviews with local IU authorities in the 1980s revealed widespread complaints about the lack of local-level IU organization or strategic support from the national leadership. Once the elections were over, they reiterated that the IU established few local committees and enacted few programs of technical support, nor was much attention paid to forming a new generation of leaders.<sup>3</sup>

In Parliament the IU generally voted as a bloc, and played an important role in voicing human rights concerns in particular. Leftists led parliamentary opposition to the harsh anti-terrorism law in 1981 (which was nonetheless overruled by Executive Decree), promoted investigative commissions of gross rights abuses, and publicized human

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<sup>3</sup> "Pueblos juvenes: Que paso con la IU?", QueHacer No. 35, junio-julio, 1985, pp. 41-45.

rights concerns locally and internationally.<sup>33</sup> But for the most part the left had difficulty in acting effectively as a minority. The leftist candidates sent to Parliament were largely people with years of experience in protest activities and opposition, but inexperienced in the arts of drafting legislation, parliamentary procedure and political compromise. Much of their time was spent in vociferous denunciations of the Belaunde government and the military, as well as in internal disputes among themselves, and they produced relatively few significant pieces of legislation. As in the municipal case IU offered little technical assistance to its parliamentary bloc. And there were few channels of communication and accountability between these elected representatives and the broad IU constituency.<sup>34</sup>

Perhaps of most concern to the leftist parties and sympathizers, however, was the IU's evolving relationship with the organized labor and popular movement, and with the broader sectors of urban and rural poor that the left saw as its constituency. The IU's ideal was to combine the structures of representative democracy with the promotion of stronger organized social movements and new forms of grassroots participation. A united left front would help to consolidate and extend the labor and popular movement, and represent it in the national political arena. Indeed, IU founders argued that a major difference between their project

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<sup>33</sup> See Abdicating Democratic Authority: Human Rights in Peru, An Americas Watch Report, October 1984, pp. 53-56; and A New Opportunity for Democratic Authority: Human Rights in Peru, An Americas Watch Report, September 1985, p. 40.

<sup>34</sup> See Enrique Bernalles, El Parlamento Por Dentro (Lima: DESCO, 1984); and La Izquierda en el Parlamento (Lima: Servicios Populares, 1984).

and APRA's was that they sought to strengthen civil society "from below" rather than control it from above.

In the 1980s the leaders of most major labor and peasant organizations continued to identify with left parties, as did many neighborhood associations. The initial formation of IU was a positive influence on these organizations. Labor and popular sector leaders appeared on parliamentary lists, longtime neighborhood activists were elected to left-run municipal government, leftist politicians lent their support to strikes and protests, and they were able to marshal support in Parliament to block new anti-strike legislation. Left political unity was mirrored in increasing labor unity, as the largely Communist Party-dominated national leadership of the CGTP (to which 85 percent of organized labor was affiliated) opened its ranks to important unions led by PUM and other non-Communist groups, including the SUTEP and the FNTMMP. Greater unity was also achieved in rural organization, through the formation of the CUNA in 1983, in which the CCP and CNA joined a coordinating committee of some fifteen agricultural organizations.<sup>22</sup>

However, as the decade unfolded and the economic situation of the working classes declined drastically, organized labor and popular leaders became more critical of the left politicians, and their rank-and-file

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<sup>22</sup> In 1985 the CGTP had an estimated 500,000 members. This included the power confederation of civil construction workers (70,000 members) and the bank employees' federation (25,000), which were backbones of the Communist Party. The mine and metalworkers' federation, FNTMMP (40,000 members), and the teachers' federation SUTEP (100,000 members), led by more radical leftists, were also technically affiliated. See Neibuhr Arellano, "Izquierda y sindicatos en el Peru", unpublished Bachiller thesis, Universidad Federico Villareal, December 1985. The following section draws on Arellano; Balbi and Parodi 1981, op cit; Parodi 1988, op cit; and Rospigliosi 1988, op cit.

began to drift away from active support for IU. As Peruvian labor analysts have point out, in the seventies the leftist parties provided labor and popular organizations with a militant, class-conscious discourse (clasismo) and forms of solidarity that were useful in a context of opposition to a military regime. Now, with a transition to democracy on one hand and deepening economic crisis on the other, these sectors expected continued solidarity--and also more effective political representation and reversal of current state policies. Yet in fact, the shift to electoral priorities led the political leaders of most parties to focus greater energy on winning over the vast urban and rural poor who were not organized in unions or parties, through populist appeals and methods rather than working closely with existing labor and peasant organizations. And importantly, the development of a cadre of professional left politicians also led to a progressive distancing between the political leadership and the daily concerns of workers and peasants--a crucial obstacle to the construction of a social democratic alternative. Those who remained actively committed to the plight of these sectors, such as PUM and the PC, had great difficulty moving beyond "standard" opposition methods--such as press denunciations and calls for general strikes--which were not particularly successful in this new context.

These problems were clearly seen in the changing relationship between the left and organized labor. The CGTP remained an important political actor in its own right in the 1980s, due to its hegemonic position in the labor movement and the intransigence of its own leadership. But the ability of organized labor to defend the living standards of its members declined dramatically over the 1980s, and trade union members

found that the national left leadership provided limited concrete help in this regard. At the same time, the various parties within IU continued to use their "control" of labor and peasant leadership as bargaining chips for influence within the front, something that was increasingly resented as manipulation by popular sector leaders and the rank-and-file.

In the case of rural organizations this political abandonment by IU was felt even more strongly. The main concerns of peasants and other rural producers, represented by the organizations grouped in the Unitary National Agrarian Council (CUNA), included access to land, stagnation of agricultural production, general abandonment of the countryside by civilian authorities, and increasing violence against the peasantry by military and by Sendero. The IU did not have a strategy for stemming the tide of the Belaunde policies, nor an alternative rural policy, and only the PUM was actively taking up the issue of land rights within IU. And although the left took up the banner of human rights, this was an easily politicized issue for them and did not result in the kind of broader national support necessary to reverse repressive state policies. The parties with important presence in the countryside found their local leaders subject to violence from both the military and Sendero, and they could offer little in the way of protection.

While labor and peasant organization had been the theoretical foundation and political backbone of the great popular mobilizations of the 1970s and the emergence of the electoral left, it was the poor urban neighborhoods that received the most attention from IU after 1980, and particularly after the municipal elections of 1983. This shift in attention coincided with electoral incentives, as organized labor remained

a minority of the Peruvian population while new voters were largely urban and poor. It was also consistent with IU's programmatic evolution, towards a vision of a broad alliance of oppressed groups and "progressives" of all classes. Working through neighborhood or regional-level organization rather than gremios, the left could ideally reach more women, youths, the unemployed, and families, leading to a broader and more truly representative organizational base. Yet in practice this strategy had mixed results. Under the IU-led Municipality of Lima between 1983 and 1985, important steps were made in organizing low-income neighborhoods and especially poor women, and concrete benefits such as a popular free milk program for children and a proliferation of community soup kitchens were attained. Yet in some districts of Lima and other provinces the IU made little progress in the way of lasting political and social organization, or added little to preexisting local community groups. Indeed, in some districts critics questioned how different the left's behavior was from traditional populism, especially when new populist leaders emerged to successfully challenge the left's leadership. Furthermore, for large sectors of the urban and rural poor their main form of "incorporation" into IU remained the same as through other political parties, ie, through elections and occasional participation in rallies and protests.<sup>23</sup>

Eventually, the discontent of the more militant labor and popular sector forces led to the formation of several "National Popular Assemblies" (ANP). These were large conferences of labor and popular leaders and some party representatives. While not directly confronting

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<sup>23</sup> See Teresa Tovar Samanez, "Vecinos y pobladores en la crisis (1980-1984), in Eduardo Ballon ed., Movimientos sociales y crisis: el caso peruano (Lima: DESCO, 1986), pp. 113-163.

the IU, the ANP was not convened by the front; rather, it was an alternative arena in which wider criticism of the front was aired and separate goals were formulated. Invitations to participate were extended to the small unions affiliated with APRA and the Christian Democratic Party. At the same time, while remaining critical of Sendero Luminoso, the ANP also extended participation to radical groups outside of IU, and was more tolerant towards advocacy of armed struggle and the boycott of elections. Yet the ANP remained a temporary form of meeting, a way of airing frustrations and calling for change, that did not evolved into a lasting form of organization and political pressure on either IU or the state.<sup>34</sup>

The presence of Sendero and other armed groups proved to be one of the major challenges to the legal left in the 1980s, and another one that the IU was never fully able to resolve. Sendero's increasingly coercive relations with the poor and attacks on the legal left itself did bring a new consensus across much of Peru's political elite about the value of democracy as well as the need for distributive justice. The IU joined other parties in denouncing Sendero, and the presence of the terrorist group was a factor in the IU's moderation. Yet Sendero and the MRTA were also powerful poles of attraction for popular sectors and youths in particular who were frustrated with the inability of the political elite

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<sup>34</sup> See "Asamblea Nacional Popular", El Diario, 22 de septiembre de 1983. In 1983 the ANP included representatives of the CGTP and most IU member parties; the small Aprista and Christian Democratic unions; representatives of regional defense fronts, professional associations and women's organizations, as well as trotskyites and other leftist outside of IU. On March 7, 1984, a second ANP drew over 300 delegates from labor, peasant and shantytown organizations, and leftist parties. Participants agreed to support a General Strike with a common list of economic and social demands (El Diario, 8 de marzo de 1984).



and the democratic system to provide them with real alternatives. This in turn fostered a certain return to verbal maximalism within the PUM and other radical groups. But instead of working through a common position on this most urgent of threats, the IU was relatively immobile in its response and did not generate any clear strategy to deal with Sendero.<sup>22</sup>

These outcomes--distance between leadership and bases; abandoning of class-based concerns and labor organization; programmatic ambiguity or stalemate; a tendency towards populist appeals--are cited by Przeworski and others as the inevitable result of transition to electoral politics.

But Peru's leftist parties shared a common goal of being more than just another electoral alternative. Instead, the left aimed to combine electoral victories and political power, with the construction of a strong grassroots-based organization that would actively incorporate and empower popular sectors, develop democracy "from below" and represent the poor majority in a non-populist manner, between elections. But the way in which the IU was forged exacerbated the effects of electoralism. And although it produced a highly popular candidate in Barrantes, it did not project an image of governability, nor did it offer effective political representation to those sectors of society who were frustrated with the deepening economic crisis and persistent injustices. This meant that when serious competitors came along to challenge the IU's electoral space, the IU would be hard-pressed to maintain a credible alternative identity. It also meant that the IU's shortcomings would continue to feed a more radical left opposition, within the electoral system and increasingly outside of it.

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<sup>22</sup> See Bernales 1987, *op cit.*, pp 173-177.

### The APRA: Redefining the Parameters

By 1985 APRA had demonstrated its capacity to persist as the country's dominant national political party, and to adapt to a shifting social and political context. Yet as in the case of IU, the way in which unity and new leadership were attained in this period did not erase serious problems inherited from the past, which would have important implications for APRA's ability to forge a democratic left alternative--as a party and as a government. As with IU, consensus within APRA was heavily conditioned by electoral priorities and built around a popular leader-candidate, while issues of party organization and popular sector incorporation were postponed. Unlike IU, where Barrantes' authority rested on an uneasy stalemate among various parties, the APRA was one large party historically dependent on a single leader. Once Garcia became Secretary General there was a stronger tendency to close ranks and let him define the party's public position, strategy and alliances, even by those who privately opposed his choices. This discipline helped APRA succeed where IU fell short by 1985, in articulating the broad opposition to Belaunde in the electoral arena. Yet it would also be a major hindrance to the resolution of underlying contradictions within the party and to the APRA's ability to govern--and to undertake a new, social democratic project--after 1985.

In February of 1984 Garcia was chose as APRA's presidential candidate in internal party elections that were hailed as part of an ongoing process of internal party democratization. This time, however, there was only a symbolic leftist challenger to Garcia--Senator Javier Valle Riestra--who withdrew his candidacy before the voting began, leaving

Garcia as a near-unanimous choice.<sup>26</sup> The selection of Garcia marked a clear option to concentrate on reviving the party's electoral fortunes and winning state power. Other party leaders and militants had reason to be optimistic about this choice, as Garcia's leadership had brought rapid success in improving the party's popularity.

While Garcia and his professional consultants engineered a remarkable renovation of APRA's image before 1985, there were several important issues that had not yet been addressed. These included the definition of a more concrete program and political space, and the party's actual relationship with both dominant elites and labor and existing popular organizations. The APRA's general program in 1985 would be conditioned by its electoral strategy. Garcia decided that in order to win he had to stake out the shifting center of Peru's political spectrum. This meant distancing APRA from IU and at the same time trying to win over the popular and middle sectors that were increasingly sympathetic to a democratic left alternative. He reasoned that the IU faced an inevitable identity problem; torn between the need to differentiate itself from APRA through greater radicalism, and the need to take distance from Sendero, which led them into a moderate social democratic position not very far from APRA's. His strategy would be to take the lead in opposing the current government, while at the same time presenting APRA as the only

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<sup>26</sup> In an interview with the author on January 16, 1986, Valle Riestra stressed that his candidacy was a symbolic action by a small group of younger "progressives" who wanted to challenge Garcia's positions on substantive issues, such as human rights, economic and social policy.

viable alternative to the threat of a marxist-leninist regime.<sup>17</sup>

A nationalist and populist discourse, a cultivated association with international social democracy, and a studied ambiguity on policy details would all follow from this strategy. Garcia called for the union of "todos los peruanos" in a national crusade against Peru's ruling technocrats and their external allies. He emphasized his love for popular music (making the classic waltz "Mi Peru" his official campaign tune), his long-time devotion to the popular saint El Senor de los Milagros, and his family roots in the highlands of Cuzco. He talked about the need for social democracy and publicized his ties to Socialist International leaders. At the same time, he did not elaborate a specific program for Peru, sticking to general statements in favor of national economic sovereignty, democracy with social justice, and moralization. Although the CONAPLAN gathered an array of technocrats and projected an image of great productivity, the APRA published no government program at all before the elections. Indeed, Garcia proclaimed that his position (which observers called Alanismo) was "a will before a program, an emotional state before a project".<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Garcia's pragmatic centrist option was further demonstrated in his choice of Vice Presidential candidates--party patriarch Luis Alberto Sanchez, and the technocratic young head of CONAPLAN, Luis Alva Castro. The selection of this slate was widely seen as the definitive defeat of the party's left wing, which had proposed reform labor leader Luis Negreiros as Vice President. At this stage, few party leaders, including Villarjeva, were willing to challenge Garcia's strategy. See "El rechazo de Alan", El Buho Mayo 24, 1984, p.13.

<sup>18</sup> "El fenomeno Garcia", Caretas abril 8, 1985, p. 36. The CONAPLAN spent over a year producing a general Plan del Peru, which general guidelines for a new APRA government--giving a central role to the state to provide for basic needs and the promotion of private enterprise. It also included an 18-month emergency plan, for provide employment and social programs to the very poor. This Plan was never

In the short run this personalistic approach was very successful. Garcia offered something for everyone, and before long he had forced all the other political forces to define themselves in relation to APRA ("everything turned on the rules of the game the young candidate had imposed" said one commentator), without really defining APRA's own plans in any detail. One reporter summarized his success by the fact that "in Peru in 1985, one just says 'Alan'"--not even Garcia--a major publicity triumph in itself. Another commented that Garcia's appeal was patterned on the successful campaign of Fernando Belaunde in 1980. In the longer term, however, this personalist control over policy and strategy, combined with a lack of definition on the major concerns of the day would be a hindrance to democratic governance and effective social policy. Furthermore, it would give his political allies and the public at large little upon which to hold the Garcia Administration accountable.<sup>29</sup>

The APRA's space in the center of the political spectrum was reinforced by its relationships with powerful economic sectors and with the armed forces. While emphatically denouncing the Belaunde Administration and its "anti-national" economic policies, Garcia made a point of cultivating informal ties with influential members of Peru's national bourgeoisie. Reiterating his message of change without

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released to the public, however, nor did it serve as a practical guideline for the new administration. See "El plan desconocido", Caretas, abril 17, 1985, pp. 30-32. Also "Alan Garcia: confesiones de un corredor de fondo", La Republica 31 de marzo de 1985, pp. 23-26; "Alan Garcia se pronuncia", Vision Peruana, 21 de abril de 1985, pp. 3-4; and "Las campanas del APRA y la IU", QueHacer No. 35, junio-julio 1985, pp. 30-67.

∴ See Raul Gonzalez, "La victoria de Alan Garcia y una mirada dentro del APRA", QueHacer No. 35, op cit.

radicalism, he assured them that an APRA government would be a bulwark against both the extreme liberalism prescribed by the IMF and the communist tendencies within IU. This effort was fairly successful, as leading industrialists and key members of the financial establishment contributed generously to the APRA campaign. These private sector allies believed they were getting a President who would respect their property and economic interests, deal preferentially with them and grant them policy influence within the state apparatus. For his part, Garcia expected that these actors would follow his lead and cooperate with his broad nationalist goals. When his policy goals clashed with their interests, however, he would face a major dilemma.<sup>22</sup>

Of even greater consequence for Garcia's future project was the APRA's relationship with the Armed Forces. The APRA knew from historical experience that it needed good relations with the military to win and retain power. Haya de la Torre had made a careful effort to build a working alliance with the military during the transition period. This relationship diminished somewhat during the party's internal succession conflicts, but Garcia focused on reviving and strengthening it. As Michael Adams points out, several factors caused the military, or sectors of it, to seek an ally in APRA again in 1985--including the severe economic crisis and resultant social conflict, the increasing attacks against the military and criticism of its human rights violations, the threat that IU's electoral strength meant for some officers, and even

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<sup>22</sup> See Francisco Durand, La burguesia peruana: Alan Garcia y los empresarios (Lima: DESCO, 1988).

Belaunde's foot dragging on requests for new military hardware.<sup>31</sup>

This evolving relationship would have important implications for the APRA's relations with other groups within civil society, as well as for democratization and the defense of social justice after 1985. Since military officers were wary of the radical elements within IU, this reinforced the APRA's decision to distance itself from the legal left. Because the emergence of Sendero made the military increasingly nervous about popular mobilization, this would also have implications for the strategies APRA could undertake in its efforts to mobilize support among popular sectors and serve as an effective representative of popular interests. And while Garcia may have felt that having the confidence of military leaders would help him to introduce moralization and human rights norms in the ranks, the price of good relations would ultimately prove to be the maintenance of limits on civilian authority and military accountability.

However ambiguous Garcia's appeal was on other scores, APRA party leaders and militants expected him to heed their longstanding concerns for strengthening and extending the party's social base. In successive party congresses since the late 1970s, they had called for reestablishing the party's presence in the organized labor movement and demonstrating more active support for working class interests. They had voted repeatedly for a renovation of the corrupt CTP leadership, and a reduction in its visceral anti-communism. They also wanted to bolster APRA's organized base among the broader urban and rural poor, and to democratize the party structures more thoroughly in order to permit more diverse leadership to

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<sup>31</sup> Adams 1984, op cit, p.116-117.

emerge.

Chapter VII discussed Garcia's stance in regard to labor and popular sectors, which differed from Aprista progressives and, indeed, from the goals expressed in the party's general congresses. Instead of trying to revive APRA's dwindling union bases, or win over non-Aprista labor and popular organizations, he conceded these sectors to IU. Instead, Garcia's campaign would focus on appealing to the broad majority of Peruvians who did not belong to political parties or unions, including new generations of middle class and professional groups, and what he called "the poorest of the poor"--landless peasants, urban shantytown dwellers, and especially those laboring in the expanding informal sector. While making subtle references to the unionized work force as a "labor elite" or part of Peru's privileged "upper 25 percent", he focused primarily on a populist discourse that avoided any conflict between classes.

This neo-populist appeal followed a basic electoral logic, and was not so different from that being pursued by Barrantes (who had also begun to gently criticize the "clasista" behavior of the CGTP and appeal to broader sectors of the urban poor). Indeed, this became central to Garcia's campaign in the wake of Barrantes' 1983 municipal victory, which had demonstrated the limitations of what had been to that point a more moderate and middle class APRA campaign. From 1983 onward, Garcia and Barrantes would challenge each other's claims to represent this unaffiliated majority.

Yet although this made sense electorally, it was not accompanied by a clear strategy for organizing these newly identified sectors into a political force, nor any concrete plans for satisfying their basic needs.



Over 1984-1985 Aprista militants covered the poor districts of Lima and all provinces with party propaganda, made donations to community kitchens and mothers clubs, organized local fiestas and other activities, and signed up new party members. But the party's functional organization was not significantly expanded, and a regular Aprista presence among existing organizations of workers or pobladores remained minimal. Meanwhile, despite Garcia's promises to reverse the party's historical neglect of the countryside and prioritize the rural sector, there was little sign of Aprista activity among peasants before 1985.

It was Garcia's ability to grasp the changes in Peru over the past decade which allowed him to adapt his party's image and forge a winning ticket. But his focus on a strictly electoral strategy also avoided addressing one of the most fundamental problems left over from the past--the limitations of the APRA party itself. The APRA which survived the military era remained the largest political party Peru. But despite its relative size and increasing electoral appeal, the party's deficiencies in terms of leadership, organization and popular sector incorporation were not adequately addressed over the 1980s. By 1985 the party was not prepared to defend the interests of the new sectors Garcia tried to appeal to, nor to govern effectively in a new era.

Historically, the APRA had always been Peru's largest political party, retaining a devoted core of members and a share of voters that ranged between a quarter and a third of the total electorate even in the worst periods of internal conflict or external repression. Although its membership dwindled to a minimum under Velasco, the Aprista bases began to grow significantly with its electoral fortunes after 1977, and no other

single party came near to APRA in terms of membership. By 1980 the APRA had some 140 party committees in Lima and over 1,000 nationwide, and the number of registered members increased dramatically after 1977. During the internal crisis of 1980-1982 party membership stagnated and inscription was even closed for a period. But from 1983 onward, Garcia's popularity and APRA's electoral comeback was matched by a flood of people interested in joining the party. By 1985 accounts of registered Apristas ranged from 300,000 to 600,000, some 50 percent of whom joined in 1980-1985. At either number, this was well above any other party.<sup>12</sup>

The APRA always prided itself on being national and multi-class, and in terms of electorate and membership that became more true than ever in the 1980s. While the party's historical strength had been in Peru's Northern provinces (Piura, La Libertad, Lambayeque), after 1983 Garcia made a successful effort to increase electoral support in the capital and the Southern provinces, and party membership expanded in a similar direction. By 1985 28 percent of registered Apristas (and nearly 40 percent of new party members) were in Lima, and membership increased in the Southern coast and sierra as well. Party members were drawn from all social classes, although there was a predominance of urban lower-middle class and working class people, and few were drawn from the very rich or very poor, especially the rural poor.

Yet while the party increased in numbers, the meaning of party membership changed significantly in the 1980s. In the past party

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<sup>12</sup> This section draws on the author's interviews with Secretary of Organization Alberto Kitasono and numerous other party officials, and on an unpublished survey of APRA members between 1975 and 1985, "Sumario de inscritos en el PAP en el periodo 1975-1986", Partido Aprista Peruano.

membership involved a series of responsibilities as well as opportunities. Party members were militants, and their entire families upheld party traditions (songs, salutes, etc). They participated actively in APRA youth groups, women's associations, cell meetings, and the like, respected party discipline and hierarchy, and exuded a nearly religious faith (or mística) in the APRA, best expressed in the party slogan "SEASAP" ("Only the APRA will save Peru"). But in the 1980s the national leadership had an open door policy towards new members, and in the haste to win elections little attention was paid to recreating this spirit and discipline among the thousands of new Apristas who signed up after 1983, or to forming a new generation of leaders as Haya had done. Many of these new members joined out of opportunism, hoping to win public employment or other benefits through an APRA party link. Many were also attracted by Garcia's charisma, but had little familiarity with the APRA's past history and doctrine, and little loyalty to the party itself. For its part, the party had less to offer this generation of members between elections and was not equipped to incorporate them all into existing party structures.<sup>22</sup>

This lack of orientation of new party members was due not only to electoral fervor, but to persistent limitations of party leadership and organization. Garcia's election as APRA's Secretary General in 1982 had been the result of internal democratization and base mobilization, but subsequently this democratization process did not go as far into the party

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<sup>22</sup> Sentiments such as "they don't form cadres any more", "we don't learn any doctrine" and "now there's no real commitment or struggle" were repeatedly voiced in the author's interviews with Aprista militants in 1985 and 1986. See also Luis Tejada, "Resultados de la encuesta", unpublished survey of 49 APRA party members, Universidad Católica del Perú, n/d.

apparatus as many had hoped. The APRA's middle leadership ranks (national and local party leaders, mayors and city councilmen) remained dominated by individuals whose interests and class base were distant from Peru's poor majority and from much of the new membership.<sup>34</sup> They were often middle or even upper class, urban and criollo figures who might have begun as rebels with humbler roots, but had become firmly rooted in local power structures by the 1980s. They tended to be sectarian, and were resistant to putting Garcia's apertura towards independents into their own political practice. There were also many staunch anti-Communists, who entered the party in the era of pacts with the right and were more conservative on many counts than the social democratic image that Garcia wished to project. Yet it was not ideology, but clientelism and paternalism that dominated the political practice of many local APRA leaders; their traditional approach to popular sector incorporation was heavy-handed and vertical. While Garcia's discourse gave more attention to new generations of urban and rural poor, it was very hard for these leaders to represent interests they did not identify with. This was especially problematic in the Southern Andes, where local APRA leaders were firmly entrenched in dominant relations with the poor and indigenous peasantry.

In addition to leadership deficiencies, party development as a whole

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<sup>34</sup> These observations are corroborated by unpublished interviews of local APRA leaders conducted by Liisa North in August 1986, following up on her previous research, "Origenes y crecimiento del Partido Aprista y el cambio socioeconomico en el Peru", Lima: Universidad Catolica, 1975. See also Raul Haya de la Torre de la Rosa, "El Aprismo en el proceso politico peruano: hacia un acercamiento integral", Lima 1983, unpublished paper; and Tito Aguero Vidal, "Una experiencia politico-partidaria", Lima: unpublished paper, Catholic University of Peru, 1986.

was stymied during this crucial period.<sup>35</sup> Modernization of internal structures and practices, including such basic things as an updated census of party militants, was indefinitely postponed. So were demands for further democratization of the party structure. Although the APRA remained relatively more democratic than its competitors on the left or right, in that it had some structures for representation of party bases and election of leadership, there were widespread demands for more open elections throughout party ranks, improved channels of representation for provincial bases, and greater mobility for younger generations and working class militants. And once elected, the CEN and Secretary Garcia had supreme authority and few channels of accountability back to the bases.<sup>36</sup> With the increased focus on elections the APRA's legendary "machine" became out-of-date and overrated. It remained active during electoral periods (doing voter education and registration, spreading propaganda, monitoring electoral stations and disputing vote counts). But the new

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<sup>35</sup> These observations on the APRA party apparatus were confirmed in the author's interviews with the late Secretary of Discipline Alfredo Tello, his successor, Vitaliano Gallardo, and other party leaders. See also, "El Aprismo Realmente Existente", QueHacer No. 47, junio-julio 1987.

<sup>36</sup> Party leaders and militants interviewed for this study were divided over the virtues of greater internal democratization. Senator Valle Riestra feared that if provincial bases were given more power to influence national leadership, the party would be even more conservative. Ricardo Ramos Tremolada (interviewed on September 13, 1986), Raul Haya de la Torre de la Rosa (interviewed on January 27, 1986), and other younger leaders argued that this would not be the case if, as they proposed, local party bosses were themselves subject to more open election and there were less of a gap between bases and leadership at local level. But Garcia strategist Hugo Otero said that one of Garcia's main concerns was the "danger of democratismo"; that the process of internal democratization that led Garcia to the head of the party would get out of control and prevent him from imposing his own program (May 21, 1985).

party committees did not function with much vigor between elections (only 48 of 140 comites in Lima functioned between elections, according to the author's interview with former Secretary of Discipline Alfredo Tello), and there was a marked decline in the party's traditional functional organizations, including not only labor but professional associations, women's and youth groups. Furthermore, with the increasing reliance on mass media and professional public relations advisors to garner independent voters, even as an electoral machine APRA fell short.

Public relations is just one example of the many areas that Garcia had defined as a priority, for which new kinds of skills and experience were needed and for which the average Aprista leaders were not equipped. There was also a need for trained economists, planners and other technocratic types that were rare among the party's professional politicians (and which on the whole the party did not make the effort to train). The "new" APRA needed more people with Alan's external appeal--younger, with more modern outlooks on politics, and pluralist appeal. Given the dearth of party leaders with these qualities, Garcia would recruit advisors and personnel from outside party ranks, which in turn reinforced internal resentment among party ranks. He would also, ultimately, end up ruling alone.

Tactical differences between Garcia and other sectors of the party (both new progressives and entrenched conservatives) did not go away during this period, particularly over APRA's ties to labor and popular organization. But impressed by Garcia's popularity and the possibility of electoral victory in 1985, these sectors postponed their differences and made only a minimal challenge. Apristas and their opponents assumed that

Garcia was saving the task of party-building and popular organization until after the elections, when he could extend APRA's base in the more traditional fashion--from a position of state power and clientelistic resources. Yet in fact, given the limitations of the party apparatus in 1985, Garcia would be tempted to opt for a more personalist and populist form of rule, attempting to bypass the APRA as well as leftist-led organizations. As in the case of IU, this would lead in turn to the resurfacing of unresolved internal conflicts.

In addition to perpetuating APRA's limitations, this outcome did not bode well for broader political or social democratization in Peru. In the post-Velasco era the poor were not the disorganized and "available" mass that Garcia alluded to, but in fact had considerable experience with organizing for survival--through neighborhood associations, churches and community centers, women's and youth clubs and other forms--and would not be easily manipulated by external political actors. Popularity based on electoral appeals without participation in an ongoing political project can be fickle indeed. In a period of austerity the Peruvian state was also not in a position to undertake massive populist spending to win over the poor. Furthermore, the organized labor movement in Peru--urban and rural--was still an important political actor, whose weight and representative capacity far exceeded its electoral numbers. And because Garcia conceded the bulk of the labor movement to IU leadership, the party did little to build a working relationship with organized labor at all. The CTP itself was never renovated and the confederation leaders remained closely linked to the party. Before 1985 party leaders did establish a "National Secretariat of Labor Communities and Associated Industries",

which was designed to serve as an alternative channel for party-labor relations. However, by itself it proved to be little more than a new mechanism for continuing the traditionally clientelistic relationship the party has maintained with sympathetic unions, and did not win over those with leftist leadership. The APRA's relations with the CGTP and such important groups as miners, bank employees, teachers and other civil servants, would be a major challenge for Garcia to overcome after 1985.

#### Contesting the Center: The Populist Realignment of 1985

By 1985 Peru was facing a serious Dirty War between Sendero Luminoso and the Armed Forces, the economy was in severe crisis, and virtually all social classes were united in opposition to the Belaunde Administration. These factors set the parameters for the elections of 1985. The APRA and IU both were the only civilian alternatives to increasing militarization and a brutal insurgency, and their leadership converged around remarkably similar programs for change. But this was a campaign of images more than of programs, and by 1985 Garcia had become far better at this than Barrantes and the IU.

Garcia and Barrantes both emphasized emergency relief programs for the very poor and alleviation of the debt burden, although vague calls for broader structural change remained part of the general discourse. Both found the International Monetary Fund a good enemy around which to build a multi-class coalition, and both made overtures to nationalist bourgeois sectors--IU made a point of placing some prominent capitalists on its lists. Both also promised greater attention to peace and human rights, although they were careful not to antagonize the military and did not make this a central part of the campaign. And both were charismatic, populist



leaders with great personal appeal, who pitched their appeals to independents and especially the poor. Their differences in slogan were primarily semantic--Barrantes evoking "el pueblo" with IU, and Garcia promising that "mi compromiso es con todos los Peruanos" (my commitment is to all Peruvians").<sup>37</sup>

There were of course some real programmatic differences between APRA and the IU. On the whole, the leftist parties were more willing than APRA to criticize the power and privileges of the Armed Forces. The IU was also allied with the leadership of Peru's major labor and peasant organizations, as well as the nation's major student groups and a good share of the intellectual community. Garcia made a special appeal to the non-unionized poor, and at the same time enjoyed growing support among nationalist business sectors. Both stressed the participation of labor interests in government, but IU placed more emphasis on a general democratization of the state. The IU's economic policy statements were also clearer and more explicit than APRA's in reference to the need to nationalize and statize the banking system, and other sectors of the economy still dominated by foreign interests. While not denying this, Garcia avoided being specific about this issue.

A good example of their convergence, as well as their remaining differences, is the appearance of Garcia and Barrantes at two public meetings held by the major representatives of Peruvian business and labor-

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<sup>37</sup> This analysis of the 1985 campaign is drawn from the author's personal observations, press sources such as La Republica and Caretas; "Las Campanas del APRA y la IU", QueHacer No. 35, junio-julio 1985; and Fernando Tuesta Soldevilla, Peru 1985: el derrotero de una nueva eleccion (Lima: Centro de Investigacion de la Universidad del Pacifico, 1986).

-the Annual Executives' Conference (CADE), and the first National Conference of Workers (CONADET). Both APRA and the marxists were historically distrusted by business. At CADE in 1984, however, Garcia told the businessmen what they wanted to hear: that his government would work together with the private sector and encourage private initiative ("together we will make Peru the business of all Peruvians"), and he received a very warm reception. Barrantes was less convincing in his promises to respect the private sector, given his socialist trajectory and alliance with labor, but he was the first marxist political leader to speak at CADE and many participants found him surprisingly reasonable and sympathetic.<sup>32</sup>

The National Conference of Workers (CONADET), held February 27-28, 1985, was organized by the CGTP with support from the state employees' confederation and other major unions. All major presidential candidates were invited to address issues of most concern to labor and respond to labor's policy recommendations, facing an audience of some 800 union and popular sector representatives. In the official position of CONADET the main culprits of Peru's crisis were "Yankee imperialism", multi-national business interests, the AP-PPC government, and the APRA for its repeated elite pacts and "selling out" of labor interests. The changes recommended by labor included a redirection of macroeconomic policy and renegotiation of Peru's external debt on better terms; nationalization of the banking system and other leading economic sectors; a national referendum on debt and economic policy; wage and salary adjustments to the cost of living; reform of the social security system; and state concern

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<sup>32</sup> See QueHacer No. 35, op cit., pp. 35-40.

for the protection of basic human rights and political liberties. And above all, the union leaders stressed their role in the process of transition to democracy, reminding the candidates that "the CGTP was at the head of the struggles to recuperate democratic and sindical liberties, and it will keep struggling for an authentic social democracy".<sup>39</sup>

It was clear from the outset that the CONADET would give its endorsement to Barrantes, who was greeted as an old friend of labor. He promised to address all of the main labor demands, as well as to postpone the foreign debt and nationalize the banks. He also offered to involve the main labor centrals in policymaking, starting by having them appoint the Minister of Labor, and encouraged them to prepare for playing a central role in broader social change. "For me social change is nothing other than constructing a truly democratic society with a perspective towards socialism", he said, promising "sovereignty, development, and a popular and democratic government".<sup>40</sup> At the same time, Barrantes managed to avoid the issue of human rights and the military, as well as any reference to the role of IU as an organization in his government.

Garcia had not sought the endorsement of organized labor, and he expected the CONADET audience to be hostile to APRA. Yet he surprised many workers with his own promises of "social change and the formation of a nationalist, democratic and popular government", and he also addressed most the major demands that labor had put forth. This included general

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<sup>39</sup> CONADET 85: Conferencia Nacional de Trabajadores, Por el Cambio Social (Official program, Lima, February 1985), p. 7.

<sup>40</sup> These comments are drawn from "Plena vigencia de la estabilidad laboral ofrece Alfonso Barrantes", La Republica jueves, 28 de febrero de 1985, p.4; and the author's own observations of this event.

promises to pursue fair wages and living standards for workers, to respect labor rights and autonomy, and to consult with the CGTP as a legitimate representative of organized workers. He advocated national concertacion to overcome the crisis, and promised "dialogue as a method of government without any exclusions". Although CONADET concluded by criticizing Garcia for skirting the issue of nationalizations and foreign capital, his presentation was met with warm applause.<sup>41</sup>

Despite these events, the IU's actual Plan de Gobierno did not reach a wide public and the APRA's Plan de Peru was never disseminated. Hence programmatic differences per se were not the determining factor for most of the voting public. In the final instance, what did impact on the public was how each candidate "sold" himself--the dynamic leadership profile of Garcia and the apparent unity of his party around him, in contrast to the increasingly apparent lack of consensus within the leftist ranks between Barrantes and the leftist parties. Indeed, in contrast to 1983, Barrantes was not an enthusiastic candidate in 1985 and did not have a broadly supportive team behind him. Instead, he ran a personalist campaign with his own set of loyal advisors, a campaign that was marred by frequent and sharp confrontations with the more radical sectors in IU over issues of style as much as substance. It must be emphasize that as the left's opponents predicted, Peru's new preferential voting rules exacerbated the IU's lack of internal control, encouraging each party or

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<sup>41</sup> This is drawn from "El APRA respetara a sindicatos y buscara entendimiento con la CGTP", La Republica viernes, 1 de marzo de 1985, p. 3; and the author's observations. Ironically, Garcia in fact attempted a serious renegotiation of the terms of Peru's foreign debt with foreign creditors after 1985 and nationalization and state takeover of the banking system in 1987.

subgroup to run separate campaigns for Congress. While the APRA candidate gave off a sense of security, and it was widely felt that his government would enjoy business confidence and tacit military approval, no one knew how an IU government would operate. When Garcia argued that IU would bring economic and political instability, it was not only the private sector and middle classes that were persuaded but most poor voters as well. As one shantytown dweller put it in a pre-electoral interview, "if the left wins here we are going to be like in Bolivia!".<sup>42</sup>

Garcia had been in campaign for this election since at least 1983, and as the election approached the APRA strategy was more of the same. With his own team of hand-selected advisors, Garcia played down the party and worked on himself, and the message was a simple one--Alan was the candidate of "todos los peruanos"; and an APRA government would not be sectarian, but rather would be nationalist and pluralist. The party's cadres also moved into action, spreading propaganda, manning voting tables, and instructing people how to vote (and vote for APRA), which had an important impact on an overwhelmingly inexperienced electorate. The campaign was unprecedented in its expense, involving huge amounts of television time and newspaper propaganda, and party coffers were fattened by support from Garcia's private sector contacts.

Having survived military rule, the loss of its founder and severe internal fragmentation, the APRA under Garcia finally won an undisputed

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<sup>42</sup> See "Las uvas estaban verdes", QueHacer #35, junio-julio, 1985, p 39. In this article, leftist analysts present the widely held view that Barrantes and the IU leadership really did not want to win the presidency, given their persistent internal differences as well as the fear by some of a military veto. Instead, leftist candidates preferred the safety of winning parliamentary seats and hence gave priority to winning the preferential vote.

and unprecedented electoral victory on April 14, 1985. Although no one was surprised that he won, the size of the vote was indeed unexpected, as Garcia won 53 percent of the total national votes and APRA candidates won even in the left's strongholds, in the Southern Andes and among Lima's poor. The IU placed second with 24 percent of the vote, while the PPC took only 11 percent and the AP a mere 7 percent. Given Garcia's incredible popularity, and the fact that APRA and IU together claimed 75 percent of the electorate, the Peruvian public had clearly given its new government a mandate for progressive social change within democracy. At the same time, it had elected another very personalist and populist leader, more radical than Belaunde but strikingly similar in leadership style.

## POSTSCRIPT

### From Euphoria to Collapse: Populism in Power, 1985 - 1990

Alan Garcia's electoral mandate, initial policy measures and tacit support from the United Left seemed to herald a new era of economic revival, political consensus and social democratization in Peru. Yet over 1985-1990 this government degenerated into even more personalist and authoritarian patterns of rule than its predecessor, and eventually led the country into profound economic and social collapse. Instead of democratic consensus-building, Garcia alienated the left and the right, labor and business, and many Apristas as well. Instead of strengthening popular organizations, he attempted traditionally populist forms of state patronage towards the poor, which could not be sustained in a radically shrinking economy. Furthermore, because the IU was unable to offer a viable alternative, and ultimately fell apart into warring factions, this experiment discredited the entire party system and reinforced the crisis of representation.

How can this failure be explained? Why was this form of populism and collapse the outcome after 1985, rather than the "more profound conception of democracy...social democracy" that Garcia and his allies professed? A detailed analysis of the Garcia Administration is beyond the scope of this study.<sup>1</sup> Instead, a central premise of this thesis

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<sup>1</sup> Although no comprehensive "post mortem" analysis of the Garcia Administration has yet emerged, several articles give useful overviews. See Rosemary Thorp, "'Structuralist' Attempts at Short-Term Management in the 1980s: The Case of Peru Under Alan Garcia", in European Journal of Development Research, Volume.1, No.2, December 1989; Carol Wise, "Democratization, Crisis and the APRA's Modernization Project in Peru", in Barbara Stallings and Robert Kaufman, eds., Debt and Democracy in

is that the roots of this outcome lie in the past--in the historical-structural constraints on democratization in Peru, and the political choices and processes that either reinforced these constraints or created new barriers--particularly during the uncertainty of the regime change period and the initial years of the new democracy. This study also argues that without the establishment of effective democratic structures and processes of representation, this outcome is likely to be repeated.

This postscript briefly reviews the 1985-1990 period, in order to highlight the ways in which the constraints and choices discussed in previous chapters prevented the APRA and the marxist left from forging effective party organizations and social policy alternatives over 1985-1990, and facilitated the persistence of populist forms.

#### From Euphoria to Collapse

Upon assuming power Garcia emphasized his commitment to the inclusion of all sectors of society in a new nationalist and democratic development path. He promised to reduce inflation while reviving real wages and economic growth, reversing the recessionary policies of the previous regime, and announced a bold decision to limit external debt service payments to ten percent of exports. He pledged to give priority to the very poor and to focus economic reactivation efforts in the countryside--an unprecedented stance for APRA. He also promised to clean up the public administration, to reassert civilian authority over

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Latin America (Boulder, San Francisco and London: Westview Press, 1989); Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski, "Peru", and comments by Barbara Stallings and John Williamson, in Williamson, ed., Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1990).



the armed forces, and to pursue the concertacion that Belaunde had abandoned--through regular dialogue with major interest groups and political forces, to solicit their input into policymaking.<sup>2</sup>

These decisions--to pursue heterodox economic policies and political consensus-building--generated unusually broad support at home and abroad. Capitalists were relieved that Garcia avoided the temptation of expropriations and other socialist measures, and concentrated on drawing them into partnership with the state. Labor leaders, while distrustful of the APRA, were pleased by initial wage increases and the nomination of an independent Labor Minister. Military leaders were reassured by his nationalism and commitment to restore authority. At the same time, Garcia enjoyed tacit support from Barrantes and the more moderate leftist leadership, whose own program differed little from Garcia's and who were impressed by his initial policy choices.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, in the context of a region-wide search for alternatives to the recessionary impact and high social costs of orthodox stabilization measures, these policies sparked considerable interest from foreign scholars and media.

This apparent consensus, combined with a congressional majority, a

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<sup>2</sup> See "El Mensaje Presidencial, 28 de julio de 1985", reproduced in Mensajes de Fraternidad (Lima: Secretaria Nacional de Cultura del PAP, 1985; and Garcia's speech to the United Nations, Deuda o Democracia: La Alternativa de America Latina, Speech of the President of Peru, Dr. Alan Garcia Perez, before the XL General Assembly of the United Nations, New York (Lima: Editora Peru, 1985).

<sup>3</sup> In 1985 Javier Iguinez, President of the IU's Government Plan Commission, expressed optimism "about the prospects for translating the fundamental shift in the balance of power into an APRA-IU program for economic reactivation". See Peru: Democratic Elections and Economic Crisis 1985, report of the Overseas Development Council and the Washington Office on Latin America, April 9, 1985, p. 4.

weak Cabinet and hand-picked technical advisors, allowed Garcia to concentrate significant personal authority and implement policy quickly. He was aided by reserves built up through suspension of the debt, which financed a boom in consumption and imports. In turn, perhaps the most striking feature of his initial year in office was his populist style of governing. Not only did he take actions that immediately touched the lives of the poor, such as reducing the costs of basic foods and medicines and implementing temporary job programs, but he delivered these measures through rallies around the country and through direct "dialogues" with the public from the Palace balcony. These balconazos, which resembled his election campaign speeches more than actual dialogue, were covered with much fanfare by the media.<sup>4</sup> Garcia's popularity reached an approval rating of more than 90 percent in 1986, and the APRA won major victories in the 1986 municipal elections, dislodging its leftist competitors in Lima and elsewhere.<sup>5</sup>

By early 1987, however, the reserves began to run out and it became increasingly apparent that Garcia and his advisors did not have coherent plans for moving beyond the short-term, either economically or politically. The consumption boom and private sector incentives failed to stimulate significant new investment or stem capital flight, the public sector deficit began to widen, and inflation began to rise once

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<sup>4</sup> See Eduardo Ballon, "Alan, la piramide y el movimiento social", QueHacer No. 41, June-July 1986; and Alan Riding, "Garcia Asks for Change and Peruvians Say Si!", The New York Times September, 1985.

<sup>5</sup> Peru's GNP grew by an average of eight percent annually over 1985-1987, real wages increased by 30 percent in the countryside and 25 percent in the cities, and at the same time inflation slowed from a yearly rate of nearly 250 percent to just 63 percent in 1986. See Thorp, op cit, p. 257-261; and Kuczynski, op cit., p.86.

again. Most importantly, the promised concertacion did not develop as anticipated. Economic deal-making was conducted in a personalist fashion between Garcia and a small group of leading capitalists (popularly dubbed the "Twelve Apostles"), bypassing the existing trade associations and generating considerable resentment among those left out. Despite a few highly-publicized presidential "dialogues" with rural producers and peasants, the rural sector never came to play a central role in, or benefit from, economic policy. Garcia also alienated organized labor by giving priority to his meetings with capitalists and not making them a tripartite effort.<sup>5</sup> Finally, a highly controversial decision to nationalize the private banking and financial system in July 1987 brought greater economic disruption, and revived the nearly-moribund conservative political opposition, without regaining the popular support Garcia had bargained for. The bank takeover was apparently a personal decision by Garcia, against the warnings of key advisors, and responded to his sense of betrayal by the private sector as well as declining support from labor and popular sectors and the left. Novelist and neo-liberal spokesman Mario Vargas Llosa led a widespread backlash movement against the measure--adopting the name Movimiento Libertad--which mobilized not only business and conservative politicians, but many of the independent middle sectors that had voted for Garcia. Although this measure was anticipated in

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<sup>5</sup> The general failure of the concertacion is described in Wise, op cit, pp. 174-177. Rural policy failure is described in Jose Maria Salcedo, "Gobierno y comunidades: el servinacuy del Rimanacuy", QueHacer No. 41, June-July 1986. Labor policies are reviewed in Javier Neves and Alfredo Villavicencio, "Political Laboral: El debe y el haber", QueHacer No. 41, op cit, pp. 59-64.

IU's 1985 program, leftists were also unwilling to support it. The radicals denounced it as an opportunistic ploy, while Barrantes criticized the unconstitutional manner in which it was imposed. Even many Apristas were opposed to this measure, and some prominent Garcia allies resigned from the government over this. After protracted conflict between the state, the private bankers and opposition politicians, the measure was eventually halted.<sup>1</sup>

"The honeymoon is over" was the dominant theme of media headlines and political analysts in late 1987, and over the next two years the government went into a policy paralysis reminiscent of the end of the Belaunde Administration, while the rapid downward spiral of the economy ended in a disaster of even greater proportions. A conventional austerity package was implemented in September 1988, but this proved to be insufficient and by 1989 hyperinflation was running at about 6,000 percent annually, while GDP was contracting at a 20 percent annual rate. Garcia also left his successor an external debt that had risen to \$22 billion in 1990, of which \$8 billion was interest arrears that Garcia had refused to pay. Widespread charges of corruption among Apristas and Garcia allies in government also emerged, repeating the pattern of the previous regime. In this context Garcia's popularity rating dropped to just 16 percent approval by late 1988 and continued to fall, while the press reported rumors of his offers to resign.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See Thorp, *op cit*, p. 268; "Peru: Right gets its act together", Latin American Regional Reports, 17 December, 1987, p. 3; and "FREDEMO draws up its manifesto", Latin American Weekly Report 25 February, 1988, p. 11.

<sup>2</sup> This rapid decline is detailed in Wise, *op cit.*, pp. 172-178, and Kuczyński, *op cit.*, pp. 86-89.

A number of structural factors certainly worked against the Garcia Administration, including the nature of Peru's external financial dependency, the weakness of its private sector and the limited capacity of the state to assume the tasks set out for it. Yet there were important political factors that exacerbated the economic crisis--and crisis of representation--produced in this period. These include the weaknesses of the APRA party and its distance from labor and popular organizations, and the structure of political authority that Garcia inherited, both of which were reinforced by his actions in power. They also include the limitations of the IU, which was unable to play a constructive role in this period or present a viable alternative.

As noted above, it was Garcia's ability to grasp the changes in Peru over the past decade that allowed him to adapt his party's image and forge a winning electoral coalition. Yet his focus on a strictly electoral strategy up to 1985 avoided addressing the structural and organizational limitations of his party. Previous chapters pointed out how the APRA which survived the military era was fraught with clientelism and sectarianism, and the party apparatus had little vigor between elections. While remaining the largest single party in Peru, the APRA was not prepared to represent or defend the interests of the new social groups that Garcia tried to appeal to, nor did it have many leaders with the capacity to govern in an efficient and democratic fashion.

After sixty years in opposition Apristas nonetheless believed they had finally come to power in 1985, and that Garcia would use state power and resources to strengthen the party. Instead, he opted to maintain a

personalistic approach, drawing on a select group of independent advisors and refusing to submit to party mechanisms for important policy decisions. Apristas had a majority in Parliament and began to fill the lower ranks of the state bureaucracy, but Garcia's interest in reform remained at the level of electoral images, and over 1985-1990 he made little effort to encourage internal changes that could make the party organization more responsive to a new society. Internal party tensions that were rooted in the seventies and the transition period, but were postponed during Garcia's upward course, resurfaced with a vengeance, culminating in an extremely hostile APRA party congress in 1988 and Garcia's resignation as the party President. Nonetheless, the clientelism and corruption of some party members within the public administration led to the public discrediting of Apristas and Garcia's independent allies alike.<sup>3</sup>

Garcia also inherited a structure of authority that facilitated the concentration of state power in the Executive, as discussed in Chapters V and VI, and this was exacerbated by his own populist style. As with Belaunce, a parliamentary majority allowed Garcia to assume legislative powers and implement policy with few checks and balances. This was seen as a virtue as long as outcomes were favorable, but was a major problem as policymaking began to veer out of control and the President proved unwilling to delegate authority. He was also unable to institutionalize channels of consultation with established interest groups, preferring informal interaction with selected elites (such as

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<sup>3</sup> See Raul Gonzalez, "El Aprismo realmente existente", QueHacer No. 47, June-July 1987, pp. 18-22; and Ricardo Ramos-Tremolada, "El APRA en visperas de su XVI Congreso", QueHacer No. 53, julio-agosto 1988.

the "Twelve Apostles" and Barrantes) and plebiscitary relations with masses convened to listen to him. When his popularity plummeted the "dialogues" were simply halted, and relations between the state and these sectors of society effectively ceased. Analysts reviewing this period tend to agree that it was this lack of consensus-building and accountability, and not only structural and technical factors, that undermined the programmatic goals of this administration.<sup>13</sup>

Garcia's approach to popular sectors was particularly problematic. Once in power, he attempted to bypass existing unions and popular organizations in a manner that resembled the "No-Party" bias of the Velasco era and in fact involved former personnel of the military regime.<sup>14</sup> Through temporary employment programs, microenterprise credit plans, state-sponsored community kitchens and other forms of barrio assistance, as well as the mass meetings between peasant leaders and Garcia called Rimanacuy, there was an effort in the first two years to establish direct contact between the state (in the person of the President) and the least politicized sectors of the urban and rural poor. This effort provided short-term benefits to a small segment of the poor and gave the APRA a firm victory in the municipal elections of 1986. But it did not incorporate new sectors of society into any

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<sup>13</sup> See Thorp, op cit, pp. 257. In a 1989 interview Garcia admitted that his "emotional relationship with the people" and deliberately charismatic leadership were a mixed blessing, but put himself in the same category as Barrantes and Belaunde in this respect. He also attributed his economic policy mistakes to "an excess of social emotion". La Republica, July 25, 1989, p. 3.

<sup>14</sup> These included long-time Apristas or sympathizers (Javier Tantalean, Remigio Morales Bermudez, David Sifuentes), new converts (Luis Gonzalez Posada) and former enemies-turned-advisors such as Carlos Franco.

political project, and it did not have a lasting organizational impact. The programs tended to be vertical and manipulative, working outside existing neighborhood and community organizations, which generated resentment within low income communities. Furthermore, in a context of a rapidly shrinking economy they were very short-lived--the Rimacuy stopped after 1986 and the employment programs were discontinued in early 1988.<sup>12</sup>

Indeed, with this approach to popular sectors Garcia departed from past Latin American populism. Populist governments in past eras did incorporate new sectors into the political arena, albeit in an unequal and partial fashion, and they relied on an expanding economy to institute concrete welfare reforms, the memory of which often lasted well beyond the leaders themselves. Garcia did not open the political arena to new social groups, quite the contrary, and his government did not have the resources to make any lasting social welfare changes.

This government also ignored an important lesson of the Velasco era--namely, that Peru's poor and working classes, though weakened and dispersed by the crisis, were still far more articulate and demanding of political leaders than in past eras. Velasco was unable to create a loyal mass following in the best of conditions. With far scarcer resources, and in a context of increased labor and popular organization, Garcia had much less space for building a new social base through direct

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<sup>12</sup> Instituto Nacional de Planificacion, Plan Nacional de Mediano Plazo, 1986-1990, Parte IV, V (Octubre 1986); Susana Pinilla Cisneros, "Políticas y Programas de Promoción del Empleo: El Pait y el IDESI", unpublished paper, UCSD, March 1988; and Ballón, op cit.



state channels.<sup>13</sup> In the case of the labor movement, tremendously weakened by the economic crisis and the crisis of the political left, this government did not respond to the major demand they shared with other sectors in the 1980s--democracy. To labor this came to mean effective channels of dialogue and policy concertation, and unions vigorously protested Garcia's resistance to such measures.<sup>14</sup> Finally, the APRA's historical reconciliation with the military, which was crafted during the transition process and cultivated by Garcia after 1983, remained a double-edged sword that conditioned APRA's relations with the left and with popular sectors. Any government in Peru needs support from the military, particularly with a violent insurgency on its hands. But part of Garcia's mandate was to address the systematic human rights violations that had become part of the military's counter-insurgency battle, and given his wide popularity and authority this government had an unprecedented opportunity to break with the past history of militarization and provide ethical leadership. Its initial actions pointed in that direction, but within three years efforts to halt human rights abuses ceased as Garcia's popularity and control dwindled. APRA leaders did not want to jeopardize their hard-won *modus vivendi* with the Armed Forces, and attacks by Sendero on Apristas and other civilians as well as military personnel goaded Apristas and other

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<sup>13</sup> An example of popular resistance to these efforts is the reactions of women's organizations in Lima's shantytowns to government efforts to coopt the successful "Glass of Milk" program they had established in alliance with the Municipality of Lima. See Sarah A. Radcliffe, "Así es una mujer del pueblo: Los nuevos grupos de mujeres y el Gobierno de APRA", Working Paper No. 43, Centre of Latin American Studies, Cambridge University, March 1988.

<sup>14</sup> See Parodi 1988, *op cit.*

political leaders into supporting repression. By 1990 over 2,000 people had disappeared and over 15,000 lives had been lost to political violence, more than 3,000 of them in 1989 alone. The majority of these victims were innocent peasants, workers and the urban poor--precisely those groups around which Garcia had fashioned his willing appeal.<sup>15</sup>

With the disastrous outcome of the Garcia government, the United Left was the largest opposition force and thus in a stronger objective position to compete for the presidency in 1990. Indeed, prominent leftist party leaders operated under that assumption over 1985-1990.<sup>16</sup> Yet instead of uniting the left, opposition to the Garcia government exacerbated longstanding weaknesses and conflicts within the front that had been postponed in the interests of electoral victory.

Chapter VIII summarized these major weaknesses. The composition of IU leadership did not correspond to that of the left's social bases, as each party or bloc had an equal quota irrespective of its membership size. Each party and leader retained a separate identity and these often conflicted, while for most of the public the IU remained associated with its popular candidate, Alfonso Barrantes. And although the left had an advantage over the APRA in its roots among labor and popular organizations, there were few channels through which these bases

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<sup>15</sup> See Tolerating Abuses: Violations of Human Rights in Peru, An Americas Watch Report, October 1988; and In Desperate Straits: Human Rights in Peru After a Decade of Democracy and Insurgency, An Americas Watch Report, August 1990.

<sup>16</sup> See "IU se niega definitivamente a concertar con gobierno aprista", La Republica 15 de marzo de 1988, p. 3; and "Izquierda Unida se alista para ser gobierno en 1990", La Republica 26 marzo de 1988, p. 8. The acting leadership of IU produced a public "message to the nation" criticizing Garcia's austerity measures and claiming to be the most viable alternative in 1990.

could influence the entrenched party leadership. The IU had no apparatus to speak of, no regular congresses or internal elections. Between elections there was considerable friction between parties, and between the directorate and the left's best organized social bases.<sup>11</sup>

Over 1985-1990 the longstanding division between "radicals" and "reformists" persisted in IU, revolving around relations with Garcia and response to the growing insurgency and human rights abuses. For many leftists the "honeymoon" with Garcia ended in 1986, with a prison massacre by the Armed Forces of hundreds of suspected terrorists, and the narrow defeat of IU in the municipal elections.<sup>12</sup> These factors, and the unrest that followed the economic downturn in 1987, led the IU's more radical sectors to demand that Barrantes cease his informal conversations with Garcia and assume a more vigorous opposition stance. They also strongly criticized Barrantes' stance on human rights, which involved continued support for the counterinsurgency effort in spite of rights abuses. Finally, the leftist parties in general charged that Barrantes' personalist leadership was stalling the process of institutionalization of IU. Indeed, echoing some Apristas' criticisms of Garcia, PUM Secretary General Diez Canseco charged that Barrantes had

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<sup>11</sup> As IU leader Henry Pease put it in a 1987 interview, "the only channel IU has had to express its positions are the communiques of the National Committee, which is not the way to be an opposition...The most serious criticism we can make of IU is that seven years after it was formed, it hasn't set up even minimal channels through which we can work. In many areas, the non-party people have been badly treated. Those not in parties want an IU founded on grassroots committees. But the parties are scared about this". Interview in Peru Report, July 1987, p. 1-3.

<sup>12</sup> "La tragedia de los penales", QueHacer No. 41, June-July 1986.

reduced IU to "an electoral front around a caudillo".<sup>19</sup>

Faced with mounting internal criticism, Barrantes also resigned from the presidency of IU in 1987. This had several effects. First, it meant that he no longer represented a collective left opposition, and hence any agreements that he might personally reach with Garcia had little standing. Second, with Barrantes gone the other leftist leaders could no longer blame him alone for the IU's lack of organic development or coherent political strategy. And finally, Barrantes' departure revealed just how weak the front was without his arbitration and electoral appeal to hold it together. The various left parties quickly fell into irreparable, open divisions over what opposition strategy to adopt, while general focus on opposition prevented them from presenting coherent policy alternatives.<sup>20</sup>

After Barrantes' departure the radical sectors took dominance within the IU National Directorate Committee. In their view it was imperative for the left to challenge the Shining Path insurgency for popular support through "militant, active opposition tactics, like the general strike, regional struggles...land invasions; to deal with the APRA government from positions of strength, of mobilization."<sup>21</sup> Yet although the radicals also gave high priority to denouncing military human rights abuses, more moderate forces criticized the radicals' for their own ambiguity about the use of violence. Moderates also charged

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<sup>19</sup> Interview in Peru Report, July 1987, pp. 4-6.

<sup>20</sup> See "IU: y ahora que?", QueHacer No. 47, June-July 1987; and "Marcha Forzada", Si, October 26, 1987.

<sup>21</sup> Interview with Diez Canseco, Peru Report op cit., p.5.

that a return to the seventies tactics of general strikes was not realistic in a context of profound economic crisis and political violence, and instead they favored consolidating a democratic socialist alternative with a firm commitment to electoral politics. Ironically, they also criticized Diez Canseco and other radical leaders for tending towards caudillista behavior of their own.<sup>22</sup> Eventually, one sector of moderates left the front to form a separate organization (Acuerdo Socialista), which ran candidates against IU in the 1989 municipal elections and supported Barrantes for President against an IU candidate in the 1990 general election. Yet all the internal conflict and public discord suggested to the electorate the real incapacity of the left leadership to take charge of the country, and both options were rejected by the public. Indeed, despite a decade of political evolution, the left ended up in virtually the same position it began in 1980--divided and defeated.

By 1990, therefore, the Peruvian public faced another vacuum of political representation. This time the Presidency was contested by two political novices--the popular novelist Mario Vargas Llosa, leading a rightist backlash movement (FREDEMO) with a clear neo-liberal policy agenda and with prominent members of the business and political establishment; and Alberto Fujimori y Fujimori, an agronomist and university professor with no concrete program, no party base, a centrist message and a campaign of vigorous rejection of Peru's entire political

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<sup>22</sup> A number of former PUM members left that party over 1987 and 1988, including the popular Mayor of Villa El Salvador Michel Azcueta, in protest over what they say was "verbal radicalism" combined with alleged caudillismo on the part of that party's leadership. "Marcha forzada", Si, op sit, p. 17; La Republica September 1988.

elite. Fujimori won by a landslide.<sup>23</sup>

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Despite the emergence of a new left, right and center, Peru in the 1980s did not generate a truly representative party system nor consolidate any of the other principle institutional foundations of a democratic regime. The structural weakening of the interest groups and popular organizations upon which the APRA and left originally drew contributed to the parties' decline, but this was exacerbated by their strategic choices and errors. The fact that the leading candidates for both the 1989 municipal elections and the 1990 Presidential race were non-politicians with anti-party messages revealed the public's dissatisfaction with a political elite that was incapable of reaching a minimum consensus and resolving the nation's pressing economic and social problems. Hence time and again, the public turned to charismatic individuals--Belaunde, Barrantes, Garcia, Fujimori--with populist, centrist appeal and promises of bold policy change. With shrinking economies and without channels of negotiation or concertacion, these governments inevitably failed, producing a cycle of economic and social crisis and public disillusionment that led some to elect new "saviors", and others to sympathize with more violent alternatives. The final chapter will attempt to analyze and explain this outcome in comparative perspective.

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<sup>23</sup> An excellent analysis of the 1990 election is Carlos Ivan Degregori and Romeo Grompone, Elecciones 1990: Demonios y redentores en el nuevo Peru. Una tragedia en dos vueltas (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1991).

## CHAPTER IX

### Conclusions: Democratization and Populism Reconsidered

When this study was initiated in 1985 there was considerable agreement in Latin America about the need to address issues of social equity simultaneously with the establishment of new political rules and institutions, if the region's new democracies were expected to last. In that context "social democracy"--broadly understood as the pursuit of equity and social justice within the parameters of a capitalist economy and political democracy--was a predominant goal of radicals and reformers alike. Hence I began this case study with general questions about what types of political organization, alliances and strategies might overcome the tremendous structural obstacles to social democratization in this region. I also asked whether a new social democratic project could avoid the weaknesses and contradictions that have plagued Latin American populism in the past.

Today the terms of debate in and about Latin America have narrowed considerably. In countries as crisis-ridden as Argentina, Peru and Brazil the central question now is whether any form of democracy can survive. Where political democracy is better established, as in Venezuela, Uruguay and possibly Chile, it remains largely an elite-directed enterprise. Furthermore, across the continent the failure of heterodox, equity-oriented economic policies have brought a return to orthodox liberal economic tenets, despite their regressive distributive effects and other social costs. Latin America's democratic socialists have largely been defeated or, as in Chile, have joined this dominant policy consensus.

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See Ignacio Walker, Socialismo y Democracia: Chile y Europa en perspectiva comparada (Santiago: CIEPLAN-Hachette, 1990).



Despite these changes, my initial discussion of social democracy remains extremely useful in understanding the failure of such a project. Indeed, I would argue that the same inability to construct social democracy explains the rise of the populist forms documented here. At the same time, in light of these research findings and of a growing body of comparative analysis, I believe the conceptual discussion needs to be elaborated in two ways. First of all, it is unfortunate but true that the simultaneous conquest of political and social democracy is difficult if not impossible to attain in the contemporary Latin American context. But might a "stages" approach still be possible--establishing political democracy first and then gradually expanding it to the social and economic realms? To answer this, we must take a closer look at the relationship between inherited structural conditions, modes of regime transition, and the types of democracy that ultimately result. Second, I believe it is important to further clarify the distinction between the phenomenon that I call "populism" in this study, and previous Latin American populist regimes, and to point out why the consequences of this version may be even more unfortunate. This chapter will address both of these issues, and trace the general conclusions of this case study in a comparative perspective.

#### Democratic Transition and Consolidation

Chapter I pointed out that while there may be no definitive structural preconditions for democracy, the lessons of European social democracy indicate that this political form has thrived under the following conditions: (1) where it has been built in stages, establishing political democracy first and then undertaking broader

social and economic reforms; (2) where the democracy has clear "rules of the game" accepted by all participants; (3) where workers and other popular sectors are well organized, and (4) linked to mass-based, multi-class parties; and (5) where there is a clear social democratic program by the ruling party or coalition that could gain the cooperation of other relevant actors.

What does it take, therefore, to build and expand political democracy in Latin America? Several recent comparative analyses underscore the importance of the regime change process per se, while bearing in mind that the choices, strategies and alliances constructed during this process are conditioned in part by inherited structures.<sup>2</sup>

A comprehensive review of recent regime changes across Latin America and Europe, by Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter, is particularly useful for placing this case study in perspective. The authors define four general modes of transition--pact, imposition, reform and revolution--and argue that these modes, to a significant extent, determine what types of democracy will emerge, whether or not these will be consolidated, and what the long-range social consequences will be.<sup>3</sup> In this scheme, a pact is when relevant political and economic elites reach a formal compromise among themselves on the terms of regime change, and is exemplified by the recent experiences of Spain

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<sup>2</sup> See Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America", Comparative Politics No., October 1990; Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe", International Social Science Journal No. 128, May 1991; and Adam Przeworski, "Transitions to Democracy", draft chapter, The University of Chicago, October 27, 1990.

<sup>3</sup> Karl and Schmitter, op cit, p. 269.

and Uruguay, as well as the Venezuelan Pact of Punto Fijo in 1958. Imposition is when dominant elites (generally the military) use force to largely determine the conditions of transition to civilian rule, as was the case in Ecuador, Brazil, Paraguay and Turkey. Reform is when masses mobilize from below to impose a compromised outcome, without resort to violence, while revolution is when mobilized masses defeat the previous authoritarian regime militarily, as in the cases of Mexico, Cuba and Nicaragua. Of course, many regime changes lie in between these modes, or change over time, as in the Peruvian case described here and the recent Chilean transition. In Chile a plebiscite originally imposed by General Pinochet in 1988 touched off a process that escaped the regime's control and resulted in a pacted transition with an alliance of all opposition parties.<sup>4</sup>

A principal, and sobering, conclusion from this study is that mass pressure, whether revolutionary or reformist, has rarely led to the consolidation of democracy. In fact, Karl and Schmitter note that "the prevailing ideal of peaceful pressure from below through mobilization of excluded groups which compels ruling groups to gradually expand democratic rights" has more often backfired, bringing a return to authoritarian rule as in Guatemala in 1946-1954 or Allende's Chile.<sup>5</sup> Instead, the paths that have most often led to the establishment of some type of political democracy, not only in Latin America but worldwide, have been "transitions from above", either through pact or imposition.

Furthermore, comparative experience suggests that the democracies

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<sup>4</sup> Karl and Schmitter, p. 277.

<sup>5</sup> *ibid*, p. 280.

which have been consolidated in contemporary Latin America and Western Europe--ie, those in which the structures and processes of democratic representation and accountability are well established--share a tendency to pact-making. In these cases there have generally been strong elite actors who are able to forge explicit (although not always public) agreements that define the rules of governance and that protect the interests--political, economic, social, institutional--of those involved. While there are some fairly consolidated democracies that do not fit this exact path, they have eventually moved to a form of pact-making which has been a crucial turning point. Such was the case in Costa Rica in 1948, where an opposition party militarily defeated the governing party in a brief civil war, but then shifted to pact-making to lay the foundation for a new democracy. The smooth transition in Chile, thus far has also been attributed to the shift from confrontation to elite pact-making.

To be successful such agreements have been fairly inclusive, involving genuine representatives of virtually all politically relevant actors and interests, including labor and business, the Armed Forces, and the major contending political parties. (Hence the recent Brazilian transition, where political pacts among traditional elites were largely controlled by the outgoing military regime, has perpetuated the undemocratic nature of the Brazilian state, rather than leading to strong democratic institutions and practices).<sup>5</sup> At the same time, even

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<sup>5</sup> See Frances Hagobian, "Democracy by Undemocratic Means? Elites, Political Pacts, and Regime Transition in Brazil", Comparative Political Studies Vol. 23, No. 2, July 1990, pp. 147-170.

the more inclusive pacts are highly undemocratic, as they are explicitly aimed at restricting the scope of representation and policy debate and demobilizing mass actors, in order to reassure those involved--especially the military and influential business interests--that their vital interests will be respected under the new regime. Many analysts and activists would argue that such undemocratic means are justified if the result is a relatively stable and lasting political democracy. But can these democracies eventually expand to incorporate new actors and interests, and extend the principles of democracy beyond elections and parliamentary structures, to broader social and economic realms?

While it is too early to pass final judgement on Latin America's recent democracies, comparative experience would suggest a fundamental dilemma. On one hand, many would argue that the ability of a coalition of representative leaders to establish democratic institutions and practices facilitates their dealing with inherited social and economic problems, and that because such pacts are not irreversible the people can democratically vote to undermine--or expand--them at a future date. On the other hand, pacted transitions to date have produced fairly restricted types of democracy. This was clearly the case in Brazil, but the same has been argued about such "model" democracies as Venezuela, where Karl stresses that despite initial progress in land reform and income distribution, the political and economic pacts institutionalized a conservative bias into the polity that has blocked

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This is argued by Przeworski, op cit, and by Guillermo O'Donnell in "Delegative Democracy?", draft paper prepared for the meeting of the "East and South System Transformation" Project, Budapest, December 1990.

further progress towards political, social and economic democratization.<sup>3</sup> In Chile, too, the price exacted by Pinochet and his allies in exchange for leaving power included a highly authoritarian new Constitution, the granting of considerable power and autonomy to the Armed Forces, a partial amnesty for alleged human rights abusers, a third of the Congress allied with Pinochet, and a Supreme Court and public administration also largely designated by the dictatorship. All of this poses serious constraints for the democratization process. Public efforts to modify the authoritarian Constitution have been thwarted, as have efforts to overturn a self-amnesty declared by the military in Uruguay.<sup>4</sup> Alternatively, although reform and revolution from below have brought about significant social-structural changes in some cases, to date they have not produced democratic political institutions or practices, and their capacity to assure citizens' welfare (and correct major policy errors) over the longer run has been hindered by this fact.

To put this dilemma in perspective, however, we must note that the most problematic and unfortunate cases have been those in which

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<sup>3</sup> Terry Lynn Karl, "The Transition to Democracy in Venezuela", in O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 198.

<sup>4</sup> See Manuel A. Garreton, "La transición chilena (una evaluación provisoria)", FLACSO Documento de Trabajo, Serie Estudios Políticos, No. 8, enero de 1991; Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, "Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe: (With Reflections on Latin America and Eastern Europe)", paper to be delivered to the conference on "Problems of Democratic Consolidation: Spain and the New Southern Europe", Madrid, July 6-8, 1990, p. 47-50; and Przeworski, op cit., pp. 29-30.

there was no leading coalition and no clear, dominant strategy for regime change. These include Peru, Argentina and Greece.<sup>11</sup> In these countries there were elements of imposition by the previous military regime, as well as considerable mobilization by urban masses and some resort to violence. But elite agreements (such as that between APRA and the military) were narrow and short-lived, the elites involved were not adequately representative, and they eventually lost control of the process. However, mass organizations were also unable to successfully impose a coherent new strategy or effective set of alternative leaders. The democracies that have resulted are what I have called "populist". They are strongly majoritarian, with power concentrated in a charismatic President (or Prime Minister) who is largely non-accountable to other institutions or interests, and they pursue initially populist economic policies. At the same time, in these cases the institutions of state and civil society are extremely weak, fragmented, and unrepresentative. The outcome has been a cycle of economic crisis and political instability that has prevented both the consolidation of minimal democratic institutions and the rectification of longstanding socioeconomic problems, and that has had a disastrous impact on the lives of the majority of citizens.

Why have some countries been able to achieve pacted transitions, while others experience these populist cycles? This case study and comparative experience suggest that the outcome is influenced by inherited structures--economic, social and political--and by the conjunctural political economy at the time of regime transition. But the

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<sup>11</sup> See Karl and Schmitter, op cit., p. 277 and 281.

Peruvian case also illustrates how political choice, strategy and alliances (or the lack thereof) can reinforce such inherited constraints, and create new barriers, especially during the regime change process and the initial years of a new regime.

### The Peruvian Case

This study has examined the efforts of the APRA party and the marxist left to forge alternative democratic left projects in Peru over the last decade and a half, in a context of transition from military to civilian rule and persistent economic crisis. Chapter II laid out the historical-structural factors that made Peru an unlikely case for the establishment of democracy well into the 1960s. These included profound ethnic and class inequality, continued dependency on a primary export sector dominated by foreign capital, a land tenure system that sustained a small oligarchy while denying livelihood to the large indigenous population, a disperse working class and small organized labor movement, and an elitist political structure that denied representation to the majority of Peruvians. This chapter also underscored the ways in the past alliances and strategies of the APRA party, long Peru's primary reform movement, further limited democratization and created a lasting resistance to pactismo among other democratic and progressive forces.

Chapters III through V nonetheless underscored how important structural changes in the 1970s reduced some of the most important barriers to democratization, and produced key political elements considered necessary for a social democratic strategy. These include a mass "popular movement" and a new political left, which was based on an increased number of trade unions and new grassroots social organizations



and which played a key role in Peru's successful transition from authoritarian military rule to elected government. They also include the establishment of new "rules of the game" through a Constituent Assembly and electoral laws, which offered unprecedented opportunities for a democratic left. Due to shift in balance of power towards the popular movement and the left, issues of human rights, social justice and economic policy alternatives were all included on the political agenda. Furthermore, Latin America's oldest nationalist reform party and the region's largest legal marxist left emerged as the main contenders to represent this popular movement politically in the 1980s. Each of them developed a new social democratic discourse and program, drawing on a long tradition of indigenous socialist and nationalist thinking, and they faced little competition from the political right.

Nevertheless, this study also demonstrates that other conditions have clearly hindered a social democratic outcome, and indeed, the consolidation of minimal structures of political democracy. First, while labor and popular organization played a fundamental role in the transition process, they remained relatively weak. Their links with the political parties were fraught with difficulties, and the deepening economic crisis and militarization of the late 1980s further undermined their organizational strength. Second, the parties themselves had difficulty shaping the transition process and representing diverse popular demands in the political arena. The only real transition "pacts" achieved were between APRA and the military, and the APRA and PPC during part of the Constituyente, both which were narrow and short-lived. As Chapter V describes, the parties lacked clarity about the

importance of the Constituent Assembly and could reach no common agreement on the basic political and economic foundations for Peru. Instead, they pursued narrow sectarian goals, approving contradictory rules that exacerbated authoritarian and populist tendencies and ultimately hurt their future development. The weakness and fragmentation of each ultimately resulted in the reelection of Fernando Belaunde in 1980, an aging populist whose government was a far cry from a step towards social democracy.

The rapid decline of the Belaunde government created another opportunity for an alternative nationalist and social democratic reform project, and the APRA and the United Left vied to represent this. However, as Chapters VII and VIII explain, the achievement of new leadership and electoral success on both sides did not erase deeper problems inherited from past years. Instead, over the 1980s the APRA and IU remained unable to capitalize on their respective strengths, build effective, representative party organizations, or reach basic programmatic accords--either within each party or with each other. Nor did most party leaders have the firm links with social groups that would enable them to deliver their potential constituencies in any negotiation attempts. Riddled with authoritarianism and sectarianism, increasingly distant from popular organizations and their concrete demands, they ultimately redefined themselves around contending electoral personalities--Alan Garcia and Alfonso Barrantes--rather than organizations or programs. The weakness of the party system created a persistent "representation gap", between the institutions of the state on one hand and the diverse interests of civil society on the other,

which meant that potential forces for a more social democracy could not be effectively channeled. This gap, in turn, contributed to the recurrence of what I have called "populism" as a dominant political form--exemplified by but not limited to Garcia--and to the cycles of social and economic crisis that characterized Peru by 1990.

#### Populism Reconsidered

Ultimately, this study concludes that instead of being a specific stage in dependent-capitalist development in Latin America, populism may be a general and recurring response to crisis--to economic crisis and to a crisis of authority or representation--in a context of severe inequality as in Peru. It also suggests that although social democratic goals may resurface, without effective democratic political structures and processes of representation, such populist tendencies may continue to prevail.

Examining this case in a more comparative light, however, it is important to elaborate the ways in which what I have been calling "populism" is similar to, and distinct from, previous Latin American populist regimes. Indeed, in hindsight I am tempted to call this version neo-populism, in order to clarify the distinction. This populism is a form of democracy, although not a liberal one. As in the past, it emerges in a stressful socioeconomic situation and a vacuum of traditional political leadership; is predominantly urban, multi-class and electoral; and is characterized by vertical and personalist authority relations between charismatic leaders and popular masses, above and beyond existing party and interest organizations. As in the past, these populist leaders also pursue contradictory economic policies

that are intended to benefit the working classes, but that end up virtually destroying the national economy and undermining the welfare of those sectors they initially aimed to help. These leaders also share the same fervent rhetoric, majoritarian and personalist leadership style, and disdain for the institutions and processes of liberal, representative democracy as their predecessors.

On the other hand, this neo-populism differs from its predecessors in terms of the external and internal political economy, and its impact on the political arena. Populism in the past greatly expanded the activity of the state "to incorporate new sectors of the working class in a process of accelerated industrialization through ameliorative redistributive measures".<sup>11</sup> Although operating under scarce resources, leaders such as Peron in Argentina, Vargas in Brazil, and Cardenas in Mexico left a legacy of reforms--such as expanded suffrage, unionization, public education and social security--for sectors of the urban working and middle classes. While such achievements were often overshadowed by the macroeconomic mismanagement and crisis that followed, they extended participation in national life to previously marginalized groups, left a precedent for future popular demands, and also froze political loyalty to the populist leaders (and generally to their parties) for years to come.<sup>12</sup>

In contrast, today's neo-populism emerges in a distinctly more unfavorable context, with shrinking national economies and drastically

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<sup>11</sup> Paul W. Drake, "Conclusion: Requiem for Populism?", in Conniff, ed., *op cit*, p. 218.

<sup>12</sup> Drake, *op cit*., p. 236.

limited resources to distribute. Import-substituting industrialization is generally not a development option, and reliance on more traditional export bases, fragile and highly competitive international markets, and limited international finances (as well as persistent external debt burdens) further limit social policy options. The result may be very short-lived experiments with heterodoxy and "social emergency programs", as in the case of Garcia, but not broader reforms. Furthermore, beyond the rhetoric, the political legacy has been distinctly non-incorporating and has not mobilized new popular sectors beyond election day. Instead, these experiences have undermined existing labor and popular organization as well as party structures. If anything, the depth of the economic crisis and despair at the lack of alternatives is greater today than it was in decades past.

This phenomenon is not confined to Peru. In a recent draft article drawing on the experiences of Argentina and Brazil as well as Peru, Guillermo O'Donnell points out the same phenomenon I call neo-populism and terms it "delegative democracy", in explicit contrast to representative democracy.<sup>1</sup> As he puts it, this form has one basic premise--he who wins a majority in Presidential elections is delegated full authority to govern the country as he sees fit. The President embodies the national interest, and although he may emerge from a particular party, he appeals to the public above party structures. The public is mobilized to vote and cheer, but otherwise remains passively on the sidelines. The idea of accountability to any institutions--including Congress and the Judiciary, as well as organized interests--is

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<sup>1</sup> O'Donnell 1990, op cit.

seen as an unnecessary impediment to the President's policy-making powers. Indeed, it is the principle of accountability which most differentiates this form from representative democracy. O'Donnell also cites the historical continuity and persistence of this form of politics:

"Whether it is called culture, tradition or historically-structured learning, the caudillista tendencies toward delegative democracy are easily detectible in most Latin American countries long before the present social and economic crisis...This conception of rule has been theorized as a chapter in the study of authoritarian regimes, under names such as caesarism, bonapartism, caudillismo, and (the Latin American variant of) populism. But we may need to see this type of rule also as an eventually enduring democratic form. On the other hand,...it would be hard to find something that is more uncongenial, if not hostile, to the building and strengthening of democratic political institutions".<sup>4</sup>

As I argued above, the emergence and persistence of this form is explained by a combination of structural and conjunctural factors, political choices and strategies. In examining the cases of Argentina, Brazil and Peru, O'Donnell stresses economic structure and conjuncture--particularly the degree of social inequality, and the severity of the economic crisis inherited from the previous regime. Yet he also points out how the nature of delegative democracies have exacerbated inequality and crisis, resulting in unmitigated economic and social disasters. This form of politics also results in a tragic cycle that goes something like this: a growing economic crisis creates a sense of urgency, and neo-populist leaders get elected to "save the country" with magic policy formulas and strong political will. While the President may desire a sweeping reform project, the task quickly becomes one of economic

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid, p. 12.

stabilization, addressed through dramatic economic plans and "packages"--Austral, Cruzado, Inti--which nonetheless do not solve the inherited problems and eventually fail. As in the case of Garcia, a key element of this failure is that these democracies are singularly unable to generate the kind of political and social pacts that could make more gradual, cautious policy-making and policies of sacrifice work. Although the Executive may complain about the "selfishness" of business and labor, such accords are blocked by the very structure of this democracy. The crisis thus returns and no one takes responsibility for it except the President, who is soon excoriated by the very forces that swept him into power. Remarkably, however, the cycle continues. One president fails, but in the absence of alternative structures and processes, hope remains for another "savior", and another one generally emerges, defeating the current president by promising a complete overhaul of existing policies...only to immediately reenter this self-defeating cycle.<sup>2</sup>

Why have some countries--Spain, Uruguay, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and apparently Chile--escaped this drama and constructed smooth, pacted transitions? This involves a combination of structure, conjuncture and political will. In most cases they inherited stronger economies, and in the Venezuelan case there were oil revenues, which facilitated a pact-making process and consensual policy-making. Some, such as Chile and Uruguay, also share a past legacy of democratic institutions; as they redemocratized, they were able to revive past structures and practices, while others had to start anew. Indeed, the Uruguayans did not inherit

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<sup>2</sup> See O'Donnell, p. 20, and my postscript on the Garcia period.

a healthy economy, but O'Donnell attributes their smooth transition to the existence of political checks and balances--the Uruguayan parliament must approve economic policy and all "packages" of measures are publicly debated and modified.<sup>5</sup> The duration of the dictatorship and the demise of radical alternatives also convinced the polarized Chilean opposition to form a common democratic accord.

What will it take for Peru--and other neo-populist or "delegative" democracies--to break out of this cycle? Can political elites, and key actors in civil society, reverse this self-defeating pattern? One message from comparative experience is that there is always potential for strategy and choice. Indeed, a new generation of leaders is emerging within the region's parties, popular organizations and intellectual circles, that has a growing consciousness of the contradictions of populism. There are also emerging social movements, such as those defending basic human rights, and the rights of women and other disadvantaged groups--that value the institutions and principles of democracy as goals in themselves, rather than simply demanding a distribution of economic goods that are not available. And the regional trend towards democratic rule--however narrow and fragile--has brought increased interaction among the region's political and civic leaders, with greater potential for shared learning. Of course, new consciousness and shared lessons cannot immediately alter entrenched structural constraints and political barriers. But they can lead to the new strategies and organizations that are necessary to build more viable forms of democracy and social justice in the future.

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<sup>5</sup> *ibid*, p. 19.



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